BEATITUDE

A Commentary on St. Thomas' Theological Summa, Ia IIae, qq.1-54

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

The Nature of Moral Theology

The second part of the *Summa* begins with a prologue which outlines the purpose and scope of what is now called moral theology. Hence we dwell here, first on the nature of moral theology, and secondly on its divisions.

The word "image" (in the phrase "image of God") signifies man as endowed with intellect, free will, and self-mastery. Hence, having treated of God, who is man's exemplar, we now proceed to consider God's image, man, namely, who is the source of his own deeds, since he has free will and mastery of self.[1]

What a sublime conception of moral theology! God's liberty in creation is the prototype of man's free activities.

In the first part of the *Summa,* the Saint, treating of God's creatures, had shown how man is the imperfect image of God, since, like God, man can know and love himself, thus representing not only the divine nature, but also the divine Trinity. Now he proceeds to show that man is God's image, not only by his higher faculties, but also in his free activities, whereby he knows and loves not only himself, but also God, as God knows and loves Himself. This knowledge and love are indeed the final goal of all human life. But even here on earth a saint differs from his fellows by that love wherewith he loves not only himself, but God. From this sublime viewpoint moral theology is the science of imitating God. It produces a more and more perfect likeness of man to God. And this likeness would be man's goal even if God had not become man.

[1] Q.93.

But how much more perfect is this likeness when imitation of God has become imitation of Christ!

A more scholastic description of moral theology can be found in the first part: [2] "Although theology is more speculative than practical, it is nevertheless practical, in its treatment of human acts, by which man is led to perfect knowledge of God wherein lies eternal blessedness." Again, in the second question, outlining the entire *Summa,* he says: "We will speak first of God, secondly of man's journey to God, thirdly of Christ who, as man, is our road to God."

Thus moral theology may be defined as that part of theology which, guided by revelation, studies human acts as the road to man's supernatural goal. Or, more briefly: a theological treatise which guides human acts to man's supernatural goal.

Moral theology, then, stands on a higher level than natural ethics. Natural ethics guides man to his last natural goal, which consists, not in the beatific vision and supernatural love, but in the knowledge, perfect but abstract, of God as the author of nature, and in the consequent natural love of God above all else. Ethics, properly speaking, does not deal with man as the image of the triune God. In the definition given above, many theologians avoid the phrase "that part of theology," substituting for it "that branch of knowledge." Hence arises the following question: Does moral theology differ specifically from dogmatic theology?

The distinction of moral and dogma became distinct in the *Summa.* But some later theologians, Vasquez, for example, maintained that moral and dogma are not two parts of one science, but two distinct sciences. In line with this tendency, moral theology, ignoring dogmatic questions (e.g., grace, merit, the nature of infused virtue), often became a casuistic treatise. In our view, casuistry is but an inferior exemplification, just as asceticism and mysticism are superior exemplifications, of moral theology.

[2] Q. 1, a. 4.

Are dogma and moral two distinct branches of knowledge? To this question our answer must be negative: theology is one science, not many. The proof follows.

Scientific unity arises from unity in subject matter and viewpoint. Now all things discussed in theology belong to one and the same subject matter, God, and are approached from one and the same viewpoint, revelation. When theology does speak of creatures, it speaks of them only in their relation to God, and draws its conclusions from the viewpoint of revelation.

St. Thomas writes: Sacred doctrine remaining one, includes the subject matter of all philosophic sciences, because it sees them under the light of its own viewpoint. Hence, whereas one philosophic science is speculative and another practical, sacred doctrine is both speculative and practical, just as God, by one and the same act, knows both Himself and His works. But theology, since it treats principally of God and only secondarily of human acts, is more speculative than practical. It deals with human acts as leading to that perfect knowledge of God which is eternal blessedness.[3]

Dogma and moral, then, are but two parts, two branches, of one and the same science. In each, under one and the same light of revelation, the viewpoint is God: God either in Himself, or as efficient and exemplary source, or lastly, as the end, purpose, and goal of our life.

Now God as God, as Deity, is an object higher than that reality which is the object of metaphysics, higher than moral good which is the object of ethics. Here appears the wonderful hierarchy of knowledge: division below, unity on high. Theology, imprinted on the created mind by God, rises on high above philosophy and history, and is subordinated only to the uncreated mind of God.

It follows, then, that to consider dogma and moral as two sciences is to ignore the sublimity and simplicity of moral theology. Separated from dogma, reduced to casuistry, under

[3] Ia, q.1, a.4

a kind of materialistic and statistic tendency, moral theology loses its native elevation and dignity.

Here follow two corollaries. First corollary. Physical science has many integral parts: mechanics, hydrostatics, hydrodynamics, acoustics, optics, thermodynamics. Theology, too, remains one science, notwithstanding the distinctions, that between positive theology and systematic theology, and that between dogmatic theology and moral theology.

Positive theology has three integral parts:

a) biblical, which assembles truths revealed in Holy Scripture;

b) patristic, which expounds the teaching of the Holy Fathers;

c) symbolic, which examines ecclesiastical creeds, definitions, and declarations.

Systematic theology has two integral parts:

a) dogmatic, which discourses on the articles of faith: God, creation, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the sacraments, the four last things;

b) moral, which deals with human acts in relation to man's supernatural goal. Mystical theology, and ascetical, and casuistic, are subdivisions of moral theology. Here a brief word on this distinction.

Moral theology is concerned with the laws of Christian life, with the virtues, gifts, and sin. But it deals with universal principles and does not, as does prudence, descend to particular applications.

Casuistic theology solves questions of conscience, and distinguishes degrees of obligation. Its tendency is negative, the avoidance of sin, rather than positive, the cultivation of virtue. It is not really distinguished from prudence, since prudence is the source of a correct and secure conscience.

Ascetical theology teaches the road of Christian perfection in its beginning and progress, by laying down practical rules toward active purification and advance in virtue.

Mystical theology shows how the soul may reach the unitive

life, by passive purification and contemplation. Secondarily it treats also of extraordinary contemplative graces. On this mystical level, moral theology merges with dogma, with Scripture and tradition, with the Word of God, whence all theology proceeds. Beginning and end coincide. The circle is closed. Unity is preserved.

Second corollary. Deep knowledge of moral and mystical theology presupposes deep knowledge of dogmatic theology, on predestination, say, and on grace. Specialization does indeed have its place, particularly in the lower sciences, mathematics, say, in physics, and biology. But specialization can be perilous in that highest science which is one and indivisible.

A doubt may here arise. Why does St. Thomas place moral theology (his second part) between his two dogmatic parts (first and third)? Why, in particular, does he place it before the treatise on the Redemption and the Incarnation? Would it not be better to treat all dogmatic questions first? Should not theology teach imitation, not of God only, but also of Christ?

To this difficulty, two answers:

1. The Incarnation presupposes not only the creation of man, but also the relation of man to God as man's supernatural goal. Even if God had not decreed the Incarnation, the moral law would still exist. God, without decreeing the Incarnation, could have created angels and men in the state of grace, in the supernatural order. The moral law, natural and supernatural, arises necessarily from nature elevated by grace. These indestructible moral truths, on the final goal, on human acts, on grace and infused virtue, on sin—these truths are presuppositions of Redemption from sin.

2. Further, when you speak of the virtues in Christ, you must first know the nature of virtue. Thus the Master of the *Sentences,* since he has no explicit moral treatise, has to deal by occasion with the virtues when writing on Christ. Hence we need not wonder that St. Thomas, proceeding specula-

tively, distinguishes three parts: first, God; second, the rational creature's movement to God; third, Christ, who, as man, is our road to God. But St. Thomas, too, in treating the sacrament of penance, deals with the virtue of penance, with grace as specifically Christian, with carrying the cross in penitential spirit. Thus he shows again that dogma and moral are not two sciences, but one. Yet in practice it is good to expound dogma entirely before beginning moral.

CHAPTER II

Divisions of Moral Theology

The first division is that between a) moral in general (I–II), and b) moral in particular (II–II). Why this distinction? "The goal determines the road." The final goal, first in intention though last in attainment, must be treated before we study the roads that lead to that end. Thus there arise four chief divisions:

A. The final goal:

1. the final goal in general;
2. blessedness, i.e., attainment of the goal.

B. Human acts in themselves:

1. those characteristic of man

a) generically (voluntary and involuntary; circumstances);

b) specifically, (1) in relation to the goal (to will, to intend, to enjoy); (2) as to means employed (to consent, to choose, to command, to use); (3) in relation to morality.

2. those common to man and beast, i.e., the passions

a) generically (their subject, their differences, their good and evil, their order of succession);

b) specifically, as found in the concupiscible passions (love, hate, desire, joy, aversion, sadness) and in the irascible passions (hope, despair, fear, audacity, anger).

C. Sources of human acts:

1. intrinsic sources (habits in general, virtues and gifts, vices and sins);
2. extrinsic principles

a) God, by His Law (law in general, natural law, the Old Law, the New Law);

b) God, by grace (its necessity, essence and divisions; its cause; its effects).

D. Human acts in particular:

1. theological virtues and correlative gifts;
2. cardinal virtues and correlative virtues and gifts;
3. states of life, state of perfection, charismatic graces.

This distribution is marked by perfect and progressive order. This division is contrasted with that of previous authors and with that of subsequent authors.

The chief Scriptural sources of moral theology are (a) the Decalogue, (b) the Sermon on the Mount. In this sermon Jesus proclaims, in all its sublimity, the New Law of love which fulfills the Old Law of fear. The New Law penetrates into man's interior, eschews even internal sins, commends purity of intention, urges imitation of God: Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect. Not perfect like the angels, but perfect like God, since men have received participation, not in angelic nature, but in divine nature.[1]

Patristic sources of moral theology are found, first, in commentaries on the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, the Gospels, and the epistles of St. Paul; secondly, in special treatises on particular duties and virtues; thirdly, in oratorical and ascetic exhortations on the full round of Christian morality. To illustrate. Clement of Alexandria; Tertullian (too rigid, does not clearly distinguish precepts from counsels); St. Cyprian and Lactantius; the Cappadocians; St. Ambrose (his *De Officiis,* suggested by a Ciceronian title, but moving on a higher level); St. Augustine (on the theological virtues, on chastity and matrimony). Last, not least, St. Gregory the Great, who, in his commentary (not scholastic, but allegorical) on the book of Job, gave to medieval ascetics a full treatise of moral theology.

The first scholastic treatise is that of St. John Damascene, who wrote the first *Summa.* Its three parts are:

[1] Ia-IIae, q. 107.

1. a philosophical introduction (findings of the pagans);
2. heresies (a general exposition);
3. the orthodox faith, in three subdivisions: first, on God; second, on creatures; third, on Christ and His sacraments. The emphasis throughout is on dogma. Moral questions are treated as occasion offers.

Peter the Lombard, whose *Sentences* remained the textbook until the sixteenth century, follows the third division of St. John Damascene. Peter's general division, differing notably from that of St. Thomas, seems to be based on the human will, and thus to be a division of moral theology. Yet, in fact, he assigns no special part for moral questions, intermingling them with dogmatic questions.

His general division, based on two acts of the will, namely, to use and to enjoy, has three chief parts: (a) things to be enjoyed (God, One and Triune); (b) things to be used (creatures as means to attain the vision of God; (c) things to be both enjoyed and used (the humanity of Christ, the sacraments, the angels and the saints).

The chief moral questions he discusses are found, first, in his treatise on the first man, where he dwells on grace, on sin, on virtue and merit, on the acts of the will. Secondly, in his treatise on Christ, where he dwells on faith, hope, and charity, on the cardinal virtues, on the seven gifts, on the Ten Commandments, on lying and perjury, on the Old Law and the New. Thirdly, in his treatise on the sacraments, where he discourses on heaven, purgatory, and hell.

Alexander of Hales, who retains Peter's division and method, shows progress beyond his master, but is still very imperfect.

The innovation introduced by St. Thomas is twofold. First he treats of God in Himself, God as the first reality, God in three persons, God as Creator, before he turns to consider God as the goal that is good and draws man to Himself. "Reality comes before goodness." Goodness is founded on reality, is

a characteristic of reality. Goodness is reality, reality is perfect and desirable. Goodness is counterfeit unless it is founded on genuine reality.

Secondly St. Thomas assigns a second and special part to moral, and treats this part scientifically, not oratorically. Thus he lays a solid foundation for casuistry, for ascetic and mystic theology, proceeding systematically from the universal to the particular.

Historians, then, are right when they say that St. Thomas was the first who systematized ethics, individual and social. See as illustration his treatment of justice, and of prudence, political, economic, and military. His social ideas deserve deeper study today.

The work of St. Thomas was, we say, an innovation. But it was not a revolution. It was the normal development of the union between tradition and that perennial philosophy which prepares theologians to proceed scientifically in matters of faith and morals.

Yet three centuries elapsed before this great innovation conquered the schools. Until the end of the sixteenth century, the textbook in all schools, Dominican schools included, was that of the Lombard. See the commentaries on the *Sentences,* from Capreolus to Soto.

Cajetan and Koelin were the first to comment on the *Summa.* Yet this happy innovation made slow headway in the schools, and did not have, even on noted authors, the influence it deserved. Let us look cursorily at these authors.

1. St. Raymond of Pennafort (thirteenth century) wrote a casuistic guide for confessors. He was followed by many others.

2. St. Antonine, O.P., archbishop of Florence, wrote a *Summa* of moral theology. His method is ascetic, and he does not always follow the doctrine of St. Thomas. A comparative study of the two saints would be useful.

3. Mystic treatment of moral questions appears in Eckhart, Tauler, Suso, Gerson, and Thomas a Kempis.

4. When commentaries on St. Thomas replaced those on the Lombard, many authors wrote moral *Summas:*

a) Cajetan, who had written a casuistic *Summa,* on sins.

b) Many commented on the second part of the *Summa:* Victoria, Medina, Dominic Soto, Peter Soto, Ledesma, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Suarez, Lugo, Gonet, Alexander Natalis, Billuart. Billuart's treatment, like that of many others, is both scholastic and casuistic, while others (e.g., the Salmanticenses) keep the two methods separated. Concina and Patuzzi, two Thomists, contended strongly against probabilism. Many religious of various orders, also many diocesan priests, wrote commentaries on the *Summa.*

5. The two centuries from 1650 to 1850 were devoted to casuistry. Many authors in this period omit all doctrinal questions. Many deal almost exclusively with practical questions: the law, conscience, probable conscience, cases of conscience, the limits of obligation. Moral theology is the science rather of avoiding sin than of cultivating virtue. This casuistic method, inefficacious in urging men to lead good lives, tends to laxism. Asceticism and mysticism lack foundation. Many treatises, ascetic and mystic, have simply no doctrinal value.

6. But during this period there appeared a man, sent by God to remedy the evils of casuistry. This man was St. Alphonsus Liguori, doctor of the Church, founder of the Redemptorists, renowned author of many works, ascetic and moral, highly praised by various popes. He is rather practical than speculative. As founder of equiprobabilism, he cleansed casuistry from the defects of probabilism and laxism.

7. In our own day we find various practices.

a) Seminaries unite the two methods, scholastic and casuistic, adding ascetic applications.

b) Universities generally give two distinct courses, one scholastic, the other practical and casuistic. Some give also special courses in ascetico-mystic theology.

8. When Leo XIII had, we might say, raised Thomism to life, many authors followed St. Thomas. But textbooks gen-

erally still labor under the defects of casuistry. They omit important doctrinal questions on human acts, on the passions, on habits.

When asked for treatises on grace, infused virtue, and the gifts, they send you to classes in dogma. But the question returns: How can moral, if it refuses to dwell on the nature of virtue and merit, proceed to a scientific explanation of human acts as the road to a supernatural goal? Science rests on sources and causes. Now the sources of salvific human acts are the infused virtues. Look at the divisions in many moral textbooks. You will find the following general division: on the last end, on human acts, on laws, on conscience, on sins, on virtues in general. Further, you will find a treatise on special moral, which deals indeed with virtues, theological and cardinal, but does not determine their nature, dwells, but all too briefly, on their necessity, while it emphasizes the sins to be avoided. At the end you find a treatise on the sacraments. The moral theology of St. Thomas, it is clear, has not yet found a home in our schools.

Three questions:

1. Why does St. Thomas place moral theology between two dogmatic parts? This question was answered above.

2. Why does he prefer division by virtues to division by precepts?

a) He does treat the precepts, first in the treatise on law, secondly after each virtue.

b) He prefers the division by virtues, for three reasons.

i) Science rests on principles and causes. The principles of human acts are the virtues, whence good deeds proceed, promptly, easily and gladly.

ii) Thus appear clearly the various functions of the spiritual organism, in hierarchical form.

iii) Thus we lay the foundation of mysticism and asceticism, which deal with the stages of progress in virtue.

3. But are not precepts the sources of human acts?

a) Yes, but they are sources that regulate human acts, not sources which produce these acts.

b) Many precepts of the Decalogue are, in their literal sense, negative. Commenting on St. Paul's word about the letter that kills and the spirit that quickens, St. Thomas speaks thus: "The mere law, without the Spirit who prints the law on the heart, is an occasion of death." Why? Because, learning from the precept what we ought to do, we leave the deed undone.

c) There are, of course, affirmative precepts: Love God and your neighbor. But the sublimity and fruitfulness of these precepts are often neglected, and the emphasis remains on the avoidance of vice. But vice is intelligible only by its opposition to virtue, just as darkness by its opposition to light. The Decalogue, finally, while it does contain precepts on religion, does not directly give precepts on faith, hope, and charity.

CHAPTER III

Ethical Systems

Before we study the articles of St. Thomas on the final goal, we think it well to classify the various systems of natural ethics. Such classification will serve to emphasize the importance and the timeliness of the saint's teaching.

A. Ethics without sanction, without obligation.

1. Hedonism, founded on pleasurable good (Aristippus, Fourier).

2. Utilitarianism.

a) Individual utilitarianism (Epicurus, Hobbes, Bentham).

b) Social utilitarianism (Comte, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl).

3. Good-for-its-own-sake (Stoics, Spinoza).

B. Ethics, with sanction and obligation.

1. Obligation arising:

a) from the human will, autonomous, by categorical imperative (Kant).

b) from the divine will, which freely decrees the precepts of the Decalogue (Scotus), and all precepts (Occam, fideists, theological positivists).

C. From good-in-itself, according to right reason, human and divine.

REFLECTIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS

These systems, one excepted, are false: false, rather in what they deny than in what they affirm, since they single out some elements of moral reality, and neglect others. Aristotle, on the contrary, and St. Thomas much more perfectly, embrace and

harmonize all aspects of morality. Hence the Thomistic ethical system is universal,[1] opposed to partial systems, as Catholic doctrine is opposed to heretical doctrine. Heresy, as its name implies, chooses one element of truth and rejects others.

Hedonism considers only the pleasurableness of good; utilitarianism, only its usefulness, unconcerned with what is by nature good (e.g., to tell the truth in the face of death). Kant does indeed admit obligation, but finds for the obligation no objective foundation, which can be found only in objective good, and ultimately only in the supreme good. Others (e.g., Spinoza), while they admit the dependence of our will on rational good, do so in a pantheistic fashion, with consequent denial of obligation and free will. The fideists (e.g., Occam) do admit moral obligation, but base this obligation, not on the immutability of nature, divine and human, but on contingent positive law, and thus reach theological positivism, which denies the immutability of natural law.

St. Thomas, on the contrary, admits all these aspects of moral reality, and harmonizes them. The good is delightful and useful, but is first of all good in itself. And thus, as good in itself, it is the object of our will, the will being a rational appetite implanted in man by the author of nature. And this good-in-itself, discovered by reason, is the proximate foundation of moral obligation. Further, since reason is right only by its conformity with divine reason, i.e., with the eternal law, the ultimate foundation of morality is God, who created and ordained men to know and love the supreme good.

Further, the Saint admits contingent positive law, even in the supernatural order. But he does not deny, rather he upholds, the necessity of natural law, whereby we are bound, not merely by necessity of precept, but also by necessity of means, to know and love God above all else, if we would attain eternal life.

[1] Some authors fear that the Church is becoming Thomistic! No, runs the answer, Catholicism is not Thomism, but Thomism is Catholic, because it is universal, not particularist. See P. H. Woroniechi, "La catholicité du Thomisme," *Revue Thomiste*, October, 1921, pp. 323–29.

Elevated and universal, St. Thomas is also scientific. He proceeds from the four causes:

a) Material cause, the subject matter, is human activity.

b) Formal cause, the viewpoint is the morality of human acts, i.e., conformity to the supreme standard.

c) Efficient cause is twofold, directive and productive. The directive cause is itself twofold, one ultimate, i.e., the eternal law, one proximate, i.e., reason enlightened by faith. The productive cause also is twofold, one radical, i.e., nature elevated by grace, one proximate, i.e., virtue, infused and acquired.

d) Final cause, the ultimate goal, i.e., the supreme good, to be loved for its own sake, not merely for the delight or utility which follows the possession of that good. This supreme good is God, both in the order of nature and in the order of grace.

Let us now enumerate, in descending order, the sources of morality.

1. The eternal law, i.e., God
2. The natural law
3. Revelation: divine positive law
4. Human laws and customs
5. Church law and doctrine
6. Synderesis (conscience)
7. Prudence (the golden middle way)
8. Choice (ruled by justice)
9. Regulated passions (fortitude and temperance)
10. Performance of moral act.

Of these ten sources of morality, naturalism denies the third and the fifth (revelation and Church doctrine). Positivism denies the second (natural law). Kant denies the ontological validity of the sixth (conscience, human reason).

Some intellectualists minimize the role of right will in forming a good conscience. This view shows the inadequacy of probability. St. Thomas shows clearly that moral and practical truth arises, not directly from conformity with reality, but

from conformity with right appetite and will (in determining the golden mean, in regard to temperance, say, or bravery, or humility, or meekness). This view, which at first glance seems to be a concession to subjectivism or pragmatism, rests in fact on profound understanding of moral activity.

The ethical synthesis of St. Thomas, then, is not, like other systems, particularistic. It is universal, it is scientific. It is but the unfolding, the development, of common sense, of natural reason, which contains all elements of morality, but does not know how to systematize them. That is why the Church, ever more insistently, prefers the teaching of St. Thomas.

Let us now proceed to a brief delineation of the aforesaid systems, as contrasted with their refutation by him whom the Church calls the Common Doctor.

CHAPTER IV

The Four Chief Systems

In ascending order, we examine here the four chief ethical systems: Empiric Ethics, Kantian Ethics, Stoic Ethics, Fideistic Ethics.

A. Empiric ethics, which limits itself to that good which is experienced as delightful (hedonism), or as useful and profitable (utilitarianism, individual or social).

Hedonism says that enjoyment is the motive and standard of human acts. Man is made to do good and to avoid evil, along the lines of sense-enjoyment. Thus Aristippus among the ancients, Fourier, a socialist, among the moderns. The latter describes the physical attractions of the passions, as physicists speak of the attractions of the stars. This system tends to cynical egoism, founded on identification of man with God, forgetting that God is, and man is not, the supreme good.

B. Utilitarianism. Individual utilitarianism says that man must renounce pleasure in favor of tranquillity and security. Thus of old the Sophists and Epicurus. The latter demands moderation of passion, between too much and too little. Virtue, he says, is the golden middle way, chosen, not for its own sake, but solely to avoid harmful extremes. In this system morality is rather a corpse than a living power. Among moderns we find Hobbes and Bentham, whose first moral law is temporal peace. Stuart Mill and Spencer look on social utilitarianism as the evolutionary goal of individual utilitarianism. Grotius and Puffendorff formulate the first ethical principle as follows: Man must worship and promote society. We must live, says Comte, for others. Society, notwithstand-

ing its defects, must be loved above all else, as if society were an evolving God. Obligation rests on human legislation. A father's right to educate his children, for example, is founded, not on nature, but on the same human law which, in ancient Rome, gave to the father the right to kill his son. Thus the Neo-Comtists, Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim.

C. Empiric ethics refuted. Three reflections may suffice.

1. A virtual refutation lies in the philosophically established proof that, as there is an essential distinction between intellective life and sense life, so likewise between good-in-itself and good as pleasurable or useful.

Sense life knows only sense-goods, pleasurable and useful. It does not know good-in-itself, which is known only by reason. The evil of empiric ethics lies in its failure to recognize good-in-itself (testimony to truth in the face of death, for example, as shown by Christ: "I am come to give testimony to the truth"). Good-in-itself is the perfection of our rational activity, and is good even if it is not followed by pleasure or utility.[1]

2. Empiric ethics cannot explain the testimony of conscience which dictates, as a first and evident principle, that, independently of consequences, good is to be done, evil to be avoided. Empirics even contradict this principle. Denying moral obligation, men will not eschew moral evil (secret theft, for example, or betrayal of country) if they find evil to be useful.

3. Empiric ethics does not, and cannot, result in the happiness it promises. That it does not was shown also by Spinoza and Kant. The man who lives without a genuine moral ideal is unhappy. His passions (desire, anger, envy) are uncontrolled, often contrary one to the other. He is self-centered in his egoism, a slave to passing events, a slave to other men, who can rob him of the sense-goods wherein he hoped to find happiness.

[1] Good is an analogous notion: primarily, it means "good-in-itself" (*bonum honestum*), secondarily, it means "the pleasurable" (*bonum delectabile*), lastly, it means "the useful" (*bonum utile*). Ia, q.5, a.6.

Further, this system, even at best, simply cannot give man happiness, because it cannot satisfy his higher faculties, his aspirations toward moral goodness and beauty, toward peace in himself and peace in society, and society is not perfect enough to be loved above all else.

Lastly, the only way to harmonize private with public utility is to love good-in-itself. All men, as St. Augustine says, can simultaneously possess good-in-itself, truth, for example, and virtue, though they cannot so possess sense-goods, a house, for example, or a field. Matter divides, spirit unites.

D. Kantian ethics refuted. Kantian ethics stands higher than empiric ethics, since it admits moral obligations. But the foundation it builds for this obligation, the so-called categorical imperative, is subjective, not objective. Subjective likewise are the three Kantian postulates of practical reason: human liberty, a future life, and the existence of God the Rewarder.

Kant begins by denying to speculative reason the power of demonstrating either God's existence, or free will, or moral obligation as an internal fact, not merely of experience, but of reason. Every sincere man finds in his own conscience an imperative, not conditional but absolute, which binds him to act morally. Kant formulates this categorical imperative as follows: "Act so that your own moral attitude can be the principle of universal legislation, act, that is, as you will all men to act."

Now this formula is not objective, based on the nature of good, but is subjective. It is, Kant says, a synthetic-a-priori judgment. We cannot, Kant explains, find the foundation of moral obligation in God as Lawgiver and Final Goal. And if obligation were imposed on us by God, our life would either be slavery, or, since it would be drawn by the hope of happiness, it would be mercenary, not, properly speaking, moral, since it would be founded on pleasure or utility. Kant, it is clear, does not see the sublimity of good-in-itself, which, though it is also delightful, is desired primarily for its own

sake. Kant thinks that the human will, in order to be truly rational, moral, and free, must be its own law, otherwise it falls into slavery. Thus the human will is autonomous, independent of any higher and extrinsic law.

Individual man, then, is to judge whether his own activity is or is not the standard of universal legislation. Individual reason is the supreme arbiter of good and evil. Individual will, as first moral cause, imposes obligation on itself.

1. Kantianism lacks foundation. Kant's judgment, synthetic but a priori, has no objective motive, because, as he says, it is not evident, either a priori or a posteriori. But, if so, it is a blind judgment. Now, since the object of the intellect is reality, and the object of the will is good, obligation must be rooted in objective reality, and ultimately in the supreme good. Kantian ethics, then, deprived of a true, primary, and objective standard, is like a landscape without the sun.

2. Absolute autonomy of the human will, unsubordinated to the eternal law, imposing on itself its own moral obligation, is impossible in any creature, since all creatures depend on God the supreme good. Kantianism leads to the errors of subjectivism and individualism.

3. The promise of blessedness is not an ill-founded invitation to a good life. The benefits God bestows are dispositions which lead us to love God for His own sake. The supreme good is indeed a delectable good, but only because it is good-in-itself.[2]

Hedonism, we have seen, aims at happiness, but excludes obligation. Kantianism, vice versa, excludes happiness as moral motive, and considers only subjective obligation. Each is an extreme. The traditional and true doctrine rises on high between these two extremes. It sees no incompatibility between happiness and obligation, but finds them both in the supreme good, which commands supreme love and rewards supreme love with supreme joy.

4. Man's reason as supreme motive is a kind of self-worship.

[2] IIa–IIae, q.27, a.3. Cf. Conc. Trid., sess. 6, can. 31, Denzinger, no. 84.

Where God is not loved above all else, there can be no love of good-in-itself, but only a proud preference for our own subjective superiority. But if we love and seek the good-in-itself, then, a fortiori, we will seek and love that supreme good which is the source of all goodness. Happiness cannot be found in any created good, but only in the uncreated Good.

But a question arises: Do not Kant's three postulates of practical reason (free will, immortality of the soul, and God's existence) show him favorable to traditional and Christian ethics? Does he not say that free will is implied in moral obligation; that the perfection demanded by the categorical imperative cannot be attained in this life: that in the next life God alone can bind virtue and happiness into a stable unity?

The answer runs thus: Kant does indeed admit these postulates, as rationally credible in the merely natural order. But he admits them, not as foundations, but only as completions, of his ethical system. Obligation rests, not on objective good-in-itself, but on man's independent and autonomous will; not on right reason as proximate norm of our will: not on the eternal law as ultimate norm. Kantian ethics, therefore, remains an arbitrary and subjective structure, an arctic region, sad and cold. It lacks the strength of common sense and Christian thought.

E. Stoic ethics refuted. Greek Stoics say that the highest good lies in virtue, i.e., in our own rational activity, not in things which are external and independent of ourselves. Even under adverse fortune, they say, the wise man, in control of his passions, finds joy in his own rational activity. A similar system of rational eudaemonism appears in Spinoza, who looks on divine good as immanent in ourselves. Pantheistic and determinist, Spinoza denies free will and genuine moral obligation. The moral law is not imperative, but optative. It can be expressed as follows: "Would that men would live rationally! But many men do not, and cannot, attain clear and distinct ideas on what is good." Here are three reflections on this system.

1. It rests on pantheism. But God, far from being identified with man, is man's cause, efficient and final.[3]

2. Human virtue is not the supreme good. Virtue inheres in the soul, of which it is not the substance, but an accident. Hence virtue is participated good that has a beginning. Hence, however noble, it is a particular and limited good, not the supreme good.[4]

3. Stoicism denies the twofold testimony of conscience:

a) the moral obligation, based on the first principle of practical reason, i.e., do good, avoid evil;

b) human freedom, based on the distinction between universal good (where man is not free), and limited good (where man must freely choose).[5]

Question: Does not moral obligation have a sufficient foundation in rational good, as the object of man's free will? The answer is: Yes, if you are looking at obligation's proximate source, but not if you are looking for its ultimate foundation.[6]

F. Fideism refuted. Fideism is not, properly speaking, a system based on nature. It is rather a pseudo-supernatural system proposed by the nominalists of the fifteenth century. This system might be entitled theological positivism, since it founds obligation only on God's free will, on the divine positive law, made known by faith and therefore unknowable by reason. Hence the name, fideism. On the surface fideism exalts faith, but in truth it depreciates, not only reason, but also the reasonableness of faith. Confounding the spheres of reason and faith, conceiving reason as confined to mere sense life, it becomes a pseudo-supernatural system.

In Occam's radical nominalism, reason cannot transcend sense-experience, cannot prove God's existence or the spiritual nature of the soul; hence it cannot be a foundation for moral obligation. Teaching that all these truths come only by faith, Occam prepared the way for Luther. The Jansenists retain

[3] Ia, q.2, a.3.
[4] Ia–IIae, q.2, a.7.
[5] Ia–IIae, q.94, a.2. Cf. Ia–IIae, q.10, a.2.
[6] Cf. Ia–IIae, q.19, a.4.

elements of this fideism, as do likewise the nineteenth-century traditionalists. But they are not as radical as is Occam himself, who holds that the great precept of loving God above all else is not only inaccessible to reason, but is in itself accidental and contingent, so that God could if He willed command us even to hate Him.

Similar is the view of Descartes, who says that the truth of the principle of contradiction depends on God's free will. If so, then on God's free will rests likewise the distinction between good and evil.

Now listen to St. Thomas. "Will is guided by reason, in man and in God. Hence the first source of all justice is the wisdom of the divine mind, which gives to all His creatures the right proportion to one another and to Himself. Hence to say that justice depends simply on the divine will is equivalent to saying that the divine will does not act according to divine wisdom—a blasphemous assertion." [7] In other words, God, if He so willed, could be the supreme evil of the Manichaeans.

Thus fideism arrives at absolute contingency, wherein there remains nothing necessary and stable, not even divine nature, the first reality.

One element of this system remains in Scotus,[8] who holds indeed that the command to love God is immutable, but that the commands concerning men are not. Thus homicide, theft, fornication are not prohibited because they are evil, but are evil only because they are prohibited. This view is opposed to that of St. Thomas,[9] who holds that God never issued orders against the fifth, sixth, and seventh Commandments. Abraham's readiness to sacrifice his son, for example, came not from his own choice, but from his role as instrument of God, who is Lord of life and death. Similarly, the executioner, who is the instrument of social authority, does not commit murder.

[7] *De veritate*, q.23, a.6. Cf. Ia–IIae, q.91–94.
[8] *Opera*, V, 19, 21, 24.
[9] Ia–IIae, q.94, a.4–6.

G. General conclusion. The doctrine of St. Thomas, its sublimity and universality, is the best answer to the catechism question: Why was man made? Man was made, not merely for his own pleasure and delight (hedonism); not merely for his own interests, individual or social (utilitarianism); not merely to cultivate his own personal dignity (Kantianism); nor for the sake of his own rational activity (the Stoics and Spinoza). Man was made, first to love good for its own sake, even if such love were not followed by delight or utility; and, secondly, to have supreme love for the supreme good, namely, God, who is man's ultimate goal, natural and supernatural.

This system harmonizes moral obligation and perfect blessedness, by basing both on one and the same foundation, that supreme good, namely, which beatifies man by insisting on man's duty to love God above all else. God's right to such love is the source of all obligation.

The time we have spent on the foregoing ethical systems will bear fruit in subsequent chapters wherein we shall develop the Thomistic synthesis, and particularly in the chapters which show the connection between the treatise on man's ultimate goal and the treatise on law, eternal law, which is the source of natural law.

H. One last question. What are the sources of traditional ethics? Can we find its essentials, in particular its view on the foundation of moral obligation, in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle? Or is it based exclusively on religious tradition, particularly on the Old Testament and the New?

Many historians of philosophy maintain that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle teach a mere rational eudaemonism, which involves no moral obligation, obligation being a religious concept rather than a moral one. Kant's admission of the moral obligation, they add, is inherited from Christianity.

The answer rests on a distinction. These three Greeks knew the proximate foundation of moral obligation, namely, right reason as commanding good-in-itself. But only implicitly

did they speak of obligation's ultimate source in a supreme Lawgiver.

Socrates we know only through Plato. But we cannot deny that Plato himself defended the objective foundation of morality. The criminal who escapes punishment, says Plato, is worse off than the criminal who undergoes punishment. Why? Because by paying the penalty, he restores the order of good which crime violated, and thus re-enters into the region of good which ends in felicity. Thus Plato admits an objective obligation, based on good-in-itself, which is the standard of man's rational activity. Further, the supreme good which Plato admits is an implicit admission of a supreme standard, even though he does not speak explicitly of a supreme Lawgiver and an eternal law.

Aristotle, too, though he speaks only implicitly and indistinctly of the supreme Lawgiver, maintains the proximate foundations of moral obligation. Good-in-itself, he often says, is the goal aimed at by virtue. This good is not only potentially lovable, but must be actually loved, since potency exists only for the sake of act. Good-in-itself (e.g., telling the truth) is to be done for its own sake, not merely for the joy that follows doing. Joy is the ornament of deed, as beauty is the ornament of youth. Joy is a consequence of the good act, but does not constitute the goodness of the act.

St. Thomas says: The first and self-evident principle of practical reason is the universal desirability of good. In other words, good-in-itself, rational good, is an obligation laid on man's will by the Author of nature.[10] This statement only makes explicit what the Greeks left implicit.

Thus the explicit view of morality, founded on the eternal law, is, in point of fact, speaking historically, religious rather than philosophic, is based on the Testaments, the Old and the New. The Sermon on the Mount, at the beginning of Christ's public life, promises men blessedness as the reward of righteousness. But the supreme precept is that of loving God with

[10] Ia–IIae, q.94, a.2.

heart, soul, mind, and strength. This precept harmonizes obligation and blessedness, each based on the supreme good, which is the goal commanded by the eternal Lawgiver.

Our long Introduction ended, we now turn to examine the questions dealing with man's ultimate goal.

FIRST PART

THE ULTIMATE GOAL (I–II, q. 1–5)

The first question treats of the ultimate goal in general, considered abstractly. The following questions discuss the matter concretely: the term "blessedness," the beatifying object, the beatifying operation, the characteristics of that operation, its attainment, its inamissibility.

CHAPTER V

The Ultimate Goal in General

The eight articles may be thus divided: the first four explain the relation of human acts to an ultimate goal, the last four show that this goal is one, and only one.

An initial question arises: Do not these first seventeen questions treat of human acts from a viewpoint, not moral, but merely psychological? Does he not begin the treatise on morality in question 18?

Answer: As found in human acts, yes, morality begins in question 18. But his first five questions are a moral treatise on the ultimate goal.

QUESTION 1

ART. 1. DOES MAN ACT PURPOSELY?

The answer runs thus: Only in view of a purpose to be achieved can man act deliberately.

Preliminaries

The question is universal: Can man, acting deliberately, ever exclude purpose from his act? Can any human act, which must necessarily have a terminus, come into being without that terminus pre-existing as intention and purpose in man's mind?

Purpose, then, as here considered, expresses the motive, the reason why, of the human act. It does not mean a mere terminus, as point means the end of a line, or as vacation means the end of a school year, or as death, according to the materialists, is simply dissolution of the body.

Some think this question is useless. Rather, it is most important, since it deals with the very foundation of moral obligation, denied by Spinoza, and the impossibility, denied by Duns Scotus, of any deliberate act being here and now morally indifferent. This importance appears in the difficulties raised by St. Thomas as he begins the question.

1. Purpose cannot be a cause, since cause must pre-exist before effect. But purpose comes at the end, as something we attain by our act.

In this difficulty lies the reason which later led Spinoza to deny that God works for a purpose. All things, so Spinoza, proceed from God geometrically, as the characteristics of a circle proceed, without finality, from the essence of the circle. But he overlooks the truth that geometry has nothing to do with act or with motion.

2. Man surely engages in some actions unpurposely, simply for their own sake, for example, play and recreation. And contemplation, thus Aristotle, being itself the ultimate purpose, has no purpose beyond itself.

3. Man often acts without deliberation, as when, e.g., he inadvertently strokes his beard. Such acts, unintended, are not done purposely.

A. The response is nevertheless affirmative. The thesis runs thus: Man, acting freely, acts for a purpose.

1. Purpose, in the world of action, is parallel to first principle in the world of speculation and contemplation. As man's mind is carried by principle to conclusion, so is man's will carried by purpose to the means needed for attaining purpose. This rule suffers no exception. Hence no individual act can ever be morally indifferent. It must be either good or bad.

2. The foregoing argument is borrowed from Aristotle. St. Thomas prepares by division for demonstration. We distinguish "human acts" from "actions of man." Human acts proceed from man as man, as distinct from irrational animals, as being, by reason and free will, the master of his actions.

Human acts properly speaking, proceeding from man's free choice, are consequently either meritorious or demeritorious, worthy of praise or of blame.

But "actions of man" (inadvertently stroking one's beard) signify acts which, being indeliberate, do not characterize human activity as human.

Three Thomistic Corollaries

a) All human acts are acts of man, but not vice versa.

b) Indeliberate acts proceeding from man's mind and will cannot properly be called human acts: first impulses to pride and to unbelief; further, spontaneous acts of wonder, laughter, weeping, speaking; again, indeliberate blasphemy under diabolic obsession; lastly, the acts of children before the age of reason and the acts of the insane.

c) On the contrary, acts of eating, drinking, walking, though they are common to man and beast, are human acts when done deliberately.

Three Doubts

a) Man's very first act of thought, which precedes his first act of will—is this thought a human act? No, because man is not master of that thought.

b) Is beatific love a human act? No, because that act is not free, but necessary. It transcends freedom, hence is not meritorious, though it is morally good.

c) The acts of filial affection toward God, which are not, properly speaking, deliberate, but are elicited by divine inspiration—are these human acts? Yes, because we freely consent to them, and merit by them. Such acts, because they transcend discursive deliberation, are still free.

B. The thesis demonstrated. All deliberate human acts are here in question. Experience itself shows that men usually act purposively. How frequently we hear: Why did you do this? But here we are asking a universal question: Can man,

acting freely, ever perform an unpurposeful act? The libertists say no, St. Thomas says yes, and his proof runs thus:

Since faculties are differentiated by their respective goals, acts proceeding from any faculty aim at the goal of that faculty.

Now the goal of the will is good to be attained. Hence every human act aims at some goal to be attained.

To illustrate the major of this argument: hearing is concerned with sound, and only with sound: sight, exclusively with color; mind, exclusively with the intelligible.

To illustrate the minor: the goal of the will is the good, just as the goal of the intellect is the true. Will aims at the good, be that good genuine or counterfeit. And the good, as attracting the will, is purpose, is final cause. It is called good, because it is desirable. It is called purpose and goal, because it moves the will to seek ways and means.

But do not ways and means attract the will for their own sake? If they do, they become an intermediate goal. But, properly speaking, ways and means attract, not for their own sake, but only for the sake of the end, the purpose, the goal. The good which is the essential and adequate object of the will, is found, secondarily, by participation, in ways and means.

Thus the conclusion stands: Every deliberate human act is done for a purpose, to attain an end. Whatever is deliberately willed is loved either as goal, or as way and means. This truth is necessary and absolute, be the good genuine or counterfeit. He who sins deliberately aims at some good, for example, mere pleasure.

An Addition

Scotus rejects this doctrine. He distinguishes three genera of the good: (a) the goal, (b) means and ways, (c) neither goal, nor means and ways. Were God neither our goal nor our way, He could still be loved by us with most genuine love. As example of this pure and neutral love, Scotus points to the inefficacious love of life in Christ when He said: "If it be

possible, let this chalice pass from Me. But not as I will, but as Thou wilt."

The answer runs thus: That inefficacious love of Christ (and of the martyrs) was toward life as a goal, since life is in the line of blessedness, which all men desire by nature. Anything that is desirable can be loved only by its dependence, actual or virtual, on the first and supreme good.

But, says the libertist, I will to will—nothing else. Answer: Where no good, not even counterfeit good, is willed, there no act of will is possible. Hence, to repeat, no individual human act can be morally indifferent, i.e., neither good nor bad. This is the common view, against Scotus, the Scotists, and Vasquez. Man, whenever he acts, is bound to act for a good purpose. Where such purpose is lacking (e.g., an idle word), the act is morally evil. Recreation is good when carried on for a good purpose, otherwise it is bad.

A Confirmation

The thesis holds for all human acts, whether they aim at the goal, or only at ways and means. Acts concerned with choice of means are evidently done with purpose. Acts concerned with the goal, simple volition and efficacious intention, though they do not proceed from a preceding act, still owe their existence to the goal. And they are virtually deliberate by reason of previous knowledge which distinguishes good from evil.

Solution of Difficulties

First. Goal, attained, comes after the act. Goal, intended, comes before, and is cause (final cause) of the act.

Second. Contemplation is the possession of the beatifying object, and joy is a consequence of possession. Hence the total and complete goal has the three elements, object, possession, joy, all welded into one whole. Joy, says St. Thomas, is the will resting in the object attained. Hence joy, while it is not, speaking rigorously, a human act, is nevertheless the com-

pletion of the act, is a connatural result of possessing the goal.

Third. Indeliberate acts, although they do not proceed from reason, still do proceed from some natural purpose, held by the imagination, in the form of a habit mechanically acquired.

Goal and Purpose

Definition and division. Goal is the final cause, which moves man to act. Goals are divided, (a) objectively, (b) subjectively.

A. Objective divisions

1. The object itself (health):

a) The ultimate object (victory for the soldier, God for man): the object which we desire (God, seen intuitively); the act by which we possess the object (the beatific vision).

b) The intermediate object, desirable both for its own sake and for some ulterior purpose (health for the sake of virtue, virtue for the sake of God).

2. The individual for whom (e.g., a sick man) I desire the good object (health). This individual may be

a) superior to me (God, to whom we wish glory)

b) myself (to whom I will salvation)

c) inferior to me (a dog, to whom I wish health).[1]

B. Subjective divisions

1. The intention of the agent:

a) identified with the natural purpose of the deed (alms to aid the poor): the purpose produced (health by the act of the physician); the purpose obtained, but not produced (pennant after contest);

b) the intention of the agent, not necessarily identified with the deed's natural purpose (alms, for God's sake, for vainglory, simply to aid the poor): the agent's primary in-

[1] Christ died for us (who are inferior to Him), but this purpose is subordinated to the glory of God. By hope we desire God for ourselves, who are inferior to God, but we do so because God so wills. Contemplation is devoted to apostolic action as inferior (*finis cui*), but to God as superior (*finis cujus gratia*). Contemplation is not a medium, subordinated to action, but rather a superabundant, fructifying cause of the apostolic action which is its effect.

tention (participating in Mass to adore God, battle to defend the fatherland); the agent's secondary intention, subordinated to his primary intention, not as a mere medium, but as effect, or as natural consequence (honor and salary for the soldier.)

ART. 2. UNIVERSALITY OF PURPOSE

Preliminaries

The thesis is twofold: Purpose, known as purpose, characterizes rational beings, but irrational beings act for a purpose, to them unknown. Against the second assertion there are three difficulties:

a) How can things work for a purpose to them unknown?
b) Only reason can seek ways and means.
c) Where there is no will, there purpose is impossible.

Thus we enter into the question of finality, as found in inanimate nature, in vegetative life, in sense life. St. Thomas, we recall, founded his fifth proof for God's existence on this principle. Experience, he says, shows us irrational beings, plants and animals, which generally, if not always, follow a steady line toward self-preservation, individual and racial. Now such activity, unexplained by mere chance, shows that such beings, without knowing it, are under the control of purpose. Thus, following Aristotle, he shows the existence of natural finality.

Here, in the present article, he shows that the principle of finality is necessarily universal: every agent acts for a purpose. This thesis is opposed by the materialists, by Spinoza, by all who deny natural finality, even by some modern Scholastics, who hold that this principle presupposes a proof of divine providence.

This principle of finality is of fundamental importance, on it rests the first principle of practical reason: Do good, avoid evil.[2]

[2] Ia–IIae, q.94, a.2.

The Argument

St. Thomas first cites Aristotle: not only intellect, but nature too, acts for a purpose. Then he proceeds to show the necessity of finality, and the mode of finality which separates man from beast.

1. The necessity of finality. The argument is indirect. An agent, capable of various acts, will never act at all unless it is determined toward some one of its possible effects. For, if the agent should produce a determined and suitable effect (if the eye, e.g., could produce vision), without tending to that one effect rather than to another, then this effect, unless intended by nature, would be simply without reason for its existence. And this tendency to definite effect must pre-exist in its cause, not actually of course, but virtually, i.e., by the faculty's innate relation to one effect rather than to another. Later we shall see that this passive and innate relationship of faculty to act presupposes an active relationship in the Author of nature.

Further. This principle of finality, just now demonstrated indirectly, is, if we admit the right notion of agent and purpose, in itself evident. Thus it is evident that sight is intended to see, hearing to hear, gravity to hold the universe together. Now this tendency to an advantageous act is the very principle of finality. Faculty, potency, is defined by its tendency to act, and act by its tendency to object. Sight, were it not for its innate tendency to see, might just as well perform an act of hearing. An acorn might grow into a pear tree, or a canine embryo into a lion.

2. Human finality. Purpose, known as purpose, characterizes rational beings. Purpose dictates ways and means. This relationship of end and purpose to ways and means is an intelligible entity, known only by an intelligence whose object is, not color or sound, but the inner realities of things, and their mutual relationships.

Animals do indeed know the sense-thing which is end and

purpose, the stall, for example, which draws the horse home. Thus, without intelligence, they act intelligently, or rather, we may say, they are driven intelligently. This intelligence in an unintelligent world points to uncreated intelligence in the Maker of that world.

Purposeful activity, then, has three levels:

a) the human level, where activity is formally directive;

b) the animal level, where the activity is directive, non-formally (materially);

c) the plant level, where the activity is merely executive.

A Recapitulation

All agents act for a purpose: some by knowing purpose as purpose (intelligence uncreated and intelligence created), some by knowing the thing which is purpose (animals); some without knowing (plants and nonliving bodies).

Finality, then, is an analogous concept, found also on the lowest level of existence. However imperfect it may be on this lowest level, it is still a natural tendency to what is best. It is clearest in racial tendencies, where the individual sacrifices its own life for its offspring, in the hen, for example, gathering her brood under her wings against the hawk.

God and Finality

1. The effects of God are done for a purpose; namely, to show forth God's goodness in which they share.

2. God's own operations, whether necessary or free, do not, properly speaking, exist for a purpose, because they are uncreated, hence have no cause, not even a final cause.

3. Still, in a sense, divine goodness is the purpose of God's free acts. That goodness, though it is not the cause, is still the reason for God's free acts. God, says St. Thomas, though He is not moved by purpose, still acts for a purpose. God is not His own cause, but He is His own reason.[3]

[3] "The world was created for God's glory." D. 1805.

What a splendid panorama! All things act purposively: God, angel, man, animal, down to the tiniest realities.

ART. 3. DIFFERENTIATION BY PURPOSE

Preliminaries

On this article depend many subsequent questions: specific distinction of virtuous act from wicked act, degrees of sinful gravity, distinction of mortal sin from venial. The initial difficulties are three.

1. Goal, purpose, is an extrinsic cause, whereas the differentiating principle must be intrinsic.

2. That which specifies and differentiates comes before the purposeful activity, whereas attainment of the goal comes after.

3. Purpose would put each human act into one specific class, whereas we know that one and the same act can be done for different ends: objective, subjective, principal, secondary, proximate, ultimate.

The Proof

Listen to St. Augustine: "As is our purpose, culpable or laudable, so are our deeds." [4] If we punish to satisfy our anger, the deed is blameworthy. If we punish to preserve justice, our deed is praiseworthy.

The argument in the corpus is not easy. It ascends from the sense-world to the world of spirit and morality. And we must rightly understand the analogy between the bodily act of heating and the spiritual act of the human will. We are seeking the universal metaphysical law of action as action.

The present article first puts down a universal law. Specification, differentiation, arises, not from potency, but from act: from the act which is form and nature, in substances; from the acts which are source and terminus, when we deal with suc-

[4] *De moribus Ecclesiae,* Bk. II, chap. 13.

cessive things. Thus heating, as action, proceeds from the actual heat of the agent, but, as passion, terminates in the actual heat in the patient.

Applying this principle to human acts, we argue as follows.

Major. What is both source and terminus differentiates human acts.

Minor. Goal, purpose, is both the source and the terminus of human acts.

Conclusion. Every human act, whether looked at as action (which commands), or as passion (which is commanded), is specifically differentiated by its goal and purpose.

The major is not merely a truth of experience (a radiator heating the air in the room), but is likewise the expression of a universal law, since any agent, acting by its own specific nature, produces an effect like itself. Action is a specific action, not by reason of the agent as efficient cause, but by reason of the agent's formal and constitutive principle. Passion, likewise, is a specific passion by reason of the patient's formal and constitutive principle.

The minor rests on the truth that, in human acts, the goal, as aimed at by the will, is the formal and specific principle of the will's action. Further, by actually aiming at the goal, the will moves itself to choose ways and means.

Question: Could not St. Thomas argue in a simpler fashion? Could he not say: Actions, like powers and habits, are specifically differentiated by their goals and objects? Now purpose and goal are the objects of the will. Hence all voluntary acts are differentiated by their goal and purpose.

The answer is threefold.

a) Had he thus argued, he would have omitted the analogy between action in the sense-world and action in the inner world of the human will.

b) The metaphysical law of action as action would be omitted.

c) We should not have had the distinction between a com-

manding action and a commanded action (as when a man, meditating a murder, passes through many acts, psychologically distinct, but morally one).

Difficulties Analyzed

1. The goal is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because the intrinsic act is, by purpose, related to the goal. The goal, as aimed at by purpose, is both the inner source and the inner terminus of the act.

2. The goal comes after the human act in the order of attainment, but not in the order of intention. The goal which differentiates one human act from another is, properly speaking, the goal as existing in the inner intention. As such it differentiates also the execution which tends to the goal.

3. One and the same human act can be directed to different goals, if these goals are hierarchically one, but it cannot be directed to diverse proximate goals. And it is this proximate and primary goal, not the remote goal, nor the proximate secondary goal, which gives each human act its specific moral nature. To illustrate. The stipend given to a priest for celebrating Mass is a secondary goal of his act. To kill a man in order to preserve justice is a good act. But to kill a man in order to satisfy anger is an evil act. The proximate primary goal gives each human act its specific differentiation.

A Corollary

The apostolic life, since it cannot have two proximate and primary goals, aims at contemplation as its primary purpose, whereas its secondary purpose, arising necessarily from its primary purpose, is to give to our neighbor the fruits of our contemplation.

Two Difficulties Analyzed

1. The goal differentiates the internal act of intention and the external act of execution. But does it differentiate both

in the same manner? Does not St. Thomas [5] say that the interior act is differentiated by its purpose, and the exterior act by its object: giving, as an example, a man's intention (internal) of committing adultery, and then proceeding to steal (external act) in order to have the money he needs for his purpose?

The answer runs thus: In the present article no distinction is yet drawn between the purpose of the agent, and the purpose of the deed. To illustrate. When the thief intends simply to steal, his purpose differentiates, not only his internal act, but also his external act. But when his intention is to use the ill-gotten money as a means to adultery, he commits two sins, one of theft (differentiated by the money, which is the purpose of the deed), and one of intended adultery (which is his purpose as agent). But even in this case, his purpose as agent (the intended adultery) differentiates also his external act of theft, not indeed directly, but indirectly, through the objective purpose of his sin of theft. The intention of the will, says St. Thomas, is the soul, the form, of the external act, because the will uses the corporeal members as instruments, and external acts are moral acts only so far as they come from the will. He concludes, quoting Aristotle: He who steals for the sake of adultery is, speaking properly, more adulterer than thief.

2. But is not purpose a mere circumstance,[6] and hence incapable of differentiating the human act? How, then, are we to distinguish purpose as differentiating from purpose as mere circumstance?

St. Thomas illustrates as follows: In theft, the fact that the object stolen belongs to someone else is of the very essence of the act, whereas the amount stolen is a circumstance. The differentiating purpose, superadded by the agent, is not a circumstance. To act bravely simply because bravery is a duty is not a circumstance. But the superadded purpose, to act

[5] Ia–IIae, q.18, a.6.
[6] *Ibid.*, q.7, a.3.

Thomas in contrast to many of his commentators, whose haste and precipitation end in confusion and complexity.

1. An ultimate goal seems impossible, because it would be the highest good, and the good is essentially self-diffusive.

2. Since our mind in counting never comes to an ultimate number, why must our will come to an ultimate good?

3. I can will something, then will myself to will it, and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence voluntary action does not necessarily aim at an ultimate end and goal.

Two Conclusions

A. In goals hierarchically ordered, it is impossible to proceed to infinity.

Before we take up the proof let us note its importance. It involves a truth taught also by the "philosophy of action" [8] and the "method of immanence." But Blondel's proof reaches a certitude that is merely practical and subjective, whereas St. Thomas, following Aristotle, reaches a certitude that is speculative, universal, and objective. Thus the present article initiates a demonstration of God's existence, proceeding from man's natural desire for happiness. The demonstration here initiated will be completed below, where we shall see that beatitude cannot be found in any created good, but only in uncreated good.[9]

The proof runs thus: Where there is no first in a causal sequence, there can be no second causes, which act only when acted upon by the first cause. But causes hierarchically ordered act only when acted upon by the first. Hence where there is no first in a causal sequence, there can be no essentially subordinated second causes.

In other words, infinite regression is impossible in a hierarchy of causes. There must, in the nature of things, be an ultimate goal, which here and now attracts for its own sake, and not for the sake of some higher goal. Our conclusion,

[8] Blondel, *L'action*, 1893.
[9] Cf. *infra*, q.2, a.8, and q.3, a.1.

then, is simply a corollary from the universal principle of causality, efficient or final. Formulated for efficient causality, the principle runs thus: Anything that has a beginning comes from a pre-existing source of its existence, and, ultimately, from an uncreated source. Formulated for final causality, the principle runs thus: Every agent acts to reach a goal, and ultimately for a goal aimed at for its own sake, not for the sake of something else.

Further, the conclusion holds good in the order both of intention and of execution. In the order of intention, it runs thus: Where there is no goal to attract the appetite, the appetite is simply not attracted. Now the first source of intention is the ultimate goal. Were there no ultimate goal, there would be nothing to attract the appetite.

In the order of execution, thus: Where there is no motive for execution, execution can simply not begin. Now the first motive in execution is its relation to the final goal. Without this goal, no agent would begin anything.

To illustrate. A sick man willing health, calls a doctor. Health he wishes, let us say, to pursue his studies. Study, to know the truth, the supreme Truth; supreme Truth, in order to reach beatitude; and beatitude, for God's glory. God's glory, beyond which there is nothing higher, is the first source in this particular causal sequence.

Again, in efficient causality: The cart is drawn by a horse, the horse is supported by the earth, the earth by the sun, the sun by some other center. Can we go on thus forever? No. There must be a first source which needs no support, which is its own activity and hence its own unreceived existence. And without this first cause, there would be no second and subordinated causes, which move, draw, and support only by some higher causality. Looked at vertically, not horizontally, the lowest motion on earth is but the lowest rung on a living stairway, which ends in an eternal and unchangeable and coexistent source of all that is below itself.

But when God creates, is there not an infinite process down-

wards? No. On the stairway of creation there is a lowest step. The supreme goodness is indeed infinitely self-diffusive. But that goodness is the source of divine liberty, which is ruled by divine wisdom.

B. Second conclusion. In a causal sequence where causes are related, not essentially, but accidentally, there can be a process *ad infinitum*.

An example, to illustrate. I wish to learn Latin, then Greek, then Hebrew, then Arabic. Then I abandon languages in favor of mathematics, or metaphysics, or law, or medicine. Then, like Faust, I abandon knowledge in favor of pleasure or riches. Lastly, I return to literature and science. In such a sequence, there is no essential dependence of one step on another, hence there can be a process without limit.

Another example, in efficient causality. Cause *per se* of the son is the father, whereas the grandfather is cause *per accidens*. St. Thomas [10] explains: Man generates as man, not as son of another man. Adam, son of no man, generated children. And the grandfather may be dead when his son generates a grandson. All fathers stand on the same level, each being a particular agent in the long line of generations. Thus an infinite series, man generated from man, is not impossible. But it would be impossible if the generation of one man depended, not merely on his father, but also on the elements, and on the sun, and so *ad infinitum*.

Here we may add, following Aristotle and Aquinas, that the impossibility of an infinite and eternal series of transformations cannot be demonstrated. Sea water into clouds, clouds into rain, and then repeat and repeat again, without limit. For such a series we need only the existence of sun and water. If these two existed from eternity, evaporation could be without beginning, but not without origin, since each evaporation would depend on the eternal Prime Mover. Thus Aristotle was led from the existence of motion to the existence of God, while he simultaneously admitted that motion

[10] Ia, q.46, a.2, ad 7um.

had no beginning, and thus reveals the infinite power of the Prime Mover. Hence we must clearly distinguish vertical dependence, which is limited, from horizontal dependence, which is unlimited. Thus the soul, considered horizontally, will never have a last volition, but each volition depends, vertically considered, on the ultimate goal of each separate volition.

The initial difficulties should by now have disappeared. In the Saint's answer to the second difficulty, we may note that infinity in numbers is an accident of number as such, and accident which may happen to any number if you add a unit to it. Any number, though necessarily unequal to all other numbers, is still equal to all others by being a number.

In the third reply we may note an example of accidental subordination. A scrupulous man, preparing a sermon, speaks thus: Since I may be laboring in pride, I ought to elicit an act of humility. But is not this humility itself an act of pride, since I wish to be more humble than others? I must pause to examine myself. But does not this examination itself proceed from pride? And thus *ad infinitum*.

ART. 5. CAN ONE MAN HAVE MANY ULTIMATE PURPOSES?

Unity, keystone unity, is here in question. We ask: first, can one man have many ultimate purposes (art. 5); second, is man's every act directed to that last end (art. 6); third, do all men have one and the same goal (art. 7); fourth, do all creatures have the same ultimate goal (art. 8).

Can one man, either actually or virtually, aim simultaneously at many and diverse ultimates? That is the precise question in the present article. The question is posed from the subjective angle (purpose), but in relation to the objective angle (goal).

Initial Difficulties

1. St. Augustine refers to some writers who defend four ultimates: pleasure, tranquillity, natural goods, and virtue.

2. There are many ultimates which are not mutually exclusive.

3. Man can successively choose as his goal, first, pleasure, second, virtue. If man has free will, why can he not choose pleasure and virtue also simultaneously?

The Demonstration

A. By authorities. "No one can serve two masters." [11] God and Mammon are mutually exclusive. They "whose belly is their God" cannot have virtue as their goal. "He who is not with Me is against Me." This sentence excludes indifference and neutrality in relation to one last goal.

B. The argument. The argument is threefold. St. Thomas generally gives but one reason, the formal demonstrative medium. When he gives a number of reasons he orders them, not by mechanical juxtaposition, but by organic interconnection. The three operative terms in this article are, first, perfect good, second, the first natural good, third, the first differentiating good. "Perfect good," the very definition of ultimate purpose, is the *terminus ad quem*. "The first natural good," the very nature of the will, is the *terminus a quo*. "The first differentiating good," i.e., the source which makes acts human, is the transition from the *ad quem* to the *a quo*. The first reason is the more fundamental and formal. The other two are confirmations.

These three reasons can be given simultaneously, as follows: No man can simultaneously desire (a) two goods, each of which is perfectly satiative, leaving nothing to be desired; (b) two first and perfect goods, each of which is naturally desirable; (c) two first and primary goods, each of which is the prime genus of human appetite. But the ultimate goal is a good that perfectly satiates all desires; the first good that is naturally desirable; the good that constitutes the prime genus of human appetites. Therefore it is impossible that one man's will can simultaneously have two diverse ultimate goals.

[11] Matt. 6:24.

Clarifications

The ultimate purpose, we say, is a good which perfectly satiates all desires, in the sense that it excludes, not all other goods, but all goods not subordinated to itself. Thus the carnal sinner, who finds in lust his ultimate purpose, may desire also food, drink, honors, and riches, but all these as subordinated to lust. But full subordination of all else to one vice is perhaps a rare occurrence, since the sinner's ultimate purpose is not the object of each particular sin, but rather selfishness, that is, the love of self above all else, even above God.

Again: When we say that the ultimate goal is the first object naturally desired, and that it is the good which constitutes the prime genus of human appetites, we mean that every man's first and natural desire is to be happy, and that therefore, even though unconsciously, he tends to love God more than himself, because natural inclination as such is always good and right.

A Confirmation

The ultimate goal is never subordinated to any other goal, but puts all else in subordination to itself. But in the hypothesis of two such ultimate goals, neither could be subordinated to the other. Hence the hypothesis of two (or more) ultimate goals is an absurd hypothesis.

Initial Difficulties Answered

1. Pleasure, tranquillity, and virtue can be considered as partial constituents of one whole.

2. Health, virtue, and God are not indeed mutually exclusive. But perfect good, the ultimate goal, does exclude all and everything unsubordinated to itself.

3. Man is free, yes, even after he has chosen an ultimate goal. But freedom cannot bring two contradictories into simultaneous existence. Now two ultimates, each perfectly satiating,

are contradictories. Each would, and each would not, be perfectly satiative.

Three Further Difficulties

1. Cannot man, being free, desire a second ultimate, as something overabundant and superfluous? No. That which is overabundant and superfluous cannot be an ultimate goal, which must necessarily be the principal object of the will.

2. One and the same man, for instance, guilty of theft, homicide, and adultery, may have for each of these three sins a separate and disparate motive. If so, will he not have in view three ultimate goals?

The answer is again no. The positive root of all sin is selfishness, i.e., the love of self above all else, and this selfishness, this egoism, is the sinner's ultimate goal, to which all his sins are subordinated. Egoism, scorning God, builds the City of Babylon, as love of God and scorn of self build the City of God. Love of God, the virtue of charity, binds all virtues into one. Egoism, selfishness, counterfeit love of self, is the source and goal of all sin.

3. But what of him who sins venially? He does not lose God as his ultimate goal, yet his sinful act, since it does not have God as goal, must be done for some created good, which is therefore a second ultimate goal.

Full answer to this difficulty will come in the next article. For the moment, let us note [12] that the goal of venial sin is not the love of a created good above all else, for that is the goal of mortal sin. Nor is God the goal, except negatively, in the sense that venial sin does not destroy man's relation to God as goal. But the goal of venial sin is good in general, seen here and now as satisfying man's desire.

The present article deals formally and primarily with man's last end, i.e., with perfect good, whenever found. Only second-

[12] With Cajetan, Contenson, Billuart, Sylvius, and others.

arily is it concerned with the object wherein perfect good is found.

ART. 6. DOES MAN WILL HIS EVERY ACT FOR A LAST END?

In every deliberate act, man acts for a purpose. The question now is: Does man will all his acts for one ultimate purpose? We expect an affirmative answer, but we must first note the initial difficulties, which were later developed by Scotus against St. Thomas.

Initial Difficulties

1. Man sometimes acts jocosely, and jocose acts are not done for an ultimate purpose. Scotus later says: Jocose acts are indifferent acts, not only specifically, but also as found in the individual who indulges in them.

2. Any speculative branch of knowledge (e.g., mathematics or metaphysics) is pursued for its own sake, but is not nevertheless an ultimate goal.

3. Man does not always think of an ultimate goal. How, then, can he always act for such a goal?

The Argument

St. Thomas begins by quoting St. Augustine, who says that the ultimate goal is that by reason of which all other things are loved.

The conclusion runs thus: Whatever man deliberately desires, he desires for an ultimate goal, at least virtually and implicitly (this last phrase is from the third solution).

We present first, the arguments of St. Thomas; secondly their interpretation, since on this last point his commentators do not entirely agree.

There are two proofs. The first runs thus: Anything a man desires he desires because it seems to be a good thing. But if what he desires is not that perfect good which is his ultimate purpose, then it must be something subordinated to that per-

fect good and ultimate purpose. Hence whatever man deliberately desires, he desires by reason of his ultimate goal.

To explain. A beginning, in any line, is subordinated to consummation. Examples are, in nature, the germ of a plant, in art, the foundation of a building.

Primarily, as we said above, the conclusion holds good of the subjective ultimate purpose, and only secondarily of the object wherein blessedness is to be found, and this in diverse modes, since the man who desires may be either a viator or one of the blessed or one of the damned. Thus the blessed, who see God face to face, cannot sin, even venially, whereas a damned soul, loving itself selfishly above all else, cannot do any good deed. The viator wills everything for his own subjective beatitude, and can sin venially, though such acts neither turn him away from God nor yet lead him to God.

The second proof proceeds thus: The ultimate purpose is the prime mover in eliciting desire. Now secondary movers, second causes, move only as moved by the prime mover. Hence only as subordinated to the ultimate goal can secondary motives move man's will.

Here, again, we are dealing primarily with the formal last end, and only secondarily with the object wherein that formal end is found. But note that the mother-idea is becoming ever more distinct.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Jocose actions aim at the good of the man who does them, whether that good is genuine (e.g., to study better) or counterfeit (to enjoy more a life of luxury).

2. Knowledge for its own sake is in opposition to the utility aimed at by the mechanical arts. Speculative knowledge, then, while thus distinguished by its proximate purpose, aims ultimately at the good state of him who pursues it.

Here enters a scholion, on the purpose of meditation. Meditation may be an act of the virtue of prudence, entered into in order to do one's duty better. But it may also be an act

of the virtue of faith, entered into in order to love God better. But love of God is related to love of neighbor, not as a means to an end, but as pre-eminent cause to its effect.

3. Even when he is not actually thinking of his ultimate goal, man's every deliberate act arises in him in virtue of that ultimate goal (*virtualiter*). The traveler's destination governs his every step, whatever he may be thinking of at every step.

Difficulties Raised by Scotus

Against St. Thomas, Scotus holds that man can act deliberately without aiming at beatitude and even against beatitude. He argues thus:

1. The will follows the intellect. But the intellect may not be thinking of beatitude.

We answer thus: The will follows the intellect, yes, but in two ways: either by actual intention (when the intellect is thinking of purpose), or by virtual intention (when the intellect is not thinking of purpose).

2. The will follows the intellect. But the intellect can think of something in itself good, without thinking of it as good toward a goal.

We answer: "Without thinking of an object wherein that good exists," yes; but without thinking of that good as part of his own happiness, no. Beginning necessarily aims at consummation.

3. Even while he remains certain that beatitude is found only in God, a man can will, for instance, the sin of fornication. Now such a man wills something against beatitude.

We answer: "Against the object wherein beatitude is found," yes; against his own desire for beatitude, no. Such a man, here and now, tries to find happiness in sin.

Further Difficulties

A good deed, done by a sinner, must be done, at least virtually, for God. But the sinner, who remains a sinner, has

something created as his goal. Hence a man may have two ultimate goals.

Answer: The sinner's good deed has God as ultimate goal, in a certain sense, yes (since the object of that deed meets with God's approval); but, simply and absolutely, no (because, not even virtually, is the good deed done for God loved above all else). This man cannot serve two masters. All his deeds, good and bad, are done for one last goal, namely, himself, loved selfishly.

But, the arguer continues, since created good is not the object of the sinner's good deed, created good is no longer his last goal.

Answer: His last goal is still his own love of self above all else; but, since he is not confirmed in evil, he can still act against his own evil goal, but not against his own desire for beatitude.

But, so the arguer again, man can simply not act for his own beatitude, because the will tends not to happiness in the abstract, but to the concrete object which gives happiness. To illustrate. A bath, to reach its purpose, must not remain in abstract thought, but must become a concrete reality.

Answer: If beatitude were aimed at without relation to me, the concrete agent, then it would remain in the abstract, yes; but otherwise, no. When I act, I want beatitude, not in the abstract for men in general, but for me, the concrete self.

It remains true, though, that this desire for happiness does not become fully and simply efficacious until I choose an object (God or myself) wherein I am to find this happiness.

But, the arguer insists, intermediate motives, like intermediate agents, must be concrete and existing realities.

Answer: "Like intermediate agents" is an ambiguous phrase. Physical agents, having physical causality, must be concrete and existing realities. But intermediate moral motives, exercising final causality, move simply by being known. Here lies condemnation of Quietism, which tells the holy soul to love God without any thought of its own beatitude.

The holy soul must love its own beatitude, but subordinates that beatitude to the glory of God, whom it loves more than it loves itself.

A fourth insistence: Do we not often choose some particular good without thinking at all of any ultimates?

Answer: Without thinking of ultimates expressly and explicitly, yes; without thinking of them implicitly and tacitly, no.

Fifth and last insistence: But if man is free, why can he not refuse to will his own happiness?

Answer: Man can refuse to exercise his freedom, yes (by going to sleep, or by getting drunk); but if he exercises his power of choice, he must choose something in some way subordinated to his own well-being.

Venial Sin

When the just man, who finds his happiness in God, still commits venial sin, is God in some way the object of that sin? Some Thomists say yes, and explain: God is the object, not positively but negatively, permissively, and habitually, since venial sin does not destroy the sinner's habit of charity. We hold that these expressions, though not false, are still improper, because God cannot, in any proper sense, be the object of sin. These authors fail to distinguish clearly the state of man as wayfarer from his state of blessedness or of damnation.

A better solution is given by Cajetan, who is followed by Billuart, Sylvius, and Contenson: namely, that everything a man does, venial sin included, is done for man's well-being, but not necessarily for that object wherein his well-being is found. The present article, says Cajetan, deals primarily with man's desire for happiness, whereas the question of the object which will satisfy that desire is the precise question in the next article.

To illustrate. The Christian, in the state of mortal sin, can elicit an act of hope, the ultimate end of which is God, inefficaciously loved. But the sense of our thesis here is that the

ultimate aim of every human act is the object which we efficaciously intend. No one can serve two masters.

St. Thomas on Venial Sin

The acts of a Christian are either good or bad. If good, they aim at God, either perfectly or imperfectly. If bad, they are either venially bad (and have no ultimate concrete aim), or then, mortally bad (and aim at some created good as ultimate). The ultimate in anyone's venial sin is his own well-being, not found here and now simply in God (else it would not be sin at all), nor simply in created good loved supremely (else it would be grievous sin). But if venial sin has no ultimate concrete end, then venial sin is impossible. Impossible, the Saint replies, in the angels, yes; in men who are still wayfarers, no. Man, the wayfarer, does not, like the angel, have intuitive knowledge, which sees instantaneously all conclusions in their principles, all acts in their last concrete end. Hence, while angels, if they sin, must sin mortally, men, as long as they are wayfarers, can sin, not only grievously, but also venially.

In conclusion, we give three more statements from the Saint.[13]

a) In venial sin man does not aim at created good as his last concrete end.

b) In venial sin man aims at created good, not as one enjoying (because he does not find in it his last goal), but as one using (since, while he retains his habitual relation to God, he actually does the deed for his own well-being).

c) Venial sin does not have created good as its ultimate goal.

APPENDIX

Virtual Intention

"Habitual intention" is a term used by many moderns to signify the intention, explicit or implicit, which St. Thomas calls "virtual intention."

[13] Ia–IIae, q.89, a.1.

Virtual intention is explicit when a man acts by reason of a past actual intention not repudiated (a physician, gathering herbs, and at the moment unmindful of his medical purpose).

Virtual intention is implicit when a man does something naturally subordinated to his own well-being, whether or not he knows the purpose of his act. This is the precise intention dealt with in our present article, since beginning, says the Saint, is always subordinated to consummation. Nature, forming an embryo, aims at the fully developed man. The hod-carrier, though he may not know the architect's intention, still aims implicitly at that intention. Interpretative intention is an intention which we judge would exist had the agent thought of its purpose. An example is a man giving alms to a stranger, not knowing that the recipient is a relative in disguise.

Intention is habitual, properly speaking, when the agent has a habit which, in no way, explicitly or implicitly, influences the deed he is here and now doing. An example is the saint who sins venially. The saint's habitual love of God simply coexists with the sin, but is not in any way a cause of the sin. Habits, we note, are simply inclinations to act, but can result in act only when the will intends to use them.

These divisions run through all moral theology. Those theologians, therefore, are not justified, who use the word "habitual intention" to signify what Thomists call "virtual implicit intention," and then proceed to quote St. Thomas for their own view.

Duration of the Explicit Virtual Intention

Some authors assign a month, some a longer period. Then we must ask: Why may it not last until the first day of the next month? Or even until the first day of the second year? These unscientific solutions remind us of the sophist's question: When does a stone heap begin? With the second stone, or with the third?

A better answer, based on principle, runs thus: Explicit

virtual intention can be destroyed only by a contrary intention. The determination left by an actual explicit intention is something spiritual, hence, in itself, independent of time. This determination, should the man die, would remain forever.

Nevertheless, by accident or occasion, this determination can be destroyed. It is a habit, and habit, long unused, may yield to a contrary intention, which may arise without the agent's explicit intention, and thus destroy his former determination.

Indirect voluntary acts (omission, say, and acts voluntary in cause) may put an end to the explicit virtual intention. An example is the physician who drinks heavily, foreseeing its evil effects on the self-control he needs for an impending operation.

How can we know, practically, that the virtual intention still endures? Ask the man why he acted as he did. If he replies, equivalently, by referring to his former intention, then it still endures.

Thus the thesis stands. Man acts always, at least virtually and implicitly, for an ultimate end, namely, his own well-being.

ART. 7. DO ALL MEN HAVE ONE AND THE SAME ULTIMATE GOAL?

Initial Difficulties

The unicity of the last end, as here treated, is concerned, not with one man, but with all men, all angels, all intellectual creatures.

1. The just man and the sinner cannot have the same last end.

2. Some just men lead the contemplative life, others lead the active life.

3. Actions, and hence the goals of actions, belong to individual men.

The Argument

A. St. Augustine: All men agree in aiming at one last end, their own well-being.[14]

B. Two conclusions.

First. All men aim at one and the same formal end, because each desires his own happiness, his own well-being, his own perfect state.

Second. All men do not aim at the same material end, at one and the same object, wherein to find their own well-being: as beatifying object, some aim at riches, some at pleasure, some at knowledge. Few choose God, who alone, as we shall see, can give happiness, even in the order of nature.

A Corollary

As man is, so man chooses. To the babe, milk means sweetness. Later his intellect first knows milk as a reality, and his will first desires that reality as good. What holds good of the babe, holds good of all men: as they are, so they choose.

Initial Difficulties Analyzed

1. The sinner turns away from the truly beatifying object, but not from his desire of his own well-being, which he seeks in counterfeit beatifying objects.

2. The active life by its proximate purpose differs from the contemplative, but each has the same ultimate goal in God.

3. Each man's acts belong to him individually, yes. But nature, the source of activity, is the same in all men, and tends to the same goal in all men. And intellect and will, the faculties by which nature acts, tend likewise to one goal, intellect to the true, will to the good.

ART. 8. DO ALL CREATURES HAVE THE SAME ULTIMATE GOAL?

The object which is the goal is one and the same for all creatures, namely, their Creator who made them in order to

[14] *De Trinitate,* Bk. XIII, chap. 4.

manifest, each in its own way, their Creator's goodness. "The creature, as creature, belongs to God, and as such is inclined to love its Creator more than it loves itself.[15]

But in the mode of attaining this goal, creatures differ. God can be possessed, properly speaking, only by acts of intellect and will, and of these acts irrational creatures are incapable.

Recapitulation

1. Man, acting deliberately, always aims at his own well-being as ultimate purpose.
2. Voluntary acts are specifically differentiated by their objects.
3. Human life has one ultimate goal.
4. No man can aim simultaneously at two ultimate goals.
5. Man, acting deliberately, wills all his actions for one last end, his own well-being.
6. All men agree in desiring each his own well-being, but not in the object wherein to find their well-being.
7. All creatures have God as their ultimate goal, though not all can know God.

All these articles proceed from one fundamental idea, the mother-idea, evolving from that idea, as bodily organs evolve from the embryo.

[15] Ia, q.60, a.5.

CHAPTER VI

Man's Objective Beatitude

PROLOGUE

The first five questions in this part of the *Summa* are concerned with the following:

1. primarily, with man's formal, subjective well-being;
2. with the object wherein this well-being can be found;
3. with the activity, the beatific vision, whereby God is possessed;
4. with the characteristics of the act whereby we possess God;
5. with the attainment of this possession, its possibility, and its degrees.

THE PRESENT QUESTION

These eight articles are concerned with four possibly beatifying objects:

a) with external goods, the goods of fortune, namely, riches (art. 1); honors (art. 3); fame and glory (art. 3); power over men (art. 4);

b) with bodily goods (art. 5) and sense-delights (art. 6);

c) with soul-goods, virtue, and knowledge (art. 7);

d) with any created good whatsoever (art. 8).

DIVISION OF GOODNESS

1. The good, as identified with reality, is divided into the ten categories of reality (substance, quality, etc.).

2. The good, as good, has three divisions, based on:

a) its perfection, by reason of which good is either fully good, or only in a certain sense (wine, deficient, but still wine);

b) its desirability, by reason of which good is good in itself, or good as giving mere pleasure, or, finally, good as the road to higher good;

c) its standard (right reason), by reason of which good is either moral or immoral or indifferent. Moral good, identified with good in itself, is found in man on three levels: in man as substance (the good of self-preservation); in man as animal (the good of begetting and educating children); in man as endowed with reason (the good of justice toward God and men).

The good-in-itself, even though it were not delightful or useful, is man's proximate standard and first duty, simply because man is endowed with reason.

ART. 1, 2, 3, 4. CAN EXTERNAL GOODS BE MAN'S BEATIFYING OBJECT?

A. The reply of revelation is clear: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, those who mourn, . . . those who suffer persecution." "What doth it profit a fool to have riches, since he cannot buy wisdom?" [1]

B. Reason itself sees this truth. If "blessedness means that perfect good which totally satiates man's longings," then, for three reasons, external goods are not the beatifying object.

1. Goods found in bad men cannot be the beatifying object. But external goods are possessed, not only by good men, but also by bad men.

2. Goods that are incomplete are not the beatifying object. But external goods are incomplete (they do not, e.g., include health and wisdom).

3. Goods that, while useful, are insecure and transitory cannot be the beatifying object. But external goods, while useful, are insecure and transitory.

This last argument condemns utilitarianism, which sets

[1] Prov. 17:16.

up usefulness as the supreme standard of morality and happiness.

Looking at particular external goods, we argue thus:

The external goods of fortune are more gloriously lost than retained. The Apostle looks on temporal goods as manure, which, heaped up, stinks, but when scattered on the field, is transformed into bountiful harvests. This holds good, not only of riches, but also of honors, dignities, and power over men. How many popes, writes Gonet, died soon after their supreme elevation. Thus pass all the glories of the world. We add a particularized proof for the first four articles.

1. Wealth cannot be the beatifying object. Wealth, money, the reward of human art and industry, is intended to serve natural wealth: food, drink, clothing, shelter. These in turn, as means of self-preservation, are subordinated to man, inferior to man. Gold, in contrast to wisdom, is but a small heap of sand. Fools think otherwise. But human standards should not be set up by fools.

Further, wealth, however great, longs for ever greater wealth. Its insufficiency is best known by its owner. But the beatifying object, the more it is possessed, the more it is loved and appreciated.

2. Honors cannot be the beatifying object. Honor, to be genuine, presupposes virtue. In contrast to the ambitious man, the magnanimous man aims, not at honor, but at honorable deeds, which he esteems much more than the honor which may or may not follow. "If you would be first, become a servant." Humble yourself, if you would be exalted.

3. Human glory is not the beatifying object. Glory rests on human knowledge, often defective. Again, true glory does not cause, rather it presupposes, that excellence which is the source of blessedness. The canonized glory of the saint presupposes the saint's beatitude.

Divine glory, by contrast, God's approving knowledge, is the cause of the saint's beatitude. "I will deliver him, glorify him, show him that I am his savior." [2] To St. Thomas, still on

[2] Ps. 15:15.

earth, Christ spoke the glorifying words: "Thou hast written well of Me." Genuinely glorious is he whom God commends.

4. Power over others is not the beatifying object. Rulers often misuse their power. Power is attended by cares and fears. Power is exercised over others, and is therefore a transitive thing, which presupposes an excellence immanent in the ruler who is to lead others to beatitude. The genuine "superman" is the supernatural man, who rules in superhuman fashion, as instrument of the Holy Spirit. Only he who serves God can rule men. Blessed are the meek, the humble, the obedient. "Blessed those who rule others:" Christ never said that.

Summary: External goods, the goods of fortune, may serve as instruments in attaining beatitude, but can never be the beatifying object.

ART. 5. BODILY EXCELLENCE IS NOT THE BEATIFYING OBJECT

Materialists, who hold that man's death is the end of his existence, must find the beatifying object in man's bodily excellence. Against them we argue as follows:

A. Common sense sees that man, in some real way, surpasses the animal world. But in bodily excellences man often yields to beasts: to the elephant, in duration; to the lion, in strength.

Our opponents insist that in brain power, the chief bodily excellence, man transcends all beasts. Here enters the twofold argument of the present corpus.

B. 1. The primary purpose of the ship is the ship's destination, not the ship's preservation. The example illustrates a principle: Destination is more important than self-preservation. Nothing less than the supreme good, which man does not have but only desires, can be the beatifying object. Man, who is limited in so many ways, cannot be the supreme good. Hence his bodily excellences (health, strength, speed, skill) cannot be the beatifying object.

2. Man's soul is more important than his body, since on his

immortal and subsistent soul depends the existence of his body. Even if, therefore, self-preservation were the beatifying object, bodily excellence could not be that object.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. As external goods are subordinated to the body, so is the body subordinated to the soul.

2. Existence is higher than life, yes, if you are talking of God's unreceived existence. But no, if you are talking of that received existence, shared in even by the stone.

3. Not self-preservation, but assimilation to the Creator, is the creature's ultimate purpose.

ART. 6. PLEASURE IS NOT THE BEATIFYING OBJECT

The word "pleasure," which means primarily sense-pleasure, includes in its wider meaning also intellectual pleasure, poetic and philosophical pleasure. Pleasure, says Aristotle, is the natural consequence of any operation perfect in its kind.

Initial Difficulties

1. Pleasure, since it is sought for its own sake, must be the beatifying object.

2. Pleasure, since it makes man scorn all other goods, must be the beatifying object.

3. Pleasure, since it is the goal of all men, whether wise or foolish, must be the beatifying object.

These objections stem from the hedonists, especially Epicurus.

The Response

A. Boethius [3] and Plato [4] are our authorities. The supreme good, says Plato, cannot be found in pleasure, because pleasure can be evil.

B. We have two proofs.

[3] Bk. III, no. 7.
[4] *De voluptate,* 21b.

1. Pleasure, since it presupposes the possession of good, is indeed a characteristic of beatitude, but cannot be the essence of beatitude. Pleasure arises from some possession, present (*in re*) or future (*in spe*) or past (*in memoria*). Just as, to quote Aristotle, beauty does not constitute youthful vitality, but is a consequence which manifests that vitality, so likewise is pleasure the consequence and expression of successful activity.

2. Much less can corporeal pleasure be the beatifying object. Man's soul, transcending matter, rises above all sense-transmitted pleasure, to the pleasures attained by man's intellect in the possession of universal truth, and by man's will in the possession of the universal good. "All irrational beings taken together, the firmament, the stars, the earth and all its kingdoms, are of less value than the lowest of spirits, since the spirit knows that entire irrational world, and also knows itself, whereas the corporeal world knows nothing at all." [5]

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Is pleasure aimed at for its own sake? As an inseparable consequence of the good possessed, yes. As direct and formal motive of activity, no. Eating, to illustrate, by aiming at corporeal preservation, results in the pleasure which manifests the good act performed. Thus, if we distinguish the joys of heaven from the possession of God, of which those joys are the inseparable consequences, we see how the saints love themselves as a consequence of the love they have for God.

2. Is corporeal pleasure the chief motive of human appetite? If chief motive means, "motive the most easily perceived," yes. If it means, "motive in itself most noble and effective," no.

3. Is pleasure the most universal motive? As an inseparable consequence of aiming at the good, yes. As something to which good itself is subordinated, no.

The greatest pleasure, then, the highest joy, results from the possession of the supreme good. But this highest joy must be

[5] Pascal, *Pensées*.

distinguished, both from the supreme good (the beatifying object), and from the possession of that object (by the beatific vision).

ART. 7. IS VIRTUE THE BEATIFYING OBJECT?

Preliminaries

The controversy here is with the Stoics, ancient and modern. Rational activity, life according to man's nature, was the watchword of the ancient Stoics. Permanent fortitude of will results in harmony with all men. "Man sacred to man" condemns slavery. Harmony with all men leads to harmony with the whole universe, since divine reason (here pantheism enters) is the soul of the universe.

The wise man, then, the Stoic philosopher, transcends the limits of family, city, and country, and becomes a cosmopolitan, a citizen of the universe, subject only to fate, which leads him who is willing, and drags him who is unwilling. Passion, the Stoic says, since it is the enemy of virtue, must be destroyed, by patience and abstinence. Says Epictetus: Sustain and abstain. Be a man, strong against passion and pleasure, tranquil in fortune and misfortune. Pleasure and pain are meaningless. Virtue is its own reward.

This ancient Stoic school was indeed a school of courage and constancy, but it was likewise a school of pride. Further, it denied free will by its pantheism, its universal determinism, which ended in fatalism. As an ethical system, although it seemed to be superhuman, it was in truth inhuman, indifferent when faced with human joy and pain.

Echoes of this ancient Stoicism are still heard in later times. Spinoza's system, though he ascends to contemplation of divine good, is still pantheistic, since he looks on man's intelligence as a mode of divine thought; Spinoza's system, like ancient Stoicism, denies free will and merit.

Stoic elements remain also in Kant's ethical system, wherein man's rational dignity is the supreme motive of man's activity. Thus this system leads to "anthropolatry," to the worship of

man, just as the altruism of Comte leads to "sociolatry," to the worship of society.

What are the arguments which seem to show that virtue is the beatifying object? Three such arguments are noted by St. Thomas:

1. The beatifying object, since it can be neither external good nor bodily excellence, must be an intrinsic good in man's soul.

2. Since we love a person more than the gift we give him, and therefore love our own person more than we love all other goods, the beatifying object must be our own personal virtue and value.

3. Since beatitude means perfection, and perfection is something intrinsic in man's soul, beatitude must consist in virtue.

Virtue, Soul-good, Cannot Be the Beatifying Object

A. Our authority is St. Augustine: Man, and all that is in man, must be loved for the sake of God, who is infinitely better than man, and from whom comes all good that man has.[6]

We have two conclusions, one concerned with the beatifying object, the other with subjective beatitude.

A. The soul itself, being a potentiality capable of receiving knowledge and virtue, cannot be its own actual and beatifying object.

Further, all soul-goods (knowledge, virtue), taken singly or collectively, are not a perfect and universal good, and cannot, therefore, be the beatifying object. In God alone, says Cajetan, is found unlimited and absolute good, whereas created goods are necessarily limited. Man's nature, says St. Thomas, desires complete goodness, but the object which gives that complete goodness is not determined by nature. All soul-goods, says Koellin, are limited, and hence cannot satiate man's desire. Just as the adequate object of the intellect, as Billuart says, is simply all truth, so the adequate object of the will is simply

[6] Cf. IIa–IIae, q.26, a.3.

all good, and God alone, since He precontains all created good, is simply and absolutely all good.

Inductively, too, we reach the same conclusion. Look at the values inherent in the soul (powers, habits, acts, all knowledge, scientific or artistic, all virtues, even the most heroic): each of these, being an accident, not only is a limited good, but has an ulterior purpose: powers and habits end in acts; intellectual acts end in truth, and ultimately in the supreme truth; voluntary acts end in goodness, and ultimately in the supreme and unlimited good, to which are subordinated all good in all souls, and all single virtues, all prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

Against the ancient Stoics, then, and against our modern subjectivists, we must maintain that the virtues, all and singly, are subordinated to the supreme Good which is their ultimate goal. Virtue is the road to happiness, but the road is not the goal. Virtue aims at regulating, not at satiating, man's appetites and desires. Beatitude is the reward of virtue, but virtue is not itself beatitude.

B. Beatitude, considered formally and subjectively, inheres in the soul. Since formal beatitude means to possess and enjoy supreme Good, and since man possesses this Good by his intellect and will, we must conclude that formal beatitude resides and inheres in man's soul.

Here we must note, with Koellin: "Not human act as such, but act as possessing infinite Good, can satisfy man's desires. Possession (the *finis quo*), and the object possessed or desired (*finis qui*) are not two separate goals, but rather two related aspects of one and the same goal."

A Corollary

The Stoics, ancient and modern, put too much value on themselves, do not look high enough to see God, the supreme Good. Even in Nietzsche's "superman" nothing is found to transcend man. The only genuine "superman" is the supernatural man, the saint, who lives, not for himself, but for God, who lives and acts for God, his friend supreme.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Goods are external, bodily, and spiritual. This enumeration is incomplete unless it includes God, the supreme good.

2. When we give a gift to a friend, we love the friend as him to whom (*finis cui*), but we love the gift as what we give (*finis qui*). Thus, in friendship with God, by the virtue of charity, we wish to give God His own infinite goodness, and, secondarily, to give that same infinite goodness both to ourselves and to our neighbor.

3. Man's perfection is something intrinsic in man. Yes, if you are talking about formal, subjective beatitude; no, if you are talking about the beatifying object.

ART. 8. NOTHING CREATED CAN BE THE BEATIFYING OBJECT

Initial Difficulties

1. Each lower level of creation finds its goal in the next higher level: vegetation in sense-activity, sense-activity (artistic imagination, say) in rational activity. Hence man ought to find his goal in the next higher level of creation, i.e., in the angels.

2. Man, being but a part of the universe, should find his goal in that universe, since parts exist for the sake of the whole.

3. Man's natural desire, since it is created and limited, cannot receive a good which is uncreated and unlimited.

Proof of the Thesis

A. The Lord is my portion forever.[7] Patristic texts are numerous. Two sentences of St. Augustine are often quoted: "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of man." "Thou hast made us, O Lord, for Thyself, and restless is our heart till it rests in Thee." [8] To the question of Christ addressed to St. Thomas: "What shall be thy reward," the Saint replied: "Nothing but Thyself, O Lord."

[7] Ps. 15 and Ps. 72.
[8] *Confess.*, Bk. I.

B. Nothing created can be the beatifying object, because nothing created can satiate man's natural desire.

This argument rests on the principle that natural desires are never in vain. Man's will aims at the universal good, just as man's mind aims at universal truth. And universal good, good that totally satiates desire, cannot be found in any or all created and limited goods.

Here we must again note that the word "good" is not used as an abstract predicate, because the will aims at the good actually existing in the concrete object. Nor does the word "good" refer directly to God, who is the total plenitude of goodness. What the word does directly refer to is good as such, good unlimited, uncontracted. And the conclusion is that such unlimited good, existing as an actual and concrete object, is to be found in God and God alone.

We may add this reflection. Let us suppose all the limited goods of the universe to be multiplied to infinity. Such an infinity of finite goods, were it even an actual infinity, would never be an infinite good, just as an actually infinite number of irrational animals would never make one man, or as an infinite number of fools would never make one sage.

Here lies the source of that deep dissatisfaction and boredom which are the intolerable burden of worldly men. Only in God can the human heart find rest.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. The human will, like the angelic will, aims at that universal and unlimited good which is found in God alone. The intuitive vision of even the highest angel could never satiate man's desire, because the angel is and remains a creature.

2. The universe in relation to its parts may be an intermediate goal, but never an ultimate goal. Thus, whereas the active life serves society, the contemplative life aims directly at glorifying God, the supreme good. Again, schism, a sin against ecclesiastical society, is not as great a sin as is infidelity, which is a sin against God.

Here enters a question: Does the human individual exist to serve society (communism), or does society exist to serve the individual (liberalism)?

Communism and liberalism are two extremes. Between and above these extremes runs the golden middle way. The individual, in temporal matters, serves society; but in eternal things he rises above civil society, since he is a fellow citizen of the saints, a member of the household of God. In defense of his country the citizen must be willing even to shed his blood. But civil authority, on the otherhand, while its proximate goal is the well-being of society, has as its ultimate goal that eternal life which is the end of all human activity. Man's active life, then, his lower and external life, is subordinated to society. But man's contemplative life, his higher and internal life, transcends civil life.

Here we note the distinction between "individual" and "person." The animal is an individual, but not a person. Man is both an individual and a person. Man, as an individual, is subordinated to society, whereas society is subordinated to man as a person. Thus in the spiritual order (as person) man is bound to provide first for himself, whereas in the temporal order (as individual) man is praiseworthy when he is generous in providing for his neighbor. Again, virginity excels matrimony, because divine values surpass human values. And private spiritual good stands higher than common civil good.

Here too lies the reason why the secrets of man's heart are not really parts of the universe, and hence cannot naturally be known.

3. Man is incapable of receiving an uncreated and infinite good. Yes, we answer, if he is to receive it intrinsically, as an attribute of his inner self. But no, if he is to receive it as object, eternally distinct from himself. Thus, even in the natural order, we would know and love God as our beatifying object.

But is not man's desire a limited and finite thing? Limited, yes, as a being, but still so insatiable that it cannot be satiated

even with an actually infinite number of finite and limited values.

But, you may insist, subjective beatitude, being finite, should be satisfied with a beatifying object which is finite. Answer: Subjective beatitude, as an elicited act, is finite, yes, yet so that its object is not finite.

But then, you insist, man would have to possess infinite knowledge of God. This does not follow. Only God's knowledge of Himself is infinite.

But then a lower saint would desire a higher knowledge of God. No. The lowest saint is fully satiated, just as the man with the least hunger is satiated, though he eats less than others.

But, lastly, the saint who possesses God still has other desires: glorification of his body, e.g., and the salvation of his relatives. Answer: He desires these things as consequence and extension of his possession of God, yes. In any other sense, no. All goods that man can desire pre-exist in God, in higher fashion than they exist in themselves.

Corollaries

1. Temporal goods are to be sought only as ways and means to spiritual values.

2. External goods, while looked upon by the Stoics as in no sense good, are good as instruments of higher goods.

3. Temporal goods are not the reward of virtue, and their loss is not primarily the punishment of sin.

4. God distributes temporal good and evil in such fashion as to promote virtue.

5. Temporal goods given to a sinner, though often in fact tending to evil, are intended to lead him back to God.

6. Spiritual goods are permanently satiative, but temporal goods are not.

7. Temporal goods attract in anticipation, but disgust when actually attained. Spiritual goods act inversely.

8. Spiritual goods do not taste well to those whose appetite is spoiled by sense-indulgence.

9. Spiritual goods, but not corporeal goods, remain full and entire when shared with others. Two men cannot simultaneously own one and the same house, or eat one and the same article of food. But two men can simultaneously possess wisdom, virtue, and God. Matter divides, spirit unites.[9]

APPENDIX

Plato and Aristotle on the Supreme Good

Plato. Plato[10] sets up a stairway of beauty: from love of bodily beauty (sounds and colors) man rises to beauty of soul, because bodily beauty comes from the soul, which gives the body motion and life. Further, soul-beauty comes from noble deeds, noble deeds from elevated doctrines and precepts, and elevated doctrines depend on the highest branch of knowledge, which has as object self-subsistent beauty and good. What felicity it would be, he cries out, what a blessed vision would be his, who beholds beauty itself, beauty pure, perfect, and simple, uncontaminated by human flesh, by colors, by all mortal trifles, a beauty uniformly permanent and divine! Would not such a man be truly virtuous, truly a friend of God, truly an immortal among mortal men?

Thus Plato, following Socrates in condemning sophistic utilitarianism, holds that beatitude does not consist chiefly in sense-pleasure, though it includes higher pleasures. Further, he holds that God, the supreme good, is man's beatifying object, to be attained by him who by virtuous life imitates God. And the supreme virtue, higher than temperance, fortitude, justice, prudence, is that wisdom which is chiefly occupied with the contemplation of the supreme good.

Further, Plato affirms the immortality of the soul, since even here on earth man's mind knows unchangeable and universal truth. Good souls, after death, are rewarded by association with the gods, but wicked souls will be tortured. But will punish-

[9] On these corollaries, cf. Ia–IIae, q.87, a.7, and IIa–IIae, q.20, a.4, and Ia, q.28, a.4.

[10] *Convivium*, chap. 29.

ment be eternal? Here Plato speaks uncertainly, basing his view on traditional myths. Thus he speaks of souls which, though evil, can still be cured, and hence return to a new body for a new trial (metempsychosis, transmigration of souls). But, although at times he speaks plainly both of eternal punishment and eternal reward, he elsewhere seems to say that all souls will ultimately attain beatitude.

To understand Plato, while we acknowledge his genius, we must recall two errors: first, his absolute and exaggerated realism which leads to pantheism: secondly, his exaggerated dualism, which, while favoring the immortality of the soul, still looks on the body, not as the soul's substantial instrument, but rather as a burden and hindrance. Yet, notwithstanding these aberrations, Plato definitely finds man's beatifying object in God, the Author of nature, known, not abstractly, but concretely and intuitively. Further, although he does not speak of the eternal law as the supreme law of morality, his philosophy does lead naturally to God as the supreme moral norm, since God formed the universe and all its laws.

Aristotle.[11] How does man reach that beatitude which his nature desires? Not by pleasure or by riches or by power or even by virtue, but, as Plato said, by contemplating God. Dispositions for this contemplation are the moral virtues, and secondarily, bodily health and sufficiency of external goods. Contemplation is beatitude, because it is the highest act of man's highest faculty, exercised on the highest of objects, namely, the supreme good. Contemplation is characterized by its permanency, its delightfulness, its self-sufficiency, its supremacy. The contemplative life is full human life, almost a superhuman and divine life, because man's mind is something divine, even while man is mortal. Let man live by what is best in his soul, his intellect, by which he is man. Soul-life, mind-life, is of all lives the best and most delightful. Little at best is man's knowledge of higher beings, but that little is more lovely and desirable than all man can know of lower beings.

[11] *Ethica ad Nicomachum,* Bk. I, chaps. 2–7; Bk. X, chap. 7.

These affirmations, as being in harmony with truth, become, in St. Thomas, the natural foundation of supernatural morality.

But Aristotle speaks only of beatitude in the present life. On the future life he is silent. Since the soul is the form of the body, how can the separated soul think, since it cannot employ as instruments the sense-powers which reside in the body? Nor does he speak explicitly of the supreme standard of morality, though he maintains that justice is something objective, based on nature. Nor did he reach an explicit knowledge of creation.

DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AS PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

Preliminaries

1. This proof is virtually identified with St. Thomas' fourth way, which shows the necessary dependence of imperfect goods on an actual infinite Good, which makes them one in goodness. St. Thomas, like Plato, rises from multitude to unity, from composition to simplicity, from received good to the Good unreceived.

2. From the viewpoint of morality, we present this argument as follows: Since natural desire can never be in vain, and since all men naturally desire beatitude, there must exist an objective being that is infinitely perfect, a being that man can possess, love, and enjoy.

This argument [12] rests first, on inductive evidence, secondly, on metaphysical evidence. Inductively, we take examples: the natural desire of life for air, of self-preservation for food, of the ox for grass, of the lion for meat. We quote illustrations from the words of Christ: the birds of heaven, fed by the heavenly Father, the foxes who have their burrows. We quote the Psalms and Job: The swallow finds a house, the dove a nest, the young crows find food. To all these illustrations, the cynic, pointing to individual cases of starvation, fails to see

[12] Father Gredt's formulations of this argument (*Elementa,* Vol. II) are not quite correct and precise.

that exceptions prove the law, that the natural desire of living things for life is not a desire that is idle and in vain, but a desire that is fulfilled in the endless propagation of the race.

But do all men naturally desire beatitude? Again, induction says yes. Neither sensual pleasure nor riches, nor honor nor power nor science nor even friendship can satisfy man's natural desire, which remains unsatiated until its rests in the supreme good. All else is "vanity of vanities" and affliction of spirit.

Metaphysically considered, our two propositions are likewise evident. A natural desire cannot be in vain, because nature tends to an object that is real, not merely imaginary. If any action could be without some natural purpose, it could not exist at all, since everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence. This truth is particularly true in relative beings, like desire or sight or hearing, since their whole nature is a tendency to something else which is their object. Thus the human will's natural tendency cannot be idle and in vain.

Again. Good exists in actually existing objects. Hence, since man's desire tends to good as such, to a boundless and unlimited good, this infinite good really exists.

Clarifications

This argument rests, not on man's natural desire to see God face to face, but on man's desire for natural happiness, a desire which is innate, identified with the will itself, a desire which is quasi-infinite, insatiable by any finite good. Seen thus, this argument is an apodictic proof of God's existence. "One sigh of man's soul for perfect happiness is a supergeometric demonstration of the existence of God." Supergeometric, we say, because it is metaphysical, based on principles on which depend mathematical principles. Metaphysical, yet simple, since Christ's word, that "the clean of heart will see God," holds good proportionally also in the natural order.

Is our argument identical with that of Blondel and others, who try to prove God's existence from man's immanent desire for God? Superficially, yes, in reality, no. These philosophers,

since in various degrees they follow Kant in doubting the validity of speculative reason, affirm in its stead the primacy of practical reason, which, objectively insufficient, is nevertheless a subjectively sufficient basis for moral life. This conclusion, they add, is then confirmed by moral life itself, which finds experimentally that God satiates man's aspirations.

But, we must ask, if in the order of thought you mistrust even the principle of contradiction, what assurance can you have in the order of action? If your speculative mind is fallible, how can your will, which follows your mind, be sure and infallible?

To summarize. The existence of God is proved by man's natural desire for an actually existing supreme good. God, known as the Author of nature, is the presupposition of man's knowledge of God as the Author of grace.[13]

[13] God as being, as reality, is infinitely simple. But God as intelligible object is seen in one way by reason, in another way by faith, and in a third way by the beatific vision.

CHAPTER VII

What is Beatitude Considered Formally, Subjectively? (Q. 3)

PRELIMINARIES

Seven notable answers have been given to the question: In what does formal beatitude essentially consist? Two answers find that essence in an uncreated Good, which is either a reception of the Divinity into the essence [1] of the soul, or an uncreated knowledge of God, communicated to us by our own unitive act.[2]

Five answers find this essence in a created good, which is, either

a) a habit which deifies the essence of the soul; [3] or

b) the beatific vision; [4] or

c) the beatifying love of friendship with God; [5] or

d) the enjoyment and fruition of God; or

e) equally in the vision of God and the love of God.[6]

Let us begin with a synopsis of the doctrine of St. Thomas. Formal, subjective beatitude,

1. is the created possession of uncreated Good;

2. this possession is an activity; but

3. not a sense-activity, though it is preceded and followed by sense-activity;

4. this activity is exercised by the intellect, whereas the consequent delight is an activity of the will;

[1] Henry of Ghent. Peter Lombard's view of charity as something uncreated.
[2] Master Bonae Spei and some Belgian Carmelites.
[3] St. Bonaventure (IV Sent., dist. 49, a.1, q.1, n.5.)
[4] Thomists, Bellarmine, Becanus, Vasquez, Tostatus, and others.
[5] Scotus.
[6] Molina, Suarez, who thus attempt to harmonize Thomas and Scotus.

5. it is an activity of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect;

6. it is not the natural metaphysical knowledge of God, though this knowledge may be called imperfect beatitude;

7. it does not consist in knowing the angels;

8. but it does consist in the immediate vision of God.

These eight assertions are to be proved in the eight articles which follow.

ART. 1.

Whereas God, the beatifying object, is indeed uncreated, unchangeable, and eternal, man's possession of this object has a beginning, and is therefore something created. Man's own beatitude is received from God. Hence the blessed soul loves God more than it loves itself. The soul's ultimate end is the possession of God.

ART. 2.

As preliminary, let us note the six initial difficulties. How can this possession of God be called an activity? Let us enumerate the difficulties.

1. The possession of God is called "eternal life;" and life means the nature, not the mere activity, of the living thing.

2. Boethius calls beatitude "a state;" and state (permanent condition) is surely distinct from activity.

3. Beatitude is intrinsic, whereas activity is something extrinsic, something that passes from the agent into the patient.

4. Beatitude is permanent, activity passes away.

5. Beatitude is one and indivisible, whereas activities are many (to understand, to will, to enjoy).

6. Beatitude goes on uninterrupted, whereas activities come to an end (in sleep, e.g., or in some other activity).

The Affirmative Proof

A. Our authority is Aristotle: Felicity is the activity of man's most perfect power.[7] This definition of natural felicity

[7] *Ethica*, X, c.7.

holds good likewise of supernatural felicity. This is eternal life, that they know Thee, the one true God.[8] The clean of heart will see God.[9] Blessed souls see the divine essence, by a vision that is intuitive.[10]

B. Since perfection consists in act, not potentiality, and since man's beatitude is his ultimate perfection, beatitude must be an activity. *Agere sequitur esse:* activity is the purpose of existence. Possession of the beatifying object is the highest kind of activity.

Objections Analyzed

1. Life is of the very nature of a living thing; yes, when you divide substances into living and nonliving. But life means activity, when you look at the purpose for which substance exists. By its purpose, its activity, you distinguish active life from contemplative life.

2. Beatitude is a state (a permanent condition); yes, if you are giving a broad definition of the beatifying object, of all the values that are subordinated to God. But formal, subjective beatitude consists essentially, not in possessing an aggregate of goods, but in possessing the supreme good by the highest activity of our highest faculty.

3. Beatitude is an immanent activity, not a transient activity. This latter, which is truly said to be "in the agent," is yet more truly said to come "from the agent." Immanent action (sensation, understanding, will) is both from and in the agent, perfects the agent, and can constitute his subjective beatitude. Thus man's immanent contemplative life stands higher than his transient active life. And the celebration of Mass stands higher than preaching.

4. Whereas beatitude is permanent, activity passes away. Yes, if you refer to this life's activity; no, if you refer to the activity of life eternal, an activity which is measured, not by

[8] John 17:3.
[9] Matt. 5:8.
[10] D. 530.

time, but by eternity. Like God's eternity, the beatific vision is entire and simultaneous, and the light of glory, which is its source, is not subject to variation.

5 and 6. The answer is similar. The activities of the blessed soul are indeed many, but only one of them, the vision whereby it possesses God, constitutes beatitude, and suffers no interruption. The other activities of the blessed soul (thoughts about creatures) are subject to interruption and time.

Henry of Ghent and the Magister Bonae Spei

Many mystics seem to say that the soul's intimate union with God takes place, not in the operative faculties, but in the very essence of the soul, where sanctifying grace resides. Thus to Henry of Ghent is assigned this statement: Subjective beatitude consists in a descent of Divinity into the essence of the soul.

This view is contrary to authority, which finds beatitude, not in essence, but in operation: The blessed see God, know God, have intuitive vision of God. It is contrary likewise to reason. God is present in the essence of the soul by producing the soul's existence, or by granting it sanctifying grace. But this descent of God, since it is found in just men here on earth and in the souls in purgatory, cannot be essential beatitude. Further, the human soul, being a created existence, can operate only by faculties distinct from itself. Action is not identified with existence, action follows existence. The view which is attributed to Henry of Ghent has no probability.

The same sentence must be passed on the Magister Bonae Spei, who finds beatitude in an uncreated understanding of God, communicated to the soul by the soul's own act of union with God. Against this view, let us note two truths.

1. Beatitude, the vision of God, is a vital act, performed by a created soul. But an uncreated understanding, being identified with God Himself, can never be an act performed by a creature.

2. God, the Uncreated, cannot be the effect of a created intellect, or the form of a created intellect. God is the efficient and the final cause of the universe, but cannot be either the material or the formal cause. Even in the hypostatic union, the divine Word, far from being the form of Christ's humanity, is simply the act which terminates and renders incommunicable the human nature of Christ.

These two views, then, that of Henry of Ghent and that of Magister Bonae Spei, lead to the pantheism of Spinoza,[11] who says: "Man's intellectual love for God is identified with the love whereby God loves Himself."

To conclude. Formal, subjective beatitude is an activity, an operation, immanent, not transitive, eternal, not transient, forever new and forever delightful: an everlasting midday followed by no night.

ART. 3. IS IT SENSE-ACTIVITY?

Here we note three brief conclusions:

1. Sense-operations, limited to the corporeal world, cannot be the beatifying operation.

2. But sense-operations, since they are the prerequisites of intellectual operations, belong antecedently to the beatific operation.

3. Lastly, since after the resurrection the soul's beatitude overflows on the body, sense-operations belong to perfect beatitude as consequences.

These distinct adverbs, "essentially," "antecedently," and "consequently" throw light also on other questions. For example, our love of desire belongs to charity, not essentially (because charity is disinterested friendship), but antecedently (because if God were not our own supreme good we could not love Him), and also consequently (because for love of God we love our own soul, and desire eternal life for ourselves). Again, many elements which do not constitute the mystic state still belong to that state antecedently or consequently.

[11] *Ethica*, pars 5a, pr. 36.

ART. 4. BY WHAT FACULTY IS THIS ACTIVITY EXERCISED: BY THE INTELLECT OR BY THE WILL?

Preliminaries

On this question Thomists and Scotists are at odds. St. Thomas holds that the beatifying activity is essentially an operation of the intellect, whereas Scotus says it is essentially an act of love, an act of the will. The view of St. Thomas rests on two previous positions.

1. The notion of truth is more absolute, more independent, more universal, than the notion of good. The good presupposes truth and reality. Hence the truth, as object of the mind, antecedes the good, though no concrete thing can be perfect unless it is good.

2. Hence, by reason of its object, the intellect is, speaking simply, a higher faculty than the will.

Scotus,[12] looking at the concrete subject rather than the differentiating object, denies these two positions of St. Thomas. The notion of truth, says Scotus, is not nobler than the notion of good. Hence the will, since it is the seat of charity, the highest of all virtues, is, speaking simply, a faculty higher than the intellect.

Initial Difficulties

1. Beatitude, since it is peace, belongs, like joy, to the will.

2. Again, since it is the highest good, it belongs to the will.

3. Again, since among the faculties the will is the prime mover, and the prime mover is also the last end, beatitude must belong to the will.

4. Again, since charity, the highest virtue, is in the will, beatitude too must belong to the will.

5. Lastly, since he is blessed who has all he wills and who wills nothing evil, the beatific operation must be an act of the will.

[12] IV Sent., dist. 49, q.4. See Cajetan on Ia, q.82, a.3.

The Affirmative Argument

A. Scripture favors our position: To know God is life eternal. Show us the Father. The clean of heart see God. We are like God, because we see Him.[13] These texts, although they do not distinguish beatitude from its qualities, surely favor the intellect as the beatifying faculty.

Patristic texts likewise favor our position: Life eternal comes from seeing God.[14] The highest contemplation constitutes human felicity.[15] To live blessedly means to possess by knowledge that which is eternal.[16] Mental possession means possession by knowledge.

B. In the body of the article we have, first, a distinction, then two conclusions. As we must distinguish man's essence (i.e., rationality) from his characteristics (i.e., laughter, wonder, and speech), so must we likewise distinguish the essence of beatitude from its characteristics. The essence of beatitude is the possession of the beatifying object. From this essential possession flow many characteristics: love, joy, bodily glory.

First conclusion. The essence of beatitude cannot be found in any act of the will, but only in an act of the intellect. The proof runs thus: The attainment and possession of the beatifying object cannot be an act of the will. Why not? For two reasons, one a priori, the other a posteriori. The first reason is that the acts of the will either antecede possession (in the form of desire), or presuppose possession (in the form of joy).

Here lies the difference between intellect and will. The intellect draws its object to itself, becomes that object, *intentionaliter,* either by an intermediate ideal species, or without medium (in the beatific vision). But the will is drawn to the object as it is in itself. Love, says St. Augustine, is a weight, bending me to the object I love. The will, then, is either seek-

[13] John 17:3; 14:8; Matt. 5:8; I John, 3:2.
[14] Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.,* Bk. 4, chap. 37.
[15] Cyril of Alexandria, *Contr. Jul.,* 1. 3.
[16] Aug., in his *Octoginta quaestiones,* q.35.

ing possession or enjoying possession, whereas the intellect apprehends, seizes, possesses the object.

To speak concretely. A saint (e.g., St. Teresa) who on earth enjoyed high intellectual visions, must experience the immediate vision of God as something entirely new. Her previous visions being based on faith, not sight, are like nonseeing in comparison. Even the highest faith (as in Our Lady) cannot see. Only the beatific vision can see.

Further, love effects union; yes, but an effective union, not an objective union. Objective union is effected by the vision, and this union is necessarily followed by the joy of mutual inhesion: My beloved to me, and I to him.[17] Even on earth (think of Mary) this mutual inhesion can be very intimate, but can never constitute perfect beatitude.

The second reason, a posteriori, rests on analogy with possession in the sense order. The child's desire for a coin is not possession. He attains and possesses when he holds it in his hand, and possession is followed by joy. Again, the eye possesses color, the ear possesses sound, the palate possesses flavor. Now as sense is related to sense-good, so intellect is related to intellective good. An intellective being, therefore, attains and possesses the beatifying object, not by its will, but by its intellect.

Second conclusion. But to the will belongs that joy which is a consequence and characteristic of blessedness. Joy, since it follows the possession of supreme truth, is the consummation of blessedness. "Rejoicing in the truth" is Augustine's definition of beatitude. Joy is a characteristic, which follows beatitude but does not constitute it.

Difficulties Analyzed

These objections are: first, the initial difficulties proposed by St. Thomas; second, those proposed by Scotus; third, those proposed by Suarez.

[17] Cant. of Cant., 2:16.

Initial Difficulties

1. Peace and joy, which belong to the will, are a necessary consequence of beatitude, but not the essence of beatitude.

2. God, as good, is the object of the will, yes; an object attainable without the mediation of the intellect, no.

3. Among man's faculties, the will is the prime mover, yes, yet so that the will cannot do by itself the work which it commands the intellect to do.

4. Love for God is better than knowledge of God: here on earth, where by faith we move toward God, yes; in heaven, where we see and possess God, no.

5. Blessed is he who has all he desires: yes, but he has them, possesses them, by knowing them, not by willing them. His will is either a disposition for possession, or a consequence of possession.

Difficulties Proposed by Scotus

1. Attaining God is twofold: by knowledge, which is first in the order of time; by love, which is first in the order of perfection. Answer: Love for the beatifying object is not, speaking properly, the same thing as attaining that object. Love either precedes attaining or follows attainment.

2. Love implies rest, and resting in God is blessedness. Answer: Resting in God is the consequence, not the essence, of the beatifying operation. Love, since it abstracts from the object's presence or absence, cannot be attainment of the object.

But, the objector insists, love, according to Augustine, Denis, and Aquinas, is "the virtue which unites lovers." Answer: Love is union, affective union. But love causes real and objective union. Love moves the intellect to attain experimentally the object which love desires.

3. The will desires its own act more than it desires the act of the intellect. Answer: Desires its own act more, as a

command to the intellect to see and possess, yes; but otherwise, no.

4. The will is more perfect than the intellect, because the will is, first, not abstractive, but concrete; secondly, it is the mover of the intellect; thirdly, it is free. Answer: The will is more perfect than the intellect: simply speaking, no; *secundum quid,* yes.

To explain. It is true that the good, the object of the will, does not, like the intellect, abstract from actual existence. But the object of the intellect (truth, reality) is more independent, primary, and universal, than is the good, which is the object of the will. Mere concreteness of object does not prove the superiority of the will, otherwise the sense-powers would be more perfect than the intellect, the horticulturist than the metaphysician. The will, as efficient cause, moves the intellect, but the intellect, as final cause, moves the will. The intellect plans, the will executes.

Again, freedom is indeed in the will, but the source, root, and cause of freedom are the intellect's power of deliberation. Cause is higher than effect, root is higher than fruit. Withered root leads to dead tree.

Lastly, beatific love is not a free act, but a necessary act, which rises above freedom, just as God's internal and necessary acts are superior to His external and free acts.

5. Charity, love of God, is more perfect than knowledge of God: on the road to heaven, yes; in heaven itself, no. St. Thomas speaks: When the thing where good resides is more noble than the soul, will is more noble than intellect. But when the good thing is less noble than the soul, intellect is higher than will. Hence, here on earth love of God is better than knowledge, whereas knowledge of the corporeal world is better than love of that world. Speaking simply, however, where objects are equal, the intellect is more noble than the will. In heaven, souls differ in degrees of grace, love, and vision; but vision, speaking simply, is more perfect than love.

6. Charity, in the will, is more perfect than faith, which is in the intellect. Answer: Faith is imperfect knowledge. As imperfect, yes, faith is lower than charity; but, as knowledge, it is higher than charity. Faculties must be weighed by their adequate objects. Thus sight, speaking simply, is higher than hearing, but listening to a symphony of Beethoven is higher than the sight of a commonplace movie.[18]

7. The seraphim, named from burning love, precede the cherubim, named from perfect knowledge. Answer: Let it pass; what does it prove? If answer be called for, let us simply say that charity on earth stands higher than faith.

8. Vision is the road to love. Answer. As means to end (in final causality), no. As cause to effect (in efficient causality), or as essence to characteristic (informal causality), yes. Love, on earth, longs for the vision. Love, in heaven, follows the vision.

9. Vision reaches its perfection by love: its consequent perfection, yes; its essential perfection, no.

10. Friendship, loving God for His own sake, loves Him more than it loves its own vision. Yes, but, in so doing, friendship ascribes to God its own already established beatitude. Friendship for God, a free act here on earth, is in heaven a necessary act. The blessed soul, seeing God, must love Him above all else. Friendship for God, like impeccability, is a necessary consequence of the vision.

11. Beatific love, since it comes later than vision, is more perfect than vision. Not so, we answer, if it comes as a characteristic of the essential beatitude constituted by vision.

12. But you cannot deny that love is the ultimate act of the soul in heaven. No, I cannot deny, I affirm. But, I must add, love is the ultimate, not in the line of attaining and possessing, but in the line of resting and rejoicing.

13. If hatred of God is worse than the absence of vision, then charity is better than vision. Answer: You are confound-

[18] Voluntarism leads ultimately to Protestantism, to positivism, to the denial of the natural law and of immutable morality.

ing two orders. In the moral order, hatred of God (and indeed any vice), is worse than absence of vision. But absence of vision, eternal damnation, since it deprives man of ultimate perfection, is the worst of all physical evils. Further, charity in heaven is no longer a free and moral act, but an act which transcends freedom and merit. Again, privation of vision is privation of the highest conceivable good, a good found only in heaven.

14. But, since the moral order is higher than the physical order, charity must be higher than vision. Answer: Although the moral order is higher than the physical and inanimate order, it is not higher, rather, is lower, than the intellectual order. And all acts in heaven, beatific vision and beatific love, are, properly speaking, not moral, but supramoral.

15. Fruition, peace, and impeccability flow from the act, not of the intellect, but of the will. Answer: But that act of the will, the primary characteristic of beatitude, and the source of all other characteristics, arises from the act of the intellect.

Here enters a question, suggested by the principles of St. Thomas himself. In natural beatitude would not love for God stand higher than knowledge of God? No, runs the answer, because love, by its very nature, either precedes possession or follows possession. To illustrate. The hypostatic union, though it is higher than the beatific vision, is not essential beatitude, because it does not possess God as intelligible object. Similarly, love of God as the Author of nature would be a necessary consequence of natural contemplation. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, finds natural beatitude to consist in contemplation, since contemplation is an act of man's highest power, namely, the intellect. Hence supernatural charity is the only kind of love which stands higher than contemplation. Natural love of God is measured by natural knowledge of God.

Objections proposed by Suarez. To reconcile Scotus with Aquinas, Suarez maintains that beatitude consists equally in

two acts, namely, vision of God and love for God. A general answer runs thus: The act of the will is subordinated to the act of the intellect, which it presupposes. Hence vision and love cannot equally constitute beatitude. Again, the possession of the beatifying object cannot consist in two operations equally perfect, because if the two are specifically different, then one must be more perfect, and if the two are only numerically distinct, one of the two is superfluous.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Vision and love, as two partial causes, concur in attaining God. Answer: Since God is indivisible, He cannot be possessed by two partial causes. God entire is possessed by vision. Of this entire possession, love (the second operation) is a consequent characteristic.

2. Two operations are better than one. Answer: If you are looking at the state of blessedness, yes; if you are looking at the essence of blessedness, no. Vision, the essence, the root, precontains love and all other characteristics.

3. Vision alone does not satiate all the desires of the blessed soul. Answer: Vision, looked at as separated from its characteristics, I grant; looked at as possession, necessarily followed by love and joy, I deny.

4. But if God, absolutely speaking, would refuse concurrence with the blessed soul's act of love, then that soul would still be essentially blessed: surely an absurd conclusion. Answer: Absurd, yes, if you confound essential beatitude with consummate beatitude. A baby, although it is essentially a man, is not a full-grown man.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the difficulties raised by Scotus, by Suarez, and by others, the doctrine of St. Thomas still stands. It is held by many theologians (Bellarmine, Becanus, Tostatus, Vasquez) who do not belong to the school that is strictly Thomistic.

Our defense of the intellect as the beatifying faculty has led us to anticipate the following articles, which maintain that beatitude is a contemplative activity (a. 5), is not a mere metaphysical knowledge (a. 6), consists essentially in the immediated vision of God.

ART. 5. IS BEATITUDE AN ACTIVITY OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE INTELLECT?

The practical intellect is concerned with making, the speculative intellect with knowing. God cannot be made, but He can be known. Hence contemplation is its own end, whereas actions aim at producing, not directly at knowing. Man shares contemplation with God and the angels. Action he shares with animals, who also labor for their own self-preservation.

Even the imperfect happiness of the present life lies chiefly in contemplation, and only secondarily in practical activity, whereby man rules his passions and forms his character. In heaven, then, a fortiori, contemplation transcends action. Contemplation, thus Augustine,[19] is promised to us as the goal of all activity, as eternal and perfect enjoyment. Let modern pragmatism take notice.

ART. 6. CAN METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE BE CALLED BEATITUDE?

Metaphysical knowledge, even in its highest reaches, rests on principles, abstract principles, derived from the sense-world. Now such principles can never raise man to perfect knowledge of God, but only to a knowledge that is negative, or relative, or at best analogical. Negatively we know God as nonfinite, nonmutable, nonvisible. Relatively we know Him as supremely good and true. Analogically we know Him as precontaining, in infinite fashion, all the perfections we find in creatures.

No wonder, then, that even perfect metaphysical knowledge is clouded with obscurities. God is unchangeable, and still

[19] *De Trin.*, Bk. I, chap. 10, initio.

free. God has infallible knowledge of the future, yet man is free. God is omnipotently good, yet He permits evil. His mercy is boundless, yet His justice is inexorable. These obscurities, though they are antinomies, not contradictions, constitute that supreme philosophical mystery which is the source of the natural desire, conditional and inefficacious, to see the very essence of God, the Author of nature. Metaphysics alone, then, while it is the source of imperfect beatitude, can never give man perfect beatitude.

A Difficulty Analyzed

Felicity, since it is the act of our highest faculty in its highest object, must consist in the knowledge of God. Yes, but on earth this felicity remains imperfect. Even if man had been left in the merely natural state, with perfect knowledge and love of God, he would never have perfect beatitude, which arises only from intuitive vision. In point of fact, however, as revelation teaches, man is destined for supernatural felicity. Natural felicity is proportioned to human nature, but supernatural felicity, since it transcends all created natures, is attained, not by man's natural powers, but by God's generosity.[20] Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, heart doth not suspect, what God holds ready for those who love Him.

ART. 7. BEATITUDE DOES NOT CONSIST IN KNOWING THE ANGELS

Revelation: "Let him who glories glory in this, that he knows Me." [21] "When He shall appear we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is." [22]

Reason. To contemplate limited and participated existences cannot constitute the perfection of our intellect. But the angels have participated existence and therefore participated

[20] Cf. Ia, q.23, a.1; Ia–IIae, q.62, a.1; *De veritate*, q.14, a.2.
[21] Jeremias, 9:24.
[22] I John, 3:2.

truth. Angels can illumine us, but only as far as they are instruments of God. Even if we knew angelic nature intuitively, as the angel sees himself, our knowledge of God would still be analogical, negative, and relative. Hence there would always remain the desire of knowing God in Himself.

ART. 8. FORMAL BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE

Difficulties. Man seems capable, not of the immediate vision of God, but only of mystic and obscure contemplation of God. To see God without medium seems to be an incommunicable perfection of God.

Revelation. "We see now as in a mirror, but then face to face." [23] "The blessed in heaven see God clearly, one and triune, as He is." [24] "The blessed in heaven see the divine essence, with a vision that is intuitive and face-to-face, a vision not mediated by any creature but by the divine essence showing itself without medium openly and clearly." [25]

Propositions Condemned

1. "Every intellectual nature is in itself naturally blessed, and the soul does not need the elevating light of glory in order to see and enjoy God." [26]

2. "The exaltation of human nature to share in divine nature, since it was due to the integrity of man's primal condition, should be called natural and not supernatural." [27]

3. "Absurd is the view of those who say that man was, from the beginning, by a supernatural and gratuitous gift, raised above the condition of his nature, in order to adore God in faith, hope, and charity." [28]

[23] I Cor., 13:12.
[24] Conc. Flor. (D. 693).
[25] Benedict XII (D. 530).
[26] D. 475.
[27] *Ibid.*, 1023.
[28] *Ibid.*

4. "The integrity of the primal creation was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but was man's natural condition." [29]

5. "The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation, due to Adam's perfect nature." [30]

According to these condemned propositions man's ultimate natural end is identified with his supernatural end, and the beatific vision is not only possible, but is due to us by justice, since it corresponds with our natural efficacious desire, and consequently is not intrinsically supernatural.

This doctrine of Baius reappears among the Modernists. "Catholic men are found who, while they reject immanence as a doctrine, nevertheless use it in apologetics, and so incautiously as to admit in human nature, not only a capacity for the supernatural order (a capacity which Catholic apologists, under proper modifications, have always maintained), but also a true and genuine exigency, and thus find in our nature itself the germ of the supernatural." [31]

The beatific vision, then, the immediate vision of God, is indeed possible and welcome, is the reward promised to us, but is a gift which transcends the powers and exigencies, not only of human nature, but also of angelic nature. It is consummated grace, altogether gratuitous, because it pleased God's infinite goodness to raise man to a supernatural end.

St. Thomas. In support of his doctrine, Baius quotes the present article. Let us look more closely at the Saint's teaching on the existence of the beatific vision. In this article St. Thomas does not intend to prove by mere reason the existence or the possibility of the beatific vision, since mysteries, because they are intrinsically supernatural, cannot be demonstrated by the natural light of reason, not even after revelation. Thus the Vatican Council: "Divine mysteries, by their very nature, so exceed the created intellect, that even after

[29] *Ibid.*, 1026.
[30] *Ibid.*, 1383.
[31] Encyclical *Pascendi* (D. 2103).

revelation has been given and faith has been accepted, these mysteries remain veiled by faith, wrapped in a kind of darkness as long as we are pilgrims on earth, because we walk by faith and not by sight." [32]

Mysteries intrinsically supernatural include, not only the Blessed Trinity, but also the Incarnation, the Redemption, and the life of grace and glory. Grace and glory, since they are real and formal participations in the divine nature, in the intimate life of God, cannot be proved by reason alone even after revelation.

Why is demonstration excluded? Because what is supernatural in its substance is supernatural also in its cognoscibility. How, then, can the theologian defend these mysteries? He can do three things: first, he can show that they are contained in the deposit of revelation; secondly, he can give some understanding by analogies with nature; thirdly, in answer to those who speak against the faith, he can show that their views are either false or inconclusive.

Illustrative Texts

1. "Sacred doctrine uses human reason, not to prove the faith, but to manifest other truths contained in the faith." [33]

2. "The Trinity supposed, reason can illustrate, but not prove." [34]

The mode of arguing in this article differs slightly from the mode followed in the first part. The argument in question twelve of the first part runs thus: Natural desire cannot be in vain, cannot tend to the impossible. But man has a natural desire to know, not only that there is a first cause, but also what it is. In the Prima Secundae the argument may be expressed as follows: Man is not perfectly happy as long as something remains to be desired. But man has a natural desire to know, not only that there is a first cause, but also what it is.

[32] Cf. Conc. Vat. (D. 1785 sqq.)

[33] Ia, q.1, a.8.

[34] Ia, q.32, a.5. Cf. *De veritate*, q.14, a.2; *Contra Gentes*, 1 I, c.8; Ia–IIae, q.114, a.2.

The principle here invoked is the principle of finality. If every agent acts for a goal, then natural desire cannot be empty or vain, otherwise it would tend to something and still tend to nothing. Natural desire is not fictitious (like, say, the desire to have wings), but is based on nature itself, which cannot be fallacious, just as the intellect is never deceived regarding the principle of contradiction. This argument has its own difficulties. It seems to prove either too much or not enough. Two difficulties arise, one minor, one major.

The minor difficulty. If we understand this natural desire to be an efficacious desire, then we prove too much. We fall back into the heresy of Baius, which claims that the beatific vision is due to human nature, just as is the immortality of the soul, or God's concursus with created causes. On the other hand, if this natural desire is conditional and inefficacious, then it can be frustrated, and the argument does not prove enough. Nay, the question arises whether nature has even an inefficacious desire to see God. God causes natural things, not by necessity of nature, but by intellect and will. Now this truth is known by metaphysics or natural theology, and thus we would not have even an argument of convenience in favor of the beatific vision (which is beyond the ken of philosophy).

Answer to This Difficulty

1. Even the most perfect abstractive knowledge would remain analogical, involving great obscurity regarding the intimate harmony among God's attributes: immutability and liberty, a free act which still is not contingent, omnipotent goodness and permission of evil, infinite mercy and infinite justice. Of each divine attribute we know rather that it is than what it is. From this obscurity arises a natural desire to see the essence of God, the Author of nature. I say, the Author of nature, for God as triune, as the Author of grace, cannot be known by reason alone, and hence the vision of

God as triune cannot be naturally desired. This natural desire remains in the angels even when their natural cognition has been consummated, and their natural cognition is much more perfect than ours.

2. What kind of natural desire does St. Thomas have in mind? As background for answering this question, let us give, in synopsis, various meanings of the term "desire." Desire may be

A. supernatural, as coming from charity or as coming from hope. It may be

B. natural

1. as innate or
2. as elicited, and
 a. necessary, or
 b. free, and if free, either efficacious or inefficacious, and implicit or explicit.

Cajetan says that, in our present article, the term "desire" means "supernatural desire," connatural to us under grace. Scotus says that it means an "innate natural desire of the beatific vision." Baius says that it means a "natural and efficacious desire." Thomists say that it means a "desire, natural but inefficacious."

We follow this last view. St. Thomas is speaking, not of an efficacious natural desire, but of a natural desire which is conditional and inefficacious, of velleity, which, absolutely speaking, might be frustrated, and would in fact have been left unfulfilled had not God pleased to raise man to a supernatural end. Thus understood, the argument proves neither too much nor too little, since it is not apodictic, but is persuasive. There cannot be a natural efficacious desire except in relation to a good that is proportioned to nature and due to it.

Illustrative Texts. 1. Thomas. "Eternal life is a good exceeding the proportions of created nature, because it exceeds even the cognition and desire of nature." Again

2. "Man cannot merit eternal life without grace, nor prepare himself without the aid of grace for grace." [35]

3. "No rational creature can have a motion of the will directly ordained to that beatitude unless this creature is moved by a supernatural agent, namely, the aid of grace." [36]

4. "There is another good which exceeds the proportions of human nature, which natural powers do not suffice either to think of or to desire." [37]

5. "Nothing can be ordained to a certain end unless there pre-exist in it a proportion to that end, which may create desire of the goal. Hence man's initial step toward eternal life is infused faith." [38]

These texts show clearly that Baius was wrong in citing St. Thomas for his view. The term "natural desire," as used by St. Thomas, although it does not mean "efficacious desire," does not, on the other hand, mean the "innate desire" admitted by Scotus, namely, an inclination of the will anteceding all cognition and all elicited desire, since it is clear from the text of St. Thomas that the desire of which he is speaking follows cognition of the effects of God and of the existence of God, whereas appetite is directed only to beatitude in common.

Hence, as Thomists commonly say since the time of Baius, we are dealing here with a natural desire, not innate, but elicited, not efficacious, but conditional and inefficacious. Now this conditional and inefficacious desire supposes a judgment both on the goodness and on the natural unattainability of the desired object. Man might say: "Oh, this wondrous vision of God: if only I could attain it." Finally, this velleity would be either explicit or implicit: implicit, when it is known confusedly; explicit, when the object is known.

This velleity seems to be expressed in this passage of Plato:

[35] *Ibid.*, q.109, a.5, 6.
[36] Ia, q.62, a.2.
[37] *De veritate*, q.14, a.2.
[38] *Ibid.*

"How blessed would that vision be, could a man be granted to see beauty itself, beauty unalloyed, and divine! Would not this man be the friend of God? Would he not deserve to be called immortal?" [39]

Conclusion. Hence, as Thomists commonly teach, man naturally desires to see the essence of God, the Author of nature, yet this desire is not innate, but elicited, conditional, and inefficacious. But even this desire, although conditional and inefficacious, cannot, it seems, be vain, cannot tend to something impossible. Thus the argument is persuasive of the possibility of the beatific vision, of the existence of a potentiality which can be elevated to the supernatural vision.

A doubt. Why is this argument not apodictic but only persuasive? All Thomists agree that this article does not prove apodictically the fact of our elevation to the beatific vision. Some few, however, hold that it does prove apodictically the possibility of this elevation, since it would be absurd to admit such a natural desire if the vision were impossible. Answer. The general answer runs thus: The existence and the intrinsic possibility of mysteries which are essentially supernatural cannot be demonstrated by reason even after revelation has been given. But life eternal, the beatific vision, participation in the divine nature, is a mystery intrinsically supernatural. Hence this vision is impossible without the light of glory, and by reason alone we cannot prove the possibility of the light of glory, though we can defend that possibility.

A special reason runs thus: The aforesaid desire, since it is conditional, does not prove apodictically the possibility of this vision, but presupposes the hypothesis of this possibility. Yet this desire, since it is natural, since it does not proceed from mere phantasy, or from one individual's philosophical knowledge, but is found in all wise men, it becomes a very probable and persuasive proof that the vision of God, the Author of nature, is a possibility. We cannot, from reason

[39] *Convivium*, c. 29.

alone, prove that the adequate object of intellect is not only reality as reality, the object of metaphysics, but also reality in its whole latitude, containing the Trinity clearly seen.[40]

Synopsis of Opinions

Natural desire is either:

A. innate

1. and in some way efficacious, because intuitive vision, while it is a natural goal of man's desire, is supernatural in mode of attainment (thus the Augustinians, Noris and Berti);

2. and inefficacious, because intuitive vision, while it is the universal human goal, is not universally known, hence not efficaciously desired (thus Scotus); or

B. elicited and

1. natural *secundum quid,* because, while it does not reach out beyond our natural powers, it still arises connaturally when the effects of grace have been revealed (thus Cajetan against Scotus);

2. simply natural, because it follows knowledge of natural effects (Thomists in general).

Opinions Examined

1. The Augustinian opinion, closely related to Baianism, does not preserve the absolute distinction of the natural order from the supernatural order, and denies the principle of finality, that every agent acts for a proportionate end. God as Author of nature, would have given us an innate desire for an end to which, as Author of nature, He could not lead us.

2. Nor does the opinion of Scotus sufficiently preserve the distinction between the two orders, because this distinction, according to him, is not necessary but free, depending on God's free will, since God could have given us the light of glory as a human characteristic. But then, our intellect would

[40] Cf. Salmanticenses, in Iam, q. 12, a. 1.

naturally have the same formal and proper object as has the divine intellect, and would thus be a created God: a view which leads to pantheism.

Further Reflections

1. This desire, being inborn, should be efficacious, since a desire is inefficacious only by proceeding from a conditional judgment. Innate desire, since it does not proceed from cognition, cannot be conditional and inefficacious.

2. This innate desire involves contradiction. It would be essentially supernatural, differentiated by a supernatural object. The very nature of the human will would be ordained, not only to good in general, but positively and naturally to the vision of God. Similarly, the active obediential potency held by Suarez would be something positive and essentially natural, and at the same time essentially supernatural.

3. Cajetan's opinion seems to be an excessive reaction against Scotus. St. Thomas, expounding the mode in which this desire arises, speaks of the supposed knowledge of effects, not supernatural, but natural: a desire which is simply natural, but inefficacious. Cajetan himself seems to grant this when he says: "The human intellect, knowing that God exists, and desiring naturally to know what God is, obeys a natural desire which leads us, when we see an effect, to know the cause of that effect." [41]

4. Following Ferrariensis and Bañez, and the Thomists who wrote at the time of Baius, we hold that man could have been created in a purely natural state, and that therefore grace, as its name implies, is a gift simply gratuitous, not due to us or to the angels, but supremely harmonious with created nature.

Two Corollaries

First. The obediential potency, the elevability of our nature to the order of grace, is not active, but passive, an

[41] In Iam–IIae, q.3, a.8.

aptitude, that is, to receive from God whatever God wills to give. Thus our nature has obediential potency for the hypostatic union. Second. Obediential potency is immediately directed, not to any supernatural object or act, but to the supreme Agent whom it obeys. Hence the human soul is positively and immediately ordained to a supernatural act only after its elevation to faith and grace.

The foregoing opinions may be thus summarized.

St. Thomas: Grace is gratuitous and harmonious. Seminaturalism: At least the possibility of revelation can be demonstrated. Scotism: The distinction between the two orders is contingent. The Augustinians: Latent confusion of the two orders. Pelagianism: Denial of all supernaturalness of Christian life. Pseudo-supernaturalism (Protestants, Baius, the Jansenists): Supernaturalness does not transcend the exigencies of our nature.

The principal objection against our doctrine runs thus: The beatific vision, since it is in supremest harmony with our nature, must be proportioned to that nature, and not gratuitous. Were it not so proportioned, it would not be harmonious, but inharmonious, violent, or indifferent, neither good nor evil. Answer. Supernatural harmony, by reason of its very gratuity transcends natural harmony, and is the most profound of all harmonies. Only God can unite two things that are apparently opposite, the highest kind of harmony and the highest reach of gratuitousness. Supernatural gifts perfect us more than do natural gifts. They perfect our soul at its deepest and highest, namely at the point where supernatural life is inserted. The elevation of the obediential capacity to the supernatural level, in the hypostatic union, say, or in the infusion of grace, presupposes an active power that is infinite, just as does creation from nothing. Obediential potency, then, is nothing else than the essence of the soul, capable of receiving whatever God wills.

Here lies the ultimate root of our solution. We are dealing

with a mystery which lies on the confines of two orders, infinitely distant one from the other. But this much we must say: Supernatural is what exceeds the proportions of finite nature, by gratuitously perfecting the obediential capacity of that nature. Grace perfects our nature, does not destroy it.

Corollaries

1. Had man been created in a merely natural state, his lack of the supernatural would not have been painful: first, because only velleity would be frustrated; secondly, the velleity itself would not be entirely in vain, because it would lead men to adore the hidden mysteries of God's hidden life. If, on the contrary, that desire were innate and efficacious, then a merely natural state would be impossible, since God would owe it to Himself to elevate us to the life of grace.

2. After elevation to the supernatural order, privation of the beatific vision is not painful in the present life, because the radical order of our life does not yet demand that we enjoy this vision; but, even on the earth, the saints, from the efficacious ardor of their charity, desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.

3. This privation is very painful in purgatory because the radical order of the supernatural life demands that the soul enjoy this vision immediately after death. This purgatorial pain of loss is like that of extreme hunger or thirst.

4. A fortiori, perpetual privation in hell is supreme misery, simultaneously against nature and against grace. The supernatural and the contranatural are radically opposed. Even the natural law says that we are to obey all God's commands, hence to lose our supernatural end is simultaneously to lose our natural end. To confuse the supernatural gifts of God with things that are contrary to nature is to confuse true religion with stupid superstition, to confuse the beatific vision with supreme misery.

CHAPTER VIII

The Characteristics of Beatitude (Q. 4)

Division of the Question. It has two parts. In the first four articles we deal with delight and love as consequences of the beatific vision. In the following four, we deal with the extension of this beatitude, to the body, to external goods, to the society of friends.

Art. 1. Is delight a necessary consequence of beatitude?

Yes, because the will necessarily finds joy in the possession of good. "Beatitude is joy in the truth," in the possession of reality. We must clearly distinguish the essence of beatitude from its concomitants and consequences, just as the essence of the mystical state must be distinguished from its accidental phenomena (e.g., ecstasy or ligature).

Art. 2. The chief element in beatitude

Conclusion. Vision is more important than joy. Vision is the cause, joy is the effect, and stands higher than effect. Again, the will finds joy in an operation because of the goodness of that operation. Goodness is not pursued for the sake of joy and rest, but vice versa, since otherwise the very act of the will would be its own goal or purpose. Joy cannot be the first object of the will, just as the act of sight cannot be the first visible object of sight.

Objections Analyzed

1. Joy is operative perfection, and perfection stands higher than the thing perfected. Answer. Joy is operative perfection,

i.e., a perfection which follows operation. "Joy follows perfect operation, as beauty follows youth." Here lies the error of the hedonists and sensualists, who reduce good in itself to good that is merely delightful.

2. Animals, since they do not know the good as such, desire operations merely as delightful. Is, then, their activity not rightly ordained by God? Answer. God, the Author of nature, who knows most perfectly good-in-itself, adds joy to activity in order to draw creatures to right operations. "The hen gathers her chickens under her wing," and thus unconsciously does what is good in itself, whereas a woman, who defends her children under similar circumstances, does consciously what is good in itself.

3. Charity seeks God for His own sake, even though joy is a necessary consequence. Thus we refute the Quietists and Kant, who wish to exclude from pure love the desire of all reward. Joy, fruition, is no goal to which God is subordinated, but can nevertheless be legitimately desired, as a consequence inseparable from God and the vision of God.

ART. 3. DOES BEATITUDE INCLUDE COMPREHENSION?

Conclusion. Beatitude includes comprehension, not in the sense of comprehensive vision, but in the sense, that the blessed are called comprehensors, since they cling to God inseparably. Vision corresponds to faith, comprehension to hope, and fruition to charity. Comprehension belongs to the will, is a relation resulting in the will from the vision.

The beatific vision itself cannot be comprehensive, because the light of glory, being a created and finite thing, cannot produce an infinite comprehension. We see God entire, but not entirely, just as, to illustrate, a man may know an entire proposition (subject, predicate, and verb) without knowing it totally, without profound penetration into its full meaning.

ART. 4. RECTITUDE OF WILL IS INCLUDED IN BEATITUDE, BOTH ANTECEDENTLY AND CONSEQUENTLY

Authority. "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God." [1] "Pursue peace and holiness, without which no one shall see God." [2]

Rectitude as prerequired. To reach its goal, an agent must be properly orientated toward that goal, as matter is toward form. Now rectitude of will implies proper orientation toward man's last goal.

Rectitude as consequence. Ultimate beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence. Now the will of him who sees the essence of God necessarily possesses rectitude, i.e., it loves whatever it loves in relation to God, and finds it impossible to sin.

Here we are opposed by Scotus, who holds that even beatific love is not necessary but free, at least in its exercise, and that the blessed are not impeccable intrinsically, namely, by the vision of God, but only extrinsically, since God continues perpetually to rectify their will. This view is founded on voluntarism, which says that the will in itself is higher than the intellect. In virtue of this principle, Scotus holds that the Father and Son freely breathe forth the Holy Spirit. Does Scotus not see that, under this view, the Holy Ghost would not necessarily be God?

Let us look at the efficacy of the Thomistic argument, and the solution of Scotistic objections. St. Thomas: The essence of goodness is related to those who see God in the same way as good-in-general is related to wayfarers. As wayfarers cannot turn away from the idea of good, so those who see God cannot turn away from the essence of God. Further, since God contains in Himself the whole reality of good in a much more excellent way than it is contained in the abstract knowledge of good, the will is necessitated by an object outside of which nothing is desirable. But while this vision removes the

[1] Matt. 5:8.
[2] Heb. 12:14.

possibility of sinning, it does not take away liberty in relation to particular goods. A blessed soul may turn from one friend to another. Christ on earth, enjoying the beatific vision, though He could not sin, could still freely choose His apostles: "Not you have chosen me, but I have chosen you."

Objection. Granting the necessity of specification, would there not still remain the liberty of exercise, so that the blessed soul, if it willed, could interrupt its act of loving God? Answer: No. In order to interrupt this act, the blessed soul would have to retain indifference of judgment, i.e., be able to see some shade of evil, either in the supreme good clearly seen, or in its act of loving that good. Now, neither in that object nor in that act can the blessed soul detect the slightest shade of evil, of tedium or weariness. Hence the blessed act of loving God, necessary both in nature and in exercise, is an act which necessarily transcends liberty, just as the love whereby God loves Himself transcends liberty. This truth is a proof from on high that man's will has a boundless profundity, infinite in relation to its object, since created goods attract it only superficially, and thus it responds freely to their invitation, whereas God seen clearly attracts it invincibly.

Is there a parallel truth in natural beatitude? Would God, unseen, but known perfectly, be loved necessarily, say, by an angel? St. Thomas speaks as follows: "It is natural for the angel to turn with love towards God, the Author of his existence: but to turn towards God as the object of supernatural beatitude is a gift of grace coming from gratuitous love." [3] It seems, then, that the angel's natural love of God would be a necessary love, at least as regards specification; but it is not so clear that it is necessary as regards exercise.

Two Corollaries

1. The blessed are absolutely and intrinsically impeccable. It is of faith that at least extrinsic impeccability is necessary for beatitude. "That he might present to Himself a glorious

[3] Ia, q.63, a.1, ad 3um.

church, not having spot or wrinkle." [4] These words are commonly understood of the Church triumphant. Again, "He regenerated us unto living hope, unto an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, that cannot fade." [5] Beatitude would not be beatitude if it could admit sin, and hence punishment.

Scotus did not doubt the existence of impeccability, but said that it came from without, namely, from the aid of God preserving the blessed soul from sin, as it preserved the Blessed Virgin Mary from sin on earth. Thomists, on the contrary, hold that the blessed are intrinsically impeccable, because of the vision of God and the necessary love that follows it. There can be no sin in the will, unless there be in the intellect a defective knowledge, a defective dictate, arising from error, ignorance, inconsideration. But the intellect which sees God clearly cannot be defective, for in God it sees everything that belongs to our perfection, and there is no interruption of this vision because it is eternal life. In a word, he who clearly sees the supreme good, here and now necessarily lovable, cannot turn away from it, cannot sin, otherwise he would not look on God as the supreme good.

2. We desire the vision of God, not only as the delightful reward of a virtuous life, as Kant objected, but as the possession of the highest good-in-itself.

The first series of Scotistic objections is against the necessity of exercise in regard to beatific love. The second series is against the intrinsic impeccability of the blessed.

First Series

1. No object moves the will as regards exercise. Answer: The object does not move the will to exercise without the mediation of the will itself, we grant. We likewise grant that, even under this mediation, the object, if finite, does not necessarily move the will. But we deny that the will can remain unmoved when faced with an infinite object.

Indifferent judgment can come from a twofold cause. First,

[4] Eph. 5:27.
[5] I Pet. 1:4. Cf. D. 530.

from the imperfections of our knowledge (as appears in those first motions which are indeliberate): secondly, from the perfection of our vision of the highest good which transcends the natural capacity of our will. Thus beatific love is not free. It transcends merit. But it is not forced, rather it is in the highest degree spontaneous and vital.

2. Augustine says: Will does not exist unless it is free.[6] Answer: From the truth that the will is free it does not follow that it is free in its every act, just as from the truth that our intellect is discursive it does not follow that it is discursive in its every act.

3. A necessary act cannot have degrees of intensity, because it proceeds from the entire capacity of the will. Answer: We must deny this statement. The natural motion of a falling stone increases in rapidity, the motion of brutes increases as they more vehemently desire their prey, and the same truth is seen in the indeliberate motions of the will. Similarly, beatific love, though it flows from the entire capacity of the will, can be more intense in one of the blessed than in another, by reason of a more intense degree of glory and charity. Nor can the blessed on a lower level desire a higher degree of glory and charity, because each is completely satiated with his own reward and predestination. A man who is less hungry eats less, but is equally satisfied.

4. But love in heaven is identical with love on earth. Answer: Yes, but to love on earth God appears under one viewpoint as good and on the other as the Lawgiver who forbids what pleases the sinner.

5. But toward beatitude in common the will retains liberty of exercise. Answer: Toward explicit love of beatitude, yes; toward a virtual and implicit love, no. Here on earth when the will refrains from actual and explicit love of beatitude in favor of some other thought, it acts thus for its own good and thus implicitly for its own beatitude.

6. Christ's love for God, being meritorious, was free, though it proceeded from the beatific vision.

[6] *Enchiridion*, chap. 105.

Two answers. The first runs thus: Christ's love of God as God was not free; but it was free as reason for loving creatures. Thus it is with God's love of Himself: while this act is necessary, it is still freely exercised in relation to creatures. And as God, though free to create, is impeccable, so Christ was free in His love unto death for souls, yet simultaneously intrinsically impeccable by reason of His beatific vision and divine personality. Similarly, the blessed in heaven necessarily love God and freely love creatures: freely, we say, but impeccably, since they love creatures only in relation to God. But their love for creatures is not meritorious, because they are no longer *in via,* whereas Christ was simultaneously wayfarer and comprehensor. The second answer runs thus: As ruled by the beatific vision, Christ's love of God was not free: but it was free as ruled by infused knowledge, which is an analogical cognition.

John of St. Thomas says that each of these views is probable.[7] The second view is simply an addition to the first view. Yet the first solution seems to be more profound. Loving God considered in Himself differs much from loving God as the reason for loving creatures. It is more difficult to love our neighbor, a Pharisee, say, for God's sake than it is to love God Himself. In relation to creatures judgment remains suspended, the creature being lovable under one viewpoint, but not under another until the free will overcomes this indifference. But the free will of the blessed, profoundly rectified by the beatific vision, is confirmed in good. Hence it acts as it should, impeccably and freely, in such external services as are free. The necessity which remains is a necessity of precept, a necessity of infallibility and consequence, like that under efficacious grace, which does not destroy liberty but actualizes it.

7. Love that is free is more perfect than love that is necessary. Answer: Yes, if the necessity arises from imperfect cognition (as in sudden indeliberate acts); but no, if the necessity arises from perfect cognition of the highest good.

To explain. Liberty is a dominating indifference of the

[7] In IIIam, q.18, a.4.

will in relation to particular goods. But the will cannot have this dominating indifference in relation to God seen clearly. Beatific love, then, is necessary, and thus is higher than love which is free, and is not below liberty but above it. Further, necessary love precontains eminently the very foundation of liberty, because the will is free in relation to particular goods only by its necessary relation to universal good, which in reality is found in God alone. In illustration, take Aristotle's word, that metaphysics is something useless, meaning that it is not below but above utility.

8. But God can let vision continue, and still hinder love, by suspending His own concursus. Answer: God could do this, considering His absolute power, just as He could annihilate all creatures. But from this it does not follow that beatific love is not a necessary characteristic that follows vision. And God's wisdom will never allow Him to deny this concursus, just as it will not allow Him to annihilate the blessed in heaven, or to create a soul without its characteristics and faculties.

Second Series

Scotistic objections against the intrinsic impeccability of the saints.

1. The power of sinning is essential to created liberty. Answer: The power of sinning is the defectibility of liberty; it is not a characteristic of liberty as such. God is free, and yet impeccable.

2. Law is not imposed except on those who are capable of transgression. Answer: This we simply deny. On the blessed, law is imposed because they love to act in subjection to God.

3. Since liberty is related to contraries, the blessed are capable of nonfulfillment of law. Answer: Liberty is related to contraries in the divided sense, yes; i.e., it can chose one thing after another. But in the composite sense, no, because it cannot choose simultaneously two opposed courses. To explain. The soul cannot exercise simultaneously the beatific vision and nonfulfillment of the divine precept. But this

does not mean that the blessed in heaven, or Christ on earth, can sin or transgress the precept. The soul that sees God can obey freely, but, even in the divided sense, cannot disobey, though it retains the capacity of nonobedience and nonfulfillment.

A parallel truth is that of man's antecedent potency to resist efficacious grace, not in the sense that he can directly impede the efficacy of grace, but in this sense, that he retains the power not to do that to which he is determined by grace, because judgment remains indifferent, and God wills that what is done by grace be done freely. As a precept which would take away liberty would destroy its own nature, so efficacious grace, if it did not actualize but destroyed liberty, would destroy its own nature.

4. To be able to omit the act commanded is to be able to sin. Answer: To be able to omit the command by disobedience (the contrary of obedience) is to be able to sin, we grant. But to be able to omit the command by nonobedience (the negation of obedience) is to be able to sin, we deny.

There is a great difference between being able not to obey by negation, and being able to disobey, by a contrary act of commission, or by a privative act of omission. For example, if I am in no way subject to a certain superior, my nonobedience is not sinful. At the other extreme, the soul is most profoundly subject to God, retaining the power of nonobedience in things which do not attract invincibly. But when the thing is commanded, then, notwithstanding the command, the will remains free.

ART. 5. THE BODY, WHILE IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR PERFECT BEATITUDE, STILL SERVES TO INCREASE BEATITUDE

Authority. "Blessed are those who have died in the Lord." [8] "While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord." [9]

[8] Apoc. 14:13.
[9] II Cor. 5:6.

"I am straitened on both sides, having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, a thing by far the better, but to abide still in the flesh is needful for you." [10] "By apostolic authority we define that all the blessed even before the resumption of their bodies . . . have seen and still see the divine essence by intuitive vision . . . and this before the general judgment, without intermission, and from then on into eternity." [11] Some writers (Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians) thought that the face-to-face vision would be deferred until the resurrection. This question reappeared at the time of John XXII. While some authors say, not without foundation, that the pontiff hesitated regarding this question, it is nevertheless certain that he never defined his view *ex cathedra.*

Theological proof. Our intellect needs the body only because it needs the sense-images furnished by the imagination. Now the divine essence cannot be seen by means of sense-images. The principle here invoked is from reason, and the application is a truth of faith. Hence many Thomists hold that this theological conclusion could not be defined as dogma were it not revealed in equivalent terms in Scripture or tradition, in this instance by St. Paul.

Yet the body is required for the fullness of beatitude. Why? Because the soul is more perfect in its nature when it informs the body, which was created for the soul. The separated soul has "a desire to rule its body." The body subserves the soul, since the soul is on the very lowest level of intelligence, to which corresponds the lowest level of intelligibility.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. The separated soul, being subsistent, can have a perfect operation, even though it does not have a perfect nature. But it is not a person, since person signifies complete nature.

[10] Phil. 1:23.
[11] Benedict XII. Cf. D. 530, 693, 984.

2. The soul's fruition overflows on the body. The separated soul remains individual: it is this soul, the soul of Peter rather than of Paul, by a transcendental relation to its own body.

3. The desire of the separated soul, while it rests in the possession of God objectively, is not totally at rest subjectively. Hence, when the body rises, the soul's beatitude grows, not intensively, but extensively.

4. Some separated souls may see God more clearly than do the inferior angels, because, while they have an intellect naturally less keen, they have a greater light of glory.

ART. 6. IS BODILY PERFECTION NECESSARY FOR BEATITUDE?

Conclusion: Beatitude, in every way perfect, requires perfect disposition of body.

Authority: St. Paul enumerates the four gifts of the glorified body: 1. impassibility ("It is sown in corruption, it rises in incorruption"); 2. brightness ("It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory"); 3. agility ("It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power"); 4. subtility ("It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body").[12]

Reason: These gifts are necessary: first, that the flesh no longer weigh down the soul and turn it away from contemplation; secondly, that the soul, the form of the body and its principle of life, may communicate to its body a share in its own beatitude.

Impassibility excludes corruption, passion, pain. Subtility enables the body to penetrate another body (Christ entering though the doors were closed). Agility renders the body capable of the swiftest motion (though not instantaneous). By brightness the body becomes luminous, like a crystal, revealing its wonderful organization.

Aureoles. This overflowing glory carries from the soul a special beauty into the body. This beauty, particularly as it

[12] I Cor. 15:42.

appears in the glorified head, is an accidental glory, superadded to the essential glory, symbolized by the golden crown. This aureole, representing a special victory, is threefold: against the world, against the flesh, and against the devil. Those who conquered the world, wear the aureole of martyrs. Those whose teaching conquered the devil, wear the aureole of doctors.

ART. 7. ARE EXTERIOR GOODS NECESSARY FOR BEATITUDE?

For perfect beatitude external goods are in no wise required, since the body is no longer animal, but spiritual. Yet heaven, the empyrean, is a place of supremest beauty. Food and drink and riches are metaphors, to express spiritual goods: "Eat, O friends, drink, and be inebriated." [13]

ART. 8. IS THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS NECESSARY FOR BEATITUDE?

The society of friends is not necessary for perfect beatitude, since the soul possesses entire plenitude of perfection in God. Yet the society of friends adds an accidental and concomitant fullness, since the blessed see one another and rejoice in one another's company.

Why does man need friends on earth? Not for the sake of utility, since he is sufficient unto himself. Nor for the sake of delight, because his own deeds give him supreme delight. But he needs friends in order to benefit them, to be inspired by them unto good, and to be aided by them in doing good. Virtuous friendship, as distinct from friendship founded on delight or utility, is based on good-in-itself. Higher still is that friendship which is supernatural, founded on God Himself. This friendship constitutes the Church triumphant, the home of perfect beatitude.

[13] Cant. of Cant. 5:1.

CHAPTER IX

On Attaining Beatitude (Q. 5)

Of these eight articles, the first four deal with the attainability and inamissibility of beatitude; the last four, with the means whereby man attains beatitude.

Art. 1. Can man attain beatitude?

The affirmative answer is a truth of faith. A persuasive argument is based on our natural inefficacious desire of seeing God. The adequate object of our intellect is all reality, including the vision of the Blessed Trinity.

Art. 2. Can one man be more blessed than another?

One man can be more blessed than another, not indeed in the object possessed, but in the measure of that possession.

Authority. The thesis is of faith, against Jovinian and the pseudo-Reformers. "The souls of the just see God, triune and one, clearly as He is, but one more perfectly than another by reason of diversity of merit." [1] "He who says that by good works eternal life, and the attainment of life eternal, and increase of glory cannot be merited, let him be anathema." [2]

Scripture abounds in this line. "In the house of my father there are many mansions." [3] "God will render to each one according to his works." [4] "He who shows sparingly will reap sparingly. He who sows in blessings will reap in blessings." [5] "Star differs from star in brightness." [6]

[1] Council of Trent. D. 693.
[2] *Ibid.*, D. 842.
[3] John 14:2.
[4] Matt. 16:27.
[5] II Cor. 5:10; 9:6.
[6] I Cor. 15:41.

Reason. Enjoyment follows disposition, the remote disposition of merit and the proximate disposition of glory. Since the beatific vision is absolutely supernatural, its greater intensity depends, not on greater natural vigor of intellect, but on the more intense light infused into it. Obediential capacity is equally gratuitous for angels and for men. But does not he who comes last receive as much as those who labored the whole day? Answer: This parable pictures the gratuitousness of objective beatitude, not the degree. The degree of glory depends on the degree of charity at death. Sudden conversions (the good thief on Mount Calvary and the public sinner) may include a surpassing degree of grace and merit.

ART. 3. CAN ANYONE IN THIS LIFE BE BLESSED?

Answer: Perfect beatitude is not possible in this life. This sentence is of faith. Against the Beghards and Beguines, the following proposition was condemned: "Every intellectual nature is in itself naturally blessed, and the soul does not need the light of glory to elevate it to see God and to enjoy Him in bliss." [7] Scripture is eloquent on the miseries of this life: "Man, born of woman, lives a short time and is replete with many miseries." [8] Since man cannot understand except by turning to sense-images, he cannot, in this life, come to the vision of God's essence. Yet, notwithstanding ignorance, inordinate affections, suffering, and fear of death, man can still in this life have a kind of participation in future beatitude, by reason of hope and charity, especially if he reaches the unitive way, as is clear from the lives of the saints.

ART. 4. CAN PERFECT BEATITUDE BE LOST?

Inamissibility, the cause of perpetuity, is a truth of faith, expressed by the Gospel term "eternal life," by the symbol, "I believe in life everlasting," and by the statement of Benedict XII that the beatific vision suffers no interruption.[9]

[7] D. 471.
[8] Job 14:1.
[9] D. 530.

Scripture speaks often of this inamissibility: "The just will go into eternal life." [10] "I give them eternal life." [11] "The many who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake, some unto eternal life, others unto shame and opprobrium." [12] "Blessed are those who live in Thy house, O Lord, forever and forever they will praise Thee." [13]

Is this inamissibility intrinsic or extrinsic? Scotists, followed later by Molina and Suarez, tend to depreciate the supernatural gifts of God, their elevation above the order of nature, in contrast to St. Thomas, who gives to the gifts of God all their sublimity, and amplitude, and intrinsic inamissibility. Man naturally desires to retain the good he has, without fear of losing it. But beatitude is perfect good, satisfying all desires and excluding all evils. Hence beatitude includes inamissibility and excludes all fear of loss.

1. The argument rests, not on a contingent decree of God, but on the very nature of beatitude. The greatest fortune granted for one day only, or for a month, or for a year, would not make a man blessed. Even a transient glimpse of the beatific vision did not make St. Paul blessed.

2. The beatific vision, arising from the permanent light of glory, can cease only in one of these three ways: by reason of him who sees; by reason of God withdrawing the vision; or by reason of some created cause corrupting the vision. But it cannot cease in any of these ways.

The beatific vision cannot cease on the part of him who sees, because the will simply cannot find in the beatific vision anything deficient or unpleasant. It cannot cease on the part of God, considering His ordinary power, because to act thus would be to inflict punishment, and punishment presupposes guilt, and the blessed are impeccable. Nor can it cease by reason of a created cause, because the beatific vision unites

[10] Matt. 25:46.
[11] John 10:28.
[12] Dan. 12:3. Cf. Eccli. 31:10.
[13] Ps. 83:5. Cf. Wisd. 5:16.

the blessed soul immediately with God, elevating it above all created agents, above all demonic influence.

Confirmations. First, the sources of the beatific vision are absolutely spiritual and incorruptible: namely, the intellective soul, the intellect, the permanent light of glory, the divine essence taking the place of the impressed and expressed species. Hence the beatific vision is absolutely and intrinsically immutable.

Second, charity, which is the beginning of eternal life, is in itself incorruptible. Here on earth it can be lost, but only by mortal sin, since we carry this treasure in earthen vessels. But the treasure, in itself, is the beginning of eternal life, and the charity of Christ, preserving us in life, is stronger than every temptation. "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Neither death nor life nor angels nor principalities nor any other creature can separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." [14] If these words are spoken of eternal life as begun here below, how much more true they are of eternal life there where sin is impossible!

How is the beatific vision measured? Not by time, whether continuous or discrete, but by participated eternity, which infinitely transcends our continuous time and also the discrete time of the angels. In this eternity, the vision is one unbroken instant, of which a remote image can be found in the life of union as led by saints on earth.

Eternity is the perfect possession of interminable life, a possession that is simultaneously whole and perfect. The discrete time of the angels measures their succession of thoughts and affections. Continuous time, the measure of motion, is constituted by the flowing now. The one single instant of immutable eternity is related to continuous time, as is the apex of a cone to its base.

Corollary. The term "eternal life" is very profound. "Eternal" means intrinsically invariable, simultaneously whole,

[14] Rom. 8:35.

altogether without succession. It is variable only extrinsically, by the absolute power of God, who, as He began it, can also cease to support it, by suspending His own concursus. This He will never do, because there is no motive for doing so. God will never annihilate the human nature of Christ, or of the Blessed Virgin. This annihilation is not a contradiction if we look at matter and form, but it is if we look at purpose. Even the beatific vision, granted for a transient moment, as it was possibly granted to St. Paul, is measured by participated eternity, because it contains in itself no succession.

Scotist Objections Analyzed

1. That which has potency to nonexistence can be lost. Yes, if the potency is intrinsic; but no, if it is merely extrinsic.

2. Since the beatific vision is not a debt due to any creature, it can be lost. Answer: If it is not due, either in its collation or in its conservation, we grant. But if it is due to the subject at least as far as conservation goes, then we deny. It is true that the beatific vision is given gratuitously, since God gratuitously gave us the principle of merit, namely, grace. But the beatific vision is due to the blessed as a reward, and as an eternal reward, given even to children by reason of the merits of Christ.

3. Form received into a nonconnatural subject can be lost. Answer: If the form is in itself corruptible, I grant. If the form is in itself incorruptible like charity, I subdistinguish: if you can assign a cause why it should be lost, I grant; otherwise, I deny. Charity, on earth, is lost by mortal sin, but sin is impossible in heaven.

4. Whatever is received is received in the manner of the recipient. Yes, if the gift is subordinated to the recipient; no, if the gift subordinates the recipient to itself. To explain. The light of glory subjects to itself the intellect, and thereby elevates the will to immobility in good. Thus vision differs from grace on earth, which is dependent on man's subjective will.

The Word, united to the humanity of Christ, does not participate in the latter's mutability, but communicates to it its own immutability.

5. St. Paul's vision was lost, because it was transient. But the vision of the blessed is of the same species. Answer: St. Paul had the blessed vision by a miraculous privilege, granted: as an ordinary grace, denied. The vision given to St. Paul was not the reward of perfect beatitude. The life of glory, given miraculously and transiently, does not have the immobility of a habit, because it does not flow from habitual grace as a characteristic.

6. The light of glory is not more inamissible than habitual grace, which can be lost. Answer: Grace on earth is amissible, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the changeable subject in which it is. But the habitual grace of a soul confirmed in good, as was the Blessed Virgin on earth, or as are the souls in purgatory, or as are the blessed who see God clearly and cannot sin: this habitual grace cannot be lost.

Corollary. Heavenly bliss has three principal characteristics. First, love for God, necessary also in its exercise, a love which transcends liberty and merit, like the love whereby God loves Himself. Secondly, intrinsic impeccability. Thirdly, intrinsic inamissibility. Thus we explain the last words of the Creed, "I believe in eternal life." St. Augustine dwells on the perpetual newness of eternal life. The joy of entering into heaven lasts forever. It is eternal springtime, always new, always young, insatiably satiating.

ART. 5. CAN A CREATURE BY HIS NATURAL POWERS ATTAIN BEATITUDE?

Neither man nor angel can attain the beatitude of the fatherland by his natural powers. This conclusion is a truth of faith, against the Beghards. It is founded on the text of St. Paul: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard." [15] Reason agrees. Reason can prove, not indeed the existence or the possibility

[15] I Cor. 2:9.

of the beatific vision, but its supernaturalness, namely, that it is naturally unattainable. Cognition means that the object known exists in the knowing subject, by reason of the subject's immateriality. But God's immateriality infinitely transcends the immateriality of the created intellect. Like the eye of the owl to the sun, so is the created intellect to uncreated Light. Hence the infinite abyss between natural cognition and the beatific vision. Natural knowledge, though it should grow to infinity in its own line, would still not be one step nearer to the vision of God, just as a polygon, inscribed in a circle, could never be identified with the circumference, because a line can never become a point, and a line is divisible into infinity.

ART. 6. CAN MAN ATTAIN BEATITUDE BY THE ACTION OF SOME HIGHER CREATURE?

Man cannot attain beatitude by the action of some higher creature. This is again a truth of faith. "God gives grace and glory." [16] God alone is the author of grace and of glory. Grace and glory are participations in the divine nature which, much more wonderfully than physical miracles, transcend all created powers. Corporeal vision, given miraculously to a man born blind, is a natural thing, though supernaturally restored, whereas grace is essentially supernatural.

Angels can dispose man toward attaining his last end, but the order of agents corresponds to the order of goals, and only the supreme Agent can efficaciously lead the creature to its ultimate goal.

Why cannot a blessed angel communicate to us a participation in his light of glory? The angel, even naturally, can communicate to us good thoughts, also in relation to supernatural mysteries. But he cannot communicate to us supernatural light, except instrumentally, as do the sacraments, because this effect transcends the angel's proper form, natural or supernatural. Light illuminates, but not everything that is illumined can in turn illuminate others.

[16] Ps. 83:12.

ART. 7. ARE GOOD WORKS PREREQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE?

The affirmative answer is of faith, against the Calvinists.[17] "If you know these things, you will be blessed if you do them." [18] The creature cannot naturally have supernatural beatitude, but must strive to reach it, and beatitude is the reward of good works. Christ, indeed, in the first moment of His conception, enjoyed the beatific vision. But this was an extraordinary grace, like the creation of the first individuals in each species, and it was restricted to Christ, because He is the God-man, and the head of humanity.

ART. 8. DOES EVERY MAN DESIRE BEATITUDE?

First conclusion. Every man desires beatitude in common. The reason is that, thus to will beatitude, is nothing else than willing that the will be satiated. But this every man wills, as is clear both by experience and by reason, since the object of the will is universal good, not limited to this or that particular good.

Second conclusion. Not all men will that special beatitude which is found in God alone, since some men will pleasure or riches or honor, instead of God.

Summary

The essence of beatitude consists in the beatific vision. Its principal characteristics are fruition, impeccability, and inamissibility. The attainment of beatitude, not possible by nature, is possible therefore only by grace, which, when it is consummated, is called glory. May God in mercy grant to us all this greatest of all His gifts.

Supplement
On Natural Beatitude

What would constitute that beatitude which can be attained by the powers of nature, in cooperation with the natu-

[17] Conc. Trident. sess. 6, can. 26.
[18] John 13:17. Cf. Matt. 7:21; Luke 11:28; Rom. 2:13; Gal. 5:6; James 3:24.

ral help of God? In the case of men, it would consist in perfect cognition of God, the Author of nature, and in a consequent love of God, the source of all natural good. For the angels, it would consist in the natural cognition of God as the Author of each angel's individual nature, and in the natural love proportionate to this cognition. God is the objective beatitude of men and angels, both in the order of nature and in the order of grace. The creature's will is like a point from which infinite lines of desire reach out in every direction. Divine goodness, even as naturally known, is the circumference which unites it itself all these myriads of lines.

The Salmanticenses pose three questions: first, is natural beatitude possible; second, in what natural operation would it consist; third, in what state would men attain natural beatitude? Answer: Within the order of nature there is possible an operation, to which, however imperfectly, the name "beatitude" can properly be applied. For this view they cite Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Durandus, Scotus, Cajetan, Bellarmine, Bañez, and Suarez. They conclude: "The distinction between natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude is commonly received." The chief reason for this assertion, taken from St. Thomas, runs thus: The rational creature, since it is by its nature ordained to some last end in its own order, must be able to attain that end, and this attainment is natural beatitude.

They cite Vasquez to the contrary. Neither in men nor in angels does Vasquez admit any beatitude except supernatural beatitude. He rejects the common distinction between natural and supernatural, which all other theologians admit. This singular opinion of Vasquez has been renewed in our days by Henry de Lubac, who maintains that human nature is not a defined essence, with necessary characteristics and proportioned natural end, but rather an essence open to indefinite progress.[19] Traditional theologians reply thus: Then not even

[19] *Le Surnaturel*, 1946, pp. 434 f.; 485–87; 252–54. Cf. in confutation, P. Boyer, S.J. (*Gregorianum*, 1947, pp. 390 sqq.); P. Gagnebet, O.P. (*Revue Thomiste*, 1948, 1949).

God would have a definite and clear idea of human nature, He would know only human individuals, as was maintained by the nominalists of the fifteenth century, especially by Occam. Further: then there would no longer be a natural right, distinct from divine positive right, nor would natural ethics be immutable. Juridic positivism, the offspring of nominalism, would be true. Lastly, since the supernatural is defined by the Church as a perfection which transcends the natural, if there is no longer human nature nor angelic nature, then there is no longer anything properly speaking supernatural. The distinction between the natural order and the order of grace, far from being a Thomistic invention, is thus proclaimed by the Vatican Council: "The perpetual teaching of the Catholic Church has held, and still holds, that there is a twofold order of cognition, distinct, not only in source, but also in object." [20] And the encyclical *Humani generis* rejects the opinion of those who corrupt the "genuine gratuitousness of the supernatural order," since they maintain that God could not create an intellectual creature without calling it to the beatific vision.

[20] D. 1808.

SECOND PART

HUMAN ACTS

CHAPTER X

Voluntary and Involuntary (Q. 6)

This question is divided into two parts. First part, where is voluntariness to be found? This question is treated in the first three articles: first, is voluntariness to be found in human acts; second, is it also to be found in brute animals; third, can there be voluntariness without any act? Second part: Things which can cause involuntariness or reduce voluntariness: Can the will suffer violence (art. 4)? Can violence cause involuntariness (art. 5)? Can fear cause involuntariness (art. 6)? Can concupiscence cause involuntariness (art. 7)?

Art. 1. Are human acts voluntary?

Preliminaries

Here we have the definition of the voluntary act. After the first three articles on the nature of voluntariness, we discuss the divisions of voluntariness, divisions which are commonly proposed today, and which are founded in the doctrine of St. Thomas. This process is the normal one. Step by step St. Thomas proceeds to a methodical definition of voluntariness, whereas modern theologians often presuppose the definition already found and received. The difficulty of the question appears in the objections. Voluntary is that which proceeds from our will, that is, from a principle intrinsic in us. But man is moved to act from without, that is, either by the proposed object, or by a precedent motion, either corporeal (e.g., to avoid cold or heat), or spiritual, since man needs to be moved by God in order to act at all.

The Affirmative Argument

A. Authority. St. Damascene says that "voluntary is an act proceeding from the will under the direction of reason."

B. Voluntariness is found in the highest degree in human acts. When we say "in the highest degree," we are speaking of man's relation, not to God, but to brutes. The conclusion is proved as follows. Man has within himself the principle, not only of acting, but of acting for a purpose, since he knows the end and purpose of his work. Hence, since voluntary means something that proceeds from an intrinsic principle accompanied by knowledge of the end, voluntariness is found in the highest degree in human acts.

To explain the principle here invoked we must notice the divisions of motion. Intrinsic motion is either vital or nonvital. Vital movements are of two kinds, one cognitive, when the agent knows, either purpose as purpose (man), or knows only the thing which is purpose (animal). Second, vital motion, which is noncognitive (the plant which preserves itself by assimilating food). Next the nonvital movements which are still intrinsic (the stone which falls by gravity). Finally, we have extrinsic motion (the stone moving upward).

The minor is a nominal definition of voluntariness, namely, motion which comes from the agent's own inclination. But this one element is not sufficient. The vital action of the plant, for example, nutrition, is not voluntary. Hence voluntariness requires also knowledge of the end. Thus we say, in some real sense, that animals perform voluntary acts (this dog wills to eat).

In response to the third difficulty, we say that man moves himself to his end, even though, first, the object must be proposed to him, and, second, he must be premoved by God. Man has in himself, not the first cause of his act, but a created intrinsic principle of acting under knowledge of purpose. And thus man knows, not merely the thing which is his purpose,

but knows it as purpose, as precontaining the relation of means to the purpose he intends.

ART. 2. ARE THE ACTS OF ANIMALS VOLUNTARY?

Conclusion: the imperfect voluntary is found in brutes but the perfect voluntary only in men.

A. Authority. Aristotle says that boys and brutes share in the voluntary.[1] Boys, it is understood, before the use of reason. The same view is expressed by St. Damascene and Nemesius.

B. The argument. In order to have a voluntary act, the principle of the act must be within, with knowledge of the end. Now in brute animals there is at least an imperfect knowledge of the end, since by their sense-powers, especially by their instincts, they know the thing which is the end, though they do not know the end as end, i.e., they do not know the proportion between the act and its purpose. Hence in brute animals we find an imperfect voluntary. Only in man who deliberates can we find the perfect voluntary. Only man knows purpose as purpose, not only in the abstract, but also in the concrete (for example, the cook preparing a meal).

Objection: The brutes have no will and therefore they have no voluntariness. The answer runs thus: Brutes have no will, because will signifies rational appetite; while 'voluntary' gets its name from the will, it has a wider signification, namely, that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end, and in this sense it is found, analogically and imperfectly, also in brute animals.

Certain authors say that voluntariness is found univocally in brutes and men. This statement does not seem to be true, because "voluntary" follows knowledge and appetite. Now cognition and appetite are analogical terms when applied to the two orders, sensitive and intellective: analogical, because based on a similitude of proportion. Cognition is not one

[1] *III Eth.*, c.1.

univocal notion, it is not a genus, diversified by differences which lie outside the genus. In this analogous sense, cognition can be claimed even for God. Thus John of St. Thomas speaks as follows: "Some hold that the voluntary is spoken analogically of man and brute, or metaphorically, as the meadow is said to laugh." To us it seems that "voluntary" is an analogical term. It is used, not metaphorically, but properly, as is the term "cognition." Sense-cognition is cognition, properly so called, not a mere metaphor. Yet this cognition agrees only analogically with intellective cognition. Thus compare also the word "life," which is predicated, analogically but properly, of God, of the angels, of our mind, of animals, of plants. It can, of course, become a mere metaphor when we speak, say, of living water.

St. Thomas says: "Voluntariness is found by the philosopher in brutes, not as coming from the will, but as opposed to violence, so that we can speak of the acts of brutes and children as voluntary, because they act spontaneously, though without an act of choice." [2] Voluntary is here identified with the spontaneous. This seems to be the meaning of Cajetan where he says: "Simply speaking, we can deny that brutes move themselves to their end. The statement is true only *secundum quid.*" [3] And St. Thomas says; "In things which do not have the use of reason there is neither voluntariness nor involuntariness." [4] From all these considerations it seems to follow that voluntariness is found in brutes only analogically.

Definition of Voluntariness

Voluntary is that which comes from an intrinsic principle under knowledge of purpose. The voluntary is perfect when an end is known, not only materially, but formally as an end. The intrinsic principle is, in the case of perfect voluntariness, man's spiritual will, which is guided by reason. In the case of

[2] *De veritate,* q.24, a.2, ad 1um.
[3] Art. 1, no. 6.
[4] Ia–IIae, q.6, a.7, ad 3um.

the imperfect voluntary of brutes, it is their sense-appetite, guided by instinct (thus the sheep flees from the wolf).

This definition of the voluntary is legitimate, it follows the laws of logic. For, by nominal definition, popular definition, voluntary is that which proceeds from the will, or from the inclination of the agent.

A real definition is reached by the division of natural motion proceeding from a natural internal inclination of the agent which moves and acts. Now the principle of motion is twofold: efficient or final. Hence those things are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle in which we find these twofold principles, efficient (in the inclination or appetite), and final (rational knowledge of the end).

The correctness of this definition is confirmed when we compare the voluntary with other similar or dissimilar motions. Here we institute a comparison that is inductive and ascending. Voluntary is contrasted

A. as an intrinsic principle (a) with the violent (where the principle is external, counter to inclination); (b) with the object willed, but not produced by the agent (rainfall).

B. As proceeding from knowledge (a) against vegetative life (sleep, digestion, respiration); (b) against the mere spontaneous (first motions of passion, preceding all advertence).

ART. 3. CAN THERE BE VOLUNTARINESS WHERE THERE IS NO ACT?

Conclusion. A thing can be voluntary without any act, even without any internal act, if we speak simply and objectively. We have two arguments. First, from common principles. This proof runs as follows: Anything which is under our control is said to be voluntary. But man is master of his action and his nonaction, of his willing and nonwilling. Therefore, as willing is voluntary, so also is nonwilling, so far as it is under man's dominion. Therefore a man is culpable, not only when he does evil, but also when he does not do the good which he should do.

An argument more direct and proper, runs as follows: Voluntary is that which comes from the will with knowledge of purpose. But a thing can be indirectly from the will, when man does not place an act which he can and should place. To illustrate: The sinking of a ship comes indirectly from the will of the pilot, if he does not will to guide it as he should and can. Thus a thing can be voluntary without any act, internal or external. A sin of omission does not require an act of nolition, because then the omission would be directly willed. That the omission may be indirectly willed, it suffices that the agent, who can and should (e.g., go to Mass) does not do so.

In answer to the second difficulty we note the difference between "willing-not-to" and "not-willing-to." Willing-not-to is an act, not-willing-to is the absence of act. Here an objection enters. It seems that to "will-not-to" constitutes rather an involuntary act. The answer is that sometimes it does. A man who wills not to write can be forced to write, and thus does something involuntary. But sometimes willing-not-to constitutes a voluntary: I will-not-to go to Mass. Again, in the third difficulty, not to consider is voluntary, when man can and should consider.

Corollary. That omission be voluntary, it is required and suffices that a man knowingly omits a work which he could do, for instance, going to Mass on a ferial day. That the omission be not only voluntary, but also culpable, three things are required: first, that the agent could act; second, that he had a duty to act; third, that he did not act. Thus Sylvius. Similar are the words of Cajetan: "To constitute an act, indirectly culpable, three elements concur: first, ability; second, duty; third, not willing. Hence we must diligently consider whether the agent should, and when he should, hinder an omission. Thus divine permission of sin is without fault. God certainly can hinder all sin. He does not hinder, but He is not bound to hinder. Rather, as St. Augustine says, God, being infinitely good, would in no wise allow anything evil in

His works, were He not so omnipotent and good as to draw good even from evil.

A Doubt

Can omission be indirectly voluntary without some act which is its cause or occasion? Many disciples of St. Thomas answer negatively. These Thomists say that, whereas St. Thomas had answered affirmatively in his earlier writings, he later changed his view. Now, in point of fact, St. Thomas in the *Summa* says this: "For the essence of a sin of omission there is not required *per se* any act, as when, to illustrate, a man at the hour when he is bound to go to church, does not in any way think of going or of not going to church." [5]

"But if," St. Thomas adds, "in the sin of omission we understand also the occasions or causes of omitting, then in a sin of omission there must be some act. To illustrate. A man does not will to go to church, because he wills to play at the moment, or because he stayed up late last night, and in consequence does not go in the morning to church. And then this act, interior or exterior, is *per accidens* the cause of the omission. But judgment on things is to be given by what they are *per se* and not by that which they are *per accidens*. Hence we can say truly that there can be sin without any act at all."

Objections

1. But certainly at times it seems that there is no act which is cause or occasion of the culpable omission. To be guilty, it suffices that a man can and should consider and will, whereas in fact he does not consider and does not will. Answer: For the sin of omission some act is required, at least *per accidens*. When an object is proposed by the intellect, for instance, the obligation of going to Mass on Sunday, the will can have three relations to that act. First, to will; second, to will not; third, not to will. Now to will and to will not are acts, and

[5] Ia–IIae, q.71, a.5.

in this latter case the omission is directly willed. Not to will is the suspension of act, whether of volition or nolition. But, so Thomists argue, this determination to suspension cannot exist without some act. If the will would in no way determine itself to suspend the act, there would be no exercise of liberty and we would be dealing with a voluntariness that is merely potential. But, possibly, it seldom happens that we deal with this act to suspend an act, because generally the omission of the precept takes place because he who omits wishes to do something else, say, to sleep.

2. That the omission be voluntary it suffices that a man can act and does not act. But here there is no act. The answer is: If the omission is to be voluntary, the man must be able to do the objective deed and does not do it, this I grant; but the man remains without any subjective determination, this I deny. The agent certainly determines himself at least not to place the act. The exercise of liberty cannot be without all act, otherwise the will would remain as it were dead, free only as a power. Thus God omits voluntarily to hinder the sins of men, and permits them for higher motives of His wisdom, namely, to manifest His mercy or His justice.

First corollary: That an effect be voluntary, it must proceed either physically or morally from the will.

Second corollary: The effect which follows or accompanies the omission is not voluntary, unless there is an obligation to impede that effect, or unless the omission is chosen purposely as a means to this effect.

Here, then, we have the proof that this effect does not proceed either physically or morally from the will: not physically, because the agent exercises no influence; not morally, unless there is an obligation for the agent to hinder this effect. To illustrate: God omits voluntarily to hinder the sins of men, yet these sins are not voluntary on the part of God, because God is not bound to hinder these sins, but can permit them in view of a greater good.

Further, from positive and fully voluntary acts there may

follow several effects which are not voluntary, since there is no obligation to hinder them. To illustrate: The sacrilege of a bad priest is not voluntary to the penitent who asks for the sacrament. Motions of concupiscence which follow the confessor's hearing of confessions, or the physician's care of the sick, are not voluntary in the confessor or in the physician, because they are not bound to hinder these effects, since their duties are causes *per accidens* of the unintended effects.

But when an omission which is voluntary and not culpable is chosen as means to a certain effect, then such effect is voluntary, because it is directly willed. To illustrate: A man who stays away from the fire in order to suffer cold for the sake of mortification. The cold is willed *per se,* and the mortification is voluntary.

Divisions of Voluntariness

The voluntary is either perfect or imperfect. The perfect voluntary is either necessary (beatific love, love of beatitude in general) or free. The free voluntary is either direct or indirect. The direct voluntary is either voluntary in its cause or voluntary in itself, and this in two fashions: positive (*volo*), or negative (*nolo*). The positive includes the voluntary *simpliciter* (consequent will), and the voluntary *secundum quid* (antecedent will). The indirect voluntary is negative (sinking of a ship by reason of lack of vigilance). The imperfect voluntary is twofold: first, in human emotions, which are either semideliberate, or entirely indeliberate; second, the imperfect voluntary (the spontaneous as found in brutes). The six most important of these divisions are to be explained.

Divisions arising from: 1. degrees of cognition; 2. degrees of advertence; 3. degrees of freedom; 4. modes of influence; 5. modes of termination; 6. modes of willing.

1. Degrees of Cognition

By reason of cognition the voluntary is divided into the perfect and the imperfect voluntary, according as cognition is

either perfect, knowing the purpose and the proportion of means to that purpose, or is imperfect, when it apprehends, as animals do, the thing which is the purpose but not as purpose.

Thus the imperfect voluntary belongs to brutes, but it is found also in men, motions which are either indeliberate, i.e., such motions as antecede advertence, or in motions that are semi-deliberate of which we are only imperfectly conscious, because, for example, we have not waked up entirely. This imperfect voluntary appears in infants, in lunatics, in drunkards, in those suffering from hallucination or obsession. But deliberate motions elicited with full advertence are fully voluntary. Some authors note that half-insane people may still be responsible, in matters where judgment and deliberation are still free. This holds good, particularly at the beginning of the disease, as regards moral and religious standards.

2. Degrees of Advertence

Even full advertence may be either distinct or confused, according as the morality of the object is perceived distinctly or confusedly. To illustrate. He who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that he will thus wound his passing enemy, adverts distinctly to the malice of the act. But if he does the act surmising that possibly some passer-by may be wounded, he does not advert except confusedly to the likelihood of wounding his enemy.

3. Degrees of Freedom

By reason of the object proposed, the voluntary is divided into the necessary voluntary, (for example, the desire of beatitude here on earth and beatific love in heaven), and the free voluntary, an act, namely, that is immune, not only from coercion, but from the natural necessity of instinct, or of any power determined to one line.

Here enters a doubt considered by Billuart: Is the perfect

voluntary identical with the free? An affirmative answer is given by a few, who deny that the necessary voluntary is perfect. Thomists reply by distinguishing two classes of the necessary voluntary: first, what arises from imperfect cognition as in brutes and children); second, that which originates from perfect cognition. This voluntary, they hold, is not imperfect, but in the highest degree perfect. Examples are the love by which God loves Himself, and breathes the Holy Spirit, also the love whereby the blessed love God clearly seen in paradise.

4. Modes of Influence

By reason of influence, the free voluntary is either direct or indirect, according as the will has, or has not, a direct influence on the thing willed. What is only indirectly willed is willed for something else. Example: the omission of Mass when I will to do something else, as, for instance, to read a profane book. I do not will to go to Mass, but I do not say directly: "I will not go to Mass."

Further, the direct voluntary is twofold, either immediate or mediate. It is immediate when I will the object in itself, either positively (I will go to Mass), or negatively (I will not go to Mass). But this direct voluntary is mediate when I will something, not in itself, but in its cause. Example: I will to drink immoderately, though I foresee that drunkenness will be the cause of a quarrel. In this case the quarrel is willed in its cause.

Here we must note that many authors confound the indirect voluntary and the voluntary in cause, because each resembles the other, and because the omission indirectly willed, as we said above, presupposes some act of the will as cause, or at least as occasion. But according to St. Thomas there is a difference. The voluntary in cause is not indirect but direct, though not immediate. To illustrate. The demonstration from motion to God's existence is not indirect but direct, though medi-

ated. Voluntary in cause is the foreseen effect of a positive action willed in itself. Indirect voluntary is the foreseen effect of an omission. We must here pause to discuss the following relevant principles.

1. The voluntary, either indirect or in cause, can be good. And the effect foreseen as good increases the goodness of the whole act. But theologians generally deal rather with these two voluntaries under the aspect of evil, in order to tell us when the evil effect is to be avoided.

2. An evil effect, willed only in its cause, is imputable as guilt, under three conditions; first, the agent was bound to foresee this effect at least confusedly; second, the agent was able not to place the cause; third, he was bound to hinder the effect.

First condition. Nothing is willed unless foreknown. A physician or confessor, conscious that he lacks the necessary knowledge, foresees, indistinctly, the evil effects that may follow. The surgeon, conscious that he has not studied sufficiently the conditions required by the operation, is responsible for the evil effect that may come from his negligence. Thus foresight and circumspection are parts of prudence.

But when the agent cannot foresee the evil effect, then this effect is not imputed to him as guilt. Drunkenness is not indirectly voluntary in him who is ignorant of the special power of a certain wine and thus becomes inebriated (as happened to Noe).

Second condition. The agent who is morally bound to place the cause is not responsible for the effect. A priest is not guilty of sacrilege when he gives Communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound to preserve the sacramental secret.

Third condition. The agent must be bound to hinder the effect. If he is not thus bound, the effect is not imputable. Inordinate motions of sensuality, in a physician, say, or confessor, are not imputable when they arise from the exercise of duty.

Third Principle

It is allowed to place an act, in itself good or indifferent, from which follow two effects, one good, the other evil, provided the good effect is immediate, i.e., is not mediated by the evil effect; provided further that there be present a grave reason for acting, and that the agent's purpose be good. Four conditions are here laid down.

First condition. The act in itself must be good or indifferent. For if it be in itself evil, it can never become licit. We are never allowed to lie, to blaspheme, to commit fornication, even though a good effect may follow. The reason is clear. Evil is not allowed as road to good.

How do we judge whether the act in itself is evil or not? By its moral object. To illustrate. Hypnotic sleep, voluntarily produced in another, is it something morally indifferent or is it evil? The more probable opinion, based on various responses of the Holy Office, is that hypnotism is sometimes natural, not diabolical, not absolutely to be condemned. Thus we can use this medium if the reason be proportionately grave (not mere curiosity), and if there is no intention of evil, and if there is no diabolical intervention.

Second condition. The good effect must be immediate, i.e., not follow from the evil effect. Though at times good may follow from an evil effect, we are still not allowed to place the cause, since the evil effect would be directly intended as medium, and evil may not be done that good may result. Illustrations: to slay an infant in the womb, in order to save the life of the mother; to cause an abortion, in order to save honor: these acts are illicit. But a man need not abstain from riding, even though sensual disturbance may follow, an evil which he permits and to which he does not consent.

If the effect is only physically evil, not morally, it is licit as medium. Thus, if there is no other way to save your life, you may kill an unjust aggressor.

Third condition. The purpose of the agent must be a good

one. The confessor, intending the salvation of souls, can be permissive in relation to temptations which may follow. He does not desire these temptations, but detests them.

Fourth condition. There must be a cause proportionately grave for acting and permitting the evil effect. The reason is that the evil effect, though not intended, is a material sin, and not rarely brings on the danger of formal sin. To illustrate. A very urgent cause is required for a maidservant to go on exercising her service in a home where she is often solicited by a son of the family, since she is in proximate peril of sinning mortally. But for an action which only remotely and lightly tends toward an evil effect, less urgent reason is required. This question on voluntary in cause is not negligible.

5. Modes of Production

Under this heading we distinguish the positive voluntary from the negative voluntary. To illustrate. A positive voluntary act is that of theft. A negative voluntary act is that of an administrator, who knows that goods in his charge are being stolen and neglects to hinder such thievery.

This negative voluntary can be either direct (when I say "I will not go to Mass") or indirect (when I do not go to Mass, because I will something else). This negative voluntary appears in two kinds of negligence: first, in regard to what we can and should do, second in regard to what we can and should consider. Here lies a probable explanation of a difficult doctrine of St. Thomas on the first motions of sensuality. If, he says, consideration was possible and binding, then these sensual motions are minor venial sins.[6] "It is manifest," he continues, "that the act of sensuality can be voluntary, since sensuality by its nature can be controlled by the will." [7] Now reason, in the waking state, is bound to advert to the motions of the soul. If, therefore, due advertence is not present, we have a sin against prudence, an omission in some way voluntary. Again,

[6] Ia–IIae, q.74, a.3, ad 3um.
[7] *Ibid.*

St. Thomas says, that, if reason resists sensual motions there is no sin.[8] But, he adds, reason, if watchful, can be aware of and avoid each individual inordinate motion, but not the whole series as a unit.[9]

Many Thomists require at least an interpretative influence of the will if a motion of sensuality is to be a sin. Others say that it is a venial sin even when there is no sin in the will. To us it seems that there is no sin unless there is at least a negative voluntary, by neglecting resistance or consideration. We can avoid this negligence in each and every particular case, but not in the whole series as a unit.

6. Modes of Willing

Here we have two divisions: the simple voluntary and the voluntary *secundum quid*.

The simple voluntary arises when the object, considered in all its circumstances, is simply willed, although it may be associated with some difficulty or discomfort. For example, I wish to study theology, not withstanding the difficulties I must conquer. The voluntary *secundum quid* is a conditional volition, a mere velleity.

Certain authors [10] depart here from the terminology of St. Thomas. Voluntary *secundum quid,* they say, is an object at which the will aims with reluctance. They illustrate with these examples: I will to take medicine, even though it is bitter. I throw my wares into the sea in order to save my life. St. Thomas, on the contrary, says that to throw away goods when in danger of shipwreck is a simple voluntary act, and only *secundum quid* involuntary. Why? Because the sailor truly wills, though reluctantly, to act as he does act. St. Thomas would invert the example. The preservation of goods at the time of danger is voluntary *secundum quid*.

Thus the voluntary *secundum quid* is reduced to the con-

[8] *De malo*, q.7, a.6, ad 6um.
[9] See note 6.
[10] Prümmer, *Manuale theologiae moralis* (first edition), I, 38.

ditional or antecedent voluntary. St. Thomas writes: "Antecedently God wills all men to be saved, whereas consequently He wishes some to be condemned, according to the exigence of His justice. Thus the just judge wills, antecedently, all men to live, but, consequently, he wills the murderer to be put to death." [11] St. Thomas adds: What we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but only *secundum quid,* because will is related to objects as they are in themselves. Now objects in themselves are individual and particular. Hence when we will an object simply, we choose it with all its particular circumstances. The just judge simply wills the murderer to be put to death, but, in a certain sense, *secundum quid,* wills him to live, namely, in as far as he is a man. To will *secundum quid* is a velleity rather than an absolute act of the will. And thus it is clear that, whatever God wills simply, comes to pass, whereas what He wills antecedently does not always come to pass.[12]

The simple voluntary, we conclude, is identified with the consequent or efficacious voluntary, whereas the voluntary *secundum quid* is identified with the antecedent, conditional, and inefficacious voluntary. The merchant who throws his wares into the sea to save his life, says conditionally: "I wish I could save these wares, but, in point of fact, I choose definitely to throw them into the sea."

The Involuntary and Its Causes

The involuntary must be distinguished from the nonvoluntary. St. Thomas says that nonvoluntary means simply the absence of the act of the will. But the involuntary means that the will is contrary to the object proposed. Hence upon the involuntary there follows sadness, which does not always follow the nonvoluntary.

The involuntary is divided into the simply involuntary and the involuntary *secundum quid.* The simple involuntary is a

[11] Ia, q. 19, a.6, ad 1um.
[12] *Ibid.*

proposal which the will resists with all its might. To illustrate. He who is forced by external violence to immolate to an idol exercises an action that is simply involuntary. Involuntary *secundum quid* is a proposal which the will resists under one aspect, but which it still goes on to will simply, in order to avoid a greater evil. Example is again the merchant throwing his wares into the sea in order to save his life. This act is involuntary *secundum quid,* but is simply voluntary, here and now, in order to preserve his life.

The Causes of the Involuntary (art. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)

We distinguish four causes of the involuntary: force, fear, concupiscence, ignorance.

ART. 4. CAN THE WILL SUFFER VIOLENCE?

Whereas external members can be overcome by force, the question here is: Can the will itself suffer coercion? And by coercion we mean that species of violence to which cognitive beings may be subjected. A plant may indeed suffer violence, but not coercion.

Violence, generically, is defined by Aristotle as follows: an act whose principle is outside, against the inclination of the patient, who contributes nothing to the result. Hence violence adds something to necessity. Necessity means determination to one act, without power toward the opposite act. Thus the necessary can be spontaneous. To illustrate. The brute animal necessarily, but spontaneously, desires food. But under violence, the act comes from an extrinsic principle, against the inclination of the patient. Thus the necessary is twofold, namely, either violent or spontaneous.

When we have thus defined violence, it might seem (so the first objection) that the will can be forced at least by God. Further, the Molinists say that it would be thus forced if there were such a thing as a predetermining physical premotion. Further, (thus the third objection) the motion of the will to sin is against nature and therefore violent.

Our Thesis

Violence can be inflicted upon the will's commanded acts, but not on the will's own elicited acts.

Proof of the first part. By exterior violence the members can be impeded from following the command of the will. To illustrate. Someone may close my eyes, so that I cannot see, or he may open my eyes, compelling me to look upon something obscene against my will. Then this sight, though it proceeds from my visual power, is called violent, since it is against the inclination of my will.

Objection. But then this sight is not an act commanded by the will. Therefore violence cannot be effectual against the will, even in commanded acts. Answer: We distinguish the antecedent. It is not an act commanded by the will actually, we grant. Not commanded even potentially, we deny. But the conclusion deals with acts either actually or potentially commanded. Acts actually commanded by the will can be prevented by violence. Since the will resists, they come to pass only by the force of an external agent. In possession or obsession, for example, demonic violence exercised on the organism or imagination, can compel speech or prevent motion. But, says St. Thomas, although the devil can compel a man to do an act which is sinful, he cannot compel man to sin. When reason is bound, nothing that man does can be imputed to him as sinful.[13]

Proof of the second part. The will can suffer no violence in its own elicited acts (to will, to intend, to choose). No power, created or uncreated, can force the will to elicit an act. The act elicited by the will is nothing else than the will's own inclination, actually proceeding from the will under knowledge of the end, whereas an act that is forced must come from an exterior principle, against the inclination of the patient. An act elicited by the will, and at the same time forced, implies a contradiction. This conclusion is confirmed by analogy with the natural inclination of noncognitive things. By force the

[13] Ia, q.114, a.1; Ia–IIae, q.80, a.1, 3.

stone goes up, but it goes down by its natural inclination, natural gravity.

This doctrine is found in Augustine (the text cited in *sed contra est*). Also in St. Anselm, who says: "An unwilling man can not-will anything, because he cannot will, willing not-to-will." [14]

But can God, who moves from within, force the will? All theologians agree that God, using an instrument of justice (e.g., fire) can inflict punishment against the will of the patient. Thus the sufferings of hell are contrary to the will of its victims. These punishments are violent at least *secundum quid* as being against a particular inclination of the condemned soul, but nevertheless they are according to the order of justice.

Certain theologians hold that God, as universal mover, can force the will. The acts thus forced, they say, though they are in harmony with potency and with the fundamental inclination of the will to universal good, may still be against the will's inclination to a particular good. Further, Suarez and Molina say that, if God premoves and predetermines the will, the acts thus caused would not be free, and God would be the author of violence.

St. Thomas replies: God, who is more powerful than the human will, can move the human will. Again, he says: "As long as judgment remains indifferent, it is impossible that God can so premove as to force the will. Such an act would no longer be free. As long as judgment remains indifferent, the will is not limited to this object. God clearly seen by vision is the only object which removes this indifference of judgment." [15]

Further, as it is a contradiction for the will to desire an object not proposed by the intellect, so it is also a contradiction that the will desire an object under some aspect not proposed to it by the intellect. Otherwise the will would cease to be a rational appetite, and would act without cognition.

[14] *De libero arbitrio,* Bk. VI.
[15] *De veritate,* q.22, a.5, 8.

Objections

1. God can deny cooperation, say, with the act whereby the blessed love God in heaven. This cessation would be forced. Answer: First, the force here in question would not be positive compulsion to an elicited act, but a negative impeding of the act to be elicited. Second, such cessation would not be, properly speaking, violence. As it is natural for a second cause to act under the influence of the first cause, so it is natural (or supernatural or preternatural) not to act when the influence of the first cause is removed. Thus it is when fire does not burn, or when hungry lions do not devour.

2. God can produce in the will of Judas, who at the time hates John, a love for John. This act would be forced, that is, against the inclination of Judas. Answer: God can do this by changing the evil inclination of Judas into a good inclination. But He cannot do this, and at the same time preserve the contrary volition. When God changes the will, He brings it about that in place of the preceding inclination, there follows another inclination. Thus "the heart of the king is in God's hand, and whithersoever God wills He can turn it." [16]

3. Sin is against man's natural inclination, but is nevertheless an act elicited by man's will. Answer: Sin is against man's partial inclination to good-in-itself, yes; it is against man's adequate inclination to good in common, no. Man wills sin as an apparent good.

ART. 5. CAN VIOLENCE CAUSE INVOLUNTARINESS?

Preliminaries

From this fifth article to the end of the question we deal with the four causes of the involuntary, namely, violence, fear, concupiscence, and ignorance.

When we say that violence or fear or concupiscence or ignorance causes the involuntary (at least as regards com-

[16] Prov. 21:1.

manded acts), we do not mean to say that these causes physically influence the act of the will. But they do move, either physically or morally, to an act in some way contrary to the inclination of the will. Thus when fear moves man to throw goods into the sea, his act is involuntary *secundum quid,* because of his inclination to preserve his goods.

Thesis. Absolute violence causes the simply involuntary in commanded acts. Example: the man who, against his own persevering inclination, is forced to sacrifice to an idol. This conclusion is to be understood of absolute violence, such, namely, that the victim, with all his efforts, cannot overcome it. We are not treating of violence *secundum quid,* which a man is able to overcome if he resists as far as he can. Absolute violence causes the simple involuntary, violence *secundum quid* causes the involuntary *secundum quid.* Martyrdom is involuntary *secundum quid,* but simply voluntary, just as is loss of goods from fear of shipwreck. The arguments follow.

A. Our authorities are Aristotle and St. Damascene.

B. From reason. A voluntary act comes from an intrinsic principle, in agreement with the will's inclination. But that which is absolutely violent comes from an extrinsic principle, and against the will's inclination. Therefore that which is absolutely violent is not voluntary in an agent capable of cognition, just as it is not natural in things which lack cognition.

1. Objections. Our conclusion holds good only for acts commanded by the will, not for elicited acts.

2. Note that a thing can be natural, or voluntary, in two ways, one active, the other passive.

3. An act can be violent *secundum quid,* and still voluntary simply. A man, climbing a hill, is performing an act violent *secundum quid,* since the body naturally tends downward, but the act is simply voluntary, by reason of the man's intention and inclination.

Question. Does violence make the sufferings of the martyrs involuntary? Answer: The martyrs did not suffer absolute violence, but only relative violence, violence *secundum quid.*

The martyrs, had they so willed, could have escaped violence, namely, by denying their faith. But they voluntarily endured death for God's sake. Hence they did not suffer absolute violence, but they did overcome the greatest violence *secundum quid*. Everything that is born of God conquers the world, and this is the victory which conquers the world, our faith.[17]

On the contrary, when the martyr's hand is forced open to sacrifice to an idol, this sacrifice is simply involuntary, if the man resists as far as he can.

The same truth holds good of a woman in relation to the man who violates her. If she resists as far as she can, the violation is involuntary. If she does not so resist, she consents to sin. If you command me to be violated against my will, said St. Lucy, my chastity will have a double crown. The body cannot be soiled except with the permission of the mind.

A man who is forced to receive baptism receives it validly, and therefore voluntarily. Answer: To receive baptism validly, he must first put away his contrary disinclination.

A clarification: When is a woman culpable in relation to an aggressor? She is not allowed to kill her oppressor, because the integrity of the flesh is a lower good than life itself. But she can resist by cries, blows, and wounds, and she is bound to this resistance. But if there is peril to her own life or fame, and if there is no danger of interior consent, the woman is not bound to extreme exterior resistance, because exterior resistance is an affirmative precept, which does not oblige to loss of life or fame. But if the danger of interior consent is present, the woman is bound to resist even at the expense of life and fame. It is better to lose corporeal life than the life of grace.

Corollaries

1. If all resistance, interior and exterior, is unavailing, then violence is absolute, and causes the simply involuntary, because the act is not free and therefore not imputable.

2. If the person resists exteriorly, but not interiorly, the

[17] I John 5:4.

voluntary is indeed diminished but not taken away. If under violence the person is altogether passive, not cooperating, and not resisting except interiorly, then the act can still be imputable when there is an obligation to resist exteriorly, in order to prevent scandal (for example, in matters of faith), or of consent (in matters of chastity).

ART. 6. DOES FEAR CAUSE THE INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

An act done from fear differs from an act done with fear. The merchant begins his voyage with fear, but not from fear. But when, in a storm, he throws his goods overboard, he acts from fear.

Difficulties

Three difficulties present themselves: 1. Fear seems to be related to the future as force is to the present. 2. A deed done from fear seems to be in itself involuntary. 3. Such a deed is voluntary only under condition, and hence is voluntary only *secundum quid,* not simply.

Our Thesis

Deeds done from fear are simply voluntary, but *secundum quid* involuntary.

A. Authorities. Nemesius and Aristotle speak thus: "Deeds done from fear are voluntary rather than involuntary."

B. Reason. That deed is simply voluntary which, here and now, is chosen by the will. Now the deed done from fear is, here and now, chosen by the will, though that deed, seen in itself abstractly, is against the will's inclination. Therefore the deed done from fear is simply voluntary and yet involuntary *secundum quid.*

To explain. The simple voluntary act deals with objective good, clothed, here and now, with all its circumstances. The voluntary *secundum quid* deals with the object, not as it is

here and now, but as it is in the intellect abstractly, denuded of its actual and objective circumstances.

Note that we are not speaking here of fear so extreme as to make deliberation impossible. Acts done from such fear are not in any sense voluntary.

A confirmation. Acts done from fear are willed absolutely and efficaciously. The will is against them only inefficaciously and conditionally. The merchant wills efficaciously to lose his goods, though he would will to retain them were there no danger of shipwreck. A deed willed efficaciously is simply voluntary, and only *secundum quid* involuntary.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. In acts done from fear, the will consents. In acts done under violence, the will does not consent.

2. An object in itself involuntary may become simply voluntary.

3. An act done here and now from fear is absolutely willed, conditionally non-willed.

Special Difficulties

1. Fear of hell leads many men to sorrow for sin and observance of the law. Now this sorrow and observance are in no way involuntary. Hence acts done from fear need not be involuntary *secundum quid*. Answer: Even in this case the will remains conditioned: Were there no hell, I would sin. While the man in this condition is not good, his sorrow and observance are good, just as faith in a sinner is good, even while the man remains bad.

2. But a deed which is simply voluntary cannot in any real sense be involuntary. Answer: The adverb "simply" does not mean "totally." It means "principally and efficaciously."

3. Contracts entered into under grave fear are invalid, and therefore simply involuntary. Answer: Such contracts, even when they are not invalid by natural law, are made invalid by positive law. Natural law itself cancels gratuitous contracts, if

such contracts result from fear unjustly threatened, because gratuitousness presupposes full freedom.

Grave fear unjustly inflicted invalidates matrimony, some say by natural law, others, by ecclesiastical law.

1. Corollaries. Grave fear, in matters prohibited by the natural law, does not entirely excuse from sin, because the act remains simply voluntary. Example: one who from fear of death denies the faith or commits perjury or fornication. But fear does diminish the voluntary, in the degree in which the fear is grave. It even destroys the voluntary if it takes away the faculty of deliberation.

2. Grave fear, in matters which are evil only because prohibited, generally excuses from all sin, because positive laws do not oblige under grave loss. Under fear of death or of infamy, a man is not bound by the law of fasting, say, or of Sunday Mass.

3. But at times even positive laws oblige a man to risk or lose his life. But such cases contain an element of the natural law. For example, a soldier must face his country's enemy. Again, a Christian, ordered to eat meat on Friday, if the command comes from scorn of religion.

ART. 7. DOES CONCUPISCENCE MAKE THE ACT INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

By concupiscence we here understand those passions which incline us to follow a certain line of activity. Concupiscence is thus opposed to fear, the latter being motion away from evil.

Concupiscence is either antecedent (which precedes the motion of the will) or consequent (which follows the act of the will). Consequent concupiscence is the sign and effect of an intense voluntary act, which excites a corresponding passion (e.g., anger) in the inferior appetite. Here we deal only with antecedent concupiscence.

A Twofold Conclusion

First. Antecedent concupiscence of itself inclines rather to the voluntary than to the involuntary, because it attracts the will to that which concupiscence desires. Thus it increases the imperfect voluntary, whether in brutes or in man.

Second. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the perfect voluntary, because it weakens judgment. It may even coerce judgment completely (e.g., in hysteria or extreme anger). In any case, it distracts the intellect from attention to the reasons for good.

AN APPENDIX

Question: Do habits, good or bad, increase voluntariness? Habit is an acquired operation quality, a quality hard to change, which man uses when he wills, and by which he is inclined to perform similar acts, good or bad, virtuous or vicious.

Habits are found, not only in the sense appetite, but also in the intellect and the will. As regards the influence of habits upon liberty, under the moral aspect of imputability, we must make a number of distinctions. Habit either remains voluntary, or, if it has been efficaciously retracted, still influences materially.

Conclusions

1. Habit, good or bad, unless retracted, increases the voluntary, because it gives to the will facility and propensity to act, and takes away all repugnance. Nor does it diminish liberty, because it has been acquired freely and is freely preserved.

2. A good habit perfects liberty, since it inclines the agent to act according to right reason, and diminishes the power of sinning, which is a defect of liberty.

3. An evil habit increases sin, because he who sins from a habit not retracted sins with greater inclination and delight,

but not with less liberty. The man who sins by habit, and not merely from a momentary impulse, sins by malice.

4. An evil habit, efficaciously retracted but still exerting material influence, remains as a temperamental disposition, which diminishes the voluntary because it partially impedes deliberation. Acts which flow from it indeliberately (for instance, blasphemy or excess in drinking) are no longer imputed as guilt, because they are not free in their principle. But the man is bound to do his utmost toward eradicating his bad habits.

Heredity and Temperament

Heredity transmits certain inclinations which, while directly physical, are indirectly moral (e.g., the inclination to anger or to lust). Many determinists maintain that children simply cannot resist their hereditary passions.

To this we must reply: As long as the use of reason remains, there remains likewise the power of deliberating and choosing, even against hereditary inclinations. This truth is clear by the testimony of conscience and many historical facts. Christian discipline has often overcome and transformed the hereditary inclinations of barbarians. That which is born of flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.[18]

Still we must grant that hereditary inclinations do lessen liberty by disturbing judgment. Men under this handicap are to be treated kindly. Their temptations need the aid of special grace.

Heredity

By heredity we here understand psychopathic tendencies, transmitted by parents to children. From parents insane or alcoholic or neuropathic, or drunk at the moment of conception, children may have an organic predisposition to any of these evils, a certain psychopathic tendency, especially in

[18] John 3:6.

the form of disordered imagination and sensibility, of obsession, tendencies, for instance, to suicide.

Immediate heredity, i.e., from parents alone, may be simple (from one parent) or double (from each parent). Maternal heredity is probably more frequent and more grave. Mediate heredity, if it has grown through several generations, is called accumulated heredity.

Heredity is progressive, when the aforesaid disposition continually grows, and tends to the annihilation of the family. Or it is regressive, when corrected by a happy marriage, as it were by the infusion of new blood. In a family where insanity is hereditary, children are sometimes immune, and even distinguished by great genius. The sickness transmitted can be a disposition to insanity or to general paralysis or to neurosis or to syphilis or to alcoholism. General paralysis often arises from hereditary syphilis.

Modern theories tend to consider pathological heredity as the effect of disturbed nutrition, or of intoxication in the embryo. Intoxication in the blood may result in delirium, or give rise to forms of nerve-tension.

Temperament

Temperament is the complex of all inclinations directly physical, which arise, either from heredity or from the individual organism. These inclinations are based in matter signed with quantity which, according to Thomists, is the principle of individuation. This individuation, since it lies below direct intelligibility, cannot be defined, just as God cannot be defined, since He stands higher than the created intellect. Temperaments differ by predominance of nerve-power or of blood or of bile or of lymph. Some men are thus prompt to begin, but without perseverance. Others are energetic and persevering, and others sluggish.

These native dispositions can be modified by education, by external circumstances, by individual effort. Thus arises character, which is a stable complex of these native propensities,

as fixed by education and the individual's own will. Virtuous character is related to temperament, as in Latin the word *vir* is related to the word *homo. Vir,* like *virtus* (virtue), originally signified man as distinguished from woman. Cicero uses the word "virility" to express character and vigor of soul. *Homo,* on the contrary, means any member of the human race, man or woman. The word seems related to *humus* (the soil). Character, then, is the seal which man (*vir*) imposes upon his *humus,* his temperament. Christian character is constituted by the virtues, moral and theological.

Temperament, like antecedent passion, lessens free will. Character, on the contrary, like a voluntary habit not retracted, increases the voluntary and does not diminish freedom. Good character perfects liberty, evil character not retracted increases sin.

Character Education

Hereditary inclinations are modified by parents, teachers and society, under three forms.

1. The inculcation of principles, good and bad. This is a truth of the greatest importance, if, as Aristotle says, the boy's mind is a blackboard where nothing has been written. The enemies of the Church recognize this importance by claiming a legal monopoly in education.

2. The second influence of education is that of giving example which allures imitation.

3. Third, the education of passions, either by moderation or by perversion, not only by example or by inculcation of principles, but by commands, properly so called, given by parents and teachers.

Finally, the individual Christian educates his own character, by acquiring virtue, by prayer and the sacraments, which increase infused virtues. For example:

1. The spirit of faith, hope, and charity grows by meditation, by acting from good motives, natural and supernatural.

2. The continual practice of prudence, natural and Chris-

tian, which directs the moral virtues to a supernatural end. Negative prudence is not sufficient, operative prudence is required. The phrase "he is prudent," is often misused to express a negative prudence, employed in avoiding the discomforts of life, as, for example, by Epicureans.

3. Moderation of the passions, that the man may have true temperance and fortitude. Passions are not to be extinguished, because man is to be moved toward good, not only by his will, but also by his sense-appetites, regulated and commanded by virtue. God gave us sensibility to attain our purpose in life.

4. Frequent consideration of the rights of others, in a spirit of justice, and love of our neighbor's sanctification, in the spirit of charity.

Pathological Conditions

Modern authors tend to consider pathological conditions as directly affecting the will. Indecision, or any particular propensity, is looked on as sickness of the will. Such a view denies or ignores the spirituality of the soul. We must clearly distinguish physical sickness from vice, which is an evil habit of the will itself. Vice has in it more than mere sickness. Speaking properly, sickness is in the body, but only analogically in the soul, as far as the will is evilly disposed.[19]

Certain pathological states impede more directly the exercise of judgment and will. Thus indecision (*aboulia*) affects the will, as insanity does the intellect. Others less directly impede the exercise of liberty, for instance, neurasthenia, hysteria, epilepsy. But even here a crisis may make the use of reason impossible. Those who undergo hypnosis, and afterward carry out the suggestions of the hypnotist, probably suffer only a diminution of liberty. But even when liberty is entirely taken away, we must still consider whether the deeds done are voluntary in cause (by the patient's imprudent consent to be hypnotized). Each case is to be examined by the experience of

[19] Ia–IIae, q.71, a.1, ad 3um.

those suffering from the sickness, by the testimony of experts and physicians.

ART. 8. DOES IGNORANCE MAKE THE ACT INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

Ignorance is the lack of knowledge that is due; for instance, absence of theological knowledge in a priest or of medical knowledge in a physician. Thus ignorance is distinguished from nescience, which is a mere absence of knowledge, for instance, in the insane. It is likewise distinguished from error, which is not only negation or privation of knowledge, but is a contrary disposition.

Divisions of Ignorance

St. Thomas speaks of three kinds of ignorance: antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Modern theologians prefer to speak of ignorance, vincible or invincible. But these two modes of division can be harmonized.

1. By relation to its object, ignorance is *ignorantia juris* (when the law is unknown, when, e.g., I do not know that excommunicated persons are to be avoided).

2. Second, ignorance of fact. To illustrate. I know the law, but do not know that Peter, for example, is excommunicated.

3. Two other kinds of ignorance are distinguished by their relation to the will. Here we have, first, consequent ignorance, that is, ignorance willed and vincible. And this itself has two classes: ignorance, directly willed, i.e., pretended ignorance, or, then, indirectly willed, arising from negligence, which can be either grave or light.

4. Distinct from consequent ignorance is ignorance that is nonconsequent, i.e., not willed, and invincible. Also this ignorance is of two kinds. First, antecedent ignorance, when the deed is indeed done but would not be done if there were

knowledge. For example, I kill a friend while invincibly I think that I am killing a deer. Second, concomitant ignorance, when, e.g., I kill my enemy, thinking invincibly that I am killing a deer, but so minded that I would have done the deed even if I had known that it was my enemy.

Principles Regarding Ignorance

First Principle

Consequent ignorance, directly willed and vincible, causes the simply voluntary and the involuntary *secundum quid.* Such ignorance does not take away freedom and imputability. But ignorance indirectly willed lessens freedom and voluntariness.

Ignorance directly willed is itself voluntary. Willing the cause, I will the effect. For example; a physician, negligent in removing his ignorance, wishes in cause the death which follows from this ignorance.

Nevertheless this consequent ignorance, when indirectly willed, is in some way against the inclination of the agent. If he had known, the deed would not have been done. Hence ignorance indirectly willed lessens freedom and voluntariness. Thus ignorance arising from light negligence may reduce a sin objectively to a venial sin. But crass ignorance cannot be so excused. If, however, ignorance is so affected that even in its absence the work would still be done, then it does not lessen the voluntary. Example: a man wills not to know the law in order to sin without remorse. Here we have full imputability.

This first principle is thus divided by some modern theologians. Ignorance actually vincible does not remove freedom but lessens it. Ignorance here and now invincible, whereas formerly it was vincible, results in an act voluntary in cause. To illustrate. The physician, who during his medical education neglected study, does not incur the sin of homicide in that instant when he gives a medicine which produces death: but

he willed the effects of his ignorance when he neglected study. The same hold good of the confessor who has gravely neglected the study of theology.

Second Principle

Ignorance nonconsequent, not willed, invincible, causes the involuntary simply or at least the nonvoluntary. This principle has two subdivisions. First: Ignorance invincible and antecedent, since it is itself involuntary, causes the involuntary simply. For nothing is willed unless it is foreknown at least in its cause. Further, the deed proceeding from this ignorance is against the agent's inclination, actual or habitual or interpretative. This is evident in the example already adduced: I kill a friend, because invincibly I think I am killing a deer, but would not have killed him had I known him to be my friend. Second: Invincible ignorance concomitant makes the act, not simply voluntary nor simply involuntary, but nonvoluntary. This is clear from the example of the man who, invincibly thinking that he is killing a deer, kills instead an enemy whom he would have killed anyhow had he known it. Such ignorance does not take away all will of sin. Therefore the act is not simply involuntary. But neither is the act simply voluntary, because the ignorance itself is not voluntary.

Corollary. In this last case, the man who kills his enemy, invincibly thinking that he is killing a wild beast, while he is guilty of intended homicide is excused from actual homicide, and hence from punishment and censures, which are not inflicted except on account of the external act.

A Final Conclusion

In every sin there is voluntary ignorance of choice, not as regards the law, but as regards the law's application to the here and now. Here and now we choose something that is simply evil, and only good *secundum quid*. Thus, misled by passion, a man judges that it is good to steal or to lie.

Thus we harmonize the word of Plato and Aristotle that "every evil man is ignorant," with the saying of Augustine that "all sin is voluntary."

A brief synopsis. 1. Consequent ignorance causes the simply voluntary. 2. Antecedent ignorance causes the simply involuntary. 3. Concomitant ignorance causes the nonvoluntary.

CHAPTER XI

The Circumstances of Human Acts (Q. 7)

PRELIMINARIES

The nature of any human act is affected by its circumstances. Certain circumstances change the very species of an act: theft becomes sacrilege, when committed in a holy place. Other circumstances notably increase the gravity of the act: to steal a thousand dollars is a greater sin than to steal a few cents. Others are only lightly aggravating: to steal thirty cents rather than twenty-five.

ART. 1. WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCE CAN BE AN ACCIDENT OF HUMAN ACTS?

Response. Circumstance is an accident of the human act, affecting the morality of that act. We explain the definition. Circumstance is called an accident, because it lies outside the substance of the act, surrounds the act, as it were (*circumstare*, the Latin verb, means to stand around). It affects the human act, but does not constitute the essence. If it were the source of essential morality, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would either specifically differentiate the act, or would be the purpose of the deed. The purpose of the agent, when it is not identical with the purpose of the work, is a circumstance. Examples: to steal in order to pay money to a prostitute, or, on the contrary, in order to give alms. A circumstance affects the act morally, that is, modifies it in relation to moral standards. A mere physical circumstance does not affect morality. Example: A man giving alms in gold or in silver, with the right hand or with the left.

ART. 2. THEOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Circumstances modify acts, first, in relation to man's last end. To illustrate: alms, not for a mere human end, but for God. Second, in relation to good and evil. By an evil circumstance an act, by its object good, can become evil. For instance, I teach the truth, but with the purpose of attaining human glory. Third, as regards merit and demerit.

ART. 3. CIRCUMSTANCES FORMULATED: WHO, WHAT, WHERE, BY WHOSE AID, WHY, HOW AND WHEN

This division is founded on the definition of circumstance. The seven circumstances are reduced by St. Thomas to three chief classes. First, circumstances that modify the act itself. Second, those that modify the causes of the act. Third, those circumstances that modify the effect of the act.

1. Circumstances of the act itself. Such circumstances function, first, as a measure of time (when: a festival day, a prolonged period), or as measure of place (where: in public, in a sacred place). Secondly, circumstances affect the act in the manner of a quality (how: intensely, remissly, from contempt, or ignorance).

2. Circumstances that affect causes. If the cause is final, we have the circumstance "why" (the personal purpose of the agent). If the cause is the efficient principal cause, we have the circumstance of "who" (a priest, a married man). If the cause is the instrumental cause, we have the circumstance "by whose aid" (demon, poison, sword).

3. Circumstances that modify the effect. Here we have the circumstance "what" (a sacred thing, a profane thing). To illustrate. The circumstance called "what" does not denote that the thing stolen belongs to someone else, but that it is either sacred or profane, large or small. The circumstance "who" designates the quality of the agent (a priest or a layman). The circumstance "why" designates a purpose, not in-

trinsic in the deed itself, but extrinsic, namely, the purpose of the agent (stealing in order to get drunk).

ART. 4. WHAT ARE THE CHIEF CIRCUMSTANCES?

The principal circumstances are "why" and "what," since they more nearly modify voluntariness. Hence the chief circumstance is "why" as affecting purpose. Next in importance is "what," as modifying the effect destined for such a purpose. Other circumstances are ordered by their nearness to "why" and "what."

Human Acts Considered Psychologically

Human acts are either elicited by the will or commanded by the will. Acts elicited deal either with the end and are therefore divided into three classes, (namely, to will, to enjoy, to intend), or with the means employed (namely, to choose, to counsel, to consent, to use).

Although intention precedes fruition, we treat of fruition first, because it deals simply with the end, whereas intention implies relation to means. Thus God enjoys His own goodness before He intends to manifest that goodness. St. Thomas treats of choice in connection with counsel, which guides choice. Consent sometimes precedes choice, when, namely, pleasing means are open, and the agent must choose between them.

Twelve Successive Acts

Intellect	Will

Order of Intention

1. Judgment (this goal is desirable).	2. Inefficacious desire (e.g., for rain).
3. Judgment (this goal is attainable).	4. Efficacious intention (I will attain this goal).

Order of Choice

5. Counsel (many choices are open).
6. Consent (to one of these various choices).
7. Practical judgment (this is the best means).
8. Choice (I select this means).

Order of Execution

9. Command (follow this path).
10. Active use (the will moves to take this path).
11. Attainment of goal.
12. Fruition (enjoyment of goal attained).

This classification is of great importance in many questions. For instance, in the problem of free will, since the last practical judgment is within our power. Similarly, in dealing with indeliberate acts, with temptation, in analyzing the act of faith, in predestination, where we distinguish the order of intention and the order of execution, and even in the forms of government in civil society or in the Church. In regard to counsel, St. Thomas prefers a union of aristocracy and the popular elements (senators and representatives). But as regards command, unity is needed, lest there be discussion without end.

Question. Why does St. Thomas not treat these acts in their chronological and concrete order?

1. He is here following the theoretical and abstract order, treating professedly acts that belong, not to the intellect, but to the will. Hence he treats the command and commanded acts,[1] after the question of use,[2] although, it is true chronologically, command enters in at the beginning of execution.

2. Since he first speaks of acts elicited regarding the goal,

[1] Q.17.
[2] Q.16.

he speaks of fruition [3] at the beginning, although this act belongs chronologically at the end.

3. He treats of fruition before treating of intention,[4] because fruition is concerned with the end simply, whereas intention deals with the end in relation to ways and means.

4. He treats counsel [5] after choice,[6] because choice is an elicited act of the will.

5. He treats consent [7] after choice, because often there is only one suitable medium to the end. In this case the two acts are not distinguished.

6. As consent is some times distinguished from choice, so likewise we distinguish counsel from the last practical judgment. Thus we have perfect harmony between the chronological, concrete succession generally admitted and the order of St. Thomas, who treats each act theoretically and abstractly. Finally we must notice that, in the first three [8] questions on the will, St. Thomas professedly treats only of simple volition. But even while he thus treats of volition, St. Thomas adds many points regarding the volitional power. Choice, for instance, is a kind of volition, although not every volition is choice. Treating of the first volition, he speaks of volition as a genus. Similarly, treating of the angels who are the first of creatures, he deals with matters that belong in common to all created things. Treating of the first sacrament, namely, of baptism, he speaks of the sacraments in general. Similarly, Aristotle, treating of the vegetative soul, deals with the soul in general.

[3] Q. 11.
[4] Q. 12.
[5] Q. 14.
[6] Q. 13.
[7] Q. 15.
[8] Q. 8–10.

CHAPTER XII

The Will and Its Object (q. 8)

art. 1. can the will desire evil?

Preliminaries

It seems that the will can aim at evil, just as sight, for instance, aims not only at white but also at black, since one and the same power deals with opposites. Again, according to Aristotle, it is a characteristic of rational powers to deal with opposites, with truth and falsehood, with evil and good. Further, goodness and reality are convertible, and our will chooses negations of reality, for instance, not to walk, not to speak.

For our thesis we might quote Dionysius,[1] who says that evil is not aimed at by the will, that all things desire only good. But how are these assertions to be harmonized with the difficulties just now proposed? Dionysius seems at first sight to deny the existence of sin and vice. And if, as Spinoza and Hegel maintain, the object of sin is not an evil, but only a lesser good, the sinner himself would be merely a man characterized by his indistinct power of thinking. Thus we would have absolute and unlimited optimism.

Thesis. It is not necessary that the object of the will be in very truth a good, but only that it be apprehended as a good. The will cannot will evil as evil. This is the common doctrine, admitted also by St. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Gabriel Biel, and rejected only by some nominalists.

A. Authority. The word of Dionysius (see above) had already been expressed by Aristotle. St. Augustine [2] says: So

[1] *De div. nom.*, c.4.
[2] Enchirid. c. 105.

much do we want to be blessed, that we cannot will to be miserable. Not even the demon can will evil as evil.

B. By reason we prove, first, that the will always aims at good. Every appetite is inclined to something agreeable. The will is an appetite. Hence it aims only at what is good and agreeable. The will, however, can aim at apparent good. What is really evil, for instance, theft, is often looked upon as good. But the will is an appetite that follows, not upon a natural form (as does the natural appetite of the plant), but upon an apprehended form (as does sense-appetite). Therefore the will, like sense-appetite, can aim at something that is only apparently good.

Corollary. Natural appetite follows the natural form, which always tends to perfection and to real good. But whereas our natural appetite is always right, its object is the lowest kind of good. The will, however, is related to a higher good, which it attains freely, and can therefore turn aside from true good. But, notwithstanding the possibility of sin, the will transcends natural appetite, by reason of its universal object.

Confirmation. We must judge the adequate object of the will, just as, proportionally, we judge the adequate object of the intellect, or of the sense-appetite. The adequate object of the intellect is reality and truth, at least apparent truth. The adequate object of the sense-appetite is sense-good, suitable and agreeable, at least apparently. Hence the adequate object of the will is good, either really or at least apparently. The object is not, as maintained by some nominalists, reality as abstracting from good and evil. We cannot will evil except under the aspect of an apparent good.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Good and evil as opposites belong to the same power. Answer: Belong to the same power, if they are related in the same way to both, yes. The will aims at both good and evil, but not in the same way. Will, volition, aims at good. Non-will, nolition, refuses evil.

2. The will is a rational power, and therefore deals with good and with evil. Answer: The will aims at good and at evil, but at evil only under the aspect of an apparent good, I grant. Aims at evil as evil, I deny.

The following difficulties are urged.

a. He who hates his enemy wishes him evil as evil. Answer. He wishes evil as the evil of his enemy, yes; as evil to himself, no.

b. The envious man is saddened by the prosperity of another under the aspect of good. Therefore sometimes the will flees from good. Answer: The envious man is sad at the good of another as good for that neighbor, yes; as good for himself, no.

c. Sin committed by malice is distinguished from sin committed by passion or ignorance. But he who sins by passion wishes moral evil only as a sense-good, and he who sins by ignorance wishes evil because he believes it to be good. Therefore malice, differing from these two kinds of evil, chooses evil as an offense against God. Answer: That consequence does not follow. These three kinds of sin are distinguished, not by their object, but by the dispositions of the sinner. He who sins by passion is moved by that passion to sin, and he who sins by ignorance sins by responsible lack of knowledge. But he who sins from malice, not from passion and not from ignorance, while he knows that this thing is evil and forbidden, still wills it as suitable to his present evil disposition, to manifest his own liberty (e.g., his pertinacious selfishness and pride).

3. The will aims also at nonexistent things, for instance, not to walk, not to speak. But such acts cannot aim at good because good and reality are convertible. Answer. In nonexistence, in self-destruction, it is not possible to find any positive aspect of good, I grant; any negative aspect, the lack of evil, I deny. Those who will anything under a not-good aspect, do so because to lack evil is good. Demons, e.g., will

nonexistence as liberation from their miseries. They desire not to be miserable. This seems to them to be good.

The objection is urged: He who hates God, wills evil as evil. Answer: He who hates God, the judge who punishes sin, wishes to escape punishment, and this would be a good.

Corollary

The good that is only apparent good is really evil, not merely a minor good. Apparent good attracts more, the more it has the appearance of good. Greatest perversity arises when the greatest evil is pursued under the appearance of good: absolute liberalism, for example, the negation of all rights of God, under the guise of charity, namely, to avoid divisions among men. Since charity is the highest of all virtues, counterfeit charity is the greatest of evils. As such, it will characterize Antichrist, under whom even the elect, were it possible, will be led into error. Beware of false prophets in the garments of sheep. By their fruits you shall know them.[3] Test all things, keep only that which is good.[4] Do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see if they be from God.[5] All these evils are founded on the truth that evil is proposed under the appearance of good. Open materialism, manifestly absurd, is less dangerous than an idealism which flaunts Christian words, but denies their reality. Liberalism denies the obligation, laid on the individual and on society, to embrace revelation sufficiently proposed. Liberty of cult is an evil, to be tolerated in order to avoid a greater evil. It is not the ideal condition. On this point Lamennais was condemned. Liberalism, indifferentism, skepticism, lead many to confound true charity with false.

May certain tenets of liberalism be retained in practical life, on the plea that the rights of God and of God's Church

[3] Matt. 7:15.
[4] I Thess. 5:21.
[5] I John 4:1.

are allowed in our schools? In practical life, so these men say, the hypothesis of liberty for all cults is to be admitted. Answer: If the assertion were true, then it would also be true to say that though theft is simply evil, still, in hypothesis, and in practical life, we must allow theft to be justifiable. What is needed in life is not liberalism, but prudence. Prudence never allows any deed against man's ultimate goal, but it does tolerate one evil in order to avoid a greater evil. Our thesis is not a mere speculative ideal, to be abandoned in practice. The rights of God, the exigencies of eternal salvation, enunciate the very goal of human life. True religion is to be embraced, not only by individuals but by society. In attaining this end, prudence dictates toleration of an evil to avoid a greater evil. But to abandon the thesis as something merely ideal, something only for the schools, is in reality to turn mankind away from the end of human life. It would be opportunism, receding farther and farther from the love of God and of souls.

We must keep the efficacious intention of attaining the end. Liberty flows from the authority of God, but license leads to the servitude of corruption.

ART. 2. IS THE WILL CONCERNED WITH PURPOSE ONLY?

Preliminaries

Granting that the will aims only at good, either true good or apparent good, we now ask whether the will deals only with the end or also with means. It seems that it deals only with the end, according to Aristotle, since means belong to another genus of goods, namely, not to good-in-itself, or to delightful good, but to the useful good. Thus we distinguish arts concerned with the end, navigation, for instance, from arts concerned with means, say, ship-building. We answer by a double conclusion. First: The will as a power deals with both the end and the means, since both are good. Secondly: The first act of the will, properly speaking, aims

only at the end. The first simple volition is carried toward that which is willed for its own sake. But the means are not good except in relation to the end. Confirmation. In intelligence, the first act deals with principles, and the second act with conclusions. But in the order of appetibility the end has the same place as principle has in the order of intelligibility. The useful and the good-in-itself belongs to the same power, because one is subordinated to the other, just as color and light in relation to the power of vision. And one and the same operative habit (art) deals both with its own proper end and with the means to attain this end. Hence there can be no neutral act, no act which tends to an object which is neither end nor medium. Whatever we will, is in some way related to our desire for beatitude.

ART. 3. IS THE WILL MOVED BY ONE AND THE SAME ACT TOWARD PURPOSE AND MEANS?

Preliminaries

When we wish one thing for the sake of another, for instance, medicine for the sake of health, is there one act of the will directed to both objects, or are there two simultaneous volitions, one of which is the reason and motive of the other?

This article illustrates the conciliation of liberty and impeccability in Christ. Many Thomists say that Christ, wayfarer and comprehensor, necessarily loved God clearly seen in Himself, but that He freely loved God as the reason for loving creatures, and hence for loving the sacrifice of the cross. God's own love of self is necessary in relation to His own goodness, but is free in relation to creatures. This question influences spirituality also. When we will anything virtually on account of God, do we by that same act will God Himself?

Three conclusions. 1. The will is carried toward the end in a twofold manner, first, to the end absolutely, secondly, to the end as reason for willing the means. Here there is no

difficulty, for our will can be carried toward God absolutely, and by reason of this to love of neighbor.

2. The act by which the will is carried toward the end absolutely is distinct from the act by which it chooses the means. The reason is that we can think of the end absolutely, before we begin to consider the ways and means. Sometimes the first act precedes the choice of means even in time. Then it is called simple volition, distinct from choice which is concerned with means. To illustrate. First, I will health; secondly, I will to call a physician. Similarly, in the intellect: first, I know principles intuitively; secondly, I know conclusions drawn from these principles.

3. The motion of the will which we call choice aims simultaneously at end and means, because in this case the medium is willed, not for its own sake, but only for the end. To illustrate. The sick man cannot will bitter medicine unless he simultaneously wills health as the reason for choosing the medicine. Again, we cannot love our neighbor for God's sake unless we love God as the reason for loving our neighbor. Thus every act of a man who has charity, even though he is not thinking actually of God, is an act, not only of religion, but also of charity, because his will, virtually, not merely habitually, is centered on God. The will aims at medium and at end by one and the same act.

A Confirmation

By one and the same act of vision we see color and light. Light is simultaneously the what (*quod*) and the whereby (*quo*). Again, by one and the same act we know, not only the conclusion, but also the principle, not absolutely, but as our reason for knowing the conclusion. Again, by one and the same act, I believe that God is triune and I believe God when He reveals the Trinity, an act wherein God's authority is simultaneously the *what* and the *whereby*. By one and the same simple act I believe God who reveals and the God whom He reveals.

Here enters a doubt. Is the act of desiring the end in the means a simple volition or a choice? For instance, to desire health in the offered medicine. The answer runs thus: To desire medicine on account of health is an act of choice. To wish absolutely for health in an offered medicine is a simple volition. Again, when God is clearly seen in some great saint, not only is this saint loved for God's sake, but God Himself is loved in this saint. Hence the word: Wonderful is God in His saints. And when a principle is seen clearly in a conclusion, not only is the conclusion known from the principle, but in that conclusion we see the principle absolutely.

CHAPTER XIII

By What Motives the Will Is Moved (Q. 9)

PRELIMINARIES

In this article, says Cajetan, St. Thomas considers, not only the objective motive of the will, but also the different causes of volition. Chief among these causes is the volitive faculty itself. This question has two parts. The first deals with intrinsic causes, namely, the intellect, the sense-appetite, the will itself. The second part deals with causes that are extrinsic, under three headings. Is the will moved by some exterior principle (object, God)? Is it moved by the heavenly bodies or atmospheric agents? Is it moved by God alone as exterior principle, or is it also moved by the angels or the demons? Throughout the present question two general theses are to be distinguished.

First. As regards the essence of its acts (the differentiating element), the will is moved directly by the intellect, indirectly by the sense-appetite and external corporeal agents.

Second. As regards the existence of its act (*quoad exercitium*), the will is moved only by itself and God, by no other cause. In the following question, these two general theses are particularized as follows:

1. The will is differentiated. This may be (a) necessarily, by three objects: by God seen clearly, by beatitude in common, by particular goods which precede deliberation (art. 1 and 2); (b) non-necessarily, by two objects: by partial good (not evidently connected with beatitude in common), by passion (art. 2).

2. The will is exercised. This may be (a) necessarily, by

two objects: by God seen clearly, by beatitude in common (art. 4); (b) non-necessarily, by a partial good, not evidently connected with beatitude in common (art. 4).

ART. 1. IS THE WILL MOVED BY THE INTELLECT?

Preliminaries

It seems that the will cannot be moved by the intellect, because, first, we often know a good and still have no desire to attain it. Secondly, imagination often proposes an object without moving the appetite. Thirdly, we would have a vicious circle: if the will moves the intellect, then it cannot be moved by the intellect.

The response is affirmative. First, by authority.[1] The object understood is an "unmoved mover" whereas the will is a "moved mover." The will moves the other faculties to act, but itself is moved, as regards specific difference, by the good proposed by the intellect. In the body of the article we have three conclusions.

First conclusion. We must distinguish exercise of the act from specification of the act. St. Augustine, indeed, uses the term *delectatio victrix,* be that delight heavenly or carnal. The Saint seems to understand by this term the object which attracts rather than the efficient cause. But clearly we must make a distinction. By my color I can objectively move the eye of another man, but I cannot move him, efficiently, to exercise his power of seeing. The teacher can move objectively the intellect of his pupil, but only God can move that intellect subjectively to exercise its act.

Proof of the conclusion. Anything that is in potentiality must be moved in order to be reduced to act. But the faculties of the soul are in a twofold potentiality: first, as regards exercise, namely, to act or not to act: secondly, as regards differentiation, namely, to do this or that. Consequently the faculties of the soul need to be moved under two aspects.

[1] Aristotle, *De anima,* Bk. III.

First, subjectively toward exercise, secondly, objectively to specific differentiation.

Second conclusion. The will moves the intellect, and other powers, as regards exercise. When active powers are hierarchically ordered, that power which aims at the universal end moves to their exercise those powers which are directed to particular ends, just as the leader of an army moves soldiers subordinated to him. Now the will is directed toward good in common, whereas every other power is directed toward some special good, the eye, for instance, to perceive colors, the intellect to know the truth. Consequently the will must move to their exercise all powers of the soul, except the vegetative powers, which are not subject to our will.

This conclusion does not imply that the will is the *principium quod,* i.e., the acting man. But man, by his will, moves other faculties to their exercise.

Third conclusion. The intellect moves the will as regards the differentiating specification. Why? Because the intellect proposes the object to the will. Thus we have the adage, nothing willed unless pre-known. Specification in natural action, water getting hot, or cow begetting calf, comes from the specific form of the agent. But specification of an act of the will comes from the form of the object proposed to it by the intellect.

Objections Analyzed

1. If it be said that the intellect at times proposes a good and the will is not moved, we answer that the intellect moves, not to exercising the act, but as controlling specification, and even then not of necessity, if we are dealing with a particular good.

2. The intellect which moves the will is not the speculative intellect, but the practical, which proposes a certain good as here and now desirable.

3. The will moves the intellect, and is moved by the in-

tellect, without any vicious circle, because the two movements are in different genera. The will moves the intellect to the existence of the act, because the truth to be known is a certain particular good. But the intellect moves the will to specification, because the good itself is a particular truth. This mutual relation of causality between will and intellect must be kept in mind when we prove free will, or show the mutual relation between choice and the last practical judgment. This mutual relationship solves also many objections of the voluntarists, who hold that intellect does not attain truth except under the influence of the will even as regards specification. What they say is true of prudential judgment, where truth means conformity with right appetite, even while speculative error remains in the intellect. It is true likewise of faith, since the object does not sufficiently move the will, and also of the quasi-experimental knowledge founded on the gift of wisdom. But it is not true of the speculative intellect, which deals with first principles, and with conclusions demonstrated from these principles.

Three Doubts

1. What kind of causality does the intellect exercise in moving the will as regards specification? The more probable opinion is that given by Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Bañez, Gonet, and Billuart, namely, that the intellect exercises a causality which is final and extrinsically formal, but not efficient. The intellect, says St. Thomas,[2] moves the will, not as an efficient cause, but as a final cause, by proposing to the will the object which is the goal. Cajetan indeed holds that the intellect moves the will also by a certain kind of efficient causality, since the known object concurs with the will to specify the volition, almost as the *species impressa* effectively concurs with the intellect to differentiate the act of the intellect. But, we must answer, this proposal of the object is

[2] *Contra Gentes*, I, 72.

effective only in an improper sense, since it is not an action, but only a disposition, required that this differentiated act be elicited by the will. To concur effectively in the proper sense, the object proposed by the intellect would have to be intrinsic in the intellect, just as is the *species impressa.*

2. Is the action whereby the will moves the other faculties formally transitive, or only virtually transitive? Active use is not an action formally transitive, for the act of the will does not pass out of the will. It does not pass into the sense-appetite, e.g., so as to be terminated there, whereas the action of heating is terminatively in the wood that is heated. The act of the will (just as God's creative action) is formally immanent and only virtually transitive. The effect it produces is called "passive use."

3. Does the will move other faculties only by a certain sympathy, or does it imprint something real? Probably it does imprint something real,[3] since the inferior powers are compared to the will as instruments to a principal agent. Sympathy is not sufficient to move powers which resist, for instance, a distracted intellect or a disordered sense-appetite. Such a resistance is not overcome except by a real immutation. God moves our will by an action formally immanent but virtually transitive, but this transitive action produces something real in the creature, namely, the reduction of the power to act. The will is first an eliciting power, then by this imprint it actually elicits the operation.

ART. 2. IS THE WILL MOVED BY SENSE-APPETITE?

Preliminaries

It seems that the will cannot be moved by sense-appetite: first, because the higher cannot be moved by the lower; secondly, because a particular agent cannot move a universal agent; thirdly, we would have a vicious circle, because sense-appetite is itself moved by the will.

[3] Ia–IIae, q.16, a.1.

Two Affirmative Conclusions

First conclusion. The object of the sense-appetite moves the will by the mediating judgment of the intellect. Proof. Any object understood by the intellect as good can differentiate the act of the will. Now when passion is aroused in the sense-appetite, the intellect apprehends as desirable an object which it would not so judge were passion absent. Therefore the sense-appetite moves the will by means of the intellect.

Here we may appeal to experience. In a fit of anger a man judges that revenge is a good thing, a judgment he would not pass if he were in a peaceful state. Similarly, the man who desires lust. As man is, so he chooses. Each one judges practically according to his predominant inclination. Contrast the man who has the virtue of temperance with the sinner who knows the law of temperance, but who, nevertheless, as ultimate practical judgment, says that intemperance is here and now good. Truth in the practical intellect is conformity with right appetite.[4] A fortiori this is true of the command that comes after the last practical judgment.

Objections Analyzed

The sense-appetite can move the will only by the mediating intellect. But it can attract the will, since the choice is concerned with a limited good.

Second conclusion. The will moves the sense-appetite by a control which is diplomatic, not despotic. St. Thomas [5] explains. The soul's power over the body is despotic, because the members of the body (hand, foot) cannot resist the command of the soul. But reason's control of the passions is diplomatic, because the sense-appetite is able to resist the command of reason, since, in man as in brute, it is moved by instinct, imagination, and sense. Thus we feel or imagine

[4] Ia–IIae, q.57, a.5, ad 3um. Cf. Cajetan, in Iam–IIae, q.58, a.5.
[5] Ia, q.81, a.3, ad 2um. Cf. Ia–IIae, q.17, a.7.

something delightful which reason forbids, or something saddening which reason commands. Thus passion, not despotically, but only diplomatically, can be led to obey reason.

ART. 3. DOES THE WILL MOVE ITSELF?

Preliminaries

The response is affirmative, at least as regards some acts of the will. Two difficulties present themselves. 1. Since whatever is moved is moved by something else, we would, by allowing the will to move itself, destroy the first way for demonstrating the existence of a prime mover. 2. The will would be moved by two movers, each equal, namely, intellect and will itself.

Thesis

Particular acts. The proof is twofold. First, the will as free is the mistress of its own acts. Hence it has power either to will or not to will. Such power would be impossible if the will could not move itself. Secondly, the special nature of our will. Will, in the world of appetite, is like principle in the world of intelligence. The intellect, by knowing principle, reduces itself from potential to actual knowledge of conclusions, and thus moves itself. Hence the will, by willing the end, moves itself to will ways and means.

This self-motion toward choice, being a created act, does not, of course, exclude the causality of God, which is the first cause of all created acts, necessary or free.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Nothing moves itself. Yes, where only one act is in question. But the will, willing the end, moves itself to will the means.

2. The will would thus be moved by two immediate motors. Yes, but in different orders. The will is moved by the

intellect as to the kind of act it performs, but by itself to the exercise of that act.

Note that this article is of great importance in distinguishing mystical acts (where the will does not move itself, but is moved by operating grace) from ascetic acts (where the will moves itself, under cooperating grace).[6]

A difficulty remains regarding the first volition of the end. Does the will move itself to its first volition, when man comes to the use of reason, or again, to its first volition in any new undertaking, or to its first volition after sleep? The answer is that here the will cannot move itself, but is moved only by God, though the will elicits the act.

ART. 4. IS THE WILL MOVED BY ANY EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE?

Preliminaries

That the will is moved specifically by some exterior object is manifest. But we ask whether the will is moved by some exterior principle to exercise its act. The answer seems to be negative. First, it is the nature of the voluntary act to come from an intrinsic principle. Secondly, such an act seems to be forced, and violent volition is a contradiction. Thirdly, the will moves itself sufficiently, hence does not need to be moved by anything external to itself.

Thesis. To exercise its act, the will must be moved by an exterior mover, namely, by God. The argument runs as follows. That which is in potentiality to act needs to be premoved by something that is already in act. To choose means, the will moves itself, because it is already in act by willing the end. Now, in relation to the first volition of man's whole life, an act which presupposes no anterior act of the will, the will is in potentiality. To this first volition, the will cannot move itself, but must be moved by the supreme motor, that

[6] Ia–IIae, q. 111, a. 2.

is by God, the Author of nature and of will. This truth is affirmed also by Aristotle (or one of his disciples),[7] and is confirmed by revelation which says: In God we live, and move, and are.[8]

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Voluntary motion, like natural motion, must be from an intrinsic principle. From an intrinsic principle, as second cause, granted; as first cause, denied. The very first volition of our whole life comes from the will as second cause. But the will, which elicits this first volition, does not move itself to it. It moves itself when it proceeds from one act to another, when from the volition of the end it chooses the means.

The divine premotion does not reduce the will from potentiality to that act which is the operation itself. Premotion moves the will from potential eliciting to actual eliciting, just as wood becomes ignited, and then ignites other things. Three elements must be distinguished: first, the divine motion; second, the motion in the creature which is a passion; third, the operation vitally elicited.

2. The will, moved by some exterior principle, would be subject to violence. Yes, but only if it be against its own inclination. Under the motion of God the will itself acts.

3. The will is sufficiently moved by itself. To its first volition, no.

But, says the arguer, the first volition cannot be immediately from God, for this first volition presupposes intellectual cognition of the good, and this cognition presupposes the motion of the will which applies the intellect to consider and thus we have an infinite process. Answer: We need no infinite process. The intellect is simply first.[9] Knowledge always precedes volition, but volition does not always precede knowledge. The source of our first act of knowledge is an

[7] *Ethica Eudem,* Bk. VII, chap. 14.
[8] Acts 17:28.
[9] Ia, q.82, a.4, ad 3um.

intellective principle, higher than our own intellect; and this is God.

4. The first volition that follows the use of reason is not only a vital act, but also an act that is free and meritorious, as is clear in the case of Christ and the angels. Now to exercise a vital, free, and meritorious act, the will must not only elicit the act, but must also move itself to the act. Answer: This is required for a deliberate act, granted; for a free act, denied.

Explanation. This first volition, if it deals with beatitude in common, is free only as regards its exercise. If it deals with the ultimate end in the concrete, it is free also as regards specification. The act is free when the object is not proposed as absolutely good. Thus an object proposed by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost may precede the first deliberation. Then the will, already in volition to the common end, moves itself to deliberate, and this second act is not only free, but deliberate, with full dominion and full merit. Thus St. Thomas says that in their first instant of life angels could not sin, because their first act came immediately from God. Nor did that act have full dominion and full merit. But their second act was either sin, as in the demons, or fully meritorious, as in the angels. Further, acts performed under the gifts of the Holy Ghost, especially if they come after prayer disposing for them, are free and fully meritorious, although not discursively deliberate, since they come from a special inspiration.

The difficulty is urged. Man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason. Therefore in that instant man moves himself, otherwise sin would be traced to God as its author. The answer runs thus. Man can sin in the first physical instant of the use of reason, denied; in the first moral instant, granted. In his first use of reason man passes from a confused cognition of good in common to a distinct cognition of good-in-itself. Hence this knowledge is not acquired in one physical instant, but in one moral instant, that is, a certain length of time, shorter or longer, depending on the

subject's mental penetration. Hence that moral instant consists of many physical instants, at least two. In the first, wherein he is especially moved by God, man cannot sin. But in the following instant he can sin, because by his first act, elicited by God's special motion, he can by his own counsel move himself as he pleases.

Two Doubts

1. Does God move the will only in that first volition, or also in others? Answer: God moves to that first volition in a special manner. To all other volitions God moves at least as first and universal mover, since the will is always a second cause.

But God's premotion is not an indifferent premotion. God moves in different fashions, according as man's volitions are sins, or acts naturally good, or acts disposing for justification, or acts fully supernatural and meritorious. Again, in one fashion to the act of virtue, in another fashion to the act of the gifts, in still another fashion to acts which resist temptation. All these acts differ in goodness, and all good in all volitions comes from God, the supreme good.

God is not the cause of sin, but only of the physical entity underlying the sin. But God is the cause of all virtue, and of all acts which are in any way good. All that God wills He does. Nothing happens, either in heaven or on earth, unless God Himself does it in mercy (if it is good), or allows it to happen in justice (if it is a sin).

Molina [10] fell into error, by rejecting premotion and substituting for it a simultaneous concursus (two men drawing a ship). Those also are in error who admit only a premotion indifferent to good or to evil. From this would follow the proposition which Molina thought he had found in a genuine work of St. Justin,[11] namely, that our deeds, good or evil,

[10] *Concordia*, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 23.

[11] The work is apocryphal, from some Pelagian author. Thus the preface in Migne.

though they presuppose the general concursus of God, still come from our free will alone as their particular cause, and are not to be attributed to God.

God is the author of all that is good, even of merely natural good, which requires a greater natural aid than does the material act of sin. How much more is God the source of supernatural good! Without Me you can do nothing.[12] We cannot even think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.[13] What hast thou that thou hast not received? [14]

Molina's proposition is radically opposed to the definitions of the Council of Orange against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. No one has of his own anything but lies and sin.[15] God does many good things in man which man does not do, but man does nothing that is good unless God grants him the doing.[16] Surely that which is most perfect in the created order, namely, man's good use of grace, must come from God as its source. Contrast with this truth the following propositions. "With an aid that is equal in both cases, it can happen that one man called will be converted and another not. With a minor aid of grace one can rise, whereas another with even greater grace does not rise but remains obdurate." [17] "Of two similarly called, one may accept the grace and the other refuse. In this case the act is said to be from liberty alone, not that he who accepts receives by his liberty alone, but that only from liberty does this distinction arise, not from the diversity of the divine aid which precedes." [18]

2. Does God specially move man to the first volition of each day, or each new undertaking? In a new undertaking God sometimes moves in a special manner, so suddenly that the will does not move itself.

[12] John 15:5.
[13] II Cor. 3:5.
[14] I Cor. 4:7.
[15] D. 195.
[16] D. 193.
[17] *Concordia*, s. v. *Auxilium*.
[18] Lessius, *De gratia efficaci*, c. 18, n. 7.

a) Now this takes place in three ways: First, in supernatural motions, where no supernatural act precedes, but rather a contrary disposition. Instances: an infidel moved toward faith, a sinner toward penance. Such effects are due solely to operating grace. But when our mind is moved, and then moves, the operation is due to cooperating grace. Sometimes, at the beginning of the day, after sleep, we are granted operating grace, and then at once also cooperating grace. But it is not always thus. A sinful thought of sin at the beginning of the day, concerned indeed with beatitude in common, may immediately afterwards entertain a sinful purpose.

b) Second, in natural motions God sometimes suddenly gives men an entirely new thought. This can happen at man's first wakeful moment.

c) In many cases the will moves itself, from a preceding virtual intention to some new undertaking, without a special motion from God. An instance is the man who suddenly consents to a new sin at the first moral instant after sleep. Since sin cannot come from God's special movement, it must come from the sinner's will moving itself from some inordinate preceding act, which still remains, at least virtually.

ART. 5. IS THE WILL MOVED BY THE CORPOREAL WORLD?

Preliminaries

The question of fate.[19] This question today would be proposed probably as follows: Is the will affected by atmospheric agents, for instance, by hot winds? It would seem so, first, because our bodies are under the influence of atmospheric variations, the source of which is the diffusion of solar heat. Secondly, voluntary bodily motions cannot be traced back to prime physical agents, unless these agents affect also the will. Thirdly, it can be foreseen that under the influence of certain winds, suicides will increase.

[19] See Ia, q.116, a.4.

Further, materialists say that the existence of free will is refuted by the principle of the conservation of energy, according to which the world's total energy, potential and actual, remains always the same. Now if human liberty exercised an influence on our body, the quantity of energy would be increased. Similarly, the existence of a First Mover would augment the quantity of energy. Against these views stands the authority of Damascene,[20] who says that the corporeal universe is not the cause of our actions.

First thesis: The corporeal world, as object, moves the will. The sense-world, and our own organs, are subject to our corporeal environment, in particular, to atmospheric variations. Under these variations, the passions of the sense-appetite attract the will objectively.

Second thesis: The corporeal world cannot force the will to act. No corporeal agent can force the spiritual faculty, which is independent of corporeal organs. Even objectively, the imagination cannot move the intellect except through the mediation of the intellect agent. Sense-powers, since they act by corporeal organs, can be moved by atmospheric variations, which involve variations in the organs themselves.

Corollary

Fate can be admitted, if we define it as "the mediation of second causes toward effects foreseen by divine knowledge." Hence all events subject to second causes are subject to fate. But deeds done immediately by God are not subject to fate. The more removed a created thing is from the first mind, the more deeply is it bound in the bonds of fate, more subject to the necessity of second causes.

Divine motion, then, far from enslaving, liberates the created will from the fatality of material causes. Molina's *scientia media,* on the contrary, admits a determinism by circumstances, a determinism which comes, not from God on high, but from the lowest creatures.

[20] *De fide orthod.,* II, 7.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. The multiform motions of our will are reduced to one uniform cause, namely, to God, but not to the corporeal universe.

2. Many men follow passion, which varies with atmospheric influence. Predictions based on this fact often come true. But the wise man "rules the stars," by resisting passion.

3. In modern terms, this same difficulty runs thus: The physical energy of the universe is unchangeable. Answer: Physical energy produced by physical energy, yes. But experimental science cannot prove that the invisible influence of God, the First Mover, or that of our will, does not exist. Physicists acknowledge that it has never been proved that the world is a closed system, that is, separated from all invisible influences.

ART. 6. IS GOD THE ONLY EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE THAT MOVES THE WILL?

Preliminaries

It seems that God is not the only principle which moves the will. First, the human will can be moved by the angels. Secondly, our intellect can be illuminated by the angels. Thirdly, if the will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil. But the response is affirmative. In the *Sed contra* we hear St. Paul: "It is God who works in us both to will and to do." [21] St. Paul here excludes four false understandings. Namely, first, that man, by free will, can be saved without divine aid; second, that man is necessitated by fate or providence; third, the Pelagian error, that to will comes from us, but to do comes from God; fourth, that God does no good in us except in response to our merits, whereas elsewhere St. Paul tells us that salvation belongs, not to him who wills, or to him who runs, but to God who shows

[21] Phil. 2:13.

mercy.[22] Similarly, Isaias: "Lord, Thou hast done all our works for us." [23] And the Psalm: "Strengthen, O Lord, that which Thou hast wrought in us." [24] And Christ Himself: "Without Me you can do nothing." "No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me, draw him." [25]

Thesis

The only exterior principle that moves the will is God alone. Since the motion of the will, like every natural motion, comes from within, it cannot be produced except by the will and the Author of the will. But God alone is the Author of the will. Hence only by God can the will be moved to exercise its act.

To explain. To produce an intrinsic motion in the will, there must be an immediate power over the will itself. But the only cause that has this immediate power is God. Why? Because God alone, being the immediate and universal Creator and Preserver, can change the creature which He creates and preserves. Examples are: first, transubstantiation; secondly, multiplying the loaves; thirdly, the vital operations of plant life; fourthly, resurrection of the dead.

Objection. But man, who is not the creator of the stone, can move the stone downwards, though this motion is natural and intrinsic in the stone. Answer: Either the motion is more rapid than it would be by the natural weight of the stone, or it is not more rapid. If it is more rapid, the movement is not natural for the stone. If it is not more rapid, then he who throws it only removes an impediment. Thus the principle stands clear: motion cannot be produced except by the proximate agent from which it proceeds, and from that agent's Creator and Preserver.

But is God the only Author of the will? Yes. First, by nature, the will is a spiritual power of the rational soul. But

[22] Rom. 9:16.
[23] Isa. 26:12.
[24] Ps. 67:29.
[25] John 15:5; 6:44.

God alone is the Author of the spiritual soul, and therefore of the will, which is a characteristic of that soul. Secondly, the will being a universal agent, destined for a universal good, cannot be produced except by the most universal of agents, namely, God. Hence God alone can move the created will. Demons cannot change the will of man intrinsically, but only extrinsically, by persuasion, by influencing the imagination, or by exciting the humors of the body, and thus indirectly arousing passion.

Corollary

Only God scrutinizes the heart of man. The will of the rational creature belongs to God alone, hence things which depend upon the will alone are known only to God. The secrets of the heart are not necessarily connected with the external course of the world or with the essence of the soul, since they are free. Properly speaking, they are not parts of the universe, and therefore cannot be known even by the angels, though the angels know all the parts of the universe.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. The angel is indeed higher than man, but not high enough to be the cause of our will. Hence the angel can move our will only objectively, by persuasion, not subjectively, by causing the act itself.

2. Likewise the angel can illumine our intellect objectively, by proposing an object in some higher and more universal way than a human teacher could, for instance, by manifesting to a soul some beautiful metaphysical synthesis. But the angel cannot intrinsically move our intellect. This belongs to God alone. But if the angel can move our will objectively, by persuasion, like a mother, how much more is it true of God?

The Third Response

This third response is famous in the history of theology. It is cited by Molinists to prove that St. Thomas never ad-

mitted physical predetermination, but only a general concursus, or an indifferent premotion. This response contains three affirmations.

1. "As Universal Mover, God moves man's will to universal good. Without this universal motion man cannot will anything."

2. "By his own reason man determines himself to will this or that good, a good that is either real or apparent."

3. "At times, in a special manner, God moves some men to choose definitely an object which is good, as is clear in those whom He moves by grace."

Let us consider, first, the Molinistic interpretation of this text, secondly, the Thomistic interpretation. Many Molinists conclude thus: St. Thomas admits physical premotion only for that first act whereby the will wills good in common. After this first act, premotion would be indifferent, i.e., man, of himself alone, determines himself either to good or to evil. Otherwise, they say, human freedom would be destroyed. Into man's salutary act, God enters, first objectively, by the moral attraction of grace, secondly subjectively, by a simultaneous concursus or by an indifferent premotion. These views presuppose, as we have said above, a gratuitous definition of free will. Nor can they stand unless we admit Molina's theory regarding *scientia media.*

The Thomistic interpretation rests on three propositions.

1. As universal Mover, God moves the will of man to universal good, and without this universal motion man cannot do anything. In this proposition there is no difficulty. This motion is required for any act, good or bad. But even under this first proposition we reject simultaneous concursus (two horses drawing a boat), and we affirm a previous concursus, at least an indifferent concursus. God moves the will, whereas one horse does not move the other.

2. Man by reason determines himself to this or that good, real or apparent. But man does this as proximate agent, not as sole agent. God's premotion antecedes man's deed, and this premotion is not indifferent, otherwise God would not be in

any higher way the author of virtue than He would be the author of vice.

To understand this Thomistic interpretation we must distinguish six different ways in which the will is moved by God. Three of these ways are in the natural order, and three in the supernatural order. In the natural order we have, first, God's motion to good in common. Here a man cannot sin, but only elicits a vital act, as a desire of beatitude. Secondly, God moves the will to determine itself, either to a true good or to an apparent good. In this case the will moves itself and is capable of sin. Thirdly, God moves by a special inspiration, in moral, or poetical, or philosophical, or military undertakings.

In the supernatural order God moves the will, first, to turn itself toward its supernatural end. In this case the will does not move itself by virtue of a previous act, but disposes itself by operating grace and free consent. Secondly, God moves the will to exercise infused virtues. Here the will moves itself. Lastly, God moves the soul to exercise the gifts of the Holy Ghost. In this case the will does not move itself, but freely consents.

Under divine efficacious premotion to good, the will never sins, but (against the Jansenists) it can sin, if it wills to resist. Nor is there any obscurity in the present response after what has been said. The will is sufficient source of its own act, in its own order, namely, as proximate agent. Hence, when the will moves itself from intention of end to choice of means, it moves itself as a second cause, under the influence of the First Cause. God alone moves the will interiorly.

The will is not moved in the same way toward sin and toward the virtuous act. God is not the cause of sin, either directly or indirectly, though He is the cause of whatever physical entity there is in the sinful act. God is not the cause of the defects in an action which comes from a deficient second cause. To illustrate. The will causes the motion of man's members, but not his stumbling or lameness. The lameness

comes from the crooked leg. But in every state, natural or supernatural, man needs the divine aid to do good. And the divine aid in the man who does good differs from the aid given to the man who, by divine permission, commits sin.

The objection to which St. Thomas is replying runs thus: If God alone moved the will, the will would never be moved toward evil. He replies: The will is moved by God alone as exterior principle, but is moved by itself as intrinsic principle, sometimes to real good, sometimes to apparent good. Here lies the possibility of sin. But there can be no sin in that first act whereby the will is moved by God and not by itself, as, for instance, in the first instant in the life of an angel, or where the will first wills good-in-common.

3. God sometimes, in a special manner, moves a soul to determinately will something good, "as when He moves by grace." Now this proposition deals precisely with the special motion which is found, either in the beginning of moral life, or at the beginning of conversion, or in the superhuman response to the gifts of the Holy Ghost, where there is no deliberation. These are the effects of operating grace. But the effects of our will, when it both moves and is moved, are the effects of cooperating grace. But operating grace naturally leads to cooperating graces.

In summary, we say that the will cannot be determined by itself alone. First, because such determination requires some mediating act whereby the will moves and determines itself. And of that mediating act we would have to inquire by what more remote principle it is determined. Secondly, because the will as a power is indifferent and indetermined, and all determination depends on the supreme determination of the first agent, who is Pure Act. But with this motion of God presupposed, the will is the proper cause of its own act as individually mine or thine. But this same act, as entity, comes from the supreme entity, and as good from the supreme good. Thus the entire act is both from God and from the will, as from two causes, one of which is totally subordinated

to the other, not from coordinated causes, illustrated by the two horses drawing the wagon.

The Molinistic view is based on a false definition of created liberty, a definition opposed to the principle of efficient and universal divine causality, and opposed likewise to the principle of divine predilection, namely, no created being can be better than another unless it is more loved by God.

CHAPTER XIV

How Is the Will Moved? (Q. 10)

PRELIMINARIES

We have determined the cause whereby the will is moved, both objectively and subjectively. Now we have to treat of the modes under which the will is moved, one mode being that of necessity, the other that of freedom.[1]

In summary, these four articles run thus. Looked at objectively, the will is moved of necessity: first, by God clearly seen; secondly, by beatitude in common; thirdly, by a particular good where the judgment does not remain indifferent. And it is moved freely, first, by a particular good where the judgment remains indifferent; secondly by passion. Looked at subjectively, the will is moved of necessity: first by beatitude in common; secondly by God seen clearly. And it is moved freely by a particular good, a good which, here and now, is not necessarily connected with beatitude in common.

ART. 1. IS THE WILL MOVED TO ANY ACT NATURALLY, I.E., NOT FREELY?

Thesis. The will desires naturally, by the necessity of objective specification. Elements which are not *per se* and naturally intrinsic are reduced to something that is intrinsic by nature. Now the will has free motions, which are not there necessarily and naturally. Nature comes first, on all levels of reality. Thus, as we speak of the nature of God, of the nature

[1] Throughout this question the phrase *"non ex necessitate"* means "freely." St. Thomas writes: *"determinat non ex necessitate."* He does not write (pace P. D'Ales, S.J.): *"non ad unum determinat."*

of the soul, of the nature of the intellect, so we speak here of the nature of the will. Further, on every level of reality we reduce all that is diverse and mutable to a source that is one, uniform, and immutable, otherwise we have an infinite process. As the intellect has an act that is natural and necessary, so must the will itself have some natural act.

Corollary

We must look at the will as nature and as free. Will as nature desires a necessary good. Will as free desires freely any good that is not necessary. This same distinction we find in the divine will, which necessarily loves divine goodness, but freely loves created goodness.

What, then, does the will naturally and necessarily desire? Three things: first, good in common; secondly, its ultimate end or goal, that is, beatitude in common, independently of any explicit notion of God; thirdly, existence, life, truth, and other natural goods, considered in themselves, though these goods may, by accidental circumstances, be seen as evils.

ART. 2. IS THE WILL MOVED NECESSARILY BY ITS OBJECT?

Definition of Liberty

Liberty in general is exemption from necessity. Freedom from legal necessity gives us moral liberty, namely, the absence of obligation. Freedom from elicitive necessity gives us psychological liberty, i.e., free will itself. Let us look at this distinction more in detail.

1. Moral liberty means, first, exemption from law, either from civil law (e.g., the right of possessing, testating, buying, selling, marrying); or secondly, from political law (the right to participate in the government of our country); or thirdly, from restrictions on liberty of conscience and of thought (the right of professing one's own religious faith).

2. Moral liberty may also mean, secondly, exemption from

servitude, either from external servitude (slavery, imprisonment), or from the internal servitude of sin ("he who sins is the slave of sin").

3. Psychological liberty is, first, exemption from necessity, whether of acting at all (I can will or not), or from acting under specific differentiation (to love or to hate, to pray or to study). Psychological liberty is, secondly, exemption from external violence.

Freedom from necessity is also called the freedom of indifference, since under the very act of willing (under obedience, say) there remains real power to the opposite. Since this liberty of choice is based on freedom of judgment, indifference of judgment, it is called *liberum arbitrium* (free judgment).

God's freedom is not a faculty, not a potentiality which goes over into act. It is an act of choice which retains full freedom to the opposite. Freedom remains under the act already elicited, otherwise God, whose act is eternal, could never create freely. The free act, even after it is determined, remains free. Molinists disregard this truth.

Errors Regarding the Freedom of the Will

These errors are of two opposite kinds: determinism and indeterminism. Let us look, first, at the divisions of determinism. Here we find, first, divine determinism. Protestant determinism says that grace compels the will after original sin. Thus Wiclif, Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius. The only liberty that remains is freedom from external force. Pantheistic determinism holds that all things proceed under necessity from the substance of God. Thus the Stoics, Spinoza, and Hegel.

Human determinism has three forms. First, psychological determinism, which holds that the last practical judgment is determined infallibly by the strongest motive. Thus Leibnitz. Second, physical and physiological determinism (from tem-

perament, from physical circumstances, from the principle of causality, from the principle of the conservation of energy). Third, statistic determinism, which claims to foresee the number of future homicides, suicides, thefts, marriages.

Divisions of Indeterminism

Pelagian indeterminism holds that human freedom is inclined equally to good or evil; that human liberty would be unreasonably limited if we affirmed the necessity of prevenient grace for conversion; that human liberty was not harmed by original sin.

Libertinarian indeterminism holds that freedom can choose without any motive; or that the primary distinction between good and evil comes from the free will of God; or that the primary distinction between good and evil rests on God's free will; or that impeccability would destroy liberty, since liberty contains essentially the power of sinning.

Question. Did St. Thomas know these errors against free will? The answer is affirmative, as is clear from the objections in this article, and from the twenty-four questions in his treatise *De malo*.

Preliminaries

We are here treating of natural necessity, namely, whether the will is moved necessarily by its object, as a physical thing is changed and moved by a physical cause, or as the faculty of sight is moved by its object. Now it might seem that the will is moved necessarily by its object. First, the object is a sufficient motive, and any sufficient motive moves of necessity, a necessity, not indeed metaphysical or physical, but moral. Secondly, since the intellect is necessarily moved by its object, even by a particular truth, the will too must be moved of necessity by a particular good which, here and now, is evidently connected with beatitude. Thirdly, since the last end in common is necessarily desired, and the end is the reason for willing the means, the means also are desired of necessity.

Our Authorities

Aristotle says that the will, since it is a rational power, is related to opposites, and hence is not of necessity moved toward one or the other.[2] God speaks to Cain: The lust thereof (of sin) shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.[3] God leaves man in the hand of his own counsel.[4] The Church condemned this Jansenistic proposition: For merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, there is required, not freedom from necessity, but only freedom from coercion.[5]

First thesis. The will is moved to act of necessity by no object except God seen clearly. This conclusion is clear from experience. We are not bound even to think of any one object, much less to will it. But if we do will anything, then, at least virtually, we will it by reason of beatitude in common.

Second thesis. Objectively (and a fortiori subjectively) the will cannot be moved necessarily by any good proposed by reason as particular and limited.

The proof that will here follow is a metaphysical proof, based on experience. Moderns tend to ignore the foundation of the solution, namely, that the adequate object of the will is universal good. Further, they do not look on the will as a rational appetite, since they divide faculties into three, namely, intellect, will, and sensibility, and under sensibility they place, not only the passions of the sense-appetite, but also the higher inclinations of the rational appetites. This division, originating from Rousseau, is merely phenomenal, and is false, since it no longer observes the distinction between intellectual life and sense life.

The Argument

The will is not moved necessarily, as regards differentiation, except by an object here and now proposed as univer-

[2] *IX Metaph.*
[3] Gen. 4:7.
[4] Eccli. 15:14.
[5] D.1094.

sally good, in no way evil. Now all particular goods, since they are in some way limited, can be looked upon as not good. The principle here invoked has two foundations. First, the relation of faculty to adequate and differentiating object; secondly, from analogy with sight and intellect. Sight is differentiated specifically only by an object completely and actually colored. The intellect is differentiated specifically only by necessary and evident truth, not by mere probability. Only manifest evidence necessitates the intellect. Since mysteries remain obscure, it is possible to doubt the truths of faith.

A particular good may be good-in-itself, but also difficult and arduous. Or it may be delightful or useful, not good-in-itself. And even if it is in itself entirely good (existence, life, intelligence), it can still be seen as not good because of attendant evils. Such particular and limited goods cannot necessarily move a faculty of unlimited capacity.

First Corollary

Here on earth God Himself is, under one aspect, good, but under another is evil (to the sinner, e.g., who is displeased by God's commands). Here man's judgment is mutable and free. Only God clearly seen can invincibly attract our will, down to its deepest roots, whereas particular goods can attract it only superficially.

In a purely natural order, man, we may suppose, would, after probation, be preserved from practical error, and would not depart from God known in the mirror of creation. In illustration, we may point to those saints who, while still on earth, were confirmed in grace.

The dominating indifference of the will in relation to particular goods is first potential and then actual. The act, elicited and determined, still remains free, because its object is particular, not universal. Thus the man who is seated retains, even while he sits, the power to stand, though he cannot simultaneously sit and stand. Similarly, under efficacious grace, where there is transition from potential indifference to actual

indifference, the mode of freedom remains under the act itself. In God there is actual dominating indifference, but not potential. If potential indifference were of the essence of freedom, God could not be free, since His act is both free and eternal.

Second Corollary

Our will has a quasi-infinity, since only the infinite God seen clearly can adequately fill its capacity. The will's free act is man's response to the impotent solicitation coming from finite good. A particular good, augmented as far as conceivable, will never become a universal good, good under every aspect, a good that necessarily attracts our will.

Question. What is the demonstrative medium in proving free will? Answer: This demonstrative medium is the infinite disproportion between particular good and universal good. In other words, there is no objective reason infallibly determining the transition of the will from universal good to particular good. Though on earth we do not possess God as seen, we are nevertheless destined for Him, so that it is impossible to find our beatitude in any finite good. Thus the martyrs showed their freedom by despising all finite goods and overcoming all torments.

Four Doubts

First. Wherein does this metaphysical demonstration differ from the spontaneous knowledge of common sense? Answer: The difference is the distinction between confused and distinct, between natural intelligence and philosophical reason. Natural intelligence recognizes, confusedly, the disproportion between the particular good and the universal good. Thus we experience that this particular good cannot in every way satisfy our rational appetite.

Objection. But consciousness recognizes only the act already elicited which is already determined. Hence we can have no consciousness of potential liberty. Answer: Con-

sciousness knows, not only the elicited choice after it has been made, but also the entire course of deliberation, wherein choice is the terminus. Knowing this successive deliberation, consciousness perceives, confusedly at least, the infinite disproportion between the particular and the universal. Even in cases where there is no antecedent deliberation, but docile and free acceptance of divine inspiration, we should still have experience of liberty, of freedom, that is, either to accept or to reject that inspiration. Thus we experience that we stand freely, because we know that we can choose the opposite, namely, not to stand. And God knows experimentally He is free, though His choice never passes from potentiality to act.

Second. What is the relation of the last practical judgment to the act of choice? Answer: Among the Thomistic theses one runs as follows: "The will does not precede, but follows, the intellect. The will necessarily desires only what is presented as being in every way good. Thus among the various goods, desired by mutable judgment, the will chooses freely. Choice therefore follows the ultimate practical judgment. But the will itself makes that judgment to be the last."

This proposition, a compendium of our thesis, is, in its first part, against Suarez, who holds, as we shall see later, that when two equal goods are proposed to the will, the will can choose one of them without any ultimate practical judgment directing this choice rather than the opposite. His view cannot stand, because it is against the principle that nothing is willed unless foreknown, and that nothing can be more loved than another unless it is foreknown as more suitable here and now, though only, it may be, for an accidental reason and the subjective disposition of the man who chooses. The last part of the proposition is against Leibnitz, that is, against psychological determinism, which denies that the last practical judgment comes from the will itself.

Third. By what act does the will make this judgment to be the last? Many Thomists answer (e.g., the Salmanticenses) that this act of the will is free, otherwise the judgment itself

would not be free. Hence the act of the will which thus determines the ultimate judgment, regarding this particular medium, is not the intention of the goal, nor the consent given *in globo* to different ways and means. But it is the very choice of this determined medium, because choice in general acts as formal extrinsic cause, anteceding the ultimate practical judgment. This judgment does not direct the will unless the will chooses thus to be directed. Causes are reciprocal, since they are in various genera of causality.

But if the last practical judgment comes from a special inspiration of the gift of counsel, it is still free and mutable, not in the sense that it is fully and completely in our power, but in the sense that it deals with an object not in every way good, an object which man freely accepts.

Fourth. What about motions of the will that are altogether sudden or imperfectly free? Are they sins, at least venial sins? One answer is that these acts are not free. But the proper answer demands a distinction. Most certainly these acts are not fully deliberate, but an act can be non-deliberate and still free. We note some instances. The first act in the life of an angel where, without deliberation, there is an indifferent judgment and a certain domination, though not complete. Again, human acts under the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not deliberate, but still free and meritorious. Hence the proper answer to the question runs thus: These sudden motions are imperfectly free, if indifference of judgment still remains, that is, attention to the twofold aspect of the object, good in the one way, not good in another. If this attention is absent, these acts are not even imperfectly free.

But there remains a difficult question. Is man bound to be always attentive to sudden motions that arise, let us say from sensuality or temptations against faith? The answer of St. Thomas runs thus: "The corruption remaining from original sin does not impede rational man from repressing any single inordinate motion of sensuality if he foresees it: he can divert his thought to something else, some other inordinate motion

may arise. For instance, when a man changes his thought from carnal delight to the study of knowledge, there may arise an emotion of unpremeditated vainglory. Hence by reason of this corruption man cannot avoid all these motions. But such emotion is in some way sinful, since he is able to avoid each single motion that arises." [6] If he does not avoid each single motion, there is at least a negligence against prudence. And a fortiori, if the sudden motion is not in sensuality but in the will. "A sudden motion of infidelity is a venial sin."

The Roots of Freedom

Here we must distinguish extrinsic roots of liberty from intrinsic. The extrinsic root of liberty is the supreme efficacy of the divine will, which is the cause of created things and of all their modes. The intrinsic roots are two, one remote, the other proximate. The remote root of liberty is the immateriality of intellectual natures: human, angelic, divine. The proximate root is either causal or subjective. The causal root is the intellect's knowledge of universal good. The subjective root is the will's amplitude and capacity for universal and absolute good, the will's pre-eminence above all particular and limited good.

Definitions of Liberty

First: Liberty is self-control, self-mastery, dominion over self. Second: Free will is a faculty of will and of reason. It belongs to reason as origin and norm; but formally to the will, because only the will can choose. Third: Liberty is a rational power related to opposites, to act or not to act. Fourth: Free will is a faculty elective of means, presupposing direction with relation to the goal. The phrase, direction "with relation to the goal" shows that turning away from the goal is a defect of liberty. Free will is more perfect in God and Christ and the angels than it is in those who can sin. Power to sin is not of

[6] Ia–IIae, q.74, a.3.

the essence of liberty, but a defect of liberty, just as error is not essential to reason, but a defect of reason.

The Molinistic Definition

Liberty is a faculty which, presupposing all elements necessary for action, can either act or not act. This definition is, first, novel; secondly, ambiguous; thirdly, when explained Molinistically, a begging of the question; fourthly, contrary to the universal causality of God; fifthly, an offense against the very principle of causality.

As to novelty, it is not found among the scholastic doctors of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As to ambiguity, note, first, the word "presupposing," which does not distinguish the order of time from the order of nature. A prerequisite of a free act, not in time but in nature, is the divine premotion and the last practical judgment. Another ambiguous expression is "can act or not act," which expresses, either the divided sense, i.e., antecedent power, or then the composite sense, i.e., consequent power.

Molinists and Congruists interpret in the following fashion. Liberty is a faculty which, presupposing all things necessary, not only in time but also in nature, can still act or not act even in the composite sense. They explain: Supposing a congruous grace inclining to act, and supposing the ultimate practical judgment, the will not only retains the power of acting, but can even cause the nonexistence of the act. Molina, against the principle of predilection, speaks thus: "Under equal aid, one man is converted and another not. Yes, even under a smaller aid, one can rise, whereas the other, even under a greater aid, does not rise but remains obdurate." [1] Thomists on the contrary, understand as follows: Liberty is a faculty which, presupposing in time all things necessary for acting, can still act or not act in the composite sense; but which, presupposing all things required by nature, can act or

[1] *Concordia*, s. v. *Auxilium*.

not act, only in the divided sense. They explain. Under efficacious grace and the last practical judgment, we retain the power of not acting, but we cannot make the act nonexistent. An example is the man who is sitting: he retains the power to stand, but he cannot simultaneously sit and stand.

This definition, as it stands, holds good only in regard to prerequisites in time, otherwise it begs the question, and denies the principle of predilection, which declares that no one can be better than another unless he is more loved by God. "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Further, it would deny the universal causality of God.

Two Doubts

First. Can the will, placed twice under the same circumstances and dispositions prerequired in time, act differently in each case? The response is affirmative. It is commonly admitted by theologians, as a corollary of the preceding definition, as there explained.

Second. Can the liberty of indifference be harmonized with *scientia media?* No. *Scientia media* presupposes a circumstantial determinism, because in this theory God can foresee the future infallibly only by examining the circumstances in which a man will be placed. This theory involves a threefold impossibility. First, the free determination would be a good not proceeding from God. Secondly, God's intelligence would be that of passive spectator, whose knowledge is not cause but effect. Thirdly, human liberty would be destroyed, by its subjection to circumstantial determinism. But, says Thomas, no created being can be better than another if it be not loved more by God.[8] He who labors more has more of grace, but that he does labor more is an effect of some higher cause.

Dominating Indifference

The constituting element of free will is its full dominion over its own acts. This dominating indifference may be con-

[8] Ia, q.20, a.3.

sidered in relation, either to the object or to the act. In relation to the object, we have either objective indifference (in the object) or formal indifference (in the will itself). In relation to act, we have either passive and potential indifference (in the faculty), or active, actual indifference (in the act of choice itself).

Potential indifference is the state of the will, when the will is idle and inactive. This inactive indifference is not essential to liberty as such. It is rather an imperfection, since every potentiality is perfected by the act for which it exists. Otherwise it would follow that God, who is always in act, would not be free. Further, it would follow that our will, as often as it acts, would lose liberty, by losing potential and passive indifference.

Actual and active indifference appears when the will acts, but still retains power not to act. This indifference is not taken away by grace, but is given by grace. Grace moves, not only that the act take place, but that it take place freely. Potential indifference, on which Molinists insist, is not of such great importance, since it does not exist in God, nor in us when we freely choose.

Question: Which kind of indifference is essential to freedom? Our answer is fivefold.

1. Freedom of choice demands that indifference which excludes natural necessity, determined to one course. Freedom of will differs from that spontaneity which brutes have by natural instinct. Nature causes by being what it is, but the will causes, not by its natural form, but by its own superadded determination, mediated by the intellect. Jansenists reply that the mere light of reason suffices to lift the will above nature, and thus indifference is not required. But they fail to see that the will has, not only free acts, but also necessary acts, determined by its essence, for instance, the love of beatitude. "The longing for the last goal is not of those things which we are masters of." [9]

[9] Ia, q.81, a.1, ad 3um.

2. Objective indifference is required for freedom of will. It is impossible for the will to aim freely at an object proposed to it as altogether good and lovable. It can aim freely only at those goods which are proposed, under one aspect as good, under another at least as apparently deficient. Further, the act of the will is free only so far as the judgment from which liberty proceeds is itself free, i.e., in the power of the will. And this judgment is not in the power of the will if objective indifference is absent. But, so runs the question, can we not reflect on the act even without objective indifference? Answer: The intellect can reflect upon a necessary judgment by a cognitive reflection, yes; by a judicative and deliberative cognition, no. To illustrate. We cannot dissent from the principle of contradiction, or from a geometrical conclusion. Assent or dissent is in our power when the thing apprehended does not sufficiently convince the intellect.

3. Formal and subjective indifference is required for liberty, because it follows objective indifference. Otherwise the will would not tend with indifference to the object; it would not determine itself, but would be determined by its nature.

4. Moral indifference is not the essence of liberty, but rather its imperfection. To follow evil is not of the very nature of a power destined for good. The free will is destined to follow good, just as reason is destined to pursue truth. In God, in Christ, in the blessed, we find the most perfect freedom united with supreme impeccability.

5. Freedom of will does not necessarily require differentiating indifference, but it does demand indifference toward placing the act. The will brings forth this act, not because it exists, not by a determination of nature, but because, by its own counsel, it chooses to perform this act.

Objection. The desire for the last goal does not belong to those things of which we are masters. Still we are free to exercise this act. Answer: Free, yes, but only so far as we can refuse to think of beatitude. If we do think of it, the judgment is not indifferent, and the will of its own nature is necessitated toward this act.

Is Equilibrium Necessary for Freedom?

Some say that subjective indifference means equilibrium, and that efficacious grace, by determining the will to one thing, takes away this equilibrium. Answer: We do not find this term, either in Scripture, or in the definitions of the Church, or in St. Augustine, or in St. Thomas. Further, if by equilibrium we are to understand equality of inclination and facility, and even of faculty in the Molinistic sense, then the notion is false. Molina says, we remember, that under equal aid, one may be converted and another not. Or, again, that by the aid of a smaller grace one man can rise, whereas another, under a greater aid does not rise, and remains obdurate. Now these sentences are against the principle of predilection: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" and also against the principle of the universal causality of God. But if by equilibrium we understand the power of resisting any grace, and the power of conquering any temptation with God's help, in this sense we admit equilibrium, because it is then nothing else but the active indifference which is not taken away by efficacious grace, since under efficacious grace there remains a real power to the opposite. But the term is not well chosen.

Analysis of Psychological Determinism

So far we have seen that human liberty is based on reason, and have also seen the various kinds of indifference. Now we pass to the second part of the article, which harmonizes human liberty with the influence of sufficient motive. The main objection, proposed by Leibnitz, is found already in St. Thomas.

Analysis of Difficulties

A truly sufficient motive moves by necessity. But a particular good is related to the will as a sufficient motive. Answer: If it fills the entire capacity of the mobile thing, then it moves by necessity, granted. But if it is only relatively suffi-

cient, if it does not fill the entire capacity of the mobile thing, then we deny that it moves by necessity.

Eight Replies

1. The will is moved by its object, as sense-appetite by its object. Now the appetite of a hungry dog does not, by the fact that it is insatiable, remain free while eating a morsel of bread. In parallel manner, then, the will does not, by the fact that it is destined for universal good, remain free in relation to a particular good. Answer: The will is moved by its object, if you presuppose the indifference of judgment founded on the cognition of universal good, granted: otherwise, denied. This nominalistic objection shows that sensualism cannot admit liberty, but only spontaneity.

2. The will is moved by good, as the intellect is by truth. Now the intellect, though destined for universal truth, is not free regarding a particular truth. Answer: The intellect is not free in relation to demonstrated truth, I grant; in relation to mere opinion, I deny. Note, further, that the intellect draws things to itself and thus reduces many truths to the necessity of prime principles. The will, on the contrary, is drawn to the thing wherein the good exists. That good is always finite, unless it be God.

3. But that liberty or indifference of judgment in relation to particular good does not remain. Proof: Aesthetic admiration, though destined for universal beauty, is of necessity aroused by particular works of art, Michelangelo's statue of Moses, say, or by one of Beethoven's symphonies. In parallel manner, then, the will, though destined for universal good, is drawn necessarily by certain particular goods. We distinguish: Drawn by particular goods in any way imperfect, we deny. By particular goods, in every way good (existence, life, intelligence), *per se,* we grant; but note that these goods can, *per accidens,* be refused.

4. But the natural desire of the end takes away indifference of judgment. I grant, as regards specification. But, granting

likewise that the end is the reason for necessarily willing the means, here and now necessary for beatitude, (as existence, life, intelligence), I deny such necessity toward other means and ways.

5. But the practical judgment must always be necessary, otherwise ethics would be a system not necessary, but arbitrary. Answer: The standard of the will must be necessary as regards principles and conclusions, but not as regards the practical judgment of prudence. And I explain. The judgment that is speculativo-practical belongs to moral science, and proceeds from the awareness of the sinner. But the judgment that is practico-practical is determined by prudence, and is not here and now psychologically necessary. To illustrate. The sinner, though speculatively he admits that justice must be observed by all men, especially toward himself, nevertheless, in practice, judges that his injustice toward another is simply good for himself. He can repeat the words of the poet: I see the better way, and I approve, but nevertheless I follow the worse.

6. By the principles of causality and sufficient reason this indifference is taken away. A cause, under one and the same set of circumstances, cannot produce different effects. Answer: A cause determined by nature to one line of causality, granted; otherwise denied.

7. But the will cannot choose unless it is determined by the intellect, and the intellect, granted the same circumstances, cannot change its judgment. Answer: Cannot, if the circumstances of the object are here and now infallibly determined, granted; otherwise denied.

8. Individual circumstances infallibly determine the act, because the object cannot be chosen unless it is judged to be better than another. Answer: Unless it is judged absolutely better, I deny. Better in relation to the will which is here and now acting, I grant. The last practical judgment depends on the actual disposition, good or bad, of liberty itself. He who wills an object can also non-will it, to manifest his liberty.

Particular good furnishes no motive that infallibly determines the will. This truth is especially apparent in acts where we find the greatest liberty, particularly in God.

Two Doubts

1. Must choice be always governed by the last practical judgment? Thomists answer in the affirmative, against Suarez. The last judgment immediately directing election is prerequired, because nothing can be willed unless it can be preknown as good and suitable. But, says Suarez, when two goods are proposed as here and now equal, the will can choose one without any reason, simply because it wills. *Stat pro ratione voluntas.* Answer: The phrase "because it wills" modifies, not only the agent, but also the object. The will always chooses "because it wills," if you look at the act subjectively, even when it chooses a greater or an equal good. The phrase "because it wills" concurs as an objective motive. If the man is asked why he selects this minor good in preference to a major good, he will give for the reason and motive "because I will." His motive for the choice is his own pleasure which he applies to one object and not to another. *Stat pro ratione voluntas.*

Man's pleasure, we note, is often against the rule of reason, whereas God's pleasure, though infinitely free, is always conformed to infinite wisdom, and wisdom judges that, in matters which cannot necessarily be determined, it is right to act according to one's pleasure. To illustrate. God creates a man at this instant rather than before or after; or He gives to one a degree of glory which He does not give to another.

But, Suarez insists, God, without any last practical judgment, chooses this world in preference to a better world. Answer: God chooses a world, less good objectively, granted; by a motive less good, no. To explain. This world, though intrinsically less good than other worlds which God could have chosen, is nevertheless better, if you look at God's motive, since it shows God's pleasure applied to this world and not to

another. In matters of liberality and grace, the will of the donor becomes objective motive.

Further, the divine will does not, as does our will, presuppose goodness, but makes and creates that goodness, by loving and choosing it. God pours the goodness of His own choice into our free choice. God does not choose creatures because they are more or less good, but creatures are more or less good because God loves them more or less. God has greater love for better things, but better things are better because they are more loved by God.

Answering Leibnitz

God would be neither wise nor good, says Leibnitz, had He not created the best possible world. The answer is that God cannot make any created good absolutely better, because no created good is the highest possible good. God can always make something better than the thing He has already made. But He cannot act better, that is, He cannot act with greater wisdom and power. The external glory of God rests on the free counsel of His will. Supreme wisdom "delights to play in the universe." [10] What God chooses among created goods is formally better, that is, more according to His will, but it is not always materially better. To illustrate. What obedience commands is not always materially the better course; but it is formally the better.

A Final Doubt

Supposing a free and efficacious intention of the goal, and only one medium to reach this goal, is the act of the will in such cases necessary or free? For example, a man wills health, and sees that it can be attained only by amputation. The answer is that, as the case is here stated, the man's decision for amputation is a necessary act, because the will cannot efficaciously will the impossible. If he refuses, then he has withdrawn his free and efficacious intention to attain health.

[10] Prov. 8:23.

ART. 3. IS THE WILL MOVED NECESSARILY BY THE SENSE-APPETITE?

Preliminaries

This article is against physical and physiological determinism. The objections are thus proposed by St. Thomas.

1. The authority of St. Paul: "Not the good which I will do I do, but the evil which I will not, that I do." St. Paul is speaking of the concupiscence which follows original sin.

2. Aristotle says: "As man is, so does man choose." Now it is not in the power of the will immediately to cast off passion.

The thesis is negative. In the *Sed contra* we have God's words to Cain: "Why art thou angry? Under thee shall be thy appetite, and thou shalt control it." [11] Then follow three conclusions.

1. A man whose reason is totally bound by passion is necessarily moved by the sense-appetite. Where reason is bound, we cannot have indifference of judgment, and hence no voluntary act. Man is then like a brute animal.

2. When the judgment of reason is not entirely impeded by passion, man is moved by sense-appetite, not necessarily, but freely. The object attracts him strongly, but leaves his judgment indifferent and mutable. But the liberty decreases as the impulse of passion increases.

3. If an act of the will is present it does not of necessity follow passion. From this third conclusion it is clear that St. Thomas does not admit that sudden motions of the will are necessary.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. St. Thomas, explaining the Pauline phrase, "the evil which I will not, that I do," notes that the will cannot prevent movements of concupiscence from arising. The first motions of sensuality are not sins, if man immediately resists and turns his thought elsewhere. The following proposition has

[11] Gen. 4:11.

been condemned: "Evil desires, which reason does not consent to, which man suffers against his will, are nevertheless prohibited by the precept "thou shalt not covet." [12]

In an opposite direction Molinos says: "Under temptations, even furious temptations, the soul is not bound to resist." [13] Condemned is likewise another proposition of Molinos wherein he denies that first motions of sensuality can exist after the purification of the soul.[14] This condemnation of Baius and Quesnel shows that concupiscence, being a habit (*fomes*), is not properly speaking sin, and that the first motions of sensuality are not sins if man resists and turns his thought elsewhere.

2. Our will has not the power to banish passion immediately. Answer: The judgment of reason remains in some way free, and hence can refrain from following passion.

3. The will can be moved to a particular good, without any passion in the sense-appetite. A sick man, with no appetite, nevertheless wills to eat in order to sustain life, or to drink bitter medicine though it nauseates him.

We have solved the objections raised by physical or physiological determinism by recalling the source of free will, i.e., the indifference, the mutability, of judgment. If such judgment is absent, the act is no longer voluntary. Thus we see the harmony between free will and motive objectively sufficient. This motive is relatively sufficient for a free choice, but not absolutely sufficient to necessitate the will. Two finite goods, however unequal, are both equally distant from infinite good.

ART. 4. MUST THE WILL BE MOVED BY GOD TO ITS ACT?

Preliminaries

Here we are to solve the objections of Calvin and Luther against efficacious grace, objections renewed by Molinists

[12] D. 1050. 1051. 1074. 1075. 1393.
[13] D. 1257. 1261.
[14] D. 1276.

against Thomists, objections already stated by St. Thomas. For in this article we are treating not only of liberty from coercion, that is, of spontaneity, but also of freedom from necessity.

Objections

1. An irresistible agent moves of necessity. But God is an irresistible agent. This objection is raised by Calvinists and Lutherans. Molinists agree on the principle involved, namely, that God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace, would move of necessity. But they differ from heretics in the application, namely, that grace is intrinsically efficacious. This is affirmed by the heretics, denied by the Molinists. We, however, reject the principle, admitted by Protestants and Molinists.

Protestantism says: God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace, moves of necessity. But grace is intrinsically efficacious. Molinism says: God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace, moves of necessity. But God does not move by necessity. Hence grace is not intrinsically efficacious. Thomism says: God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace, moves not of necessity. But grace is intrinsically efficacious. Hence God moves not of necessity.

2. The operation of God would be inefficacious if the will refused that to which God is moving. But the operation of God is not inefficacious.

Thesis

God moves the will, yet so that He does not determine it to necessity. We prove this first by authority. "God from the beginning created man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." [15] Again, we have the definition of the Council of Trent against the early Protestants: If anyone says that the free will of man, moved by God, does not cooperate by assenting to God's calling, whereby man prepares himself for

[15] Eccli. 15:14.

the grace of justification, or says that man cannot dissent if he wills, but that, like something inanimate, he does nothing at all and is merely passive, A.S.[16]

Molinists say that the Council is here treating of efficacious grace, first, because the grace in question is one with which man *de facto* cooperates, and secondly, because the Council is treating of that grace which, according to Luther and Calvin, would destroy liberty. From this conception of the Council's meaning, they argue that man can resist efficacious grace in the composite sense, thereby rendering it inefficacious.

A Manifold Reply

1. Were this position true, the Council would have also condemned Thomism. But the supreme pontiffs, especially Benedict XV and Clement XII, declared that the Thomistic doctrine was in no way condemned by the Council of Trent, nor by the bull *Unigenitus* against the Jansenists.

2. This Molinistic objection was proposed already by Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians against Augustine.

3. Among the fathers of the Council were many Thomists and Augustinians, who certainly did not wish to condemn Thomism. And in the redaction of these canons on justification, one of the collaborators was the Thomistic Soto.

4. We grant that in this canon there is question of efficacious grace, and we answer that, according to the Molinists, man under that grace which is efficacious, though he can indeed dissent, does not in fact dissent. Otherwise this grace would no longer be efficacious, not even by extrinsic denomination, but would be merely sufficient. In the Molinistic view this grace is indeed not efficacious except by our consent foreknown by God through *scientia media*. But this prevision, depending on our consent, posits a dependence in God, which we cannot admit.

5. The fathers of the Council are probably speaking, not only of efficacious grace, but of grace intrinsically efficacious.

[16] D.814.

The meaning of the canon would be, against Luther, that this grace, intrinsically efficacious, does not take away free will, since man can dissent, i.e., he retains power for the opposite; he is not an inanimate thing, merely passive.

The fathers of the Council certainly knew that Luther and Calvin defended grace *per se* efficacious, and from this principle inferred the destruction of liberty. Hence arises a dilemma. The fathers of the Council judged, either that the doctrine of antecedent grace, that is, grace *per se* efficacious, is heretical, or that the Protestant consequence, namely, that efficacious grace destroys liberty, is heretical. That the first alternative is not their meaning is clear. They would have had to proscribe such a traditional doctrine in express terms; this they did not. Hence the second alternative holds good, namely, the fathers of the Council say that it is heretical to affirm that intrinsically efficacious grace destroys liberty.

Now from this conciliar condemnation it does not follow that Molinism, in its positive part, is a heresy; but it does follow that its objections against Thomism do not preserve the meaning of the Council. It is an illegitimate heretical conclusion to say that efficacious grace destroys liberty.

Again, the Council, treating of perseverance, declares: "God, unless men fail in corresponding to His grace, just as He began the good work, so will He bring it to perfection, since 'He works both to will and to do.' "[17] How can this proposition of the Council be harmonized with the proposition of Molina, namely, that under equal aid, or even smaller aid, one man is converted and another not. Were it so, God would have begun equally in these two men a good work, and one of these would of himself bring the work to completion.

To see the mind of the Church, let us return to ancient times, and particularly to the Second Council of Orange, against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. The twentieth canon of the Council says: "No one has of his own anything

[17] D.806. Cf. Phil. 2:13.

except deceit and sin. But if man has anything of truth and justice, it must come from that fountain which we thirst for here in the wilderness, in order that, bedewed by its drops, we may not faint in the way." [18] The many texts cited by the Council against the Semi-Pelagians hold good likewise against Molinists.

In favor of grace intrinsically efficacious, many other texts are cited, not only by Thomists, but also by Augustinians. St. Augustine himself, commenting on the words, "I will take from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh," speaks thus: "This grace, given secretly to human hearts by divine generosity, has as first purpose to take away hardness of heart." [19] Now God cannot infallibly attain this purpose by concurring indifferently, by a decree which awaits or presupposes consent given by man, since according to Scripture, it is God who takes away the hardness of the human heart. Divine Providence, says St. Thomas, works in all things infallibly.[20]

Against Lessius

Lessius speaks thus: "When of two men similarly called, one accepts the grace offered and the other refuses, then we say rightly that the decision comes from liberty alone. Not that he who accepts, accepts only by his liberty, but because by his liberty alone does this difference arise, not from the diversity of the aid which precedes." [21]

This view, Thomists repeat, is against the principle of predilection: "I will have mercy on whom I will." [22] It is also against St. Paul's word: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?" Listen to St. Augustine: "Why God draws this man and not that man, judge not unless you would

[18] D. 176 sq. 193. 195.
[19] *De praedest. sanctorum*, c. 8.
[20] *De malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3um.
[21] *De gratia efficaci*, c. 18, n. 7.
[22] Exod. 33:19.

misjudge." [23] Thomists add that, according to St. Paul, God Himself, by His election and grace, distinguishes one man from the other, whereas Molinism supposes that one, Peter, say, is distinguished from Judas by liberty alone, so that God's role is reduced to placing Peter in circumstances wherein God foresees, by *scientia media,* that Peter will consent.

Who distinguishes thee? [24] To this question St. Thomas replies: "Thou canst not distinguish thyself from the mass of lost men. Hence thou hast no reason for being proud against another, or for making thyself superior to another." Again, "No created thing could be better than another unless it were more loved by God, whose love is the cause of all created goodness."

Here enter some beautiful words of Bossuet: "We must bring our intellect into captivity before the great mystery of grace, and admit that there is a twofold grace, one sufficient, the other efficacious, the first of which leaves our will inexcusable before God, while the second hinders us from glorying in ourselves." [25]

"O God, I thank Thee that I am not like the rest of men." [26] These words St. Augustine often quoted against the Semi-Pelagians. Del Prado,[27] quoting the same text against the Molinists, shows how men should pray if the principles of Molina were true.

The Thesis

God, moving the will to choose, does not determine it to necessity, but so that its motion remains contingent, except in its natural movements. God moves all creatures according to their condition, necessary causes to necessary effects, contingent causes to contingent effects. But the will is an active principle, not determined by nature to one line of activity.

[23] In Joan., tract. 26, initio.
[24] I Cor. 4:7.
[25] *Oeuvres complètes,* I, 643.
[26] Luke 18:4.
[27] *De gratia et lib. arbitr.* III, p. 149.

Notice that St. Thomas does not say that God moves the will according to *scientia media.* Neither does Leo XIII. St. Thomas had spoken thus: "Since the divine will is most efficacious, that which God wills not only follows, but follows in that manner in which God wishes it to follow. But God wills that some things follow necessarily and some things contingently." [28]

Harmony between the infallible divine decree and our liberty is founded on the transcendent efficacy of the divine causality. The mystery lies, not in man, but in God. This efficacy of divine causality transcends all created causality, even angelic causality, just as free determination is predicated only analogically of God, angel, and man.

St. Thomas leads our intellect toward this mystery when he says that, already in the created order, "the more a cause is efficacious, the more does effect follow cause, not only substantially, but also modally." [29] To illustrate. Dissimilarity of son to father is on account of weakness in the father, whereas, if the father is strong and sound, his son is similar to him also in modes and accidents. In certain families we find that the son is the living image of the father. A great military leader (Themistocles, Caesar, Napoleon) communicates to his soldiers his own victorious modes. Michelangelo, Beethoven, Dante, Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas, each in his own line, communicates to his disciples the mode and spirit of his power. A mother leads her son, a wife leads her husband, to choose freely what she wills and as she wills. Hence the ironical proverb: What the wife wills, God wills.

Passages from St. Thomas

1. "Since the will of God is most efficacious, not only does that follow which God wills to follow, but it follows in the manner which God wills. But God wills certain things to happen necessarily, others contingently, that there be order in

[28] Ia, q.19, a.8. Cf. Ia, q.22, a.4; *Periherm.* I, lect. 14; Metaph. IV, lect. 3.
[29] *Ibid.*

things, to complete the beauty of the universe." [30] Hence for some effects He creates necessary causes, and for other things, contingent causes.

2. "Necessary and contingent are characteristics that follow being as being. Hence these modes, contingency and necessity, fall under the provision of God, the universal provider, but not under the provision of particular causes. Not only the power of freedom, but the very act of freedom, is reduced to God as its cause." [31]

3. "The divine will must be understood as transcending the entire order of the universe, as a cause that penetrates the depths of reality and all its differences. But the fundamental differences of reality are possibility and necessity, which, therefore, are caused by the divine will itself." [32]

4. "Free will is indeed the cause of its own motion, because man by free will moves himself to act. But free will need not be the first cause of that which is free, just as a cause need not be a first cause in order to be a cause. God, the first cause, moves both natural causes and voluntary causes. As He does not take away from natural causes their naturalness, so by moving voluntary causes He does not take away their voluntariness, rather He produces their voluntariness. He works in each being according to its nature." [33]

Question. How does God, moving thus, produce this free mode? Answer: The will tends to a particular good, with actual and active dominating indifference, and this indifference is based on the destination of the will to universal good, to beatitude in common. But God moves the will, first, by priority of nature, by arousing in it the desire of beatitude in common; secondly, by posteriority of nature, by moving the will to determine itself by its own deliberation, with dominating indifference to the particular good. Thus God is the cause, not only of potential indifference, but also of actual

[30] *Ibid.*
[31] Ia, q.22, a.4, ad 3um et 4um.
[32] *Periherm.*, I, lect. 14.
[33] Ia, q.83, a.1, ad 3um.

indifference. He actuates liberty, does not destroy it. He moves the will from within, according to its natural inclination toward its adequate object, before He moves it to determine itself by way of deliberation to an inadequate object.

Two Further Fundamental Arguments

1. Every good that is in us comes from God as its cause. But nothing in us is better than our free consent to good deeds. Therefore this free consent comes from God as cause.

2. Were it not so, our will would be the first source of its choice, and God would depend on our will, known by *scientia media*. God's indifferent concursus would be determined by our liberty, and our liberty would be the sole cause of discrimination between good consent and evil consent.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. When God moves efficaciously, nothing can resist Him and therefore God moves of necessity. St. Thomas does not answer as does Cardinal Billot. The latter answers that God moves only to universal good, not to particular good. Nor does St. Thomas say that the divine motion is fallibly efficacious. What St. Thomas does say is this: "The will of God extends, not only to the deed, but also to the mode which suits the nature of the thing moved. It would be more contradictory to divine motion if the will were moved of necessity, which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved freely as suits its nature." [34]

2. But, say our adversaries, grace, if it is *per se* efficacious, destroys liberty. St. Thomas replies: "On the contrary, grace, precisely because it is most efficacious, makes our action to be free, produces the free mode of our action." [35] God actualizes our liberty, does not destroy it. To illustrate this doctrine, think of the conversion of Magdalen, of the good thief, or better still, of the consent given by the Blessed Virgin on the

[34] Ia, q.19, a.8.
[35] *Ibid.*

day of the Annunciation. God touches our created liberty with a virginal contact, which contains no violence. Just as, by the operation of the Holy Spirit, the Blessed Virgin conceived and brought forth without damage to her virginity, so under the grace of the Holy Spirit our liberty remains unharmed. God does not violate liberty, but preserves, elevates, vivifies, sanctifies, and strengthens liberty. To depreciate the strength of efficacious grace would be to reduce its sweetness, because the two, strength and sweetness, are intimately connected in the most profound harmony.

3. It is impossible that the will should not will the object toward which God moves it, since God's operation cannot be inefficacious. We answer with St. Thomas, not that the motion of God is indifferent and moves only to universal good, or that grace is only fallibly efficacious, but that, in St. Thomas' own words: "If God moves the will to a certain act, it is incompatible with this position that the will shall not be moved. Yet it is not simply impossible." The will cannot resist in the composite sense, namely, it cannot combine actual resistance with efficacious grace. But it can resist in the divided sense, because there remains a real power to the opposite. While, as the Council of Trent says, "it can resist if it wills," yet, under efficacious grace it never as a fact resists, just as a man sitting can stand, but not sit and stand simultaneously.

Further Objections Analyzed

1. "God, moving the will, does not force it, because He gives to the will its own inclination." [36]

2. "To be moved voluntarily is to be moved intrinsically, yes; but this intrinsic principle can come from another and extrinsic principle." [37]

3. "If the will were so moved by another as not to be moved by itself, then the works of the will would not count

[36] Ia, q. 105, a. 4.
[37] *Ibid.*

as merits or demerits. But since the fact that it is moved by another does not exclude self-motion, merit or demerit is not taken away." [38]

4. "God moves the will immutably by the efficacy of His moving power, which cannot fail. But by the nature of the will which is moved, a will which is indifferent to various lines of activity, we do not have necessity but liberty." [39]

5. "When the Holy Spirit moves the soul to love God, charity has impeccability, since the Holy Spirit infallibly does whatever He wills. Hence these two things can never be simultaneous: the Holy Spirit moves to an act of charity and the will simultaneously loses charity by sin. For the gift of perseverance is one of the benefits of God, benefits whereby all who are liberated are most certainly liberated." [40]

6. "Every action of the will, so far as it is action, is not only from the will as immediate agent, but from God as the first agent, who is more powerful than the will. If, then, the will can change its act, much more can God." [41]

7. "Only God can change the inclination of the will to another line as He wills." [42] But even God, we may add, cannot make simultaneous these two things: an indifferent judgment in the intellect and a necessary act in the will. As it is a contradiction that the will should will an unknown object, so it is a contradiction that the will should will it in any other way than as it is known. If the will necessarily willed that which is proposed by an indifferent judgment, the will would no longer be a rational appetite. It is a contradiction that the will adhere necessarily to an object which is not proposed as good from every angle.

But then, says the objector, even sinful acts would come from God. Answer: God is the cause of the physical entity of sin, but not of sin itself. Sin is a defect, a deformity. But de-

[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *De malo*, q.6, a.1, ad 3um.
[40] Ia–IIae, q.24, a.11.
[41] *Ibid.*, a.9.
[42] Ia–IIae, q.79, a.2.

fect comes from a deficient cause, not an efficient cause. Lameness has its cause in the crooked bone, not in the lame man's motive power.[43]

But would there be sin if God did not permit it? No, but God permits it, does not impede it; first, because it is not wonderful that if a thing is defectible it should at times really fail; secondly, it belongs to the universal provider to permit certain evils, in order that from them there may arise greater good. The treason of Judas, the pagan persecutions, are permitted in order that the patience of Christ and the martyrs may infallibly manifest God's attributes of mercy and justice.[44]

The Nature of Premotion

We distinguish two questions, one principal, the other secondary. The principal doctrine is that divine decrees are of themselves efficacious, that grace is of itself efficacious. This efficacy of grace comes from the omnipotent will of God, independently of the consent of the creature and of *scientia media*. This truth we defend as a theological doctrine, connected with the principles of faith, a doctrine proximately definable, and with us agree nearly all theological schools, the Molinistic school excepted. Thus certain Augustinians explain the intrinsic efficacy of grace, not by physical premotion, but by victorious delectation.

The second doctrine runs thus: Efficacious grace must be explained by premotion, i.e., physical predetermination. This is a philosophical thesis, since it cannot be proved by revelation alone. In this secondary thesis we dissent, not only from Molinists and Congruists, but also from many other theologians who, while rejecting *scientia media* and admitting intrinsically efficacious grace, explain that efficaciousness by a multitude of moral aids, or by moral causality, or by indeliberate acts, or by victorious delectation, not by physical premotion.

[43] Ia–IIae, q.22, a.2, ad 2um.
[44] *De Deo*, diss. 8, a.5; *De gratia*, diss. 5, a.7.

Molinists confound this secondary question with the primary question on grace of itself efficacious. Billuart answers: "Let Molinists finally acknowledge that the grace necessary for salvation is not indifferent and determinable by the human will, but that, on the contrary, the human will is thereby infallibly determined, independently of *scientia media.* If they admit this, then they may reject physical predetermination, either absolutely, or at least in relation to acts that are materially sinful. Then, while as philosophers we will continue to oppose them, we will be their friends as theologians, and will not call for a new *Congregatio de Auxiliis.*" [45] After these essential declarations let us see what this divine motion is on the part of God and what it is on the part of the creature.

1. The divine action by which God influences second causes is really identified with the divine essence. It is an action formally immanent and virtually transitive. The proof runs as follows. There can be no accident in God. God is His own intelligence, His own will, His own activity. Hence His action *ad extra* is formally immanent, because identified with the divine essence.[46] But it is virtually transitive, because it places an effect *ad extra.* God's power is the source of created effects, but not the source of God's action. In God there is no novelty of action, but only a novelty of effects outside of God.

In creatures, on the contrary, an act that is formally transitive, e.g., heating, is an accident proceeding from the agent and terminating in the patient. God's action on second causes, transcending the action of created things, is really a superaction, just as God is supertruth and supergood. This position is admitted by all theologians, though they do not define analogy in the same way.

Hence divine action is in itself just as unknowable as is the divine essence. We know it analogically, in what it shares with creative action, and we know it negatively and

[45] Ia, q.25, a.1, ad 3um; Cf. *Contra Gentes,* II, 23, 31, 35.
[46] Ia–IIae, q.110, a.2.

relatively in its characteristics, namely, that it is an action uncaused, a supreme action, the source of all created action, a self-subsisting action. We know what it is not, rather than what it is. Molinists impugn this view, calling it Bannesianism, as if divine motion agreed with created motion univocally.

2. What is divine motion as found in the creature? Is it a created thing? Some theologians deny this, saying that the extrinsic assistance of God is sufficient, and that the free creature simply wills what divine liberty wills by a certain sympathy with the divine will. Thus those who follow Scotus. Others say that moral causality suffices, that is, either God's attraction by a celestial delectation, or by many moral aids, or by arousing indeliberate acts which dispose us to choose.

Thomists respond: You do not explain how God obtains infallibly the good effect He wills. Nothing attracts the will infallibly except God seen clearly. Even without victorious delectation men often desire good, even supernatural good, in aridity of the spirit, say, or in the dark night of the soul. Actual grace, operative or cooperative, is not God, but an effect of God, and it is not our act, but it is the cause of our act. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas. Listen to the texts that here follow.

1. "By the gratuitous will of God man is aided by being moved to know, to will, to do. This gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a motion of the soul. The act of the mover, in the thing moved, is motion." [47]

2. "That divine effect whereby a created thing acts, has a passing and incomplete existence, like the existence of colors in the air, and the existence of art in the instrument of the artist. It is a power, a *vis,* whereby the second cause, as instrument of the first cause, brings its act into existence. Just as a created thing cannot preserve itself, neither can it operate without a divine operation." [48]

[47] *De potentia,* q.3, a.7, ad 7um.
[48] *Contra Gentes,* III, 150.

3. "The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the movable thing, both in idea and in reality. Our advance in good works is owing to the divine aid which antecedes our works." [49]

4. "The ultimate in goodness and perfection to be attained by a second agent is that which it can do by power of the first agent. The fullest reach of the second agent comes from the first agent." [50]

Created transitive action has three elements. Motion-action (heating proceeding from fire); motion-passion (heating as a passion in the thing that is heated); consequent operation (whereby the heated wood itself heats another piece of wood).

Created immanent operation also has three elements: Motion-action (a colored object moves sight); motion-passion (the sense of sight receives *species impressa*); consequent operation (the act of sight).

Created action becomes an analogy of divine action. As wood does not heat unless it is itself preheated, and as sense does not act unless it previously receives an impression from the object, so no second cause can work unless premoved by God. And so it is that here too three elements must be distinguished: motion-action (the divine action, formally immanent and virtually transitive); motion-passion (when will is moved from potential willing to actual willing); the elicited operation of the will (which under the motion of God elicits vitally and freely its own act of volition).

To explain. The divine motion, considered outside of God, is in the created thing moved. And this motion-passion, whatever adversaries say, is not to be confounded with the operation elicited by the will. In motion-passion the will is moved, whereas in operation the will itself operates.

But then, runs the objection, the will is not the mistress of its act, because this motion-passion is produced in it by God without it. Answer: This motion received from God can

[49] *Ibid.*, 66.
[50] *De potentia*, q.3, a.7.

be called a motion of the soul, but it is not an act of the will. The will is not mistress of its own passive power, but it is mistress of its own active volition. The divine motion is not in our power, but we are in the power of God.

We must not, then, confuse the passive actualization of the will by God with the action elicited by the will. And note well that God adapts His divine motion to the freedom of our will. God does not determine our choice, as if the will would in no way determine itself. God infallibly moves the will to self-determination. God, says St. Thomas, "is the cause of every created action in four ways. First, He gives the power of action; secondly, He preserves that power; thirdly, He applies the power to action; fourthly, by His power all other powers act. Created causes concur as it were instrumentally to produce existence which is the proper effect of God." [51]

Question: Does premotion precede our act, or is it a mere simultaneous concursus? Answer: The divine premotion precedes our act, not in time, but in causality. To move and to be moved are simultaneous in time because one and the same reality is from the mover and in the movable thing. But the priority of causality is evident. The patient would not be moved if the agent did not move. And the patient cannot act unless it is premoved to act. Wood cannot heat unless it is first heated. The eye cannot see unless it is moved by the object. But the divine motion which first operates, then cooperates, is, even as cooperating, prior in causality to our action with which it cooperates.[52]

St. Thomas uses the word "motion," not "premotion," because in his mind all motion by priority of causality is premotion. The particle "pre" is tautological, but we retain it in order to distinguish the divine motion from the merely simultaneous concursus of Molina, which indeed precedes its effect, but in no way precedes the production of our operation. God and the will, according to Molina, are like two

[51] *De veritate*, q.27, a.5, ad 1um.
[52] See note 48.

horses drawing a cart. One horse does not move the other, but both move the cart. This conception, however, does not in any way explain how the will passes from potentiality to act. Our will is not its own act, and therefore needs to be premoved in order to act.

Here we must note an error in terminology. Father Sertillanges, O.P., says that many Thomists use the word "premotio physica" to signify the action of God.[53] This usage, according to him, involves a triple verbal heresy: the particle "pre" is improper, because there is no priority of time; motion, because we are dealing, not with motion but with creation; physical, because the action is not physical, but rather metaphysical. We have answered this difficulty above. The particle "pre" signifies merely priority of nature. Motion is well chosen; it is the term used by St. Thomas. And it is false to say that the action is creation, because creation presupposes nothing as its *terminus a quo*. If our acts were created, they would in no way come from us vitally, and we would have to admit occasionalism, because only God would be the agent. Finally, the term "physical" is in opposition, not to metaphysical, but to moral.

Question: Is the divine premotion the same thing as predetermination? Listen to Zigliara: "There are some who grant premotion, but are horrified at the term 'predetermination.' Now these authors tremble with fear where there is no fear. They do not understand the premotion which they admit, nor the predetermination which they refuse." [54] Premotion is identical with predetermination. It expresses relation to the divine omnipotence which moves; predetermination expresses the divine will, the predetermining decree which precedes the act, by priority, not of time, but of causality, and that from eternity. The divine intellect conceives, the divine will predetermines, omnipotence premoves.

[53] S. Thoma d'Aquin, I, p. 265.
[54] *Summ. phil.*, II, pp. 461, 504.

The word "predetermination" is not an invention of Thomists, but is found in St. Thomas himself. Here are his words: "Damascene, following St. Gregory of Nyssa, says that God foreknows our deeds, but does not predetermine them. These words have this meaning: Our deeds are subject to the determination of divine providence, but not in such fashion as to receive necessity from this determination." [55] The saint's mind is that God predetermines, not only our free future actions, especially meritorious actions, but also their free mode. Eternity precedes time by a priority, not of time, but of causality and order.

A Middle Interpretation

This interpretation was proposed by three cardinals: Pecci, Satolli, and Lorenzelli.

Preliminaries


Molinism says that God's grace is efficacious, not of itself, but from its effect, namely, from our consent, preknown by *scientia media*. Congruism retains from Molinism the term *scientia media,* but distinguishes congruous grace from incongruous. Congruous grace, though not infallibly efficacious, agrees with the temperament and disposition of the subject, and thus, as moral benefit, surpasses incongruous grace. Finally, syncretism, as proposed by the three cardinals and their disciples, joins Thomism in rejecting *scientia media* and admitting grace intrinsically efficacious, but does not allow to grace even a priority of nature.

Against this syncretism, we have elsewhere [56] discussed this dilemma: "God either determines or is determined; there is no middle way. If God does not determine, then He is determined by our foreknown consent. Hence theologians who will not admit predetermining decrees, must, willy-nilly, admit *scientia media.*"

For the moment let the following synopsis suffice.

[55] *Contra Gentes,* III, c.90, in fine.
[56] *De gratia,* 1945, pp. 363–74.

Thomism



Occasionalism	Molinism
Pantheism	Atheistic Evolutionism

This synopsis shows that Thomism is an elevation, rising not only above grave errors and heresies contrary to one another, but also above the opinions of theologians, and in particular, against eclecticism, which tries to find a medium, but does not reach the summit. Satolli rejects *scientia media,* but, while he admits intrinsically efficacious grace, he denies to that grace any priority, even that of nature. Paquet follows the same road, but comes more closely to real Thomism.

A Summary

These authors are mistaken in trying to find this doctrine in Cajetan. St. Thomas does not use the word "premotion" because for him every motion is premotion. Cooperating grace has a priority of causality in relation to our act. This syncretism leads to *scientia media,* whether they will or no.

But they say, God, without any predetermining decree, can know a free futuribility. Answer: God, without predetermining decree, could not know which of two possible contradictories would come to pass, whether Peter, in such and such circumstances, would sin or not. The *futuribile* is more than the simply possible thing, because of two possible things, contradictorily opposed, it expresses the definite outcome in such and such circumstances.

Conclusion

In the words of St. Augustine, cited by the Council of Trent: "God does not command impossibilities, but by com-

manding He admonishes thee to do what thou canst, and to ask for what thou canst not." [57] God's saving will is universal. Sin never arises from the insufficiency of the divine aid. Such insufficiency would presuppose divine negligence, which would be a contradiction in terms, a negation of divine providence and of God Himself. On the other hand no one could be in any way better than another had he not received more from God: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" [58] The mystery remains, namely, the intimate harmony of infinite justice, infinite mercy, and supreme liberty. This harmony, this transcendent eminence of God, this intimate life of God, cannot be seen except in the Fatherland.

[57] D.804.
[58] I Cor. 4:7.

CHAPTER XV

Other Acts Elicited by the Will (Q. 11–17)

FRUITION (Q. 11)

Fruition is concerned with the end simply, whereas intention is concerned with ways and means. God enjoys Himself, but He does not intend Himself. Fruition, derived from "fruit," from the tree's perfection, is essentially delight in the end attained, a delight which presupposes the possession of the end by the apprehensive faculty. It is the act of the lover resting in possession of his desire. The animal's enjoyment of its food is fruition, but an imperfect fruition. Complete fruition is concerned only with the last end; incomplete fruition is from an intermediate end, for instance, from a medicine which is tasty. In relation to the last end, we distinguish imperfect fruition, based on hope, from perfect fruition, arising from possession in reality.

INTENTION (Q. 12)

Intention is the efficacious desire to employ the proper means for attaining the goal. Thus it is distinguished from simple volition, which is a mere complacency in the good without relation to ways and means. Inefficaciously, I can wish rain, but I cannot intend it. The natural desire for the beatific vision is an act of the will, but not an efficacious intention.

Intention can be concerned either with the last end or with an intermediate end. The right intention is called the eye of the soul: "If thine eye be simple, thy whole body will

be lightsome."[1] It is called the eye of the soul because it presupposes right knowledge of the last end. By right intention our works are lucid before God, by evil intention they become dark.

A doubt. St. Thomas says: "If we take two unrelated things, man can intend many ends." Answer: At first view these words seem to say that man can intend two ultimate ends. But if so, then the will would have simultaneously two unrelated acts: an impossibility. Alvarez, with others, answers thus: "The will can simultaneously intend many things, provided they agree in some element which is willed primarily and *per se*." Thus the will can desire two ends for the tongue, namely, speech and taste, because this organ serves both purposes. A medium may be intended because it is suitable for many ends.

ART. 4, 5. IS THE INTENTION OF THE END IDENTICAL WITH THE ACT OF THE WILL TOWARD THAT END?

Answer: If we will the medium solely on account of the end, then there is one act, namely, choice. But if we will separately, first the end and then the means, then there are two acts: intention of the end and choice of means. In article five we read that brutes intend materially the end, but tend executively to the thing which is the end, but not as end. Intention, therefore, belongs to animals, not formally, but executively.

Corollary. In order that choice be right and efficacious, and a fortiori that command shall be right and efficacious in dealing with means, there is prerequired a right and efficacious intention of the end. Hence prudence, which is obligated to reach a right and efficacious command, presupposes right appetite, that is, an intention which is right and efficacious.

[1] Matt. 6:22.

THE ACT OF CHOICE (Q. 13)

Presupposed efficacious intention of the end, four acts are concerned with means: first, counsel, that is, consultation by the intellect on the means suitable for reaching the end; second, consent, which follows counsel, whereby these means are accepted as a unit; third, a discerning judgment in the intellect, which discovers the medium that is most apt; fourth, choice in the will, which accepts this medium. The act of choice, presupposing the judgment by which it is directed, is substantially an act of the will, because it deals with a good, and only the will aims at the good. But choice, properly speaking, deals only with means subject to deliberation. The physician does not deliberate on restoring health, but on the means suited to attain this end. Now man can deliberate on the ordination of his whole life toward his last end. "When man begins to have the use of reason, the first thing that occurs to him is to think of himself, to ordain himself to the right end." [2] In this case the object of deliberation and choice is not, properly speaking, the last end, but the ordination of our life to this end. Similarly, a man may choose virtue instead of vice, in relation to beatitude in common. Choice is concerned only with those things which are subject to us, or at least are subject to our appointment, as when we elect the superior of a community.

THE ACT OF COUNSEL (Q. 14)

1. Counsel is an inquisition of reason to prepare choice. Reason does not proffer its judgment without preceding investigation.

Doubt. Does counsel include intrinsically the act of judgment? There is a difficulty here in solving the doubt. St. Thomas,[3] following Aristotle, says that *eubulia* is a power that

[2] Ia–IIae, q.89, a.6.
[3] Ia–IIae, q.56, a.6; Ia–IIae, q.51, a.1 and 2.

counsels, but is distinguished from *synesis* which judges well in practical matters. Cajetan solves the difficulty thus: Human counsel includes inquisition and judgment, whereas divine counsel is a judgment without inquisition. According to the common way of speaking, the act of counsel remains incomplete unless followed by an act of judgment on the medium to be chosen. Counsel is a practical syllogism, and the practical judgment is the conclusion of this syllogism. When many suitable media appear, counsel may approve them *in globo,* before the ultimate, practical judgment determines which of the proposed media is the better: in this case there are two acts, and the qualities of counsel are distinct from the qualities of the ultimate judgment. Counsel, examining many different means, all of them apt, may consult many men: a king, for example, profits by a great diversity of competent ministers, in order to see all aspects of the affair, and all the motives pro and con. But out of this multitude of counsels the king himself pronounces the ultimate practical judgment. Counsel comes from many sources, whereas the ultimate judgment comes from one, the monarch.

A second doubt. Does every deliberate choice involve a practical judgment? The answer is affirmative.[4] Simple apprehension of good does not suffice. Without an affirmative judgment "this is to be done," "this is to be refused," choice would lack direction. Alvarez says that also the act of command belongs to all deliberate acts.

Even for the act of faith four judgments are prerequired: first, this statement is credible; second, men are bound to believe this statement; third, I am bound, here and now, to believe this statement; fourth, if I believe this statement, then I say "I believe." "No one believes the mysteries of faith unless he sees that they are to be believed, either by the evidence of miracles or by some similar evidence." [5]

[4] Ia–IIae, q.9, a.1, ad 2um.
[5] IIa–IIae, q.1, a.4, ad 2um.

But do we not thus start an infinite process? No. "We regress to the first act of the will, which does not depend upon the command of reason, but comes from instinct of nature, or from something higher than nature, namely, God who inspires the act." [6]

Art. 2. Counsel, like choice, deals, not with the end, but only with means. The end in practical matters is like principle in speculative matters. Counsel is a practical syllogism, which presupposes the intention of the end.

Art. 3. Counsel deals only with things subject to our control. It does not deal at all with things that are necessary and universal.

Art. 4. Counsel does not deal with everything we do, but only with matters of some importance. As regards matters of minor importance, the adage holds good: "Little is reputed as nothing." Lack of order in little things is not always a venial sin; it can be a mere imperfection.

Art. 5. Counsel proceeds analytically. Analytical order begins with something that is prior in cognition but posterior in existence. Now the principle in counsel is the end, which, in intention, is prior to counsel, but posterior in existence.

The order of deliberation, then, descends from the end intended to the first medium, whereas the order of execution is just the inverse. It ascends from the lowest medium to ultimate attainment. In the order of execution, life is first, study and knowledge second. But, in the order of intention, philosophical contemplation, and, a fortiori, Christian contemplation, stand higher than material or economic life. For the sake of this higher life, public executive power preserves peace in the state.

Art. 6. Counsel cannot proceed to infinity. It begins with principles of practical reason, and terminates in practical conclusions. Neglect of this conclusion constitutes scrupulosity. Is this good deed done out of pride? Ah, but even asking myself this question may be owing to false humility!

[6] Ia–IIae, q.17, a.5, ad 3um.

A doubt. May we counsel a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater? On this matter we find two extreme opinions. Some say that the lesser evil in relation to the greater is really good. Others deny, for various reasons. The lesser evil, even if compared with the greater evil, is still an evil, hence cannot be chosen, but at best be tolerated. This reason seems to be apodictic, if we are dealing with acts that are intrinsically evil. St. Thomas, proving that a lie is always a sin, that we cannot licitly lie even to avoid a homicide, continues thus: "We are not allowed to do anything illicit to avoid danger or harm. We are not allowed to tell a lie in order to deliver another from peril. But we are allowed to hide the truth prudently." [7] A minor physical evil may be counseled to avoid a greater evil. But he who counsels a lesser moral evil is the cause of that evil, and therefore sins.

Third opinion. This opinion is affirmative, but with many limitations. For this view, which Alvarez says is the more common Thomistic view, we note three considerations. First, Aristotle says that the lesser evil in comparison with a greater is really a good, supposing that we cannot avoid both evils and as long as we cannot avoid them. Secondly, the lesser evil shall not be intrinsically evil. In elections, for example, we cannot approve a program that is intrinsically evil in order to prevent one that is worse. Thirdly, the two evils must threaten one and the same person. Thus, in Jeremias,[8] ten men gave Ismael their treasures that he might not kill them. But Lot sinned, so St. Augustine says, when he counseled the men of Sodom to abuse his daughters in order to avoid the sin of sodomy. Still, when only a slight danger threatens a third person, we can counsel a lesser evil, at least a physical evil, in order to avoid a greater evil.

In summary, prudence must decide. In elections, for example, a person may commend a good candidate, so that men may not be tempted to choose between two evil candidates.

[7] Ia–IIae, q.110, a.3, ad 4um.
[8] Chap. 41.

THE ACT OF CONSENT (Q. 15)

Here, briefly, are the four conclusions of St. Thomas. 1. Consent is an act of the appetitive power. 2. Consent, properly speaking, is not found in brute animals. 3. Consent, properly speaking, deals, not with the end, but with the means to the end, thus differing from intention. 4. Consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, because consent is the final sentence on what is to be done. As long as the proposal is still subject to judgment, we do not have the final sentence. Consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, which includes also the will. Thus consent to mortal sin always belongs to higher reason, at least indirectly or negatively or imputatively. The higher judge revokes the unjust sentence of the lower judge, otherwise the higher judge himself becomes guilty. Thus mortal sin is always aversion from the last end, which higher reason is bound to consider.[9]

THE ACT OF USING (Q. 16)

We distinguish active use, which belongs to the will, from passive use, which belongs to the executive faculties. And we deal here directly with active use. Here, briefly, are the four articles of St. Thomas. 1. Active use properly belongs to the will, because the will moves other powers to their operations. Active use is an act, formally immanent and virtually transitive. 2. This act, properly speaking, is not found in brutes, because brutes do not know purpose or utility as such. 3. Use is concerned with media, with the means useful to an end. We do not use the end, we enjoy it. The last end, indeed, is useless, properly speaking, because it is above utility, not below. Thus Aristotle says that metaphysics is useless, that is, it is above utility and is sought for its own sake, thus differing from the arts, especially the mechanical arts. But metaphysics uses logic, as theology uses sciences lower than itself.

[9] Ia–IIae, q.74, a.7.

The superior uses the inferior, but the inferior, properly speaking, does not use the superior. 4. Use differs from choice, and follows it. Choice belongs to the order of second intention, namely, deliberation, whereas active use belongs to the order of execution. In choice the will possesses the end affectively, but in active use it tends to the end effectively. Choice is concerned with the medium as future, whereas use deals with the same medium as present. Use, here and now, overcomes the difficulties bound in execution itself. Many men choose easily, but fail in carrying out their choice.

Further, we choose first those media that are nearer to the end, and then descend to the lower media. To attain health, I first choose a physician, and then tell a servant to call him, and so on. In the order of execution, on the contrary, I first call the servant. God predestines first to glory, but in the order of execution, glory comes last. Again, since the acts of the will are self-reflective, in each act we can distinguish consent, choice, and use: the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself to consent and to choose, and these acts are all destined to that which is first. Again, the will uses reason to deliberate, and this use precedes choice. Then, deliberation ended, the will freely uses reason to direct choice, and thus the ultimate judgment is free.

Cajetan, commenting on this article, gives a division of the twelve acts which nearly coincides with what is commonly admitted. But he does not sufficiently notice that every act of the will is preceded by a correlative act of the intellect.

ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (Q. 17)

The command here in question is not a political command, whereby a king or a superior commands his subjects, but that personal command whereby man governs himself and his powers, which we call self-government, self-control. The present question is perfectly ordered.

Art. 1. Some theologians, Suarez and Vasquez, for ex-

ample, say that command is not a special act, since the preceding judgment directs choice. Thomists, and many others, say that command is a special act, belonging to the intellect, but presupposing an act of the will.

Three conclusions.

First. Acts of the will and acts of the reason interact on one another, in virtue of the axiom: Causes are mutual causes, though in diverse genera.

Second. Command is an act of reason, because order, arrangement, intimation belong to reason, and command is a kind of intimation. Command differs from the practical judgment, as the two following propositions differ: One says, "this is to be done," for example, tomorrow; the other says, "do this, here and now."

Third. Command presupposes an act of the will, because the first mover among the powers of the soul is the will itself. Now the command moves to execution, at least secondarily and participatively.

Suarez objects: No other act of the intellect is required but that of the practical judgment. Answer: Since nothing can be willed unless it is foreknown, a special act of the will presuppose a special act of the intellect. Hence active use, being a special act of the will, distinct from choice, presupposes a special act of the intellect, distinct from practical judgment.

Cajetan notes that the act of command includes three elements: to ordain, to intimate, to move. It ordains execution of media, here and now, not like choice, but in the inverse order, beginning with the lowest and ascending to the highest. Secondly, command intimates execution by saying, not indicatively "This must be done," but imperatively, "Do this." To intimate is to announce, to manifest, and this is an act belonging to the intellect. Thirdly, command moves toward execution. This act belongs, secondarily and participatively, to the intellect by reason of the preceding act of choice, the power of which remains in the subsequent act. Therefore command is a special act, an act of reason, which

presupposes an act of the will. Thus St. Thomas says that prayer is, properly speaking, an act of the intellect, being a quasi-command of an inferior to a superior.[10]

Corollary. The order of execution is clearly distinguished from the order of choice, because active use is distinguished from choice. Thus a new order begins. Suarez did not sufficiently notice this truth. The reason is that in the order of execution new difficulties arise, which demand not only a new effort of the will, but also a new ordination and intimation of the intellect. Many men judge well and choose well, but fail in execution, by reason of these new difficulties, many of which could not be foreseen, or, if foreseen, did not then move as they do now when they are present. Thus execution demands a new direction of reason, a direction distinct from the practical judgment, almost as existence is distinct from essence. The command "Do this," here and now, deals with media as present, whereas the judgment, "This should be done," deals with these same media as future.

Confirmation. Just as a prince or a superior must not only judge that something is to be done, but must also command it, so in our personal life, since nothing is willed unless foreknown, command is the ultimate intimating judgment.

Six Objections

1. Since we should not multiply realities without necessity, the practical judgment, if continued, suffices to direct the execution. Answer: The practical judgment would suffice if you disregard all ensuing difficulties.

2. But the preceding practical judgment, as distinct from speculative judgment, had already considered the media in their here and now. Answer: The practical judgment had already considered the media, as here and now desirable, I grant: as here and now to be carried out, I deny.

3. But even for execution thus understood, an act of the will suffices, that act, namely, which we call active use. An-

[10] IIa–IIae, q.83, a.1.

swer: To move toward execution belongs, properly and primarily, to the will, I grant: belongs to the will, secondarily and participatively, I deny.

4. Decree is the same as command, and decree belongs to the will. Thus even Thomists speak of the decrees of the divine will. We distinguish. Decree, in the wider sense, belongs to the will, yes; decree, in the proper sense, belongs to the will, no. Decree in the wider sense is identical with the choice of the will, and thus precedes execution.

5. St. Thomas himself writes as follows: "Let us consider the acts commanded by the will." Answer: The will commands, in a wider sense, by moving, yes. A command, even taken strictly, does belong to the will, not substantially, but causatively and originally, because from the will it gets its power of moving. Thus law is an act of reason, but also an expression of the lawgiver's will. Command, dominion, as intimating and directing, belongs to the intellect, but, as moving, it belongs to the will.

6. Charity commands all other virtues, and charity is in the will. Answer: Charity commands in the wider sense of the word, that is, it moves just as the will does. But when it commands in the proper sense, it does so by a mediating act of the intellect, i.e., of faith or of infused prudence. The intellect differentiates the act of the will, but exercises its act under the influence of the will.

Art. 2. Command does not belong to the brute order, because only reason can ordain and arrange.

Art. 3. Command precedes use, which it directs. But the acts, both of reason and of will, are self-reflective.

Art. 4. The command and the act commanded constitute one human moral act, just as two physical acts make one moral act, by being mutually related, as are matter and form, or body and soul. Thus we explain the unity of the mystical body, expressed by St. Paul when he says; "I live, yet not I, but Christ lives in me." This unity is more than a unity *secundum quid*. Christ and His living members constitute

one reality, not in the physical order, but in the moral order.

Art. 5–9. What acts are subject to command? These acts are divided into four classes: acts of the will, of reason, of sense-appetite, of the body.

1. Acts of the will: in a wide sense, consent and choice are commanded; in the proper sense, active use is commanded.

2. Acts of the reason: first, as regards exercise: sudden thoughts, continued or not; and deliberate study. Then, as regards specification, we have opinion, the act of faith, the last practical judgment.

3. Acts of the sense-appetite: acts which depend on reason's power over the imagination, but not acts arising from indisposed organs, or from unforeseen acts of the imagination.

4. External acts, depending, not on the vegetative powers, but on the sense-powers, e.g., acts of our hands and feet. Acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to the command of reason, because they are not mediated by knowledge, and depend on dispositions of the body which are not in our power. This synopsis is explained in the following articles.

Art. 5. Acts of the will can be commanded, with the exception of the first volition wherein man does not move himself but is moved by God. But this act is not deliberate, though surely it can be free. Intention and choice are commanded in a wider sense, because they are preceded by a command in the strict sense. Active use follows this command. *Per accidens,* however, choice itself can be commanded, when a man who is slow in choosing finally says to himself: "You must choose, now choose."

Art. 6. Acts of reason can be commanded in three different ways.

1. Thoughts that arise unforeseen come under the command of reason, to be admitted or refused or continued or interrupted. Thus it is with the first thought of all moral life, to which God moves us immediately. Thus also with

many divine inspirations; thus also with evil thoughts, arising from temptation, by means of the imagination.

2. Certain acts of reason can be commanded only as regards exercise. But evident truths necessitate assent. Thus it is with principles and demonstrated conclusions. But adherence is free when we are dealing with opinions or with inevident postulates.

3. Certain acts of reason are commanded even as regards objective specification. Thus it is with opinion, and the act of faith, and the ultimate practical judgment.

Art. 7. Some acts of the sense-appetite can be commanded, but not those acts which necessarily arise from dispositions of the body, from too great heat, or from illness, or from unforeseen motions of concupiscence. On the contrary, those acts are subject to our command which arise from the imagination, for the imagination can be ruled by reason.

Here we pause to notice more clearly the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the first motions of sensuality. He speaks as follows: "It happens at times that the motions of the sense-appetite are suddenly aroused by imagination or sense. Such motions are not under the command of reason, but could have been impeded if reason had foreseen them." Now since human reason, even when diligent, cannot foresee everything, the first motions of sensuality are not always sinful. "Reason's control of the passions is not despotic but diplomatic." "Imagination, the stronger it is, the more it is subject to reason. But when the imagination is weak, by reason of indisposition of its organ, it may fail in forming appropriate images."

Art. 8. The acts of the vegetative soul and of the correlative organs are not subject to the command of reason. We cannot command nutrition, or growth, or the movement of the heart, or the natural alterations of the organs of generation. In the state of innocence, by a supernatural privilege, concupiscence was perfectly subject to reason, but original sin left nature to itself.

Art. 9. The acts of the external members (hands, feet, head), since they are controlled by the sense-powers, just as in brutes, are subject to command, by reason of their dependence on the imagination, which can be controlled by reason.

Corollary. Man's dominion over himself and over his acts justifies the statement quoted by St. Thomas from Boethius. "Those levels of creation which are nearest to the First Mind transcend the order of fate. The farther away creation is from the First Mind, the more is it bound by the ropes of fate, by the necessity arising from second causes." [11]

The wise man rules the stars.[12] Contemplation, elevating the mind to God, frees the soul from the fatality of the laws of nature. Here lies the progressive perfectibility of the human personality.

[11] Ia, q.116, a.4.
[12] Ia–IIae, q.9, a.5.

THIRD PART

MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

CHAPTER XVI

Sources of Good and Evil (q. 18)

PRELIMINARIES

So far we have studied, psychologically, the twelve acts which concur to form one deliberate and consummate moral act. Now we are to consider these acts morally, under three heads: in their genus (q. 18), in their specific differences, interior and exterior (qq. 19 and 20), in their consequences, namely, merit and sin (q. 21).

These thirty articles, which at first sight may seem repetitious, are in reality very original. Certain modern historians forget that without speculative penetration you cannot know St. Thomas even historically.

ERRORS REGARDING MORALITY

These errors can be reduced to five. Hedonism (morality based on pleasure); utilitarianism (founded on utility, either personal or social); subjectivism (founded on the categorical imperative of conscience); eudaemonism (founded on rational beatitude, but lacking sanction, freedom, and obligation); fideism (founded on God's positive law).


Above these errors stands traditional ethics, that is, morality founded on good-in-itself, guided by right reason as proximate standard, and by the eternal law as supreme standard.

The Syllabus [1] condemns absolute evolutionism, according to which God Himself comes into existence by the evolution of humanity. God is one and the same thing with the world,

[1] D. 1756–1764.

spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, truth with falsehood, evil with good, justice with injustice. St. Thomas synthesizes all the truths found scattered in other systems, finding these systems true in what they affirm, false in what they deny. Here follows a synopsis of that synthesis.

Eternal Law



Natural Law

Human Law
Custom

Revealed Law { necessary / positive

Ecclesiastical Law
Custom

Reason

Conscience	Faith
Desire for Beatitude	Hope
Natural Love of God	Charity
Moral Science	Moral Theology

Prudence

The Will	Justice
Sense Powers	Temperance
	Fortitude

The Moral Act

ART. 1. HUMAN ACTS, INTRINSICALLY GOOD OR INTRINSICALLY BAD?

Preliminaries

Here we meet two errors, mutually opposed. Followers of Spinoza hold that no action is morally evil because man has no liberty. Men do evil only when they do not know what is good. The arguments in favor of this absolute optimism (really, a very sad thing) are identical with the objections which open this article: first, evil does not act except by virtue of good; secondly, nothing acts except so far as it is actual, and therefore good; thirdly, evil cannot be a cause. Thus murder would not be morally evil, but only a lesser good, an

imperfection. Scotus modifies, saying that no action is intrinsically evil except to hate God.

The opposite error is that of Luther and Calvin, who say that all works done before justification are really sins,[2] and that, in all his deeds, even the just man sins, at least venially, or even mortally, and hence deserves eternal punishment, and is not condemned only because God does not impute these works unto condemnation.[3] These propositions have been condemned as heretical.

Thesis: Some Actions Are Morally Good, Some Are Evil.

Authority: "Every one who does evil hates the light, and does not come to the light, that his works may not be condemned. But he who does the truth comes to the light, that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God." [4]

Reason speaks thus: Every voluntary action which lacks the fullness of the reality due to it is deficient in good, is morally bad. But among human actions many are thus deficient, in quantity (refusing to pay a debt), or in place (theft in church). Hence not every human act is morally good. This argument is independent of divine positive precepts.

God's fullness of being rests on simple deity, hence God alone can in no way be deficient. The creature's plentitude arises, not from simplicity, but from many different factors: its substance, its faculties, its acts. Hence creatures can fall away from the fullness due to them. Just as blindness, e.g., is a physical evil, so the human act, while it is a reality which comes from God, is simply evil, mortally or venially, if it lacks the plentitude due to it.

But note [5] that what is simply good and even meritorious (for instance, a remiss act of charity) may still be imperfect. A man who has five talents, but acts as if he had only two, performs an act that is simply good, though it is deficient in intensity. Such an act is an imperfection, but not a venial sin.

[2] *Ibid.*, 817.
[3] *Ibid.*, 835.
[4] John 3:20.
[5] Ia, q.5, a.1, ad 1um.

Some recent writers, neglecting this truth, maintain that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, there is no distinction between imperfection and venial sin. To speak thus is to confound counsel with precept, to confound a positive precept with a negative precept.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. An act that is simply evil is *secundum quid* good, being a reality in the physical order. But, since it lacks the rectitude due to it, it is morally evil, not a minor good.

2. The blind man who walks possesses a good in so far as he can walk, thus differing from the paralytic, but his deed of walking lacks perfection.

3. An evil action may result in a physical good (adultery begetting a child), but looked at morally it is simply evil, since it lacks direction by reason.

First corollary. Spinoza and Hegel confound the simple evil with a lesser good. In Hegel's evolutionistic terms, thesis and antithesis are good in their time, but less good than the higher synthesis which follows. Art, which can very often be pantheistic, is a thesis; while religion, a metaphorical representation of God, is an antithesis; and evolutionistic philosophy is the synthesis. Each is good in its time. Even the crimes of the French and the Russian Revolution, while they are a lesser good than Christian sanctity, are not simply evil.

This doctrine comes from denying the distinction between being and non-being, which are identified in the "becoming" (*fieri*) of creative evolution. Hence follows also the denial of the distinction between truth and falsehood, between good and evil. Thus materialism would not be simply false, but true for its time, for its moment. The crimes of Bolshevism would not be simply evil, but only an evil *secundum quid* when a higher synthesis appears.

Second corollary. If we remove the metaphysical primacy of reality in relation to becoming, we destroy radically the distinction between moral good and moral evil. Modernists

speak thus: "Truth is not more immutable than man himself, since with him, and in him, and through him truth is evolved." [6] The traditional doctrine teaches that, in virtue of the principle of contradiction, there is absolute opposition between reality and nothing, between the simply true and the simply false, between the simply good and the simply evil. The opposite doctrine of absolute evolutionism, condemned in the Syllabus,[7] runs thus: "No supreme, wise, and provident divinity exists, no divinity distinct from this universe. God, identified with nature, and hence subject to change, really comes into existence in man and in the world. All things are God and have the very substance of God. As God is identified with the world, so is spirit identified with matter, necessity with liberty, truth with falsehood, good with evil, justice with injustice."

The Essence of Morality

What is the moral essence of human action as distinguished from its physical entity? Nominalists answer, either that morality is an extrinsic denomination, as paper becomes money by an extrinsic denomination derived from the will of the prince, or morality is a mere relation of reason, hence identified with liberty itself. Others say that morality is a predicamental relation. Thomists hold that morality is a real transcendental relation to its objective standard. This thesis can be proved, indirectly and directly.

Indirect proof. First. Moral goodness consists in a plenitude of being, arising from relation to the end which is its objective standard. Now, though the end is an extrinsic cause, still the right proportion to that end, the relation to that end, inheres in the action itself. Moral goodness is in truth a positive perfection, existing objectively in human acts, caused by human virtue and God's grace. Second. Morality presupposes liberty, but is not identified with liberty. Liberty is indeed

[6] D.2058.
[7] *Ibid.*, 1701.

the indispensable subject of morality, because necessary acts are not subject to moral standards. But we must first conceive liberty before we can conceive morality. By the very fact that we conceive an act as going forth from the will under an indifferent judgment, we conceive that act as free, but not yet as moral, because we do not as yet conceive the standard to which that act is subject. To illustrate: think of an act of theft performed with the intention of adultery. Here we have a twofold moral evil, but only one free act. We grant, however, that every free act is a moral act and every moral act is a free act, because, as we will see later, every act done freely is either morally good or morally evil, at least by the agent's intention.

Direct proof. Morality consists formally in a transcendental and real relation to its objective standard. Preserving proper proportion, we must speak of act in its moral essence as we speak of act in its natural essence. But act, in its natural essence, is a transcendental relation to its objective standard. As sight is related to a colored object, as intellect to reality, as volition to good, so moral volition is a transcendental relation to the objective moral standard.

This relation is not one of reason, it exists in the moral act itself, independently of man's thought. The saint differs from the criminal, not only in idea, but in fact. Further, it is not a predicamental relation, accidentally superadded. It is related to its object, not merely as a terminus, but as its differentiating specification. An illustration: think of an act of charity, transcendentally related to God as its object.

Objection: The full goodness of the human act is surely not a mere relation. Answer: This fullness, while it cannot rest on a mere predicamental relation, does arise from the truth that human reason is essentially and transcendentally related to its object.

The Different Kinds of Morality

Goodness and malice are the two differences ordinarily assigned. Should we also speak of indifference as a species of

morality? Answer: Moral evil can be considered, either as something positive, namely, a transcendental relation to an object dissonant from moral standards, or as something privative, the privation of harmony and rectitude.

Take a sin of commission. Is its essence something positive? Our own view is affirmative, supported by many Thomists: Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, Massoulié, Gonet, Billuart, whereas the negative answer is held by Sylvius, Contenson, Bancel.

Does indifference constitute a species of morality? We affirm, with John of St. Thomas, Contenson, Billuart, and many others, against the Salmanticenses and Gonet.

Proof. An act that is indifferent proceeds from a deliberate will, under subjection to a moral standard which does not command or prohibit, but only permits. Such an act, indifferent in its object, is still subject to the permissive moral law. Hence indifference is a species of morality. "If we speak of a moral act according to its species, then not every moral act is good or evil, but some acts are indifferent." [8]

Summary. Moral goodness is a transcendental relation to an object which conforms to the law. Moral evil is a transcendental relation to an object forbidden by law. Moral indifference is a transcendental relation to an object permitted by the law.

THE SOURCES OF MORALITY (Q. 18)

ART. 1. WHETHER HUMAN ACTS ARE GOOD OR SOME OF THEM BAD

Preliminaries

St. Thomas assigns three sources: object, circumstance, and purpose. The purpose here in mind is not that objective purpose which is identified with the object, but the subjective purpose which is the principal circumstance. This has not been sufficiently noted by historians who have recently

[8] *De malo*, q.2, a.5.

treated of this part of the *Summa*. The primary and essential source of morality is the natural object of the act: God, for an act of charity, our neighbor's good (in giving alms), our neighbor's harm (in stealing).

Chief among secondary sources is the subjective purpose of the agent, in three ways. A good act becomes evil by an evil intention (to give alms for the sake of vanity). An evil act does not become good by a good intention (to lie in order to save our neighbor's life). One and the same act can have two species, either of goodness or of malice, one from the object and the other from the purpose (to give alms in order to satisfy for sin).

Another secondary source are circumstances, which either aggravate or diminish goodness or evil in the same species (to steal much or to steal little), or which even change the very species of the moral act (to steal a sacred thing or in a sacred place).

In one and the same act, we may have a multiple morality. An act, good by its object and purpose (e.g., almsgiving), becomes venially evil, for example, by vainglory. Such an act, though it is meritorious of eternal life, is simultaneously an evil *secundum quid,* an evil which must undergo temporal punishment.

ART. 2. MAN'S ACTION DERIVES ITS FIRST AND ESSENTIAL GOODNESS OR BADNESS FROM ITS NATURAL OBJECT

Preliminaries

By object we understand the direct and primary goal of the act. Thus God is the object of charity, our neighbor's property is the object of theft. And we are now looking at this object, not physically, but morally, for example, at our neighbor's property, not as a car or a purse, but as something taken from its unwilling master. One and the same act considered physically (e.g., killing a man) is morally good if done for the sake of justice by an executioner, or morally evil when done

by an assassin. Our thesis, then, asserts that the primary and essential goodness or evil of the human act flows from the moral object of that act.

Authority speaks: "They have become abominable as the things which they love." [9] They love adultery, say, or the property of another. Reason speaks: As a natural thing is specifically distinguished by its form, so action by the object to which it essentially tends. This principle holds, not only for first and essential goodness, but also for first and essential evil, since malice is opposed to goodness. As the first physical evil is lack of substantial form (a monster generated instead of a man), so the first moral evil is lack of conformity with the act's natural standard.

To explain. Action is specifically differentiated by its object. This truth holds good, not only for actions, but also for potentialities and habits. This principle, which Reginaldus [10] lays down as the third of the three fundamental principles of St. Thomas, illumines all psychology, ethics, and moral theology.

We here suppose that there are differentiated species in created things, and that essence is the primary constituent element. The nominalists, Occam, Peter de Alliaco, and Gerson, say that essences are not knowable. Evolutionists say that the essences of things are not stable, yea, that all essences are united in a universal flux, so that from a monkey a man can be generated. Here too it would follow that there is no objective difference between good and evil. This is explicitly affirmed by Occam: No act is morally good or evil by its genus, that is, by its object. It has its goodness or evil only from the positive law of God known by revelation. This theological positivism is held by Scotus, who excepts only two acts, the love of God and the hatred of God. It seems, according to Scotus,[11] that the essences of creatures depend on the free will

[9] Osee 9:11.
[10] *De tribus principiis S. Thomae.*
[11] *Opera,* XIX, 148; XXIV, 377; XXI, 537.

of God. God could have so created man that a son would be bound to kill his aged father, in order to deliver him from the miseries of life. Positivists and evolutionists, since they reject the positive law of God known by revelation, cannot recognize any moral obligation.

Let us add here that this primary objective morality does not change even if circumstances and purpose change. Thus adultery is primarily and essentially an evil by reason of its object, that is, intercourse with another man's wife. Nature remains invariable, while circumstances and purpose change.

Objections Analyzed

1. In natural objects considered physically there is no moral evil. But in these same objects, seen as standards of human activity, there is moral evil.

2. When we use the word "matter," we mean, not the matter "from which" (*ex qua*), but the matter "concerning which" (*circa quam*).

3. Although the goodness of the action is not caused by the goodness of the effect, still the proportion of the action to its effect is the reason for the goodness of the action, because the object differentiates the action as it is in intention. The causality of the effect is formal and final, not efficient.

4. Moral goodness or malice comes, not from the object, but from the law. Answer: From the law mediately, as its standard, but immediately from the object as specificating form, because action is a motion and a way to the object.

But note that the specificating object may be either good-in-itself, or good only because it is commanded (fasting on Saturday rather than on some other day). The object good-in-itself exercises immediate differentiation, whereas the object good-by-law differentiates mediately.

5. The human act receives its primary morality from the goal to which it tends, while the object is willed only on account of the end. Hence morality comes primarily from the purpose. Thus certain historians, who distort a doctrine com-

monly admitted. Answer: What the human act directly regards is the objective end (*finis operis*), not the subjective end (*finis operantis*). The objective end coincides with the object. The subjective end enters as an accident. Almsgiving aims, directly and primarily, to relieve the poor. To this objective purpose may be added a subjective purpose, the intention, say, of satisfying for sin.

6. When a man says, "I wish to live right" or "I do not wish to live right," his act does not have its specific goodness or malice from the object, otherwise this will would precontain the goodness of all virtues or the malice of all vices. Answer: The act, "I wish to live right," has indeed many material objects, but it is differentiated specifically by the common object, namely, good-in-itself, just as metaphysics, say, is specifically differentiated by being and reality.

A doubt. From what habit does this act come, namely, "I wish to live right?" Answer: If this act follows justification, it comes from charity. If it precedes justification, it comes from the will alone, as naturally inclined to good-in-itself. The opposite act, "I do not wish to live right," gets its specific difference from useful or delightful good. No one can choose evil as evil.

ART. 3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL GOODNESS OR BADNESS

Preliminaries

Circumstance is an accident which affects the human act in its essential morality. Seven circumstances are enumerated: who, what, where, by what aid, why, how, and when. To illustrate: the agent is a priest, the object is sacred, the place is public or sacred, the instrument is invocation of the demon, the purpose of the agent is evil, the mode is intense, say, or scornful, the time is a festival day, or a longer or shorter period.

Thesis: The human act derives some goodness or evil from circumstances.

Authority. In almsgiving or fasting or prayer, Christ forbids the intention of vainglory. The virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and according to other circumstances.[12]

Reason. We must judge of goodness or evil in human acts by analogy with goodness or evil in natural things. But natural things are good or evil not only by their substantial form but also by their accidents, e.g., proportion in members, in stature, figure and color. Similarly theft is always bad, but theft in a sacred place is worse.

ART. 4. PURPOSE AS CIRCUMSTANCE

Purpose stands here, not for the natural and objective purpose of the deed, but for the subjective intention of the agent.

Thesis. The human act derives goodness or evil from the agent's subjective purpose.

Authority. "Beware of doing justice in order to be seen by men." "If thine eye is evil, thy whole body is in darkness." [13]

Reason. In dependent things, just as their existence depends on agent and form, so does their goodness depend on their purpose. Thus everything created depends on at least three causes: one intrinsic (form), two extrinsic (agent and purpose). But things that are relative, while they are specifically differentiated by their objective purpose, are also related to and dependent on, the agent's purpose as extrinsic goal.

First corollary. In human action we must distinguish a fourfold goodness: 1. according to genus, looking at the action physically; 2. in its moral species, which comes from its objective goal; 3. in its circumstances, which are its accidents; 4. in its subjective purpose.

But does not St. Thomas say that the subjective purpose is itself a circumstance? Answer: Yes, this purpose is a circum-

[12] Aristotle, *Eth.* II, 6.
[13] Matt. 6:1.

stance as related to the commanded exterior act, but not as related to the interior act, the intention. Thus when a man gives alms for vainglory, this vainglory is a circumstance of the exterior act, but since it specificates the intention immediately, it also mediately specificates the exterior act. Hence the agent's personal purpose, while it is a circumstance, must be distinguished from other circumstances, since it may pass over into a specificating element.

Second corollary. An action is not simply good unless all four kinds of goodness concur. Proof lies in the often quoted word of Denis, namely, good arises from full cause, evil from any defect. Now defect may arise from any lack of conformity with the moral law.

To explain. 1. The aforesaid deformity arises, not only from the object, but also from circumstances and purpose. The act is an evil act, even though it may be good in its object and circumstances, if it is evil by the subjective purpose of the agent. Further, action is simply evil, if it is good only by the purpose of the agent, but intrinsically evil from its object (a lie, say, in order to save the life of our neighbor).

2. An action can be simply good, according to all the aforesaid kinds of goodness, and yet be imperfect in its mode (e.g., a remiss act of charity, or refusal of an unbinding inspiration). Such an act is an imperfection, but not a venial sin.

3. Further, an action may be simply good, in all the preceding four ways, if you consider its principal element, but it can at the same time be venially culpable from a secondary standpoint (e.g., a sermon, good by object, purpose, and circumstances, but venially sinful by a sudden movement of vanity or impatience). Such an act is simply good and meritorious, but with an attendant evil which calls for temporal punishment. Martyrdom itself may be disturbed by slight motions of impatience or cowardice, which are not in conformity with right reason.

Objection. But then venial sin is an act distinct from the work which is simply good. Answer: It can be a distinct act,

but it can also be a secondary mode in the principal act (e.g., complacency, or a bitter tone, in defending the truth). Is the martyr to be deprived of his crown because of a passing emotion of cowardice? It is true that martyrdom, in the last instant, satisfies for all venial sins, but even before this last instant the act was simply good. Further, if a slight deordination suffices to make the whole act simply bad, we could hardly find any good act even in holy men. And this conclusion is palpably absurd. How very few, even in the most heroic saints, are deeds unaffected by vainglory, for instance, or selfishness, or self-complacency, or remissness, or excess, or precipitation, or inconsideration! How few are penitents whose penance is not accompanied by some defect or excess! How few superiors correct with no excess of zeal or anger! How few preachers are unmoved by self-complacency! How few are men who pray without distraction!

ART. 5. GOOD AND EVIL DIFFERENTIATE HUMAN ACTS SPECIFICALLY

Preliminaries

We have seen that human acts receive their goodness or malice from object and purpose. The precise question now is this: Is the morality arising from the object specific? Is the act, for instance, of killing an innocent man intrinsically and essentially evil? Would it remain evil even if God would revoke all positive precepts? Scotus [14] says no. He holds that no act is evil by object alone, no act except to hate God. He adds that killing, if God revoked all positive precepts, would not be evil. St. Thomas holds the opposite view, as is clear from the objections preceding this article.

1. Good and evil exist in acts just as they do in things. But in things good and evil do not diversify species. To illustrate: A man who is well and man who is dying belong to the same species.

[14] See note 11.

2. Evil is a privation, and therefore cannot constitute the specific difference of any sin except that of omission.

Scotus and the nominalists, departing from tradition, prepared the way for the positivists, who deny specific distinction between good and evil. Evil, they say, is mere ignorance of what is useful and delightful. Taine said that virtue and vice are natural effects, like sugar and arsenic, arsenic not being specifically injurious, since in small quantities it can be used as a remedy.

Thesis. Good and evil diversify moral acts specifically.

Authority. Aristotle: "Habits that are similar bring forth acts that are similar." Now a good habit differs specifically from a bad habit, generosity, for example, from prodigality. The Holy See [15] has condemned the proposition of the laxists, who hold that masturbation, fornication, and onanism are not intrinsically evil by their object. The following propositions were condemned by Innocent XI: [16] 1. Fornication is evil only because it is forbidden. 2. Masturbation is not prohibited by the law of nature. Hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory. The Holy Office [17] condemned the following propositions: 1. It is probable that the onanistic use of matrimony is not prohibited by the natural law. The response says that the proposition is scandalous and erroneous, and implicitly condemned by Innocent XI. 2. To a further question, whether the imperfect use of matrimony, whether onanistic or sodomistic, be licit, the answer was, "illicit because intrinsically evil."

Hence we can no longer hold the following sentences: No act is evil by its object except to hate God: No act against creatures is mortally sinful by its nature, but only by divine precept. Adultery and murder would not be sins if God recalled His positive precept.

Reason. Acts are specifically differentiated by their objects.

[15] D. 1198.
[16] *Ibid.*, 1199.
[17] *Ibid.*

Good and evil constitute a specific difference in objects as related to right reason. Hence certain acts are essentially in harmony with reason, just as their objects are. Certain acts are not reasonable.

In this argument right reason is assigned as the proximate foundation of obligation. Good-in-itself belongs essentially to right reason, whereas evil does not. For the rational animal, that is good which belongs to him by reason, and evil is that which disagrees with right reason.

First corollary. The first principle of ethics is "do good, avoid evil," that is, "live according to reason."

Second corollary. If, as maintained by empiricism and positivism, reason were not essentially distinct from imagination, then men, not knowing the specific difference between good and moral evil, would not know that good in itself is something higher than delectable or useful good.

Third corollary. Spinoza's denial of free will destroys the specific distinction between good and evil, since liberty is a *conditio sine qua non* of morality. In Spinoza's view, Bolshevism would be nothing more than a kind of sickness.

Fourth corollary. Here appears the essential distinction between the natural law, impressed on our nature, and the divine positive law. This corollary is against Scotus, Occam, Peter of Alliaco, and Gerson.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Even in objects of nature, good and evil are essentially diverse. A dead body and a living body do not belong to the same species.

2. How can evil, which is a privation, constitute the specific difference, not only of the sin of omission, but also that of commission? Answer: Since evil is a privation of good that is due to the subject, an act is called evil in its species, not because it has no object, but because it has an object that is not in harmony with reason. Thus the object can positively constitute the species of an evil act.

Cajetan quotes St. Thomas: [18] Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in the moral world, where acts receive their species from their objective purpose. Now, since good is the reason why an object is end and purpose, good and evil are the specific differences in the moral world. But good is end and purpose *per se,* whereas evil is so only in so far as it removes the end which is due. The remotion of this due end constitutes a species, but only because it is united to an undue end.

Evil as evil is not a constitutive difference, but only by reason of the good in which it is found. The sin of commission is aversion from God with conversion to that created good by which the sin of commission is differentiated.[19] Thus sin is distinguished by its opposite virtue, and virtue by its object. Hence the formal constituent of a sin of commission is not privation, but the positive thing which is the basis of the privation, the positive tendency to an object which does not agree with right reason.

ART. 6. THE INTENTION IS DIFFERENTIATED BY PERSONAL PURPOSE

Preliminaries

Does the personal purpose diversify human acts specifically, or is it merely a circumstance? Much depends on this question. On it depends, for example, the question whether two sins are to be declared in confession or only one.

Objections

1. Acts are differentiated by the object, and the personal purpose is not identified with the object.

2. It seems to be a mere accidental blemish that a man gives alms for vainglory; hence, notwithstanding this subjective purpose, the act remains essentially good.

[18] Ia, q.48, a.1, ad 2um.
[19] Ia–IIae, q.72, a.1.

3. Acts which differ specifically can be devoted to vainglory.

Two conclusions. First: Intention, the interior act of the will, is specificated by personal purpose. Second: The exterior act, the commanded act, is differentiated, directly by the object, indirectly by the subjective purpose.

The first conclusion is proved thus: Acts are differentiated by their object, and the subjective purpose is, properly speaking, the object of the intention, the interior act of the will. This truth holds good, not only for intention, but for every interior act of the will. To illustrate: A man commands himself to give alms for vainglory. Here we have, first, intention commanding choice, then choice, commanding a second subordinated choice, the choice of a subordinated means. Again, I will to have health; hence, secondly, I wish a physician; thirdly, I call a servant to seek the physician.

The second conclusion is proved thus: The act of the will is the formal and vivifying element, of which the exterior act is the material. Now the interior act is differentiated by subjective purpose. But the exterior act, although it remains immediately differentiated by its proper object, is differentiated, mediately and formally, by the purpose. The will uses the bodily members as instruments, and exterior acts enter the field of morality only as subject to the will. The act which commands and the act which is commanded, though they are physically two acts, are still only one moral act. This explains, if we are not mistaken, the concept of moral person. A college of physicians, physically multiple, has a moral unity. A similar truth holds true of the mystical body.

Corollary. One who steals in order to commit adultery is an adulterer rather than a thief, because adultery, the subjective purpose, is the form of which theft is the material. In this case there are two sins specifically distinct, to be declared in confession.

ART. 7. DIFFERENTIATION BY OBJECT IS SOMETIMES SUBORDINATED TO DIFFERENTIATION BY PURPOSE

At other times one and the same act is in two disparate species. First conclusion. The species of good which comes from objective purpose is subordinated to the species which comes from subjective purpose. Thus theft may be subordinated to avarice. And the acts of all the other virtues are subordinated *per se* to the object of charity.

Second conclusion. That species of goodness which comes from an object ordained *per accidens* to such and such an end is not contained under that other species as genus. He who steals in order to commit adultery unites in his act two disparate kinds of malice.

Corollaries

1. A choice good by the object becomes sordid by an evil intention.

2. An evil choice is not made good by a good intention, though its malice is diminished. Illustration: the man who steals in order to give alms. The end does not justify the means, when the means are intrinsically evil.

3. One and the same act can have two kinds of goodness or malice, one from the object, the other from the purpose. Illustration: to give alms (an act of mercy) in order to satisfy for sin (an act of penance), or for love of God and neighbor (an act of charity).

4. An act, good in object, purpose, and circumstances, remains simply good and meritorious, even if there supervenes secondarily something venially sinful, a tinge, say, of vainglory or of impatience.

Two Doubts

1. Is it a venial sin, or only an imperfection, to choose a lesser good when counsel invites to a greater good? Illustration: A physician hears Mass for nine days to obtain a special

grace. He finds that this exercise was no impediment to his work. Would it be better to continue hearing Mass? But, he says, I am not obliged to this, and I can well use this time for the study of medicine, a minor good indeed, but still a good, not an evil. Some authors say that in this case there is a venial sin, but of the lightest kind. Thus they deny the distinction between imperfection and venial sin, since a lesser good here and now takes on the nature of evil. Others deny this view. The act of the physician, they say, who uses his time, not to hear daily Mass, but to study medicine, is a good act, differentiated by a good object, by a legitimate motive. We embrace this second answer.

2. Is it licit to choose a minor evil in order to escape a major evil? The answer here is now clearer. The affirmative answer again comes from the relativists, for whom the lesser evil, in comparison with the greater evil, becomes a good. Those who are rigorists in regard to the lesser good become laxists on the minor evil. Such is the confusion to which relativism leads. Others reply correctly, and negatively, namely, we are not allowed to choose the minor evil to avoid the greater when the minor evil is itself evil by its object. Only under the three following conditions may we choose a minor evil in order to avoid a major evil: (a) both evils cannot be avoided: (b) the lesser evil is not intrinsically evil: (c) the two evils must threaten one and the same person. Moses rightly counseled repudiation of a wife in order to avoid her death. But Lot committed sin when he counseled the men of Sodom to abuse his daughters in order to keep these men from sodomy with Lot's guests.

ART. 8. SOME ACTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INDIFFERENT

Preliminaries

"Indifferent" signifies an act that, morally, is neither good nor bad. "Specifically" signifies the act in relation to its ob-

ject, not in relation to the individual agent. The affirmative answer is by far the more common.

Authority. "Continence is good, lust is bad, indifferent is the act of walking." [20] Condemned is the proposition of Huss which denies the existence of acts indifferent in their nature.[21]

Reason. Act is differentiated by its object in relation to right reason. Now there are acts which do not include either harmony or disharmony with reason, for instance, to walk, to write, to speak. Such acts, therefore, are in themselves indifferent, morally neither good nor bad.

Objections Analyzed

1. Since between things privatively opposed, between light and darkness, there is no medium, and since good and evil are privatively opposed, there can be no medium. Answer: If you are talking of things already existing, of darkness in relation to light, of death in relation to life: Yes, there is no medium. But in things that are coming into existence, no. For there is an intermediate indisposition between health and serious illness. Similarly, an indifferent act, like walking, becomes evil when it subserves theft. The evil purpose does not take away objective indifference, but the act, here and now, has become simply evil.

2. But there is no habit specifically indifferent, and therefore no act. Here we deny parity. Habits are acquired by individual acts, and individual acts are never indifferent. The exercise even of the mechanical arts is not indifferent in the individual.

Corollary. Acts specifically indifferent antecede all laws natural or positive. Before any divine positive law an act can be specifically good or evil. This truth condemns Occam and other nominalists, for instance, Gerson and Peter of Alliaco, who say that no act is in its genus evil, not even that of hating

[20] St. Jerome, Epist. 89.
[21] D.642.

God, but only the evil which is positively prohibited by God. It likewise condemns Scotus, who says that no act is perfectly good in its genus, that is, by its object alone, except to love God, and no act is evil by its genus, that is, by its object alone, except to hate God. These views lead to moral indifferentism and positivism.

ART. 9. NO HUMAN ACT IS INDIVIDUALLY INDIFFERENT

Preliminaries

We are not treating of indeliberate acts, such as stroking one's beard or moving one's foot, from an impulse of nature or of imagination. These are not human acts, and hence are indifferent even in the individual. Nor are we dealing with acts which are indifferent in relation to supernatural merit or demerit, with acts ethically good, of the infidel or of the sinner, e.g., almsgiving, as a natural good, but without subordination to a supernatural end. Our thesis is the common one, against Scotus and Vasquez. It is taught by St. Bellarmine, Suarez, Valentia, St. Alphonsus, and by many recent authors: Müller, Bouquillon, Simar, Noldin, Lehmkuhl, and Frins.

Authority. "Of every idle word men will give an account in the day of judgment." [22] St. Gregory explains: "Idle words are those which lack utility or necessity or piety." If it does not lack these qualities, it is good. Hence every word is either good or evil. Speech, in itself indifferent, is never so in the individual, supposing him to speak deliberately, not merely mechanically, without consciousness. "Whether you eat or drink or do anything else, do it all for the glory of God." [23] All that we do must, at least virtually and implicitly, be done for the glory of God.

Reason. As often as a man acts deliberately, he is bound to direct his action to a good end. If he does this, the action will be good, supposing that it is not evil by object or circum-

[22] Matt. 12:36.
[23] I Cor. 10:31.

stances. If he does not do so, his act will be evil, because it lacks proper personal purpose and goal. Hence there is not, and cannot be, an act that is indifferent in the individual.

The principle here is that man, as often as he acts deliberately, acts for a purpose which he establishes by a judgment of his reason. Otherwise his act would take place by chance, and there would be no reason why he would do one thing rather than another, or there would be only an unconscious finality, as in life that is merely vegetative or sensitive. Further, man, acting deliberately, must aim at an end that is in itself good and not merely indifferent, because he must act as man, as a rational agent, whereas if he neglects to act by reason he acts as a beast.

The application is clear: every deliberate act in the individual either stands under the dictate of right reason or not. If the first, then it is good; if the second, then it is evil. Hence, even if the act be indifferent by its object, it becomes good or evil by the purpose of the agent. Man acts according to nature only when he acts according to reason.

Corollaries

1. To act deliberately merely for sense-delight as an end is evil. This corollary follows from the condemnation of the following propositions. 1. Matrimonial intercourse exercised merely for pleasure is not even venially sinful. 2. To eat and drink to satiety, simply and solely for pleasure, is not a sin, supposing that it does not harm the health.[24] Man's will is intended, not to serve the senses, but to command them. Man is not indeed forbidden to have sensible delight in exercising operations necessary for the preservation either of the individual or of the species, but he is forbidden to seek these delights as his end, as brute animals do. And even the pursuit of truth, simply on account of the delight annexed to it, would be the vice of curiosity.

2. This doctrine is very consoling for men of good will. All

[24] D. 1159.

deliberate acts, even the smallest, if they are not sins, are morally good. Thus the just man merits daily an augmentation of grace and glory. This consolation fails if, with Scotus, we hold that some acts, otherwise morally good, are indifferent even in the individual.

A doubt. But is man bound to direct all his acts, not only to a good end, but also to God, at least virtually and implicitly? The answer is affirmative, and opposed to two opposite errors. Baius and the Jansenists say that man must turn all his acts to God actually, otherwise his acts are sins, since by reason of the corruption of nature, there is no medium between heavenly charity and vitiated cupidity. Hence "all the deeds of infidels are sins." This proposition was condemned by St. Pius V.[25]

The opposite error, taught by many Jesuits, says that man is not bound to direct all his acts to God even virtually, but that it suffices that they be done for something in itself good. Some (e.g., Noldin) even say that the act remains good even though the man does not intend good-in-itself, but only the delight or the advantage he gains from it. This last view is not safe, for the following proposition has been condemned: The marriage act, exercised merely for pleasure, lacks all guilt, even venial.[26] The view of Thomists, admitted also by many other theologians, runs thus: Man is bound to direct all his acts to an end which, at least implicitly, is directed to God. Why? Because a last end has been assigned to man by his Creator, an end to which he must tend in all his acts. But this direction and ordination need not be actual and explicit; it suffices that it be implicit, as far as man sees his actions as conformable to right reason and eternal law. Delight is for the sake of the operation, not *e converso*. "Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do it all for the glory of God." [27] Nor is it required that a man daily elicit an explicit proposal

[25] *Ibid.*, 1025.
[26] See note 24 *supra*.
[27] I Cor. 10:21.

to do everything to God's glory. It suffices that, at proper times, he elicit an act of faith and charity, acts which contain implicitly the virtual intention.

Analysis of Objections

1. There is no obligation without precept. But there is no precept, natural or positive, to direct every action toward a good end. Here we simply say that there is such a precept.

2. There is no positive precept to direct every action to an end good-in-itself. The words of St. Paul, on eating and drinking, are not a precept but only a counsel. Answer: The words of the Apostle are preceptive, because the word "do" (facite) in Holy Scripture signifies everywhere a precept, and because man, even in the natural order, must do all his deeds for his last end, which is God; *a fortiori* in the supernatural order.

3. But in the natural order there is no precept to do anything for God's sake. For instance, when a man sneezes, or attends to a need of nature, is he bound to think of his last goal? Answer: Right reason dictates proper care of physical needs for the sake of health.

4. "Act according to reason" is an affirmative precept, which indeed binds always, but not at each moment. Answer: This precept is simultaneously negative, namely, "Do not act idly," do not act without reason. Hence it binds man in all his deliberate acts.

5. This precept, thus understood, would be too rigorous, would be an intolerable burden. It would result in innumerable venial sins, or would be perpetual occasion for scruple. Answer: The one essential requirement is the general intention to live according to right reason. This general intention remains virtually, unless it be revoked by contrary intention. Further, many inferior actions (spitting, eating, drinking) often occur indeliberately. Hence, on the contrary, this doctrine is one that consoles. All deliberate acts, even the smallest, unless they are sinful, are morally good and meritorious.

6. These inferior actions (spitting, drinking) cannot be

made the object of a vow; therefore they are not morally good. Answer: A vow must be devoted, not only to good, but to a higher good.

7. The omission of an act which is not commanded (for instance, to hear Mass on a week day), is not evil, but neither is it good, because its opposite (e.g., to hear Mass) is a good. Therefore such omission is indifferent. Answer: The omission is good if it comes from a reasonable motive, otherwise it is evil. It is evil if it comes from laziness or disgust or contempt, and so on. But it is good if it comes from care for health, or from any other rational motive, and thus, though less perfect, it still remains meritorious. The just man is not bound always to the maximum of generosity possible here and now.

8. A man can be invincibly ignorant of the precept that he must always act for a good end. Now suppose this man to perform an act, indifferent by object and purpose, for instance, to walk through a field. This act is not good, since it is indifferent in object and purpose, nor is it evil, because it proceeds from invincible ignorance. Answer: Some Thomists hold (e.g., Alvarez) that such an act is *per accidens* possible, and that St. Thomas is speaking only of what is true *per se*. But it seems better, with Medina, Billuart and Prümmer, to deny the possibility of such invincible ignorance. The age of reason brings obligation to act according to the principles of reason.

ART. 10. SOME CIRCUMSTANCES DIFFERENTIATE ACTS SPECIFICALLY

Authority. The Council of Trent [28] defines the circumstances which change the species of a sin (e.g., theft in a sacred place) and says that they are necessary matter in confession.

Reason. Morality arises from relationship to right reason. Now certain circumstances, independently of the moral species derived from the object, carry with them a special

[28] D.917.

relationship of harmony or disharmony with reason, the proximate standard of morals. Such circumstances change the nature of the act. They do this by superadding a new species to the act (adultery superadded to theft) by turning a specifically indifferent act into an act that is good (walking for health's sake), or by destroying the primary species of a good act (almsgiving merely for vainglory).

Objections Analyzed

1. Accidents do not create a species, and circumstances are nothing but accidents. Answer: Circumstance is an accident: an accident which can become a principal condition of the object, yes; otherwise, no.

2. But one thing cannot be in different species. A thing that is absolute, I grant; a thing that is relative, proceeding from a twofold consideration of reason, I deny.

ART. 11. SOME CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE ACT, BUT ONLY AUGMENT OR DIMINISH ITS GOODNESS OR EVIL

Certain circumstances, considered apart from the specific nature of the act, do not change that nature, but do influence its gravity. The amount stolen, e.g., determines the difference between grave sin and venial sin.

Corollary. Circumstances changing the nature of sin are matter for confession, as are also, according to the more common and safe view, those circumstances that notably increase the evil. As illustrations, take an act of hatred extending over years, or a long unbroken period spent in impurity.

CHAPTER XVII

Good and Evil in Interior Acts (Q. 19)

This question has two parts. In the first four articles we ask: Does the will's goodness depend: (a) on the object; (b) on the object alone; (c) on right reason; (d) on the eternal law. In the remaining six articles we answer difficulties about the foregoing principles: (a) Does erroneous reason oblige? (b) Is the will that follows erroneous reason evil? (c) Does the goodness of choice depend on the intention of the end? (d) Does the quantity of good in the choice follow the quantity of good in the intention? (e) Does the goodness of the human will depend on the divine will? (f) Must the human will always be in harmony with the divine will in the object willed?

ART. 1. THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON ITS OBJECT

Preliminaries

On first view, this article seems merely a repetition of the preceding question. But here, treating only of the interior act as distinguished from the exterior, St. Thomas wishes to show the relation of the foregoing articles with those that follow.

Authority. Aristotle says: "Justice is the virtue by which we will to do things that are just."

Reason: The specific difference among acts of the will follows the object proposed by reason. Just as truth and error differentiate *per se* the acts of reason, so do good and evil differentiate *per se* the acts of the will, the objects of which are necessarily subject to the order of reason.

Corollary. Acts are intrinsically good if their object is always conformable to reason (e.g., to love God or to pay debts). But we must notice, as said above, that this traditional objectivism is opposed to Kantian subjectivism. The Kantian standard is not the objective nature of good, but the categorical imperative, which is a subjective judgment, synthetic, and a priori, namely: "Act in all things so that the moral direction of your will can be a principle for common and public legislation." But this moral direction cannot be valid for all men unless it is based on the objectivity of right reason. The act of the will is differentiated, not by reason as such, but by the object subject to measurement by reason. To illustrate: The amount of food is measured by its relation to reason's standard of health.

ART. 2. GOODNESS OF INTENTION DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT AIMED AT BY PERSONAL PURPOSE

On the object alone depends direct goodness or malice, and, for the interior act, intention, the object is nothing but the purpose of the agent. The essential good and evil of the interior act of the will must be taken primarily from that which is intended by the will *primo* and *per se.*

ART. 3. THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON REASON, THAT IS, ON THE OBJECT PROPOSED BY REASON

Preliminaries

The proximate rule of morality, practical reason, has three elements: first, synderesis, the habit of first principles; second, moral knowledge which arises from these principles; third, conscience, the act of the practical reason, dictating something to be here and now done or avoided. In the supernatural order, synderesis becomes faith, moral knowledge becomes moral theology, and natural conscience becomes Christian conscience. This latter, in the just man, is an act of infused prudence subserved by acquired prudence. Since the forma-

tion of conscience belongs properly to the treatise on prudence, only general questions belong to this treatise on human acts.

Authority. St. Hilary speaks: "Unregulated is the will unless subject to reason."

Reason. The object of the will is proposed to it by reason; hence the will's goodness depends on the object of the intention. To explain. Nothing is willed unless foreknown. The will tends to universal good only because the intellect knows universal good. The will is regulated by practical reason, just as speculative reason is directed to the cognition of truth.

Difficulties Analyzed

Although the good as good belongs primarily to the will, nevertheless the good as true belongs to reason before it can belong to the will, because the will, being a blind faculty, must be directed by reason.

2. The goodness of the practical intellect, that is, truth conformed to right appetite, depends on the goodness of the will. When we praise a man as just, we speak of him as a man of good will rather than of good intellect. This objection is repeated today by pragmatism and the philosophy of action. Answer: The goodness of the practical intellect is truth conformed to right appetite. If you are speaking of the judgment of prudence, yes; if you are speaking of the judgment of moral science, no. The right moral judgment, here and now, comes from the virtue of prudence. But prudence cannot perform this duty unless the will is guided by the other virtues (justice, fortitude, and temperance).

3. How does direction by moral science differ from direction by prudence? Moral science shows us the goal to be aimed at, whether that goal be the ultimate end of all human endeavor, or the goal of any particular virtue. Thus the truth of moral science rests on objective conformity to reality. But prudence directs the choice of right ways and means, here and now, and its truth consists in man's personal intention to

reach the right goal even if, as in the case of invincible ignorance, his intention lacks conformity with objective reality. Example: a man invincibly ignorant of the special strength of the liquor set before him. Conformity with right intention justifies his drinking, even though he thereby becomes drunk. His judgment was practically true, by conformity with right intention, though speculatively false in relation to reality.

This truth, of great importance in forming conscience, is neglected by many probabilists. They insist too exclusively on the value of the moral virtues: on the truth, say, that the chaste man, by being chaste, judges correctly on matters of chastity, and the humble man on matters of humility. Now this is a part of the truth, a part contained in the teaching of Blondel, who defines truth as "equation of mind and life." This truth is verified only of the truth of prudence, and, in some measure, of the gift of wisdom, which gift nevertheless presupposes faith as conformed to divine reality.

Summary. Goodness of will depends on right reason, that is, on synderesis and on moral science. But reason in the practical order, that is, under prudence, depends upon correct intention, whereby the rectitude of universal principles descends to the particular deed to be performed here and now.

ART. 4. THE WILL'S GOODNESS DEPENDS ON THE ETERNAL LAW AS ITS SUPREME STANDARD

Preliminaries

This thesis is denied by independent ethics, independent not only of revealed religion, but even of the concept of God and of every metaphysical concept. Kant, for example, holds that the supreme foundation of moral foundation is the categorical imperative, the absolute autonomy of our will. Thus man would be like God: he would be bound, not by any superior, but only by himself, to act wisely, i.e., according to right reason. Were obligation imposed on us by God, our life, being a servitude, spent to obtain a delightful reward,

would not be, properly speaking, a moral life, would not be worthy of man's dignity.

The objections which Kant here raises against traditional ethics are, at bottom, identical with those which St. Thomas puts at the head of this article: 1. Reason alone is a self-sufficient standard. 2. Whereas measure must be proportioned to the thing measured, the eternal law is not so proportioned. 3. The standard of human activity must be most clear and certain, whereas the eternal law is unknown to us.

Against these arguments, agnostic and positivistic, we defend our thesis: Goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law as its supreme standard.

Authority. Sin, says St. Augustine, is a word or deed or desire against the eternal law. The following proposition was condemned: "A philosophical sin, a moral sin, is a human act out of harmony with rational nature and right reason. Theological sin is free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in a man who ignores God, or does not think actually of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense against God. It is not a mortal sin dissolving our friendship with God, nor does it deserve eternal punishment." [1] From this condemnation it is clear that there cannot be a sin merely philosophical, that is, a sin against reason but not against the eternal law. Therefore the eternal law is the supreme standard of human morality. The following proposition is also condemned: "The laws of morality do not need divine sanction, nor need human laws be in harmony with the natural law, or receive their obligation from God." [2]

Reason. In a series of causes, one subordinated to the other, the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause. But human reason regulates the human will only by dependence on eternal law, which is divine reason. To explain. Human reason can rightly command good to be done and evil to be avoided, only by appealing to conformity with

[1] *Ibid.*, 1290.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1756.

the eternal law. Human reason is a second cause, not the first. And the order of subordination of agents corresponds to the order of goals. Hence movement to universal good, to the last end, must come from the first cause of morality, that is, from God.

Corollary. The obligation of the natural law begins with God's will to create man. God promulgates the natural law by imprinting it on man's mind.

Independent Ethics

Objections Analyzed

The objections formulated by St. Thomas are repeated by independent ethics.

1. The one standard of human action is human reason. Answer: Yes, if you are talking of a proximate standard, subordinated to a higher standard.

2. The measure must be proportioned to the thing measured. But the eternal law is not proportioned to human will. Answer: Not proportioned as proximate measure, granted; otherwise, denied.

3. The eternal law is not the supreme standard, because the first and essential goodness of an act comes from its object, and an object in itself good is independent of the eternal law. Answer: Goodness comes from an object, good by moral standards, yes; good by mere physical standards, no.

4. To tell the truth is morally good independent of God's creative free act. Answer: God is free to create, or not to create. But if He creates rational beings, He must will them to live rationally.

5. Veracity is morally binding on God Himself, before He promulgates the eternal law. Answer: God's veracity is identified with God's wisdom. And obligation, properly speaking, does not exist for God, since God has no superior, though He does owe it to Himself to act wisely.

6. The standard of morality must be known naturally, and

from the very beginning of moral life. Answer: Must be known even from the beginning of moral life, at least in its first principle, i.e., do good, avoid evil, I grant, though I hold that revelation is morally necessary if all men are to know, explicitly and unerringly, the fullness of the natural law.

7. But even this first principle of the eternal law, since it is admitted by the authority of reason, is subordinated to reason. Thus even obedience to God is good, not because it is commanded by God, but because it is a dictate of our reason. Hence the supreme foundation, even of religious certitude, is human reason.[3] Answer: The authority of human reason discovers the divine reason, whose authority transcends altogether the authority of our reason.

8. If the goodness of the will depended on the eternal law, our will would have to be conformed to the divine will in every object which it wills. Thus I would have to will the eternal damnation of my father if God wills it. This is an undesirable conclusion. Answer: Ultimately, I will all evils which Providence permits, but, here and now, under particular reasons which I must consider, I do not will what God wills, but I will what God wills me to will.

A Related Question

Does conscience prove a posteriori the existence of a supreme legislator?

Preliminaries

Many traditional authors answer affirmatively. Among those who answer negatively is Father Billot, S.J.[4] The background of this denial is the following thesis: Many men are invincibly ignorant of God's existence, and of the first precepts of the natural law, and are invincibly ignorant of these truths even up to death. Such men never reach the age of reason, as far as morality goes. Atrocious crimes, in such men,

[3] Thus Victor Cousin.

[4] *De natura et ratione peccati personalis*, pp. 23 sqq.

would be only material sins. Moral evil, he says, cannot be conceived, unless we anteriorly know God who obliges.

This concept of Father Billot seems to presuppose that the obligation of the natural law is founded on a special divine law, while we say it rests on God's general creative will. Otherwise, he adds, we should again fall into the theory of "philosophical sin," i.e., a man could sin against right reason, without sinning against God whom he would not yet know.

Answer: Notwithstanding these objections, we maintain that the existence of God can be proved from the fact of moral obligation known by conscience. Let us note, first of all, that proofs of God's existence can begin with any fact, whether in the sense order, or in the intellectual and moral order. Man's intellective soul leads us to a supreme intellect. What participates (the fourth way), what is changeable (the first way), and what is imperfect (the third and fourth way), demand the pre-existence of something immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is intellective by participation, because only one of its parts is intellective: and it is imperfect, because it does not understand everything and because it proceeds from potentiality to act.

Uniting the five ways, we speak thus: Whatever is changed is changed by another; whatever begins to cause needs to be moved toward causing; every contingent thing is caused by a necessary thing; everything imperfect or composed of parts is caused by a perfect and most simple thing. But the human intellect and will are changeable, contingent, imperfect, yet are destined for universal truth and universal good. Hence the human soul depends on the prime mover, on the prime cause, on the prime necessary being, on the supreme and most perfect being, on the supreme ordinator.

This fivefold demonstration can be applied also in the field of practical reason. On a superior cause depends whatever is moved or begins to cause, or is contingent, or is imperfect, or is ordained to another. Now practical reason begins with the first principle, i.e., good is to be done, evil is to be avoided,

and then begins to regulate our activity by this principle. Further, it is contingent and imperfect, and is related to the truth as the will is to the good. Hence our practical reason, in knowing and commanding good, commands by virtue of a supreme cause, namely, God the Legislator.

Objections Analyzed

1. This demonstration proceeds, not from moral obligation, but from the various imperfections of our practical reason. Answer: It proceeds from the imperfections of our practical reason, in its action considered psychologically, no; in its action as commanding and regulating, yes. Practical reason not only shows us the good, but also commands us to do that good. But it commands as a second cause, which does not act except in virtue of the first cause.

2. But we cannot know moral obligation unless we know God beforehand. Answer: Unless we know God, from the very obligation itself, yes; otherwise, no. To explain. Obligation is knowable in two ways: a priori and a posteriori. A priori, we know it either from its supreme foundation in God, or then in its proximate foundation, in the self-evident principle that good is to be done, and evil to be avoided. A posteriori we know it in the joy of a good conscience, in the remorse of conscience, in the insufficiency of human legislation which itself needs regulation. But note that the principle of doing good and avoiding evil is a principle, not a mere conclusion.[5] Without this principle man would have no duty to live according to reason.

3. But obligation, known a posteriori, and a priori in its proximate foundation, is known, not as a moral obligation, but only as a rational imperative, not yet morally obliging. Answer: This obligation cannot be known perfectly, a priori, in its supreme cause, unless we first know God. But it can be known in its proximate foundation, which is immediately evident, namely, in remorse of conscience. Knowing the obliga-

[5] Ia-IIae, q.94, a.2.

tion, we simultaneously know, a posteriori, the existence of God the Obligator, precisely because there is no obligation without a superior who obliges.

4. But thus we would have the sin that is called philosophical, because man could know his action to be against right reason, without knowing that it is against the eternal law. Answer: He can know this without knowing the eternal law distinctly, but not without knowing, at least confusedly, the existence of God the Legislator. My practical reason sees at once that I am not the source of a law that binds all men, individually and collectively. Since, then, practical reason knows that it commands as second cause, it follows that philosophical sin is impossible. If God can be known from the wonderful ordination of plants and animals to their own proper functions, why can He not be known from the natural ordination of our will to God?

ART. 5. ANY ACT OF THE WILL AGAINST REASON, RIGHT OR WRONG IS ALWAYS EVIL

Preliminaries

At this point modern manuals introduce a treatise on conscience. Aquinas is writing, not a manual of practical theology, but a speculative treatise on morality. His treatment is here universal, but later we will meet questions on the principles of human acts: law and virtue, and the relation of prudence to the other virtues. Justice, fortitude, and temperance cannot exist without prudence to direct them, nor can prudence exist without these moral virtues. The special treatise on prudence will be, concomitantly, a treatise on right and certain conscience.

In the present general treatise on human acts, the only truth needing proof is that moral activity demands a conscience that is right and certain. The precise question in this article runs thus: Is our will evil when it is against erroneous reason? Does an erring conscience oblige? The answer is that

any act of the will discordant with reason, right or wrong, is always evil. In other words, we are never allowed to act against conscience, even though the conscience be erroneous.

The reason is that the will is a blind power, which follows the lead of reason. Nothing can be willed except as foreknown. Hence, if reason erroneously proposes a line of activity as evil, the will is still bound to avoid that line. Similarly, when reason proposes an object as good and the will refuses, the will will be evil. If reason, for example, tells a man erroneously that he is bound to save his neighbor's life by a lie, he is bound to tell that lie. Again, a man who eats food which he thinks forbidden, sins, says St. Paul,[6] because he is not acting from faith, that is, from conscience (so the Fathers commonly interpret this text). Conscience is the proximate and immediate standard for human actions, since it applies the law here and now. To act against conscience is to act against the law.

ART. 6. CONSCIENCE VOLUNTARILY ERRONEOUS DOES NOT EXCUSE FROM SIN

The argument is a distinction between conscience invincibly erroneous and conscience which is voluntarily in error. Man can never act against conscience, but he can and should lay aside any erroneousness of which he is aware, or should be aware.

ART. 7, 8. GOODNESS IN CHOOSING WAYS AND MEANS DEPENDS ON THE GOODNESS OF INTENTION

In article seven we show that goodness in choosing means depends on the antecedent intention of the goal. This relation to the goal is the source of goodness in the object willed. Example: a man who fasts for love of God. Article eight asks this question: Is the goodness of choice equal to the goodness of intention? Answer: The quantity of goodness, whether it comes from the object or the mode of intention, while it does

[6] Rom. 14:23.

not necessarily descend fully into the act of choice and execution, does nevertheless overflow on the act of choice and execution, in the degree in which these acts tend to the goal to which the intention is directed.

Corollary. In order that the entire goodness of intention overflow on election and execution, the ways and means must be directed, not only to the proximate object, but also to the goal of the intention. Thus genuine Christians do not act from natural precipitation, but keep even their exterior acts directed to that last goal which is the object of charity.

ART. 9. GOODNESS OF WILL DEPENDS ON CONFORMITY WITH GOD'S WILL

Authority comes from our Lord's words in Gethsemane: "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt." The argument runs thus: All action is judged by its relation to its standard, and the divine will is the standard, the first rule and measure, of every act of man's will.[7] What does this truth mean for men, pagans particularly, who do not know the true God? Answer: If they ordain their actions to the highest good which they know, these actions are morally good, otherwise they are bad.

ART. 10. THIS CONFORMITY MUST BE FOUND IN WHAT IS GOOD BY ITS VERY NATURE

Preliminaries

Objections. 1. We cannot will what we do not know, and often we do not know what God wills. 2. When God wills the condemnation of a man whom he foresees will die in mortal sin, is this man bound to will his own damnation? 3. When God wills my father's death, would I not be unfilial if I also willed that death?

Contrary objections. 1. That man has the right heart who wills what God wills. 2. Since the will is differentiated by its object, if man must conform his will to the divine will,

[7] *De veritate*, q.23, a.7.

then he must also conform his will to the object of God's will.

First thesis. Our will must be conformed to God's will formally, i.e., by willing the good-in-itself. Proof: Since man must will everything for the sake of good-in-itself, he who knowingly wills a good, not good-in-itself, formally wills evil. Action is judged rather by its form than by its matter. But he who aims at good-in-itself aims, at least implicitly, at the supreme good.

Second thesis. Our will is not bound to conformity with the divine will materially unless this object is known by precept or prohibition.

This truth was not understood by the Quietists, who said that conforming our will to the divine will means sacrificing our own interests, even our eternal interests. Proof: Will tends to its object as proposed by reason. Now one and the same object can be good from the standpoint of God, the universal provider, and still not be good from the standpoint of man as viator.

The death of a robber, to illustrate, is necessary to the common good, but injurious to the robber's family. The judge wills the death of the murderer, but the murderer's wife, whose duty it is to care for the family, does not will her husband's death. Similarly, the universal provider permits evils in view of greater good, to manifest His mercy and justice. Though God allows my father to die in heresy, I cannot will that death. A fortiori I cannot will my own damnation. Thus, in the object willed, though I seem to recede from the divine will, I am indirectly in harmony with that will, since, here and now, I will not what God wills, but what God wills me to will.

Corollary. Opposite wills of different men can each be good. St. Philip Neri and St. Charles Borromeo, attempting to found an institute of priests, differed in their ideas, hence each made his own foundation. The more saintly men are,

the more must they agree to disagree, each insisting on what God wills him to do.

Objections Analyzed

1. While sense-appetite can refuse what God wills, the object of deliberate will must be conformed to God's will. Answer: Conformed to God's will as our reason for willing, yes; but not necessarily in the material object, unless there be a precept. When Christ said, "Let this chalice pass from Me," He shrank from death as material object, but embraced death as willed by divine Providence.

2. The object formally willed is the most universal aspect under which all particular reasons are contained. Now, since, we are bound to conform in the formal object, we are bound to conform also in the material object. Answer: The formal object is the most universal reason, in causing, yes; in being, no.

3. In the Lord's Prayer we say, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." But in heaven the blessed are conformed to the divine will also in the material object. Answer: The blessed in heaven are conformed, even in the material object, to God's will because, knowing God's will perfectly, they are no longer bound by temporal considerations, since they adhere fixedly and immovably to God's will in everything, even in the manifestation of His justice. But this privilege does not belong to those still on earth.

4. But is it not better to be conformed to the divine will also in the material object? Answer: Yes, when such conformity is licit, in willing, for example, my own humiliation or the advantage of religious obedience, which means formal conformity even in the smallest details of life.

5. When does material conformity become illicit? First, when the material object, sin, say, is only permitted by God and not positively willed. Secondly, when we are dealing with an opposite precept. Thus I am not allowed to will damna-

tion, my own or that of another. Again, since charity binds me, I am not allowed to will, either for myself or my neighbor, an evil which would deprive us of confession or communion.

6. Supposing we are not bound to material conformity, may we continue in this attitude? Answer: If the thing is irrevocably done, no. We can only be sad about it, and wish it were not, if that were possible. But if the thing has not yet been done, yes, we can and should labor against it. Even saints, to whom God has revealed their death, should and would take remedies against sickness.

In preaching, let us avoid subleties. Christians in general understand that we may not will our own damnation, that we must all labor toward salvation. Yet the distinctions in the present article are necessary, particularly in confuting the errors of the Quietists, on sacrificing our own good, our eternal salvation. To our people let us urge conformity to the divine will of sign, namely, the precepts and counsels of the Gospel, the spirit of humility, mildness, and patience, and blessings offered to the poor, to the meek, to the victims of persecution.

7. When the deed in question is known by revelation, what conformity is required? Answer: Although we cannot strive against God's will or permission, we must still strive against the deed considered materially, as far as it depends on particular causes. Peter, after the revelation of his threefold denial, was still bound to strive against sin. And Christ, foreknowing His own crucifixion, still prayed that the chalice might pass from Him.

CHAPTER XVIII

Good and Evil in Exterior Acts (Q.20)

ART. 1. FIRST CONCLUSION. GOOD AND EVIL ARE FIRST FOUND IN THE INTERIOR ACT

This is true, whether we consider the goal intended, or the ways and means undertaken. The exterior act, being the effect of the will, derives its good or evil from the will.

Second conclusion. But if we consider the exterior act in its object as presented by reason, then its good or evil comes, not from our will, but from the object which differentiates our will. Good intention does not justify a medium that is in itself evil.

This twofold conclusion is based on the distinction between differentiation by purpose and differentiation by object. For instance, in almsgiving the exterior act, as object, antecedes the will, whereas, as effect, it follows the will.

ART. 2. EXTERIOR GOOD AND EVIL IN RELATION TO THE WILL

We must steer between two extremes: the subjectivism which justifies even evil deeds by a good intention, and the pragmatism which judges only by external results.

Four conclusions. 1. The good or evil which the exterior act derives from the purpose depends altogether on the will. 2. The good or evil which the exterior act derives from object and circumstances depends on conformity with right reason. Robbing the rich is wrong, even if it is done with a good intention, such as almsgiving. 3. The exterior act is not simply good unless the act of the will is good, in its purpose, in its object, and in its principal circumstances. The exterior act is

simply evil if the will is evil, either by its subjective purpose, or by its object, or by a principal circumstance.

ART. 3. INTERRELATIONS OF EXTERIOR ACT TO INTERIOR ACT

Four conclusions. 1. These two acts, interior and exterior, looked at morally, are one act, though physically they are distinct. The act of the will is the formal element, and the exterior act is the material element, but form and matter form one reality. 2. One and the same act can contain different kinds of goodness or of evil. 3. Interior goodness or evil is not identified with exterior goodness or evil except when goodness or evil arises merely from subjective purpose. 4. When the exterior act is good by its object and circumstances, its goodness differs from that interior goodness which arises from subjective purpose.

ART. 4. DOES THE EXTERIOR ACT INCREASE THE GOODNESS OR EVIL OF THE INTERIOR ACT?

This article carries great spiritual importance. Suppose a man robbed of money meant for almsgiving: Is he less good before God than if he had in fact given the alms? Again: Does actual martyrdom add goodness to a man's efficacious desire to die for Christ? Or, once more, does actual theft increase the evil of the desire to steal? [1]

On this matter, some fail by defect; namely, the Quietists, who hold that all exterior works are useless. Others err by excess, not considering the greater importance of the interior act.

First conclusion. The exterior act, precisely as execution of the interior act, does not add goodness or evil in relation to the essential reward or punishment.

Authority. Abraham [2] is praised as if he had in fact immo-

[1] *De malo*, q. 2, ad 8um; *II Sent.*, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 3.
[2] Gen. 22:11.

lated his son. He who looks on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.[3]

Reason. The exterior act, as object, has already been willed internally. As a mere external act, it has only an extrinsic goodness or evil, denominated from the goodness or evil of the interior act. The interior act alone has intrinsic liberty, whereas use of the members can be violently impeded. Virtue, like grace and glory, is independent of human violence. "If I be violated against my will, my crown of chastity is twofold." [4]

But, let us note, in the absence of external occasion for merit, also the will to merit is often absent, whereas the external occasion tends to renew the interior act, which is then perfected in the exterior termination.

Second conclusion. The exterior act gives an accidental increase to the interior act.

Reason. All tendencies are perfected by attaining their terminus. Actual martyrdom does bring to the martyr, not only a reward, but also the aureole of martyrs, which is an accidental reward, an additional joy.

Are we bound to confess external acts of evil? Yes, because: first, evil is ordinarily intensified and multiplied by the exterior act; secondly, the exterior act is an evident sign of efficacious will; thirdly, because of harm done to others; fourthly by reason of greater adherence to sin, and a more difficult cure. The confessor is not merely a judge, but also a physician.

This doctrine is exaggerated by the Quietists, who hold that external acts, even though they proceed from an interior will, are still useless. This doctrine is clearly wrong, because also exterior acts are commanded by the law. That man lacks good will who can act and does not.

[3] Matt. 5:28.
[4] St. Lucy.

ART. 5. DO RESULTS AFFECT EXTERIOR GOODNESS AND EVIL?

The answer is affirmative, if the result has been foreseen and intended, or if it should have been foreseen. But if the result is accidental, and is in no way intended, it adds neither goodness nor evil, since it is in no way voluntary.

ART. 6. CONCLUSION

One and the same physical act may be morally manifold. Example: the act of walking, morally good by good intention, may, by change of intention, become morally evil.

The Consequences of Human Acts in the Line of Goodness and Evil (q. 21)

Four conclusions. 1. Relation to its end makes the human act either right or wrong. 2. Voluntary acts are either praiseworthy or blameworthy. 3. By retributive justice, human acts are either meritorious or demeritorious, in relation to men. 4. By retributive divine justice, human acts are meritorious or demeritorious in relation to God, "who will bring all things to judgment, be they good or bad." [5] "Man is not ordained to the political community in his entire being, hence his acts are not necessarily meritorious or demeritorious in relation to the political community. But man in his entirety is ordained toward God; hence his every act is meritorious or demeritorious before God." [6] "Man is a person, not merely an individual. And persons are born to know and love God." [7]

[5] Eccli. 11:9.
[6] Ad 3um.
[7] Etienne Gilson.

FOURTH PART

CONSCIENCE

CHAPTER XIX

Definition and Division

Definition. Conscience is a practical judgment, which proceeds from common moral principles, and which, here and now, commands good and forbids evil.

Explanation. First. Conscience dictates and regulates both choice and execution: of the three acts of prudence, namely, counsel, judgment, command,[1] the second, that is, judgment, coincides with conscience that is right and certain, though conscience exists imperfectly also in those who do not yet have prudence acquired or infused. The phrase, "man must form his conscience before he acts," means that he must form a right judgment.

Second. The subject of conscience is practical reason, not the will nor the speculative intellect.

Third. It proceeds from common principles, furnished by faith, or by natural reason, or by a moral conclusion. Conscience is not identified with the habit (synderesis) of prime moral principles. Conscience can err, synderesis cannot err. Synderesis is a spark enkindled by the Creator in the minds of all men, a spark which cannot be extinguished as long as man retains his reason, and which remains in the condemned as a worm that cannot die.

Further, speaking properly, neither moral science nor the virtue of prudence is subject to error. Error arises, not from these habits, but from some other source, such as precipitation, which does not use moral science or prudence as it should. Imprudent judgment comes, not from prudence, but from imprudence. Conscience, on the contrary, can be erro-

[1] IIa–IIae, q.47, a.8.

neous, an erroneous application of true principles to a particular case.

Fourth. Conscience judges goodness or evil, either of the act already done, or of the act to be done. Whatever conscience, after due diligence, judges to be in harmony with law, is subjectively good, even though it be objectively evil. Thus conscience, even when it is invincibly erroneous, is the subjective standard implanted by God. It is, as it were, the voice of God, intimating to us how His law is to be applied in this particular case.

DIVISIONS OF CONSCIENCE

OBJECTIVE DIVISION

A. True and right conscience.

1. In relation to obligation.

a. When binding, it is called commanding conscience or forbidding conscience;

b. when not binding, it is called permitting conscience or advising conscience.

2. In relation to act, it is called (a) antecedent conscience (when it deals with an act not yet done), (b) consequent conscience (when it deals with a deed already done or omitted).

B. Erroneous conscience.

1. When it is excessive, it is called (a) scrupulous conscience (futile fear of evil), (b) perplexed conscience (seeing sin on both sides).

2. When it is defective, it is called (a) lax conscience (judging too easily that there is no sin), (b) hardened conscience (by sinful habit), (c) pharisaical conscience (making great sins small, and small sins great).

SUBJECTIVE DIVISIONS

A. Certain conscience (acting prudently, without fear)

B. Uncertain conscience, which is called 1. probable con-

science (judges, with fear, an act as licit or illicit), 2. dubious conscience (not assenting to either side); it is either speculatively dubious or practically dubious.

Let us note that a conscience speculatively probable can become practically certain, here and now, by a reflex principle. To illustrate. I can judge speculatively that it is illicit to confer baptism with rose-water. This is an abstract judgment, speculativo-practical. But if I am dealing with an infant about to die, and all other material be absent, I judge practically that, here and now, under these circumstances, it is right to confer baptism with this dubious material. In this decision I am guided by the reflex principle: "Sacraments are for the sake of men." Hence in the case of necessity, I can give baptism even with dubious matter.

TRUE AND RIGHT CONSCIENCE

1. Here we must solve some doubts. Is a conscience which is practically true necessarily also right? The answer is affirmative. Practical truth, rectitude, arises from conformity with right intention according to law. But note that a judgment can be speculatively true, and still be rash. Example. A judge condemns to death a man whom he believes, but on slight grounds, to be a murderer, or a traitor. The judge's conscience is speculatively true, but not morally correct.

2. Can a conscience that is practically true and right still be speculatively false? The answer is affirmative. Speculative truth means harmony with objective reality. But practical truth, prudential truth, means conformity with a right intention, made with due diligence and attention. Now only this practical truth is the object of conscience. But such a conscience can be speculatively false. To illustrate. A judge, under invincible ignorance, decides that this man is a murderer. When Jacob took Lia for his wife, his error was speculative, not practical.

3. But are we not arguing in a circle? Will and intention are right only by conformity with right reason. The answer

is, no. Practical judgment, the prudential judgment, dealing only with ways and means, is true by its subjective conformity with right will, with right intention. But this right will itself, this right intention, means objective conformity with moral science, and this means conformity with reality, with human nature, with natural law. Let us note the three levels of truth.

1. Speculative truth, objective conformity to reality, in synderesis and moral knowledge. Example: Temperance is man's duty.

2. Truth in the will, regulated by the moral science, say, of temperance.

3. Practical truth, conformity with the right intention. Here and now, I must observe the just medium between excess and defect.

Question. In the development of moral virtue, temperance, for example, is the virtue regulated immediately by moral science, or by initial prudence? Answer. In relation to the goal, initial temperance is regulated by synderesis and moral knowledge.[2] But in relation to ways and means, initial temperance is regulated by prudence. Causes are mutually causes. Further, the four cardinal virtues grow together, since, whether initial or perfect, they are inseparable, and grow simultaneously, like the four fingers on one hand.[3]

PRINCIPLES OF CONSCIENCE

1. Man is bound to have a right conscience, a conscience in harmony with the law of God, the voice of God. Hence conscience must be formed by serious study of the laws which govern life. But ordinary diligence suffices.

2. Supposing conscience to be right, man is bound to follow that conscience, whether it commands or forbids. Conscience, being the application of the law, here and now, is as binding as is the law itself.

[2] *Ibid.*, a.6.
[3] Ia–IIae, q.66, a.2.

Modern manuals give little space to the virtues, in particular to the virtue of prudence. Thus, in favor of practicality, they neglect the deeper reasons for the truth which they defend. Much of the doctrine of St. Thomas on conscience is found in his treatise on the virtue of prudence.

IS MAN BOUND TO OBEY AN ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE?

Preliminaries. Synderesis, the knowledge of first principles, cannot err, but conscience, the application of those principles, can err. Examples. A man who concludes from Christ's words on swearing that he cannot, here and now, take an oath before a tribunal, even if legitimate authority commands the oath. Again. A man who concludes from the law of charity that he is bound, here and now, to tell a lie in order to save his neighbor's life. In such and similar cases conscience, though erroneous, is still binding. If the error is vincible, the man is bound to renounce the error before acting. But he is not allowed to act against his erroneous conscience, even if the error is vincible.

Authority. That which does not come from faith (i.e., from conscience) is sin.[4]

Reason. The will is evil when it aims at an object proposed by reason as evil. An object proposed by conscience, even by erroneous conscience, is an object proposed by reason. Hence the will, if not in harmony with conscience, true or erroneous, is always evil.

Goodness or evil in the will comes from the object as proposed by reason, because nothing can be willed by the will unless it is foreknown by reason. Further, by definition, conscience is the proximate and immediate standard of human acts, because it applies the law here and now, dictating that the act is either an evil to be avoided, or a good to be done. Hence we are never allowed to act against conscience, even though conscience be erroneous. Examples. If erroneous reason proposes abstinence from fornication as evil, the will dis-

[4] Rom. 14:23.

cordant with this dictate is evil. Again. When belief in Christ is proposed as evil by erroneous reason, the will is related to this belief as evil, not because the belief is evil in itself, but because it is evil as apprehended here and now by reason. Briefly, the argument runs thus: That man sins who wills sin and is attached to it. But he who acts against his conscience, even if it be erroneous, wills sin, because he wills a thing which he judges to be a sin.

Objections Analyzed

1. Reason that errs does not come from the eternal law, and therefore is not binding. Answer: Reason that errs comes from the eternal law, not by objective truth, but by subjective judgment, and is, even though erroneous, still binding.

2. The precept of reason in error is against a higher law. Answer: Is against a higher law, and this opposition is known, I deny; this opposition is not known, I grant.

3. A man can believe invincibly that to love God above all things is a sin. Answer: This statement we simply deny. A man who knows that love for God means inclination toward God cannot simultaneously think that such love is against God.

Corollary. One who thinks, erroneously, that the day is a day of fast, and still acts against his conscience, sins formally, because he scorns a precept which he thinks to exist. One who thinks that Christianity is not revealed by God cannot legitimately believe, because he has no sufficient credibility and his act would be against prudence. But if he thinks that the divine origin of Christianity is seriously probable, he is bound to inquire and to pray.

THE WILL IN HARMONY WITH ERRONEOUS REASON IS GOOD

First conclusion. The will, if it agrees with invincibly erroneous reason is good. Proof. Good and evil are in an act as they are willed. But under invincible error, evil is not willed as evil, but is willed as good. Conscience, invincibly in error,

while it is speculatively false, is practically true. The sin in this case is not formal, but only material.

Corollary. A man who, under invincible error, thinks it his duty to tell a lie (e.g., to save his friend), would commit sin by refusing to lie.

Second conclusion. We are not allowed to follow a conscience that is vincibly erroneous. Proof. Good and evil depend on voluntariness. But vincible error does not make the evil involuntary, because the man exposes himself to the peril of sin. He must put away his erroneous conscience, by prayer, deliberation, and counsel. If he must act, let him choose the less probably evil.

Doubt. In what sense is it true to say that we must revere every man's conscience? Answer: From the truth that conscience is always binding it does not follow that we can follow conscience if its error can be cured. Rather, we must reform and correct that conscience. Otherwise we fall into liberalism, that is, into denial of divine law. This denial, at least implicitly, speaks thus: "Whether God speaks in the Gospel, whether Catholic doctrine is revealed or not, is of little importance; I intend to enjoy my liberty." Such a position gives to error the rights that belong to truth alone, to erroneous sects the rights that belong to revelation alone. The pretext of intellectual liberty minimizes, even destroys, the supremacy of truth. Under the pretext of charity we leave the field to unbelievers who themselves fight against the faith. People begin to say that no religion can sufficiently manifest its own divine origin. Man feels that he is excused from sin when he says: "I do not believe" or "I cannot believe," [5] Liberty or error has become liberty of perdition.

CONSCIENCE ON THE PART OF THE SUBJECT

On Certain Conscience

First conclusion. We are never allowed to act with a conscience that is practically doubtful, or probable, or even prac-

[5] D. 1690. *Dict. de théol. cath.*, s. v. *Conscience.*

tically more probable. This is the common conclusion, even among probabilists.

Authority. Again St. Paul's text: "What is not from faith (that is, from good conscience), is sin." St. Augustine: "To do a deed, uncertain whether it is a sin, is certainly a sin." [6] St. Alphonse: [7] "He who acts with a dubious conscience, commits a sin of the same species and gravity as the matter on which he doubts, because he who exposes himself to the danger of sin has already sinned: He who loves danger will perish therein." [8] We add that the sin is less grave than if he were certain.

Reason. 1. An act against prudence is sinful. But he who acts with a conscience practically dubious, or practically probable, or more probable, does not act prudently, for the act of prudence is always practically true and certain.

2. He who acts thus exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning formally. By doing what he reasonably suspects to be a sin, he virtually wills sin, just as a man who would take a drink, though very probably not poisoned, would imprudently expose himself to the danger of death.

Second conclusion. Indirect moral certitude suffices, if direct certitude is unattainable. Moral certitude differs from metaphysical and physical certitude. Metaphysical certitude excludes all possibility of error. Examples: Good is to be done, God is to be worshiped. Physical certitude excludes error in the physical order. Examples: I shall die, the sun will rise tomorrow. Moral certitude is based on human habits and dispositions. Example: I am certain that my friend, whom I know perfectly well, is not, here and now, telling me a lie.

But this moral certitude is twofold: speculative or practical. Speculative certitude means harmony with objective reality, as known by reliable testimony. Example: This man is a murderer, hence it is right and just that the judge inflict on this man the punishment of death.

[6] *De bapt. contra Donatistas,* c.6, n.6.
[7] *Theol. mor.,* Bk. I, n.22.
[8] Eccli. 3:27.

Practical certitude means harmony with right intention and due diligence. Example: Obedience to a man whom, mistakenly, we hold to be legitimately elected. This practical certitude can exist, with or without speculative certitude. If speculative certitude is absent, practical certitude, based on reflex principles, is always attainable. Example: In doubt whether a superior's command is licit, the presumption stands for the superior.

This wider certitude may be called "probable certitude" if, following Aristotle and St. Thomas, we make "probable" the equivalent of "commonly admitted."

Why does our thesis say that practical certitude, even if imperfect, is ordinarily sufficient? St. Thomas answers: "We must not seek for the same kind of certitude in all matters. The field of prudence is that of particular and contingent things." [9] Now in this field no certitude can silence all questioning. We add the restriction "ordinarily speaking," because in certain cases the use of probability is not licit.

[9] IIa–IIae, q.47, a.9, ad 2um.

CHAPTER XX

Dubious Conscience

Dubious conscience means a suspension of our intellect, assenting to neither part of a contradiction. Probabilists use the term "probable opinion" to express what is, in reality, only a doubt, a suspension of judgment.

DIVISIONS OF DOUBT

A. Objective doubt is

1. by its nature either (a) a *dubium juris,* i.e., is there, or is there not, a law in this matter? or (b) a *dubium facti,* i.e., is the alleged fact true or not true? or

2. by its universality (a) a speculative doubt (is painting, say, a servile work?) or (b) a practical doubt (am I allowed, say, to read this book here and now?)

B. Subjective doubt is positive doubt, i.e., with serious reason pro and con, or negative doubt, i.e., a mere hesitation, for slight and insufficient reason (e.g., a priest, who conscientiously fulfills his daily office, but cannot recall explicitly whether he said Sext today).

Thesis. We are never allowed to act with a conscience that is practically doubtful. Positive doubts must be removed by reflex principles. This conclusion, held by nearly all Catholic theologians, including the probabilists, is a mere corollary of the preceding conclusion, namely, that to act licitly we need a conscience that is practically certain.

Proofs. 1. "That which does not come from faith (i.e., from persuasion of licitness) is sin." 2. To act with dubious conscience is a sin against prudence. 3. Such action exposes the agent to the danger of sin.

Corollary. Sin thus committed is of the same species as sin committed with a certain conscience. He who doubts whether his contemplated act is perjury commits the sin of perjury. Interpretatively he wills the sin to which he exposes himself.

But do not scrupulous people often act with fear of sin, and yet do not sin? Answer: Under a fear that is merely speculative and inconsequential, yes. Under a fear that is practical and reasonable, no. Let such victims simply obey their confessors.

HOW TO SOLVE PRACTICAL DOUBTS

Doubt can be solved in two ways: first directly, (by consultation, by reading, by reflection); secondly, if the direct way is impossible, then indirectly, by the aid of reflex principles. But if even this cannot solve the doubt and if action cannot be deferred, then, to exclude the peril of sin, we must choose the safer part, i.e., the part which includes observance of the doubtful law.

THE CHIEF REFLEX PRINCIPLES

Reflex principles are general norms which solve the question, not directly and intrinsically, but indirectly and extrinsically.

First principle. A dubious law does not bind. This principle was exaggerated by the laxists (Caramuel, Diana, Tamburini), who applied it without exception in all the fields of action, whereas more rigid probabilists (many Dominicans of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century Concina and Batuzzi) rejected this principle entirely. The Holy See, under Innocent XI, in the year 1679, before the birth of St. Alphonsus (1696–1787) condemned the application of this principle in four lines of action: first, the validity of the sacraments; secondly, in matters necessary for salvation (acts of faith and charity); thirdly, in dealing with certain rights of a third person; fourthly, when we are bound to

avoid grave peril of spiritual or temporal harm, either to ourselves or to others.

With these four exceptions, this principle is a legitimate way of solving practical doubts. Probabilists, indeed, hold that this principle by itself suffices by itself alone, whereas other theologians demand the addition of the principle, that the condition of the possessor is the better. With St. Alphonsus we say that a dubious law does not bind if we are dealing with a doubt in the strict sense, i.e., if there is equal probability that the law was never passed, because in this case liberty is in possession. But equal probability that the law has ceased does not suffice, because then the law is in possession.

Second principle. When there is doubt we must stand on that side where stands the presumption, i.e., arguments and signs which prevail until the contrary is clearly proved. This principle has many equivalent formulas. 1. Man is presumed to be good until he is proved to be evil. 2. Crime is not to be presumed, but to be proved. 3. In doubt, we must favor the accused. 4. In doubt concerning the rectitude of a superior's command, presumption stands for the superior. 5. In doubt, presumption stands for the validity of the act (for the validity of religious profession if, for instance, the religious begins to doubt whether he had sufficient intention and sufficient knowledge). 6. In doubt, presumption stands for the usual and the ordinary.

Third principle. In doubt the condition of the possessor is the better. This principle, the foundation of aequiprobabilism, taught by St. Alphonsus, finds particular application in the field of justice. Men generally watch over the possessions they are entitled to, and positive law favors the possessor, that lawsuits may not become interminable. Thus far all theologians agree. But the probabilists hold that this principle is valid only in matters of justice, whereas the aequiprobabilists extend it also to other fields.

According to St. Alphonsus, law and liberty can be considered two possessors. The law binds until it ceases to be law.

But liberty acts freely until a new law is promulgated. Thus man is not strictly bound to confess a sin that is dubiously mortal, since liberty is in possession. But if he is certain that the sin is mortal, whereas he doubts seriously that he has ever confessed it, he is bound to confession, because the law of confession is in possession, a law which he does not satisfy by a dubious fulfillment. When liberty is in doubtful possession, the law is certainly in possession, and vice versa.

Subordination of reflex principles. All reflex principles can be reduced to one: Find that line where presumption is in possession. The principle of dubious law holds good only where there is a true presumption for liberty, where, namely, we doubt, not whether the law has ceased, but whether it ever existed. The reflex principle of presumption has many advantages: it is admitted by theologians, it is easily understood by unlettered people, it operates in the civil courts, it was common in all schools before the controversies concerning probabilism, and we may hope, by its aid, to end the interminable quarrels between different moral systems. Now let us put the eight reflex principles in proper subordination.

1. In doubt, stand where stands presumption.
2. In doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better, because there stands presumption.
3. In doubt, favor the accused, because for him stands presumption.
4. In doubt, presumption stands on the side of the superior.
5. In doubt, follow daily and ordinary experience.
6. In doubt, stand for the validity of the act.
7. In doubt, amplify the favorable, restrict the unfavorable.
8. A doubtful law does not bind, i.e., a law that is doubtful in its very existence.

Question. What relation is there between these reflex principles and the doctrine of St. Thomas, who bases conscience on the truth of prudential judgment, which means conformity with right intention? Answer: These reflex principles are useful in establishing this conformity. Conformity with right

intention, he says, moves the intellect to due diligence in finding the law and the law's application to the here and now. Where direct principles are lacking, we fall back on reflex principles, i.e., we ask on what side stands presumption. But what are we to do when all these principles do not go beyond probability? We can still attain practical certitude by conformity with a good and virtuous will. As man is, so man wills. The chaste man judges rightly in matters of chastity. Rectitude in moral science descends in vital manner from right will down to practical judgment, in the here and now.

CHAPTER XXI

Probable Conscience

PRELIMINARIES

Opinion is an act of the intellect which favors one line of a contradiction while fearing that the other may be erroneous, i.e., adherence must outweigh fear of error. An opinion ethically probable must rest on a good foundation, worthy of acceptance by a prudent man, even though there be fear of error. But the term "good foundation" varies with different systems: probabiliorism, probabilism, aequiprobabilism. Probabilism holds that a less probable opinion suffices, if only it is seriously probable. Probabiliorists reply: An opinion less probable, faced with a more probable opinion, is not, properly speaking, here and now probable, since the fear of error is greater than the inclination to adhere, and thus the opinion is merely voluntary, not rational. To solve this difficulty, let us note the divisions of probable opinion.

A. In view of the object, opinion is

1. absolutely probable (i.e., in itself, where fear is based on lack of sufficient proof);

2. comparatively probable (i.e., as faced with an opposite probability, which engenders fear). An opinion comparatively probable may be most probable, or more probable, or equally probable, or less probable.

B. In view of the motive, opinion is

1. intrinsically probable (i.e., as seen by reason), or

2. extrinsically probable (i.e., as based on the authority of approved teachers).

What is meant by "the safer opinion?" The safer opinion is

that which favors the law. The less safe opinion is that which favors liberty. Hence the more probable opinion is not always the safer.

What is meant by "the more probable opinion?" It is that opinion which rests on the more solid reasons. Here appears clearly the distinction between probabilism and probabiliorism. Probabiliorism holds that the foundation necessary for an opinion ethically probable is not to be found except in a more probable opinion, because the opinion less probable, when faced with an opinion more probable, is no longer ethically probable. If proposition A is to me probably true, then proposition B, opposed to it contradictorily, is not probable, but probably false. When probabilists argue that the opinion less probable can still be accepted as seriously probable, the probabiliorists reply thus: Opinion, by its very nature, cannot abstract from the fear raised by the opposite opinion. Hence an opinion wherein fear of error predominates is not rationally and ethically probable, and can be accepted only by going against the virtue of prudence.

THE USE OF PROBABILITY

First conclusion. The use of probability is illicit when there is danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided. Proof of this thesis, commonly admitted, lies in the condemnation of laxism.[1] Probability is condemned in dealing with the four following cases.

1. In conferring the sacraments. As far as we can, we are bound to safeguard the validity of the sacraments; otherwise we are in danger of inflicting grave harm on our neighbor, and of being irreverent.

2. In assuring salvation. In peril of eternal damnation, the safer part must be chosen. The following proposition has been condemned: The infidel is excused from infidelity if he is led by a less probable opinion.[2] The unbeliever is bound

[1] D. 1151, 1154.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1154.

to search for the truth and to pray. He sins against faith if he does not use the means necessary for reaching it. Thus St. Alphonsus.

3. In the certain rights of a third person. We must favor the accused man as long as crime has not been proved. Even in civil cases the judge is bound by the more probable opinion. The laxist view, that he can follow an opinion less probable, has been condemned.[3]

4. In dangers spiritual or temporal. We are not allowed, without grave necessity, to run the risk of probable death (say, by taking a doubtfully poisoned drink).

These four cases limit the reflex principle that a dubious law does not bind. The general principle runs thus: Where law and obligation are certain, the principle of probability does not apply.

A THOMISTIC FORMULATION[4]

Probability is illicit in matters where the measure of action is an objective medium, that is, correspondence, not to the interior dispositions of the agent, but to external reality. My neighbor's rights are an objective medium not dependent on my conscience. If I owe him one hundred dollars, no probability can change that amount.

By contrast, in matters of fortitude and temperance, we determine the golden mean, not objectively, but subjectively, by the agent's interior dispositions, passions, and age. The measure of food and drink varies with age, season, and occupation. Here lies the field of prudence, and prudence operates among probabilities. But, let us repeat, the objective medium which rules justice, rules likewise the four cases treated above, where the safer part must always be chosen.

Second conclusion. Probabilism is licit when we are not dealing with matters excepted in the foregoing conclusion. Here lies the field of prudence, which measures the proper

[3] *Ibid.*, 1152. 1126.

[4] Ia–IIae, q.60, a.2; IIa–IIae, q.58, a.10; q.57, a.1.

proportion of act to agent. But here, too, we find extremes that have been condemned, namely, rigorism and laxism. Rigorism says that, in doubt, the safer side, the side which favors law, is always to be followed. Rigorism [5] forbids us to follow even the most probable of probable opinions, even when the very existence of the law is dubious. How unreasonable! Such a system would make life itself intolerable. Laxism [6] speaks thus: For prudent action, a tenuous probability suffices. But, we ask, is it a mark of prudent men to be guided by tenuous probabilities? A conscience thus guided would be a conscience practically doubtful, and hence illicit. Excluding these extremes, we find three systems admitted in the Church.

1. Probabiliorism, which will depart from a safe view only for a more probable view. It urges two reasons. First, the less probable is not really probable. Secondly, we would thus be in danger of transgressing the law.

2. Aequiprobabilism, which says we are allowed to abandon the safe view when an equally probable view is in possession. Hence, in doubt concerning the existence of a law, we can follow the aequiprobabilism in favor of liberty, and in doubt concerning the cessation of law, we are to follow the opinion equally probable in favor of the law. This system, impugned by Billuart and admitted by Father Beaudouin, is really in harmony with the views of St. Thomas, and is supported by the great authority of St. Alphonsus, who is a doctor of the Church. This system is based on the principles of possession and presumption, perfected by prudence acting in conformity with right will and right intention. As man is, so man wills.

3. Probabilism, which holds that we are allowed to follow any view that is seriously probable, since a dubious law does not bind. This rule, they add, is not a norm of perfection, but the lowest degree of obligation.

Here we must demur. This system offends, not only per-

[5] D. 1293.
[6] *Ibid.*, 1153.

fection, but the very essence of prudence, which is not a mere counsel, but a strict obligation. The prudent man, since he is bound to act licitly, is likewise bound to seek and follow the truth, or then to stay as closely as he can to the truth. To act otherwise is to favor laxism.

Against probabilism stands the great authority of St. Alphonsus, who, beginning as a probabilist, ended by confuting probabilism. Liberty, against a law in possession, is not a liberty which liberates. While we are free to choose a lesser good, we are not free to look upon a probable obligation as no obligation.

FIFTH PART

THE PASSIONS

CHAPTER XXII

The Passions in General (Q. 22–25)

Passions may be considered, psychologically, or morally, or ascetically.

1. Psychologically. Passion is a motion of the sense-appetite, arising from the imagination of good or evil, accompanied by corporeal transmutation. Moderns often give to passions the name of emotions, restricting the word "passion" to designate vehement or prolonged emotions.

Sense-appetite is the formal element of passion; the corporeal mutation is the material element.

DIVISION OF PASSIONS

Passions are either concupiscible or irascible.

A. Concupiscible passions are caused by

1. a sense-good, which attracts (a) simply, and is called love, (b) when absent, and is called desire; (c) when present, and is called gladness.

2. a sense-evil, which repels (a) simply, and is called hatred; (b) when absent, and is called aversion; (c) when present, and is called sadness.

B. Irascible passions are caused by

1. a sense-good that is difficult, but (a) attainable, and is called hope; or (b) unattainable, and is called despair.

2. a sense-evil that is arduous, but (a) still easy to repel (audacity); or hard to repel (fear); or present, and calling for vengeance (anger).

First among all passions, and the origin of all others, is sense-love. Without love, no desire and no joy, no hatred, no aversion, no sadness. Again, in the irascible passions, without

love there is neither hope nor despair, neither fear nor audacity, no rising up in anger.

2. Moral view. Here we meet a twofold error, one by defect, and the other by excess. The hedonists hold that all passions are morally legitimate expansions of our nature. Thus Aristippus among the ancients, Fourrier and Saint Simon among the moderns. By excess, the Stoics condemn all passions, as being opposed to reason and nature, and hence to be eradicated. Aristotle holds that passions in themselves are neither morally good nor morally evil, though some of them are naturally laudable, e.g., commiseration and modesty. They become morally good when they are commanded or directed by reason, otherwise they become morally evil. St. Thomas [1] evolves this doctrine under three headings.

a) Passions in themselves are indifferent to moral good or evil, since morality depends on the laws discovered by reason. Anger uncontrolled by reason is bad, but subject to reason (in Christ, say), it is good.

b) Passions become voluntary by relation to reason. Unregulated by reason, they degenerate into vice (pleasure becomes gluttony or lust).

c) Passions, commanded and moderated by right will, are aids to virtue. Thus we find them in Christ, who felt sadness even unto death, and whose anger drove the moneylenders out of the temple. Rejoice, says St. Paul, with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep. But when unregulated, or when commanded by evil will, passions become the roots of vices, especially of capital vices.

ART. 3. DOES PASSION INCREASE OR DIMINISH THE GOODNESS OR THE EVIL OF AN ACT? (Q. 24)

It might seem that passion always diminishes the goodness of the act, first, because passion perturbs reason; secondly, because we must imitate God in whom there are no passions;

[1] Ia–IIae, q.24, a.1, 2.

thirdly, since he who sins in passion sins less, it seems that he who does good passionately does a lesser good.

Conclusion. The perfection of moral good requires the cooperation of man's sense-appetite.

Proof. Moral good grows by the number of its cooperating sources, and sense-appetite, subject to reason, is such a source. Passion that antecedes reason is not voluntary, and such passion may indeed cloud the judgment and diminish responsibility. But when passion follows upon deliberate choice, it does increase either the goodness or the evil of the action. Perfection requires that all passions be regulated by reason, just as are the external members. My heart and my flesh, says the Psalmist, exult in the living God. Thus fortitude established a just medium between the defects of fear and the excesses of audacity. Saints are men of strong passions, but passions inspired by zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of souls.

Ascetical view. The passions, in themselves morally indifferent, are not to be eradicated, as if they were vices or sins, but are to be regulated, moderated, educated, to be like trained horses driven by reason and faith.

Corollary. Training must be proportioned to its purpose. Even extreme anger or sadness or fear need not go beyond right reason. Moses was very angry at the adoration of the calf. The zeal and indignation of Phineas was praiseworthy. Heli was not sufficiently indignant against his children. Jeremias was often very sad, and rightly so. Christ drove the sellers from the Temple, was sad unto death, wept over Jerusalem, moaned in spirit.

CHAPTER XXIII

The Passions in Particular (Q. 26–49)

Love (Q. 26–28)

Love is complacency in good. It is divided as follows:

A. Elicited love, which follows either

1. intellective cognition, in the form of friendship (I love my neighbor for his sake), or in the form of concupiscence (I love for my own advantage); or

2. sense-cognition, either in the form of animal friendship (the hen protecting her brood), or in the form of animal concupiscence (the hungry dog seeking a bone).

B. Innate love, which antecedes all cognition and is identified with the natural inclination of each created being toward its own proper object (the love of a falling stone for its center). Modern authors express this innate natural love by such terms as attraction, affinity, coherence.

Sources of love. The chief source, the object and motive, is sense-good. Two conditions are added: first, cognition, because the object moves only as it is known; secondly, similitude, since every living thing loves that which is like itself. Actual similitude causes the love of friendship, whereby two become one, either by nature or by cooperation. Potential similitude causes rather the love of concupiscence, as found, say, in the disciple toward his master, whose knowledge he desires for himself, whereas the master's love is that of friendship: as examples, think of Plato loving Aristotle, of Christ loving Peter.

But if, so runs an objection, bricklayers hate one another, similitude is not the cause of love. Similitude, we answer, re-

mains by nature the source of love, while it may still, as an accidental impediment, be the source of dislike and hatred. Quarrels arise, not from similitude, but from pride.

The effects of love. St. Thomas notes six effects. 1. Union. This union is either affective, constituted by love itself, even though the object be absent, or real union, by the presence of the object loved. Affective love moves the lover to seek real union. Thus love for God moves men to desire the beatific vision.

2. Adherence. The lover tries to penetrate into the interior of the loved object, to know it, to find his delight in it.

3. Ecstasy. The lover is drawn outside himself, first by knowledge beyond his proper measure, secondly by affection, whereby he goes forth from himself. This is true even in the love of concupiscence, but much more in the love of friendship. Ecstasy in the saints is a normal effect of their burning love for God.

4. Zeal is an ardor against everything that is opposed to love. In the form of envy, it belongs to the love of concupiscence. In the form of zeal for God's glory and the salvation of souls, it belongs to the love of friendship.

5. The lover's lesion. Richard of St. Victor seems to say that all intense love is violent. But the love of supreme good, even when intense, is not in itself violent, though it may, by concomitant passion, become violent and inflict a wound on the lover. Similar effects of love appear in "melting of the heart," that the beloved can enter in; in fruition, if the beloved is present; in languor, if the beloved is absent; in fervor, an intense desire of possession.

6. General influence. Love, the root of all affections, penetrates and animates the lover's entire life and activity.

Hatred (q. 29) is aversion from evil. It is opposed to love and takes on two forms: abomination (e.g., of cruelty), and enmity (willing evil to a foe). Hatred is born of love, since only something which we love can make its contrary hateful.

Desire (q. 30), often called concupiscence, is affection to-

ward an absent good. Its opposite is flight. Can concupiscence be infinite? St. Thomas distinguishes. Natural concupiscence (e.g., for food or for sexual pleasure) can never be infinite actually, though it can be infinite potentially: "He who drinks of this water shall thirst again." But unnatural concupiscence, which follows, not sense, but wrong reason, is altogether infinite, since reason has no bounds, and can seek infinite beatitude, not in the infinite God, but in finite things, for instance, in riches. Thus a man may desire to be rich without any limit. Reason apprehends the universal, hence man's concupiscence, when disordered, is greater than concupiscence in brutes, because man, even in dealing with lower goods, seeks, as it were unconsciously, an infinite good. Such love often turns into hatred, because finite good cannot give infinite beatitude.

Delight (q. 31–34). Delectation is the rest which follows possession. When possession comes by the intellect, this rest and quiet is called joy. This rest in the possessed good is not cessation from all act, but is a state of complacency in the good attained. Delight is something positive, not merely cessation of pain, as was maintained by Epicurus, Kant, Schopenhauer, and other pessimists.

Plato says that delight is motion rather than rest. St. Thomas [1] answers: Since motion is an uncompleted act, delight would not be the ultimate perfection. But experience shows that delight, especially intellectual delight, joy in truth at last attained, is the ultimate emotion. St. Thomas adds that Plato failed to distinguish the ultimate objective end, which is God, from the ultimate subjective end, which is the possession of God, a possession which is followed by supreme delight and joy. Here lies the golden middle way between Epicurus and Plato. Delight is not cessation of pain, nor motion toward good, but rest in the goal now attained.

Is intellectual delight greater than sense-delight? In itself, yes, because it is more noble, solid, and penetrating. But in

[1] Q. 34, a. 3.

relation to man in his present state, sense-delight is greater, because it is more easily experienced, particularly in its corporeal effects, in its remedial power against pain and sadness. Hence men who cannot reach spiritual joy, which belongs to the virtuous, turn aside to corporeal delight.

Scholion. What is the source of those abnormal perversions which sometimes afflict men, such as delight in eating dust or charcoal, or in bestial and sodomistic intercourse? These corruptions of nature arise from one of two sources: a bodily disease or evil dispositions of soul.[2]

Causes of delight (q. 32). Six causes are assigned: 1. harmonious activity; 2. variety, change; 3. hope; 4. memory; 5. congenial association; 6. wonder and admiration. But these six sources are not exhaustive. Active love of neighbor is a never-ending source of joy. Service to fellow men reacts on our own legitimate self-love, teaches us to grow in overflowing charity, enables us to penetrate this teaching of Christ, quoted by St. Paul: It is better to give than to receive.

The effects of delight (q. 33): expansion of the heart; thirst ("he who drinks of this water will thirst again"); hindrance to the use of reason, if the delight is corporeal and vehement. But, in general, delight is the perfection of operation, as beauty is of youth.

Delights, good and evil (q. 34). Delight is good if its object is good and reasonable, otherwise it is evil. The highest kind of delight is delight in truth, especially delight in God possessed in eternal life. Man is judged good or evil by the objects that give him joy. He who rejoices in earthly things is earthly, he who rejoices in heavenly things is heavenly. He who rejoices in God is God's son and God's friend.

Sadness and pain (q. 35–39). Pain is a motion of the sense-appetite, arising from the apprehension of present evil. It must not be confused with physical evil, which is a privation in the organism. Pain is something positive, a motion of the sense-appetite, opposed to delight. Sadness is a special kind of

[2] Q. 31, a. 7.

pain, as joy is a species of delight. Contemplation itself is faced with no contrary sadness, though it may be impeded by bodily weariness.

Speaking *per se,* the desire of delight is stronger than aversion from sadness, because good is willed for its own sake, but evil is shunned as a privation of good. All natural motion is more intense as it approaches the goal. But *per accidens* we shun sadness more than we desire delight, since sadness impedes every kind of delight. Similarly mental pain is in itself keener than bodily pain, just as spiritual delight is in itself higher than sense-delight. But *quoad nos* the contrary is true, because exterior pain is felt more keenly.

There are four species of sadness: (a) compassion, which is sadness for our neighbor's evil; (b) envy, sadness at our neighbor's good; (c) anxiety, which sinks the soul in present evil; (d) sloth, which weighs man down in the face of duty that seems to be too heavy. From sloth comes laxity, intellectual or spiritual.

Causes of sadness. We distinguish four causes: (a) loss; (b) concupiscence, whereby delay saddens us; (c) love, desiring a union not yet attained; (d) external power, that keeps us from our goal.

Effects of pain. Pain (a) lessens the power to learn; (b) weighs on the soul; (c) weakens operation or even impedes.

Remedies of sadness. Sadness is mitigated in many ways: by opposite joys, by weeping and mourning, by the compassion of friends, by sleep, by the contemplation of truth and future beatitude.

Sadness, good and evil. Though sadness is in itself a kind of evil, sadness over sin is good. Blessed are they who mourn. Such sadness acts like medicine. The greatest evil is not the sadness of punishment, but the sadness of guilt. From the concupiscible passions we now pass to the irascible passions.

Hope and despair (q. 40). Hope arises from a loved object, hard to attain. Its opposite is despair, which considers at-

tainment impossible. Hope, properly speaking, rests on man's own power, whereas expectation looks to help from others. Hope is abundant in youth, and in the state of inebriety, in those who lack experience of difficulties, easily supposing they will obtain what they want. Descartes, in his youth, fondly hoped to re-create all philosophy!

Hope and love. Hope in relation to its object is caused by the love of concupiscence. But in relation to the person through whom that object is expected to be attained, it leads to love and friendship. Thus the theological virtue of hope disposes us for charity, and it presupposes faith.

Hope aids operation, first because its object is good and though difficult to obtain, still possible; secondly because it evokes delight, which aids operation.

Fear (q. 41–44) is a motion of the appetite faced with evil that cannot easily be resisted. The species of fear are six: discouragement (fears the burdens of duty), shame, regret, hesitation, stupor, agony (there is no escape).

Fear of punishment differs from fear of guilt. Man can fear even fear, just as he can love love. Fear arises, not only from love, but also from experience of our own defects. Fear has many effects: shrinking, paleness, loss of voice, dryness of throat, hair standing on end, unconsciousness, even sudden gray hair. Fear uncontrolled leads to despair.

Audacity (q. 45) is a motion whereby the soul goes out to conquer a great evil, here and now imminent. Such victory is necessary to attain the purpose of hope. Animals which have a small heart, says Aristotle, are audacious, while those that have a large heart are timid. And lovers of wine are distinguished by audacity.

How does audacity differ from fortitude? The audacious are more prompt to begin than to sustain, because of perils they did not anticipate. Comparing the two acts of fortitude, to attack and to sustain, we find that the latter is more important and more difficult. The brave differ from the auda-

cious in this: In beginning, they seem to be remiss, because they attack, not with passion, but with deliberation. But actually faced with danger, they resist better.

Anger (q. 46–48) is an appetite for vengeance, accompanied by heat around the heart. Anger has no passion contrary to itself, because it deals with evil difficult to avoid and already present. In this situation the soul either sinks down in sadness, or by anger conquers the evil. Anger is natural by the law of self-preservation. Mildness, on the contrary, is less natural, and is a virtue to be acquired. The physical disposition to anger is a choleric temperament.

Anger, though it is much less grave than hatred, is much more impetuous. Hatred wills evil to neighbor as his evil, but anger considers this evil as a right required by justice. The angry man, after accomplishing vengeance, feels mercy, but not so the man who hates.

The species of anger are two: bitterness and fury. Fury never rests till it has finished its task of punishment. The angry man, says Aristotle, is sharp, bitter, and difficult to deal with.

Causes of anger. The principal cause is contempt for our neighbor, arising from the thought of our own excellence. Hence men in high station are prone to anger, as are also rich men, orators, and poets. Sickly people are disposed to anger, since they are more easily saddened.

The effects of anger are four: delight in the hope of vengeance, rush of blood to the heart, disturbance of mind and body, taciturnity.

Thus we conclude the treatise on the passions. Passions are to be regulated by reason: "Under thee shall be thy appetite." Passions, thus regulated, become virtues, in the form of temperance and fortitude. Acquired virtues are a participation in the light of reason, and infused virtues are a participation in the uncreated light of God. But if the passions, intended as servants and handmaids, act instead as masters and mistresses, they become vices and corruptions.

SIXTH PART

HABITS

CHAPTER XXIV

Habits in Their Essence (q. 49)

PROLOGUE

Having now considered those acts that are characteristic of man, and those that are common to men and brutes, we must now deal with the sources of these acts. These sources are two: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The intrinsic principle is either power or habit. As powers have already been treated, we have now to deal with habits. Treatment of the extrinsic principle, namely, God who instructs by law and aids by grace, is matter for another book.

The present treatise has three divisions: habits in general (q. 49–54), virtues in general (q. 55–70), vices and sins (q. 71–89).

The treatise on habits in general has four divisions: 1. habits in their essence (q. 49); habits in their subject (q. 50); habits in their cause (q. 51–53); habits in their distinction (q. 54).

THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS TREATISE

Since habit is the genus both of virtue and of vice, we cannot rightly know either virtue or vice unless we first know what habit is, and how one habit is distinguished from another.

This treatise is difficult, and it is comparatively neglected. Cajetan and Koellin did indeed write on these articles, as did John of St. Thomas; but the Salmanticenses, Alvarez, Gonet, and Billuart have nothing to say on this subject.

Comparison with modern theories must be our first step,

for three reasons: first, moderns generally have no explicit treatment on habits, speaking rather of custom; secondly, because moderns tend to opposite extremes, either of passivity or of activity, whereas St. Thomas harmonizes these two aspects; thirdly, because moderns, particularly the phenomenalists, deny the existence of soul-faculties, and consequently of habits, appealing instead to subconsciousness and method. Like quacks who prescribe remedies by mere tradition, since they are not masters of medical science, many moderns seem to think that ethical science, far from being a single science, is a mere juxtaposition of unrelated conclusions. These men have lost the scientific spirit.

To illustrate. Vasquez had lost the notion of habit, when he said that, even when infused faith is lost, the habit of theology can still remain. The truth is that, when faith is lost, there remains only the corpse of theology, namely, a certain material arrangement of ideas, since theology lives only by faith itself. Modern terms, "habitude," "usage," "custom," correspond rather to the Latin *"consuetudo"* than to the Latin *"habitus."* The word *"habitus"* is not easy to translate. It signifies a disposition, permanent and difficult to change.

We must dwell here on two opposed theories. Some moderns, like Descartes and Comte, hold that habit is something passive, a phenomenon of inertia, meaning that a body remains where it now is, in a condition of rest or of motion, unless an extrinsic cause disturb this condition. A projectile dropped into a vacuum would have a habit of everlasting motion. Habit would thus be nothing but the passive perseverance of matter in its present state. Scientific habit would be nothing but the passive persistence of certain modifications in the nerve centers. Descartes puts method in the place of habit, as if mechanical control of method guaranteed possession of science.

An opposite extreme, borrowing from Aristotle and Leibnitz, says that habit is a law of activity, whereby living beings incline to remain in their present state or action. Habit,

then, would be, not a mere passive perseverance, but a tendency to repetition of acts ("using the same path twice"). Thus habit would not be found in inanimate bodies, but only in living things, in animals, especially domestic animals, and particularly in human attitudes, intellectual or moral.

This second theory is not satisfied with Cartesian passivity, which does not explain the tendency of habit to act, to be second nature, to establish continuity in human life, to make progress and education possible. Good habits, by strengthening the will, strengthen also liberty.

This second theory harmonizes better with the view of St. Thomas,[1] though he admits, not only operative habits, but also entitative habits, bodily health, say, and sanctifying grace. St. Thomas speaks thus: Habit cannot be produced in an agent (e.g., fire) whose principle is merely active. But in an agent with two principles, one active, one passive, habits can arise. Multiplied acts generate a certain quality in the passive principle, and this quality is called habit. Thus habits of virtue arise in the appetitive powers under the influence of reason, and scientific habits arise in the intellect under the repeated influence of self-evident propositions.

How profound St. Thomas here appears! Moderns, generally, do not rise above experimental psychology, whereas St. Thomas is metaphysical, and, of course, more difficult.

Other moderns, positivists and phenomenalists, deny even the existence of habits. They reduce substance, faculties, and habits to a mere succession of phenomena, and thus arrive at absolute nominalism. Many positivists recur to subconscious psychological phenomena, as the source, for instance, of mathematical virtuosity.

Against phenomenalism in general we argue thus: Whereas our sense-powers are limited to phenomena (color, sound, and so on), our intellect apprehends the reality, the substance, existing under phenomena. Now finite substance is not immediately operative, but acts by powers and faculties distinct from itself. Its existence is not identified with its

[1] Q.51, a.2.

activity, since existence is one, whereas activity is manifold. But if existence and activity are really distinct, distinct must be likewise their correlative potentialities, i.e., the substance which underlies existence, and the operative faculties which underlie activity. Such faculties are intellect and will. And if we have faculties, we can also have habits in these faculties, for instance, science in the intellect, justice in the will, chastity in the sense-appetite.

HABITS IN GENERAL (Q. 49)

This question has four articles. Is habit a quality? Is it a determined species of quality? Is habit necessarily related to act? Are habits necessary?

ART. 1. IS HABIT A QUALITY?

Habit does not seem to be a quality. First, because habit, from the Latin word *"habere,"* indicates possession, and we possess not only qualities, but also quantity, money, and so on. Secondly, because habit is that ultimate predicament, which expresses a mode of clothing. Thirdly, habit means disposition, which seems to refer to corporeal attitude.

Authority. Habit is a quality difficult to change.[2]

Reason. From the nominal definition we pass on to the three meanings which the word "habit" may have: possession, a garment, a disposition either to good or evil.

1. *"Habere"* (to possess) is an element common to diverse categories, and hence is found among the post-predicaments.

2. "Habit" signifies garment, and thus constitutes a special category, whereby man is said to be clothed or armed. In this meaning, habit is not quality, or quantity, or action, or passion, but a mere relation.

3. Habit is used to express, not a possession of something external, but a mode of self-possession, and such self-possession is a kind of quality, belonging to the highest genus of quality.

[2] *De categ.*, c.6, n.4.

Aristotle's definition runs thus: Habit is a disposition, whereby the subject is disposed, well or ill, either in itself or in relation to something else.[3] When we say "habit does not make the monk," we mean external habit. But internal good habits do make the monk.

ART. 2. IS HABIT A DEFINITE SPECIES OF QUALITY?

Quality is distinct from substance, quantity, action, passion, relation, and so on. The category of quality contains four species: habit and disposition; power and impotence; sense-qualities; form and figure. Why these four? Because there are four modes whereby a substance can be disposed in itself.

1. To be good or evil in relation to its nature: habit and disposition.

2. To be disposed well or ill in its operation: power and impotence.

3. To be well disposed in relation to sense-alteration (color, heat, sound, odor, taste): sense-qualities.

4. As limiting quantity: form and figure.

Habit here comes before power, because it expresses an immediate relationship to the nature of the substance. Habit (e.g., science) can be changed only with difficulty, whereas disposition (opinion) can easily be changed, though, by reason of passion, opinion may, *per accidens,* be very tenacious. But habits may begin in the form of dispositions. Science, in the pupil, exists first as a disposition, and only when rooted in the subject does it become a habit. The same truth holds good in the development of moral virtues.

ART. 3. DOES HABIT INCLUDE NECESSARILY RELATIONSHIP TO ACT?

All habits, whether entitative or operative, are related to act. 1. Entitative habits, since they dispose the substance in itself, have a consequent relation to act, because activity is the purpose of nature. Thus health and sickness, beauty and

[3] *In Met.,* V (IV), c.20, lect. 20, n.1064.

ugliness, habitual grace and its privation, although they are entitative habits, still have consequent relationship to act. 2. Operative habits, since they dispose the operative powers, have as their chief purpose a relationship to act.

ART. 4. ARE HABITS NECESSARY?

First conclusion. Where operative power is distinct from operation and is not limited to one operation, there habits are necessary, since otherwise the power would remain undetermined and idle, whereas it should act promptly and easily, and in various directions: for instance, the intellect in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the will in justice, religion, and temperance.

In God, who is His own activity, as He is His own existence, habits cannot exist. Nor do natural agents, which are restricted to one effect, need a habit (e.g., external senses or the vegetative powers).

Second conclusion. Entitative habits are necessary when the subject needs them in order to be well disposed in itself, i.e., when many elements concur in forming that disposition. Thus health is an entitative habit, since it implies a definite proportion among many factors. Beauty, too, is an entitative habit. For example, loss of eyelashes or eyebrows suffices to mar the beauty of the human face.

Proceeding metaphysically, from the distinction between faculty and act, we have established these truths: Habit is a quality, a special kind of quality, either operative or entitative, each necessary in its place. Only by reduction to metaphysics does psychology qualify as a perfect science, simultaneously inductive and deductive.

CHAPTER XXV

Habits and Their Subjects (Q. 50)

ART. 1. HABITS IN THE BODY

First conclusion. The body has entitative habits, such as health and beauty.

Second conclusion. No operative habit exists principally in the body as subject. Operative powers which are not limited to one line of activity belong either to the soul alone (intellect and will) or to the soul principally (in the inferior faculties only as subject to the will). Thus temperance and fortitude exist principally in the soul, and only secondarily in the body.

Here lies an error of materialism, which reduces habits to mere modifications of the organism, particularly of the nerve centers. But the emotion of modesty is not identified with the virtue of chastity, nor sense-commiseration with the virtue of mercy, which belongs in the highest degree to God.

ART. 2. CAN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL BE THE SUBJECT OF HABITS?

First conclusion. No natural entitative habit, but only that supernatural entitative habit which we call sanctifying grace, is received into the essence of the soul. The human soul is the complete form of human nature, and cannot receive any better disposition. But sanctifying grace deifies the very essence of the soul, thus preceding the infused virtues, just as the soul's essence precedes the powers of the soul. As man's intellective power participates in divine knowledge by the virtue of faith, as man's will shares in divine love through the virtue of charity, so man's soul itself participates in the

divine nature by the grace of regeneration and re-creation.

Second conclusion. Operative habits are not in the essence of the soul, but in its faculties, because the soul is not immediately operative.

ART. 3. CAN THE SENSE-POWERS BE SUBJECTS OF HABIT?

Conclusion. The sense-powers, though in themselves incapable of supporting habits, can do so as directed by reason, since reason can turn them to various lines of activity. Thus temperance and fortitude exist in the sense-appetite, as ruled by reason and will. The same direction develops memory and artistic imagination. But neither the external senses, nor the vegetative powers, can be subjects of habit, because their activity is one and unvaried.

ART. 4. INTELLECTUAL HABITS

Intellectual habits are five: The habit of first principles, wisdom, science, prudence, and art. Averroes falsified this Aristotelian doctrine by positing one single possible intellect for all men, thus denying personal immortality. Further, since men differ in wisdom, knowledge, prudence, and art, Averroes said that these habits are not in the possible intellect, which is one, but only in the internal senses, imagination and memory, whereas Aristotle holds that these virtues are in that part of the soul which is rational by its essence, namely, in the intellect, not in the internal senses, which are rational only by participation.

Conclusion. Habit belongs to the power which performs the act, and intelligence is the act proper to the intellect. All ideas retained in the intellectual memory are habits. In a secondary, dispositive sense, habit exists in the imagination, which prepares the object for the possible intellect.

First corollary. Profound treatment of the nature of science, the nature of metaphysics, the nature of theology, and the division of sciences is impossible unless we realize the importance of habit. Habit, far from being a mere mechan-

ical juxtaposition of ideas, is rather a simple, vital, soul-quality, essentially related to one formal object, whence it derives its unity. Thus theology, resting on virtual revelation, is one indivisible science. Dogmatic theology, moral theology, hermeneutics, and so on, are but different aspects of one and the same vital habit, namely, the habit of faith, which is an impression of the knowledge possessed by God and the blessed. When the formal motive of faith ceases, virtual revelation also ceases. When the theologian becomes a heretic, he retains, not the habit of theology, but a mere collection of statements which have authority only from his own private judgment.

Second corollary. How many distinct sciences are there? As many as there are scientific habits, specifically distinct. Moderns often treat the integral parts of one science as if they were diverse sciences, as if dogma, let us say, and moral theology, and exegesis, were three distinct sciences. In one and the same science there can, of course, be many parts, like the branches of a tree, and in this sense we distinguish positive theology from speculative theology. But any excessive emphasis on specialization destroys unity and life of the intellectual habit. Synthesis becomes impossible, and many difficulties arise regarding the relations of these partial sciences one to another: difficulties which cannot be met except by the direction of a higher habit, whose integral parts have been separated without justification.

ART. 5. ARE THERE HABITS IN THE WILL?

The answer is, yes. By nature the will is determined only to universal good, not to this or that particular good. Habits enter in to set the will definitely on a particular line of activity, such as justice or charity or hope or religion: and all habits, whatever their subject, depend on the will for their exercise, since habit is a possession which man uses when he pleases.

Were the will a mere agent, like the agent-intellect, it

would not need a habit. But the will is not only a moving thing, it is also a moved thing. Even to its first act the will is moved objectively, by the good proposed by the intellect. Secondly, by intention the will moves itself to choose means.

ART. 6. DO THE ANGELS NEED HABITS?

The angels need operative habits, and also the entitative habit of sanctifying grace. While by his nature the angel understands his own essence, he still needs grace if he is to know and love God supernaturally. Thus as long as he is on the way to beatitude, the angel needs the habits of faith, hope, and charity. And when he has been beatified, he still needs the habit of sanctifying grace and charity.

General conclusion. Operative habits are necessary in faculties which need to be determined toward good activity. These faculties are: first, the will; second, the intellect; third, the sense-appetite; and fourth, the internal senses. Entitative habits exists in the body, in the form of health or beauty. But they are unnecessary in the essence of the soul, unless the soul is raised to the supernatural level.

CHAPTER XXVI

The Source of Habits (Q. 51)

ART. 1. DO HABITS COME FROM NATURE?

Opposite errors meet us here. Plato and Descartes hold that our primary ideas are innate, not abstracted from sense-activity. Leibnitz, too, says that these first principles are in us, at least virtually, before sense-cognition. Opposed to this excess is the view of sensists and empiricists, who admit no essential distinction between intellect and sense. Let us first note a twofold meaning of the word "natural." 1. A thing can be natural according to the nature of the species, for instance, "man is a risible being." 2. A thing can be natural according to the nature of the individual, for instance, "Socrates is healthy."

First conclusion. Man has entitative habits, some (like health) totally from nature, others partly from nature (health restored by medicine).

Second conclusion. No operative habits come totally from nature. Here man differs from the angel, whose ideas come totally from its nature, a privilege unsuited to human nature, because the human intellect naturally uses sense-activity. Man's proper object is the lowest of intelligible objects, those mediated by sense qualities. A man born blind can have no direct knowledge of color. Here lies condemnation of the theory of innate ideas.

Third conclusion. Some human operative habits arise partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle. The habit of first principles, for instance, the principle that the whole is greater than a part, is a natural and inevitable possession, not a mere empirical association, reiterated by

tradition. The habit of first principles is an indivisible natural quality, not divided into parts. But it is not totally from nature, as would be an innate idea.

A comparison may illustrate. Just as nutrition is a natural act of the soul when food is offered, so the knowledge of first principles is a natural act, which receives its food only when, on coming to the age of reason, it derives its first ideas from experience. Then there flows into the possible intellect that quality which we call the habit of first principles. Thus we steer between the two extremes of innatism and sensism: innatism, which says that all our ideas are inborn; sensism, which denies the essential superiority of intellect over sense.

But the human will has no need of a natural habit, because in the very inclination of the will to universal good proposed by reason, we have the seeds of virtue, the roots from which grow the habits of justice, temperance, and fortitude. Some operative habits, while they arise from individual nature, depend partly on a well-disposed organism: a truth expressed by the proverb, "Poets are born, not made." Similarly, some men are naturally disposed to chastity or mildness. Not all operative habits, however, are natural. Science, for instance, is not a gift of nature, since it arises only from demonstration, and hence is properly styled an acquired habit.

ART. 2. DO HABITS ARISE FROM ACTS?

Again we meet two opposite views. One view, based on the inertia of matter, derives habit from the passivity of the subject. The other view says that habits (e.g., carpentry) are caused by activity, by repetition of acts. St. Thomas begins with three objections in favor of the theory of passivity. 1. Quality depends on the receptiveness of the subject, whereas activity is not a receiving, but a giving. 2. A faculty, which by acting would cause a habit, would be simultaneously mover and the thing moved. 3. Effect cannot be nobler than cause, and habit is something nobler than the act which precedes.

Against these objections stands the affirmation of Aristotle,[1] that the habits of virtues and vices are caused by acts. St. Thomas finds partial truth in each theory, harmonizing them, not in the fashion of eclecticism, but in a higher synthesis.

First conclusion. An agent whose only principle is active cannot develop habits. Stones and plants, to illustrate, neither develop new customs nor lose old ones. A stone falls always the same way, the plant nourishes itself always in the same way.

Second conclusion. An agent which has both active and passive principles can develop habits in its passive principle. This statement is proved, first, by experience. The will, moved by reason, develops the habit of justice. And the sense-appetite develops temperance and fortitude. Moved by the habit of first principles, the intellect develops the habit of drawing scientific conclusions.

The statement is proved, secondly, by argument. Everything that is moved by another is disposed by the act of that agent. Men have faculties which are moved, either by another faculty, or by themselves as already in act. Hence multiplied acts result in habits in the power which is moved. Nor is the habit nobler than its cause. Reason itself is a nobler principle than the moral virtue generated by repeated acts. And the habit of first principles is nobler than the knowledge of conclusions. Moral virtue is a participation in reason, and the habit of knowledge is a participation in the light of first principles.

Pedagogical Corollaries

1. To learn is not simply to remember. Here we oppose Plato who, since he did not distinguish potential knowledge from actual knowledge, said that knowledge pre-existed in the pupil's mind, hence the teacher's work would be that of reminding, not of instilling.

The teacher is perfect in proportion to his power of re-

[1] *II Eth.*, cc. 1 and 2.

ducing the truth to higher and more universal principles, since under this influence the disciple acquires the habits of science and wisdom. Great teachers are instruments in a kind of natural revelation, whereas hardly any intellectual formation comes from a teacher who is satisfied with the positivist or empirist approach. Facts unrelated to principles, while they furnish materials for science, can never become science, can never result in scientific synthesis.

3. Pedagogical theories are three: the traditional one (Aristotelian-Thomistic), the innatism of Plato, and empiricism. Against the traditional theory, which regards the human intellect as the lowest of intellects, Plato sins by excess, the empiricists by defect.

ART. 3. CAN HABIT BE PRODUCED BY ONE ACT?

Preliminaries. It seems so: 1. By one demonstration we create science, at least one scientific conclusion. 2. One intense act is equivalent to many acts less intense. 3. By one act a man becomes sick or well; and sickness, like health, is a habit. But, as "one swallow does not make spring," so one day does not make a man virtuous.

First conclusion. In no appetitive power can the habit of virtue be generated by one act. One act of reason cannot totally conquer any appetitive power, because the appetitive power is multiple and variable. Only gradually, like fire in damp material, or water dripping on rock, can reason create that second nature which we call habit. Reason's first act produces a disposition, the second act strengthens that disposition, and the series must continue to a final act, strong enough to turn the disposition into a permanent quality, difficult to change.

To illustrate. One set of circumstances demands that we act humbly, another set that we act magnanimously. Magnanimity is not ambition, just as humility is not pusillanimity. Multiplied and repeated acts of reason are required before both humility and magnanimity become man's second na-

ture. The term "second nature" is illuminating. As nature imitates God, so the virtuous man imitates nature, whose unchangeable laws are God's own creation.

Two Corollaries

1. All virtues are fields of slow development. Justice, unbroken recognition of our neighbor's rights, becomes a habit only under the persistent prodding of reason. Only after long training does religion become a virtue, independent of sensible devotion. The same road is marked out for temperance, fortitude, meekness, patience, and chastity, which develop only by a long-continued restraint on sensuality.

2. Disposition, although it is the necessary road to habit, is never identified with habit, which is the goal of all dispositive activity. A moral habit is thus distinguished from a scientific habit, which can be generated by one act.

Here we meet a mystery, which permeates all levels of creation. It is just as difficult to draw the line between ultimate disposition and habit, as it was for biologists finally to determine that the sponge, say, is not the apex of vegetative life, but one of the lowest forms of senselife. But, admitting this concrete difficulty, vegetative life still remains specifically distinct from senselife, and licit mental restriction still remains distinct from a lie.

Second conclusion. Science can be caused by one act, but opinion cannot. One proposition, if self-evident, convinces the intellect, though this one scientific conclusion can grow, both in intensity and in extension, by application to other conclusions. In illustration, we may refer to the subordination of all second causes, including the human will, to God the First Cause. But, though conviction may be immediate, the scientific habit, by reason of external dependence on sense powers, becomes firmly established only by repeated acts.

As similar instances of a metaphysical habit established by one act we may note: first, being as being, reality as reality,

is the precise object of ontology. Secondly, in God alone is essence identified with existence. Opinion, too, is a habit, but it cannot be established by one act, because it depends on probable propositions.

Third conclusion. Only by repeated acts can habits be established in the lower cognitive powers, particularly in the memory. Experience is sufficient proof for this statement. But we must note the terminology of Aristotle,[2] who uses the word "passive intellect" to express a sense-power, which applies memory and imagination to concrete and particular problems. This power, he says, is subject to corruption, as are all sense-powers. Averroes, erroneously identifying this "passive intellect" with "possible intellect," concluded that Aristotle had denied personal immortality.

Reason argues thus: Because organic powers depend on matter, the principle of corruption, they need much repetition to become fixed in one definite direction. Here lies the reason why men differ in the power of imagination. What Aristotle [3] calls a "dry" memory does not easily receive, but preserves well what it has received, whereas a "wet" memory receives easily, but also loses easily. Climates, dry and wet, may serve as illustrations.

Fourth conclusion. Bodily habits can be caused by one act if the active element is very strong. One dose of strong medicine may restore health. Inversely, one blow may destroy health.

Corollary

A widespread error confounds instruction with education. Instruction aims at intellectual habits, which can be generated, often by a single act. But education, which aims at moral habits in the will and in the sense-powers, is a long and slow process. To suppose that children who are merely instructed, not educated, will become good citizens, with

[2] *De anima*, III, c.5, lect. 10.
[3] *De memoria*.

well developed moral and religious habits, is a fatal error. Imagine parents who would exercise no care over their children's food, because, forsooth, these children, as adults, will suddenly be capable of self-control.

ART. 4. ARE SOME HABITS INFUSED BY GOD?

It is of faith [4] that the process of justification includes the infusion of virtues: faith, hope, and charity, and so on. These virtues are qualities permanently inherent in the soul or in its faculties, though it does not seem certain by faith that these qualities are in the strictest sense habits, since the Council does not use the words "quality" and "habit." But while the demands of faith are met by holding that sanctifying grace is an habitual internal gift, it is still theologically certain that grace and its consequent gifts are habits.

First conclusion. Supernatural habits cannot arise except by infusion. Habits, natural or supernatural, must be proportioned to the end for which they dispose us. But natural habits acquired by repeated acts can never dispose us to a supernatural end. Supernatural habits, therefore, cannot arise except from supernatural infusion. This truth holds good of even the highest angel, even if he should have been created from eternity.

Second conclusion. Habits which are in themselves natural may arise from infusion. Such habits (e.g., sudden mastery of a strange tongue) are said to be infused *per accidens*. Adam must have had many such habits.

First Corollary

A habit infused *per accidens* is of the same species as an acquired habit, just as the eyes given to a man born blind are specifically the same as natural eyes. But habits *per se* infused are also *per se* supernatural, not supernatural only in their mode (such as origin by miracle), but supernatural in their very essence.

[4] Conc. Trid., sess. 6, can. 8.

Second Corollary

While infused habits are simply indispensable for meritorious acts, still certain salutary acts, not yet meritorious, may, under actual grace, arise even before justification and infused habits.

Question. Do the acts arising from an infused habit beget another habit of the same species? Answer: No, because one and the same subject cannot have two forms of the same species. Acts produced by an infused habit simply strengthen the pre-existing habit.

CHAPTER XXVII

The Growth of Habits (Q. 52)

In three articles we ask: Do habits grow? Do they grow by addition? Does each and every act of the habit increase the habit? This question is difficult, but important, especially in its pedagogical consequences.

ART. 1. DO HABITS GROW?

It seems that habits cannot grow. First, growth, augmentation, is a quantitative term, whereas habit is a quality. Secondly, habit is a kind of perfection, and perfection, since it means an ultimate, does not admit degrees. Thirdly, qualitative augmentation would at best be nothing but alteration.

Authority sustains our thesis. "Lord, increase our faith." "Grow in grace and in the knowledge of God." [1] "Fructify in every good work and grow in the knowledge of God." [2] The Council of Trent: He who says that the justice received from God cannot be augmented before God by good works, let him be anathema.[3]

Conclusion. 1. Certain habits can be augmented in extension, e.g., knowledge, which becomes greater by being extended to new conclusions. 2. All habits grow in intensity as they are more and more rooted in the subject. Thus charity becomes more intense, knowledge becomes more profound. The foundations of this demonstration are thus proposed by St. Thomas.

a) While it is true that augmentation, in its primary mean-

[1] II Peter, 3:18.
[2] Col. 1:10.
[3] D.834. 842.

ing, belongs to quantity, still, in an analogical and true sense, it belongs also to spiritual qualities, since we know spiritual things only by analogy with the sense-world.

b) Perfection of quality or form can be considered in two ways. First, abstractly, as form. Thus we say knowledge is small or great. Secondly, concretely, as participated by the subject. Thus we say that a man is more or less healthy, or that one philosopher is more profound than another.

Here we find four fields of thought. 1. Plotinus and other Platonists hold that habit grows in itself. 2. Some think that habits are not augmented in themselves, but only more deeply participated in by the subject. 3. A medium between the two foregoing views is that of the Stoics, who say that certain habits, arts and sciences, are also in themselves augmented in extension, but that other habits, virtues, are augmented only in intensity. 4. Others hold that immaterial qualities and forms do not admit variation in degree, but that material forms do admit variation.

To find the truth here, St. Thomas appeals to the great principle which governs specification of qualities. It runs thus: The specificating element must be something stable and indivisible. Things below this point are in a lower species, things above this point are in a higher species. To illustrate. Rationality is the element that differentiates man. Animals, without rationality, are below men. Angels, who transcend rationality, are above men. Now qualitative hierarchies are governed by the same principle. Species are like numbers. Add one, subtract one, and you have a different species. Of this principle we have two applications, one on absolute qualities, the other on relative qualities.

1. A form or quality that is absolute does not admit of more or less, and is incapable of augmentation. Thus it is with the human soul: below it is the brute animal; above it is the angel.

2. A quality that is relative, i.e., differentiated by its essential object or terminus, while it may increase as it approaches

its goal, remains specifically the same, because its terminus is one. Thus motion in any line is more intense or more remiss, and health grows better by greater harmony with the nature wherein it exists.

Here rests the first part of our conclusion, namely: certain habits can be augmented extensively, i.e., can be extended to new termini under the same formal object. Thus grow arts and sciences. Thus theology in itself was greater in the thirteenth century than it was in the eighth century.

On this point, then, the Stoics were right: extensive augmentation takes place when the habit is extended to a new material object under the same formal aspect, that is, in arts and sciences. But this extensive augmentation does not find place in moral and theological virtues, because the man who has, e.g., the moral virtue of temperance, has it in relation to all objects of temperance, and he who has even the lowest degree of charity reaches out to all objects that can be loved by charity. This same truth governs the virtues of hope and faith. Since the death of the apostles, the smallest level of faith embraces all objects to be believed, though there can be a transition from implicit to explicit.

The second part of the conclusion treats of intensive augmentation. It says: As shared by the subject, some qualities and some forms admit degrees, but others do not. Forms participated substantially are incapable of intensification and remission. But here, too, we appeal to the general principle of specification, namely, that the differentiating element must be stable and indivisible. From this principle it follows that substantial forms do not admit variational degrees. A rational soul makes man to be a man, and nothing else. It follows further also that accidental forms which are in themselves indivisible do not admit degrees. Each number is constituted by an indivisible unity. Geometric figures cannot be more or less triangular or circular. Thirdly, it follows that habits (sciences and virtues), since they do not give substantial species to the subject, and do not in their nature include indi-

visibility, may be possessed in various degrees by different men.

Recapitulation

First conclusion. Certain habits grow in extension. Proof. That quality can be increased in itself which can be extended to one to more or fewer termini under the same formal object. Now certain habits, namely, sciences and arts, can be extended to more or fewer termini under the same formal object.

Second conclusion. All habits can be increased in intensity. Proof. Any quality that does not give its subject a substantial differentiation, and which does not in its nature include indivisibility, can grow in intensity. Now every habit is a quality which does not give its subject substantial differentiation, and does not in its nature include indivisibility.

ART. 2. ARE HABITS AUGMENTED BY ADDITION?

Preliminaries

It seems that even intensive augmentation takes place by addition. 1. The term "augmentation" is a quantitative term, and quantity is not augmented except by addition. 2. The agent, unless he produces augmentation by addition, would produce nothing. 3. A white thing becomes more white by the addition of a greater whiteness, just as a heap of coins or grain grows by addition.

Contrary authority. A thing already hot becomes hotter without any addition of heat newly produced.[4]

First conclusion. Sciences and arts are augmented in extension by the addition of a new conclusion, but not by a new partial habit. Geometry may serve as an example. Analogy confirms the thesis. Motion can increase, not only in velocity, but can also be extended in space and time.

Let us note that this extensive augment does not take place

[4] *Aristotle, IV Phys.*, cap. IX.

by a collection of many qualities, but by a new mode and manner of one and the same habit.

All Thomists defend this view against Vasquez and the nominalists, and also against Scotus and Suarez, who hold that the habit of science is not a simple quality, but an aggregation of many particular habits.

Corollary. St. Thomas,[5] holding that theology is one simple habit, by reason of its formal object *quod* and *quo,* is in direct opposition to those moderns who say that sacred theology is a collection of many sciences. Each of these two conceptions dictates its own mentality and pedagogical method. One is satisfied with unrelated acquisitions, the other unifies the spirit.

Second conclusion. Intensive augmentation, arising from deeper participation of the subject in the form, does not take place by the addition of form to form. This Thomistic view, held by many outside the Thomistic school, is against Durandus, who holds that intensive augmentation takes place by generation of a new and more perfect quality, and also against Scotus, Suarez, and Vasquez, who hold that augmentation takes place by the addition of a new qualitative entity. The thesis is proved, first directly, secondly indirectly.

Direct proof. The law of augmentation follows the law of production. A thing becomes hot by participating in the form already present. Form is not that which is, but that by which a thing is so and so. Rotundity is not an existing thing, but is that whereby a round thing is round. It is impossible to make rotundity, but it is possible to make a round thing. Again, humanity is not generated, but this man, the subject which participates in humanity.

We must therefore conclude that intensive augmentation of quality does not take place, as Durandus wills, by generation of a new form, nor by the addition of a new entity, as Scotus, Suarez, and Vasquez maintain.

Indirect proof. If intensive augmentation took place by

[5] Ia, q. 1, a. 3.

addition, this would be owing either to the form or to the subject, but neither view is possible. Any addition owing to form would vary the species. And any addition owing to the subject would presuppose some part of the subject to receive the form which it had so far lacked, and we would be dealing again with extensive augmentation. Hence generation (or augmentation) of habit does not mean that one part is generated after another part, but that the subject participates more and more perfectly in the quality.

Only a rude imagination can think of charity, say, as a heap of minor little charities. Again, this new partial charity is either more perfect than the pre-existing or not. If it is more perfect, the pre-existing is superfluous. But if it is not more perfect, it cannot make the subject more perfect, but will be a mere extension of the form, an extension which is inconceivable in a spiritual subject.

The growth of charity is growth, not in size, but in perfection. Charity grows intense by being more deeply rooted in the subject. As trees grow by deepening their roots, charity grows by penetrating ever more deeply into the potentialities of the will. As charity grows, sin becomes ever more difficult. One and the same man is successively an infant, a boy, a youth, and an adult, not by the advent of a new partial man, but by advance to a more perfect state of life. And so, too, one and the same quality may grow from remissness to intensity, not by the advent of a new partial quality, but by advance to a more perfect mode of being. In the phrase "degrees of charity," degrees means, not a partial quality, but a higher mode of perfection. Each new degree contains virtually all degrees lower than itself. Even if, by a miracle, charity were separated from its subject, it would still be rooted in its subject, not actually, but aptitudinally.

Corollary. The opposition between these two theories begets two opposed pedagogical systems and methods: One, mechanical and external, proceeding by juxtaposition of acts and exercises, the other, dynamic and internal, guided by the

purified formal object of the science or of the virtue. The first method, unless corrected by the second, will not lead to the unitive life, but only to multiplied and unorganized perfections.

ART. 3. DOES EACH AND EVERY ACT INCREASE THE HABIT?

This question faces modern theories, on progress in civilization, in science, in philosophy, in theology.

Preliminaries

It seems that each and every act increases the habit: first, when cause is multiplied, effect also is multiplied; secondly, all acts that proceed from one and the same habit are similar; thirdly, one similar thing is increased by another similar thing. But the response is negative: Not every act increases habit.

Authority. "Some acts proceeding from habit diminish the habit." [6] As illustration, think of the fourteenth century, which did little to develop philosophy and theology, which rather, in Occam, saw a great regress that prepared the way for Luther. What holds good in society, holds good likewise in the individual.

Reason. Only an act as intense as the habit can increase the habit. Cause must be proportioned to effect. If a remiss act caused increase of habit, more would be produced from less, the more perfect from the imperfect.

To illustrate. A man with a habit equal, say, to ten talents sometimes works remissly, from negligence or tepidity, as if he had only two talents. Hence not every act proceeding from a habit augments that habit.

Second conclusion. An act equal or superior in intensity to the habit either increases the habit or disposes proximately to such increase.

Third conclusion. But if the intensity of the act is not proportioned to the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dis-

[6] *II Eth.*, c.2.

pose proximately to increase of the habit, but rather for its decrease. This conclusion is against the modern dogma of necessary progress. We are dealing here with the physical disposition necessary to increase habit. We are not dealing with merit, because, as will be said later, an act of charity, even though remiss, is still meritorious. Yet it disposes to decrease, since it opens the road to contraries. Every act of charity, says St. Thomas,[7] even though it be remiss, merits eternal life and an increase of charity. Charity, however, is not always increased at once, but only when the subject endeavors to reach such an increase. In illustration, we may point to the laborer who daily increases in riches, because daily he acquires a new right to a reward or merit, though in fact he does not receive this reward except at the end of the week.

We must here notice the difference between an acquired habit and an infused habit. Our acts, just as they are the physical cause of an acquired habit, so likewise they are the physical cause of increase in the habit. But since our acts, even under actual grace, are not the physical cause of an infused habit, but only dispositions for its infusion, they are likewise not physical causes, but only dispositions for the increase of charity. Hence a remiss act of charity, while it is meritorious, does not dispose us to an increase of charity except remotely, and may even dispose us for a decrease of the habit, since he who works remissly easily yields to contrary acts whereby the habit is corrupted. Thus imperfections may be dangerous. We must progress, in order not to regress. Unless the boy grows, he remains an abnormal man.

St. Thomas and Suarez

Suarez maintains that by each and every act, however remiss, the habit is at once increased. And he differs again from St. Thomas on this question: Does the precept of charity bind a man to greater charity even up to the time of death? To this question St. Thomas answers affirmatively, since the per-

[7] IIa–IIae, q.24; Ia–IIae, q.114, a.8.

fection of charity falls under precept, at least as an ultimate goal. Suarez denies, saying that the perfection of charity does not fall under precept even as a goal. Perfection of charity, he adds, is a counsel, not a precept.

The doctrine of St. Thomas, rejected by Suarez, leads to a very important corollary in the spiritual life. It runs thus: [8] The rate of increase in virtue should be continually accelerated, as it was in the saints, and especially in the Blessed Virgin. Growth in faith (or in any virtue) corresponds to natural motion, where rate of increase is measured by nearness to the goal, whereas the contrary holds good of violent motion. "The nearer you see the day approaching," says Scripture.[9] And again, "The path of the just, like a shining light, grows unto perfect day." [10]

Why does natural motion grow ever more intense? Because the goal attracts it ever more strongly. A stone falls ever more rapidly, whereas thrown upward by force, it rises ever more slowly. Man's soul, says St. Thomas, tends more vehemently to joy than it flees from sadness, hence is drawn more strongly by God the nearer it comes to Him.

Material gravitation illustrates spiritual gravitation. If the velocity of a falling body is equivalent to 20 in the first second, it will be 40 in the second that follows, 60 in the third, 80 in the fourth, and 100 in the fifth. Here lies a far-off view, an inkling, of Mary's final state. Her initial plentitude of grace surpassed the grace of all saints and angels, and her rate of increase suffered no interruption even by sleep. Hence no creature is more beautiful or more faithful to God.

Objections Analyzed

1. Acts, coming from a habit, must increase that habit. Yes, but only when the act is proportioned to the habit.

2. But if one act increases the habit, why not all similar

[8] In Ep. ad Heb. 10:25.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] Prov. 4:18.

acts? Yes, but only if they are similar, not merely in species, but also in degree of intensity.

3. But every act is similar to its habit. Yes, similar in species, but not necessarily in degree of intensity.

4. If a remiss act is sufficient disposition, both for the infusion of grace and charity, and for its sacramental increase, then, also outside the sacramental world, a remiss act should be sufficient disposition to increase the habit. We deny the parity. Grace and its increase come from the sacraments *ex opere operato,* and God supplies the lack of disposition in adults as he supplies the entire lack of disposition in infants who are baptized. But, outside the sacraments, grace and its increase arise *ex opere operantis,* i.e., by personal acts of contrition and charity.

5. But does not the Council of Trent say that the sacraments cause grace according to the disposition of each recipient? Yes, but the phrase "according to" is to be understood, not arithmetically, but proportionally, i.e., the better the disposition the greater is the grace received, but the grace is not necessarily equal to a man's disposition.

Corollary. He who has charity represented by two talents and elicits an act equivalent to three, receives the augmentation of charity at once. But he who has charity measured by five talents and elicits an act worth four does not at once receive an increase of charity, though his act is meritorious, and he will receive the increase when he performs an act sufficiently intense.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Corruption and Diminution of Habits (Q. 53)

PRELIMINARIES

Moderns harp on progressive evolution, as if progress came necessarily, as if regress were not possible. This progress they guarantee by developing, not habits, but rules, methods, and mechanical aids. Here Descartes was a pioneer. He denied the very existence of habits, and even of faculties distinct from substance. And Leibnitz meditated a machine for thinking and computing, that thus the mind would be dispensed from thinking distinctly. To this "democratic" conception of science, we oppose the "aristocratic" conception, the mental nobility arising from permanent good habits. Modern treatises on mental prayer need the same reminder. Methods, while useful for beginners, can never be substitutes for supernatural habits.

The progress expected from rules and methods, however advantageous in the material and mechanical world, has not prevented mental and moral regress toward irreligion and atheism. And when we hear modern determinists applying the doctrine of transmitted heredity to modern crime and insanity, we wonder how they harmonize this view with universal progress. When God is denied, enigmas increase, and insoluble questions arise.

ART. 1. CAN HABITS BE CORRUPTED?

Preliminaries

It seems that habits cannot be corrupted. 1. Nature cannot be corrupted, and habit is second nature. 2. Spiritual habits

cannot be corrupted, because they exist in an incorruptible subject. 3. Neither corporeal transmutation, nor sickness, nor death, can destroy the habit of knowledge or virtue, since these exist in the spiritual and incorruptible soul.

Authority. "Forgetfulness and error corrupt knowledge." [1] "By contrary acts virtues are generated and corrupted." [2]

First Conclusion. Health and beauty, and all corporeal habits are corruptible, both *per se* and *per accidens: per se,* by reason of the subject in which they exist, *per accidens,* by reason of contrary causes.

Second conclusion. The habits of first principles, both speculative and practical, are incorruptible, both *per se* and *per accidens: per accidens* because they exist in the intellect which is incorruptible, *per se* because they have no contrary cause. The notion of being, of reality, is not contrary to the notion of nothing, since they can coexist in the same subject, though they cannot be predicated of one and the same object. Nor is there anything contrary to the act of the agent intellect, which, since it abstracts ideas from phantasms, is the cause of the habit of first principles. Hence this habit, like synderesis, is incorruptible, both *per se* and *per accidens.*[3] Unassailable by forgetfulness or error, first principles are the adamantine base of our intelligence, incorruptible, indestructible, even in the minds of professed sophists, such as Hegel or Protagoras. Protagoras cannot simultaneously both exist and not exist, nor simultaneously be Protagoras and not be Protagoras.

Third conclusion. Science and opinion, moral virtues and vices, are corruptible both *per se* and *per accidens.* They are corruptible *per accidens,* because, though their chief subject is incorruptible, they reside secondarily in a corruptible subject, namely, in the internal sense-powers, imagination and memory, or in the sense-appetite. And sciences and moral

[1] *De long. et brev. vitae,* c.2.
[2] *II Eth.,* c.2.
[3] *VI Eth.,* c.5.

virtues are corruptible *per se* by the law of contraries. A scientific conclusion can be overthrown by a sophistic syllogism, a true opinion by false opinion, moral virtue by the opposite vice.

Corollary. The modern dogma of unbroken progress is false. Regress appears in society as it does in individuals. As example, think of the downward gradation from Lutheranism to Modernism. Yet some authors seem to think that Scotus and Suarez, by coming later, perfected St. Thomas, as if Thomas were the thesis, Scotus the antithesis, and Suarez the higher synthesis. The twenty-four Thomistic propositions would merely codify an inferior period of scholastic evolution.

ART. 2. CAN HABIT BE DIMINISHED?

First conclusion. Habit can be diminished just as it can be increased. First, remiss activity reduces subjective intensity. Secondly, sciences and arts may decrease also in extension. As habits increase in a twofold way, intensively and extensively, they may also decrease in the same two ways.

Second conclusion. Decrease comes from the same causes as does corruption. Decrease is the road to corruption, just as generation is the foundation for increase. Reiterated acts are the cause of increase of infused habits. The same disparity appears in decrease. Charity can be diminished, not directly, but only indirectly: not directly because charity is not caused or augmented by human acts, but only by God. By mere cessation from act (supposing the cessation not to be mortal sin), charity is not diminished, nor is it diminished directly by venial sin, because venial sin, unlike charity, is not concerned with the last end. But indirectly charity is diminished by venial sin, which impedes the application of charity, allows evil inclinations to arise, thus making the exercise of charity difficult, and disposing the soul to mortal sin, whereby charity is destroyed.

ART. 3. IS HABIT CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED BY MERE CESSATION FROM ACT?

Conclusion. Cessation from act causes *per accidens* corruption or diminution of habit, because it removes the factors which hinder corrupting or diminishing causes. Knowledge can be overthrown, not only by error but also by forgetfulness. Friendships wither by lack of association. Let us apply this conclusion, first, to virtue.

When a man does not use the habit of virtue to moderate passions or actions, there must arise many non-virtuous passions and operations, from the inclination of the sense-appetite and other exterior attractions. The same truth holds good in the man who does not keep up the habit of mental prayer.

Second, application to knowledge. When a man ceases to use his knowledge, for instance of theology, extraneous imaginations may lead him to confuse the doctrine of charity with the tenets of liberalism.

Corollary. In the way of virtue and science, cessation means not to progress, and not to progress is to regress. Acts that are good, but remiss, although they do not cause regress are still a disposition to that regress, since they open the way to contrary inclinations.

Maritain [4] writes: "Progressive negation of the value of habits would need its own special history. It began in the fourteenth century among theologians, and has now descended to the lowest level." Scotus and Occam denied specific distinction among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Further, Scotus denied the necessity of infused moral virtues, and held the theological virtues to be supernatural only in mode. Following Occam, Luther denied all infused habits, grace, in his view, being a mere extrinsic denomination under which man remains in his corruption.

The next step was to eliminate acquired habits. Descartes denied the distinction between substance and accident, thus

[4] *Art et scolastique*, p. 55.

eliminating the accidents which we call habits, and substituting for them infallible methods of attaining knowledge. After Descartes, method becomes the almost exclusive catchword. The final step was envisioned by Leibnitz. His calculating machine, releasing mankind from the burden of thought, would create an age of light, of universal intellectual democraticism!

CHAPTER XXIX

Habits, How Distinguished (Q. 54)

In these four articles we deal with habits as related to the subject wherein the habit exists, to their objects, and to the goal toward which they tend.

Art. 1. Can many habits exist in one subject?

First conclusion. Many entitative habits, at least many corporeal habits (such as health, beauty, and strength) can exist in one and the same subject. Corporeal elements serve nature in diverse ways. Good proportion in the non-solid elements constitutes health. In the solid parts (bones, muscles) it constitutes strength. Harmony of members and countenance constitutes beauty.

Second conclusion. Many operative habits can coexist in one power. One power can be moved to act by many objects specifically distinct, and habits are proportioned to the acts by which they are generated. As matter is moved by agents specifically distinct into forms specifically diverse, so, for instance, the intellect is moved to act by objects specifically distinct, physical, mathematical, metaphysical, and these acts generate corresponding habits. And, whereas matter cannot simultaneously receive many substantial forms, one power can simultaneously receive many habits, because habits are accidents.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Whereas generic diversity creates distinction of faculties, specific diversity is the source of acts and habits. Thus our intellect ascends, step by step, from reality in general to changeable reality (natural science), then up to quantitative

reality (mathematics), and ultimately to the divine reality (theology).

2. Although the intellect cannot understand many truths simultaneously and actually, it can still simultaneously and habitually be master of many and diverse branches of knowledge.

ART. 2. ARE HABITS DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS?

Preliminaries

To attain a supernatural goal we must have a supernatural habit. Thus Thomists in general maintain that our infused faith and the acquired faith of the demon do not rest on the same formal motive. Infused faith rests on the authority of God, the Author of grace; acquired faith rests on the authority of God, the Author of nature and of miracles. They also hold that natural love of God the author of nature is distinguished from love of God the author of grace, by its objective goal, whereas Molina and other Jesuit theologians teach that an infused habit (e.g., theological faith) needs no formal object that surpasses the powers of reason, since they deny the principle of St. Thomas, namely, that habits are differentiated by their formal objects.

Difficulties. It seems that habits are not distinguished by specifically different objects: 1. One and the same science reaches out to contraries, such as health and sickness. 2. One and the same knowable truth, for instance, the earth is round, is demonstrated in diverse sciences, in physics and in astronomy. 3. One and the same object, as related to different goals, can belong to different virtues. To illustrate, money given for love of God belongs to charity, while money given to pay a debt belongs to justice.

General conclusion. Operative habits are distinguished by diverse objects. Since acts differ specifically by their objects, and since habits are simply dispositions to act, habits themselves must be distinguished by their objects.

To explain. Operative habits are essentially ordained to produce acts: knowledge, to produce demonstration; virtue, to bring forth virtuous acts. This principle leads St. Thomas to consider habits, in their relation first to their active principles, secondly to the nature of the subject, thirdly to their objects. Difficulties arise from the caviling of the nominalist, and the false interpretation of the Molinist.

Molinist interpretation. Molinists [1] hold that, according to this article, an infused operative habit is specifically distinct from an acquired habit only by reason of the effective principle, not by reason of its formal object, since infused faith is immediately produced by God, whereas acquired faith is not. Thomists commonly reject this interpretation. Why?

1. Because thus we should abandon the fundamental principle of St. Thomas,[2] that operative habits are differentiated by their formal object.

2. If infused faith had the same formal object as acquired faith, it would be infused only *per accidens,* would be supernatural only in the mode of its production, like infused geometry or the gift of tongues, or like an eye given miraculously to a blind man, which would not differ specifically from an eye given by generation. Thus the essential supernaturalness of infused virtues would be destroyed.

This doctrine of Molina comes from nominalism, which maintains that we do not know the essences of things, the essence of grace or of virtues, but only facts, for instance, that this man has faith. Nominalists say further that sanctifying grace is not intrinsically supernatural, but gives a right to eternal life only by divine institution, by an extrinsic denomination, like a written note which promises money. Nominalism thus prepared the way for Luther's tenet, that grace is not an infused gift of God inherent in the soul, but only an external imputation of the justice of Christ.

1 See Molina, *Concordia,* ed. Paris, 1876, pp. 34–38. Also Billot, *De virt. infusis,* 1905, pp. 84–87.

2 *Tabula Aurea,* s. v. *Objectum.*

3. This Molinist interpretation does not preserve the true meaning of the present article, which rests on the doctrine that every habit implies relationship to the nature of the subject. The following is a synopsis of the article.

Habits are differentiated:

A. As forms passively received by their proximate principle, whereby they are either

1. infused habits (from God as agent); or

2. acquired habits, which are either branches of knowledge or moral virtues (guided by reason).

B. As dispositions related

1. to the nature of the subject: infused habits (from God); or acquired habits, which are either good (in harmony with nature) or bad (contrary to nature);

2. to the object of the act to be performed: infused habits (object supernatural); or acquired habits (object naturally attainable).

This synopsis shows that the three modes of distinguishing infused habits from acquired habits are convertible. An operative acquired habit would not suit our nature, and would not be acquired under the direction of right reason, unless it had an object that is true, good, and naturally accessible. But all such habits are distinguished by their special harmony with our nature, under the special directions of reason. And this harmony and direction depend finally on the differentiating goal and object.

Similarly, a habit essentially supernatural, that is, infused *per se,* would not *per se* belong to participated divine nature, to sanctifying grace, and would not be infused *per se,* if it did not have an object essentially supernatural. Hence relation to the object is the primary differentiating element. Whatever Molinists say, our assertion is this: habit can be specifically and simultaneously differentiated by its object, by the nature in which it is, and by the active principle. But, object removed, no habit remains.

First conclusion. Habits, as forms, are distinguished by

their proximate and diverse active principles. To illustrate. Every proximate agent makes an effect specifically like itself. A transitive action (e.g., the act of heating) is distinguished specifically by the principle of action from which it proceeds. Thus we admit that an entitative habit, (e.g., sanctifying grace) is distinguished from acquired habits by its active principle, which is God. The same truth holds good of infused virtues and of the seven gifts, which flow from sanctifying grace, though all these habits, as operative, are differentiated by the goal and object to which they are proportioned.

We are dealing here, not with the supreme active principle, but only with the proximate active principle. Thus the proximate principle in the appetitive field is the cognitive power which represents the object. Moral virtue, in the sense-appetite, is a participation in reason. In sciences, demonstration is the active principle. The following are illustrative texts.[3]

1. We learn the nature of faculty from the act to which it is ordained.

2. The object is compared to the act of a passive power as principle and moving cause. Color is the principle of vision.

3. To the act of an active power (e.g., augmentation) the object is compared as terminus and goal.

4. From these two, principle and terminus, every action gets its species: heating, for example, from an agent that is hot, cooling from an agent that is cold.

5. Diverse demonstrative media [4] are the active principles of diverse scientific habits. But these active principles, since they are objective, coincide with the formal motive (with the *objectum quo*) by which the object is constituted as knowable.

6. In the virtues, too, the proximate active principle is the goal intended.[5] Goal in the field of activity is like principle

[3] Ia, q.77.
[4] Art. 2, ad 2um.
[5] *Ibid.*, ad 3um.

in the field of demonstration. Diversity in goal diversifies virtues, just as does diversity of active principles. As the demonstrative principle is the formal motive *quo* of the conclusion, so the proximate goal is the formal motive *quo* of choice. Money for God's sake belongs to charity, money to pay a debt belongs to justice.

Second conclusion. Habit, as disposition, is specifically distinguished according to the agent's nature. Things that are relative are distinguished by their relation to different termini. Habits, in particular entitative habits, are good or evil according as they are or are not in harmony with nature. Health in man belongs to one species, health in the horse to another species, because man's nature is not the nature of the horse. Acquired human virtues are specifically distinguished from infused virtues, since the former dispose us for an act harmonious with human nature, whereas the others dispose us for an act harmonious with grace, that is, for participated divine nature. And, we repeat, this distinction by relation to nature is always found in union with the distinction by relation to object.

Third conclusion. Habits, as disposing for operation, are differentiated by objects and goals specifically different. Operative habits, being related to distinct operative termini, must be differentiated by those termini. This conclusion is universal, holding good of all operative habits. Since infused geometry and acquired geometry have the same formal object, they are not specifically distinct, and the infused habit is infused only *per accidens*. But in virtues *per se* (e.g., divine faith) the proper motive is the First Truth, the authority of God the Revealer, the Author of grace, whereas the formal motive of acquired faith is the natural evidence of miracles. The following texts are illustrative.

1. Acquired faith is not a special gift of God, but the result of natural intellectual perspicacity.[6]

[6] IIa–IIae, q.5, a.2, ad 2um et 3um.

2. But since a man who makes an act of faith must be elevated above his nature, he must have within him a supernatural principle, moving him to this act.[7]

3. The expression "to believe" is equivocal when used of faithful men and of demons.[8] He who lacks infused faith and has only acquired faith is like a man who hears materially the sounds of a symphony, but does not hear the soul of the symphony because he lacks musical appreciation.

Summary. Proportionality governs the relations of habitual grace and infused faith to their acts, and to the objects of those acts. In the doctrine of Molina we do not find this proportionality. According to him, habitual grace and infused faith have the same object as the nature of the soul and acquired faith. But it is clear that infused faith cannot be *per se* proportionate to habitual grace, unless it is addressed to an object which is *per se* in harmony with habitual grace. For the operative habit, like the operation itself, is differentiated by its formal object.

This principle is absolute. It gives light to the whole treatise on habits and infused virtues. It is strange that many Molinists reject it, or retain it only in relation to charity which remains in the fatherland, and do not retain it in treating of hope and faith. But surely faith and hope and moral virtues are all supernatural in substance, otherwise we destroy the sublimity and homogeneity of the spiritual organism.

Molina objects. "The necessity of a supernatural habit of infused faith resides in this: acts of faith must be elicited as suited to a supernatural end, to salvation. Hence the acquired faith of the demon would be distinguished from infused faith, not by its formal object, but only by its ultimate goal." Answer: This ultimate goal, in the Molinist theory, does not rise higher above natural powers than does the for-

[7] IIa–IIae, q.6, a.1.

[8] *De veritate*, q.14, a.9, ad 4um.

mal object of faith or of hope. If therefore the formal object of faith and hope can be attained naturally, by historical knowledge of the Gospel confirmed by miracles, we cannot see why the ultimate end, and even the object of charity, God loved above all things, cannot be naturally attained. And thus we would return to the Pelagians, who held that charity was necessary only in order to love God more easily.

Corollaries. 1. Sciences are specifically distinguished by their formal objects *quod* and *quo,* i.e., by the objective motive and active principle. Virtues, too, are distinguished by this twofold formal object, *quo* and *quod*. Entitative habits alone are not distinguished by their object.

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Habits are specifically distinguished, not by their material object, but by their formal object. Thus medicine deals with contraries, namely, health and sickness, by one and the same formal object.

2. Sciences, too, are distinguished, not by their material objects, but by their formal objects, namely, by their different demonstrative principles.

3. Nor is virtue distinguished by its material object, since, for example, money can be given for a motive either of charity or of justice.

ART. 3. ARE HABITS DISTINGUISHED AS GOOD AND EVIL?

Conclusion. Good and evil distinguish habits essentially, not only accidentally. Virtue is contrary to vice, and contraries belong to different species. Habits are specifically distinguished, not only by their objects and active principles, but also by the nature in which they are and with which they either are or are not in harmony. This truth is against Spinoza, who holds that vice comes solely from mental confusion. The following texts are illustrative.

Acquired virtue, and divine virtue *per se* infused, are dis-

tinct specifically. The first arises from harmony with human nature, the second from harmony with divine nature, of which grace is a participation.[9]

Is human virtue specifically distinct from heroic virtue? Yes, if by heroic virtue you understand virtue that is *per se* infused; no, if by heroic virtue you understand acquired virtue.

Many evil habits may exist in one field of activity, since lack of harmony with right reason may arise either from excess or from defect.

ART. 4. CAN ONE HABIT BE COMPOSED OF MANY HABITS?

Preliminaries

It may seem that one habit can be composed of many habits: for example, geometry is constituted by many different conclusions, and one and the same virtue has many parts. But the conclusion runs thus: Habit is a simple quality, not constituted by many habits. Habit is an operative principle which, however far its extends, has but one formal object. A science, reaching out to a new conclusion, does not develop a new partial habit.

Thomists commonly defend this view against those who maintain that theology is not one simple science, but an aggregation of many particular habits, dogmatic, moral, and so on. This adverse view is radically opposed to the spirit of science. It maintains, with Vasquez, that a man who loses infused faith may still preserve the theological science whose root is faith. But in truth, when faith, the soul of theology, is taken away, theology itself has been destroyed.

Question. But are not the cardinal virtues composed of various habits? Answer: Without being composed, the cardinal virtues are divided, either integrally (into various functions), or subjectively (into various fields of labor), or lastly potentially (into conative adjuncts).

[9] Ia–IIae, q.63, a.4.

Thus terminates the treatise on habits, in their essence, in their subject, in their cause, and in their distinction. On these foundations depend all questions concerning virtues and vices. Habit is the common genus of all of them. Neglect of generic treatment often creates insoluble difficulties in treating of species, difficulties that can be solved only by metaphysical study of the genus in itself.

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